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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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SECRETARY'S NOTES.

I.—New Members.

The following officers joined the Institution during the months of August, September, October, viz. :—

Major L. H. Payne, D.S.O., 40th Bn. Australian Imperial Forces.
Second-Lieutenant W. R. Caborne, attached Essex Regt.
Lieutenant G. B. H. Jones, M.C., Welsh Horse Yeomanry.
Lieut.-Colonel C. C. Newnham, D.S.O., I.A.
Second-Lieutenant F. Russen, Royal West Surrey Regt.
Major R. E. Harenc, I.A.
Major F. S. Low, M.C., R.F.A.
Major J. J. Read, D.S.O., R.F.A. (T.F.).
Lieut.-Colonel R. L. Ricketts, I.A.
Captain H. E. Yeo, M.C., K.O. Yorkshire Light Infantry.
Lieutenant H. C. Trimen, R.N.V.R.
Captain W. K. M. Leader, M.C., D.C.L.I.
Lieutenant C. F. Jepson, R.N.
Lieutenant W. R. Batty, Cheshire Regt.
Capt. G. Uloth, I.A.
Major R. B. Burney, A.S.C.
Lieutenant W. H. S. Cheavin, 12th (Service) Bn. Middlesex Regt.
Captain L. Airey, 4th (Reserve) Bn. East Lancashire Regt. (T.F.).
Lieut.-Colonel E. S. Forde, R.A.M.C.
Captain J. Lothian, I.A.
Major-General Sir H. T. Lukin, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Staff.
Captain N. F. J. Wilson, C.M.G., C.B.E., Royal Indian Marine.
Colonel W. S. Speranza, R.E.
Major H. E. Lyons, General List.
Captain K. G. Fitzgerald, A.O.D.
Major F. Waterfield, Royal Defence Corps.
Lieutenant F. A. Woods, A.P.D.
Lieutenant R. J. Appleby, Durham Light Infantry.
Lieutenant A. G. N. Wyatt, R.N.
Assistant-Paymaster D. Ogg, R.N.R.

II.—Gold Medal Essay (Naval) for 1919.

The Council have to announce that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have approved of the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for officers of the Royal Navy being resumed, and have selected the following subject: "The Influence of the Submarine in Naval Warfare in the Future."

The Council have decided to give three prizes, viz.: Thirty guineas to the winner of the gold medal, and twenty guineas and ten guineas to the writers of the Essays next in order of merit. Competitors must be members of the Institution or eligible for membership.

All particulars governing the Essay can be obtained from the Secretary, Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W.1., and are being supplied to the Fleet by the Admiralty.

III.—*re* Journal and Museum Catalogue.

Owing to the enormous increase in the price of paper, and the rise in wages, the Council regret to announce that for the present the quarterly JOURNAL of the Institution will be reduced to 176 pages of articles, etc. The price of the Museum Catalogue, for the same reasons, has had to be raised to 2s. 6d. per copy, and even at this enhanced cost it does not yield any profit to the Institution, but rather than that it should cease to be issued the Council have decided to increase the price of it.

IV.—The Museum.

The Council beg to give notice that from November 1st, 1918, to March 31st, 1919, inclusive, the Museum will be open from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. In the event of fog or darkness it is left to the discretion of the officer in charge to close earlier.

The amount taken for admission to the Museum during the past quarter was:—

£80 2s. 6d. in August.
£64 15s. 0d. in September.
£57 6s. 0d. in October.

ADDITIONS.

- (3446). A Revolver, picked up in No-Man's Land, having been used by Sergeant W. Gregg, D.C.M., M.M., Rifle Brigade, during the action in which he was awarded the Victoria Cross for gallantry on April 22nd, 1918. (For description, see card.).—Deposited by the Rifle Brigade Museum.
- (3447). A German Machine Gun, captured by Sergeant J. E. Woodall, Rifle Brigade, for which he was awarded the Victoria Cross on May 22nd, 1918. (For description, see card.).—Deposited by the Rifle Brigade Museum.
- (6941). One of the Hay Portable Flame Guns, which was actually used by the landing party from H.M.S. "Vindictive" in the attack on the Zeebrugge Mole, on April 23rd, 1918. The apparatus is incomplete, and in a damaged condition. The label has a drawing of the gun completed.—Presented by the Ministry of Munitions of War.
- (6942). A German Sand Bag, with string attachment made from paper.—Presented by the Army Council (War Trophies Committee).
A set of 16 Artist's Proof Coloured Etchings of the following places and buildings mutilated by the Germans during the great European War, viz.:—
- (6943). "Rheims Cathedral," from the south-west, engraved by J. Alphege Brewer.

- (6944). "Rheims Cathedral Towers," engraved by Henry C. Brewer and J. Alphege Brewer.
- (6945). "The North Transept, Rheims Cathedral," engraved by J. Alphege Brewer.
- (6946). "Ypres" engraved by J. Alphege Brewer and F. Sherrin Brewer.
- (6947). "The Hotel de Ville, Arras," engraved by J. Alphege Brewer.
- (6948). "Antwerp," engraved by J. Alphege Brewer.
- (6949). "Evening on the Meuse, Huy," engraved by J. Alphege Brewer and F. Sherrin Brewer.
- (6950). "Verdun, from the Meuse," engraved by J. Alphege Brewer.
- (6951). "The Cathedral of St. Gudule," from the Rue de la Collegiate, Brussels, Belgium, engraved by J. Alphege Brewer.
- (6952). "Laon Cathedral," engraved by Henry C. Brewer and J. Alphege Brewer.
- (6953). "Venice," engraved by J. Alphege Brewer.
- (6954). "The Hotel de Ville, Louvain," engraved by J. Alphege Brewer.
- (6955). "Malines," engraved by J. Alphege Brewer.
- (6956). "The Palais de Justice," from the Boulevard de Waterloo, Brussels, Belgium, engraved by J. Alphege Brewer.
- (6957). "Dieppe," engraved by J. Alphege Brewer.
- (6958). "Bruges," engraved by J. Alphege Brewer.
- (6959). Piece of the Fabric of Von Richthofen's Fokker Triplane. He was shot down and killed near Corbie, on April 21st, 1918. He was regarded as Germany's greatest airman, and had been credited with 57 air victories, and commanded their 1st Air Squadron.—Presented by Captain H. L. Lush.
- (6960). A German Machine Gun, captured by the 8th Bn. Yorkshire Regt., September 20th, 1917.—Presented by the officers and men of the 8th Bn. Yorkshire Regt.
- (6961). A German Machine Gun, captured by the 22nd Bn. Royal Fusiliers.—Presented by the officers and men of the 22nd Bn. Royal Fusiliers.
- (6962). A German Cuirassier's Helmet, picked up outside Liege by a Belgian soldier.
- (6963). A Bavarian Infantry Soldier's Helmet (101st Regt.), with cover, picked up near Arras by a private of the Royal Sussex Regt.
- (6964). A Prussian Infantry Officer's Helmet, picked up in France by Sergeant C. H. Hook, R.F.A., 7th Ammunition Column.
- (6965). A German Artillery Officer's Helmet, taken at the first Battle of Ypres by a sergeant of the Suffolk Regt.
- (6966). Small Manuscript Diary, giving a list of the seamen and marines killed and wounded on H.M.S. "Victory" on October 21st, 1805, compiled by George Coppen, who was serving on that ship.—Purchased from one of his descendants.
- (6967). A German 75 mm. Trench Mortar, captured in France by the 9th Division.—Presented by the G.O.C., 9th Division.

(6968). The following Badges, etc., of The King's Own Malta Regiment of Militia, viz.:—

- (1) Officer's Cap Badge.
- (2) Rank and File Cap Badge.
- (3) Officer's Helmet Plate.
- (4) Officer's Belt Buckle.
- (5) Officer's Collar Badges.
- (6) Officer's Button (in button case).

—Presented by Lieut. J. H. Briffa, The King's Own Malta Regt. of Militia.

November 1st, 1918.



THE JOURNAL

OF THE

Royal United Service Institution.

VOL. LXIII.

NOVEMBER, 1918.

No. 452.

[Authors alone are responsible for the contents of their respective Papers. All communications (except those for perusal by the Editor only) should be addressed to the Secretary, Royal United Service Institution.]

OUR EARLY REGIMENTS OF MARINES.

By COLONEL C. FIELD, R.M.L.I.

AUTHORITIES QUOTED.

Luttrel's "Brief Relations of Foreign Affairs."

"Tangers Rescue."

"History of Landguard Fort."—Major J. H. Leslie, R.A.

"History of the Royal Marines."—Colonel L. Edye, R.M.L.I.

"State Papers."—Various.

"Reports of Historical MS. Commission."—Various.

THERE was a great review of troops on Putney Heath on October 1st, 1684, when three troops of Guards, a regiment of Horse Guards, a regiment of Dragoons, and five Infantry battalions were reviewed by the King and Queen, and "The Colestream, my Lord Dumbarton's, and the Admiral's Battalions successively exercised, all three by beat of drum, the military postures of pike, sword, and musket; every man dextrously discharging their duties with an exact and general readiness, to the great delight and satisfaction of their Majesties and Royal Highnesses, vouchsafing all the time of exercise to grace their arms with the honour of their presence."¹

The "Admiral's² Regiment" here referred to must have presented a brilliant, not to say gorgeous, appearance, as we learn that it was

¹ Grosse's "Military Antiquities."

² The Duke of York and Albany, Lord High Admiral of England. *Vide* Note I.

dressed in yellow coats, red breeches and stockings, and wore hats bound with gold-coloured braid.

It had at this time been just twenty years in existence, having been raised in 1664 in compliance with an Order in Council which directed "That twelve hundred Land Souldjers be forthwith raysted, to be in readinesse, to be distributed into his Mats Fleets prepared for Sea Service wch said twelve hundred Men are to be putt into One Regiment Under One Colonell, One Lieutenant Colonell and One Serjeant Major and to be divided into Six Companies, Each Company to consist of Two hundred Souldjers; And to have one Captain, One Lieutenant, One Ensigne, One Drume, Fowre Serjeants, an Fowre Corporalls, and all the Souldjers aforesaid to be armed with good Firelocks; all wch Armes, Drumes and Colours are forthwith to be prepared and furnished out of his Mties Stoares. The care of all which is recomended to the Duke of Albemarle his Grace, Lord Generall of Mats Forces."¹ The Colours borne by this regiment were: for the Colonel, plain yellow; the Lieut.-Colonel, a red St. George's Cross with white edging upon a yellow ground, and the "Major's and the Company's Colour," which bore a cross similar to that upon the Lieut.-Colonel's, but with yellow sun-rays issuing from the angles upon a white ground.

It must be remembered that at this period, and for a number of years afterwards, each company in a regiment carried a Colour, and the field officers each had a company as well as the captains. The reason that yellow was chosen for its uniform and Colours was probably that it was a favourite colour of the Duke of York, for his troop of Life Guards wore yellow velvet belts and ribbands in their hats and had horse furniture of the same colour. Yellow and red were also the colours of the Royal Stuart livery. Possibly the sun-rays upon the company Colours have reference to the Royal badge of the "Sun of York."²

The connection of the Admiral's regiment with the trained bands—from which many of its men were recruited—may have been another reason for the adoption of a yellow uniform. For among the trained bands was a "Yellow Regiment," and at that time regiments were constantly referred to by the colour of their coats—as the "Blues" are to-day.³

¹ Privy Council Register, C.II., Vol. IV., fol. 264.

² "Now is the winter of our discontent made glorious summer by this Sun of York."—King Richard III., Act 1, Sc. 1.

³ Yellow was adopted for the clothing of British troops as far back as the year 1600, since, according to Meteren, those who aided the Dutch at the Battle of Nieuport in that year were all clad in yellow coats.

It may be, too, that the buff coat having established itself as an almost universal military dress by this time, the yellow cloth coats presented a distinctly military appearance in the eyes of the public of that day. And although we think of buff leather as being merely of a yellowish tinge, it is quite possible that it was so prepared in the 16th and 17th centuries as to assume a decided, and, perhaps, brilliant yellow colour.

At any rate the buff coats of various Cheshire officers and gentlemen who defended Chester for Charles I., appear a decided yellow (almost canary), as depicted in a stained glass window in Farndon Church, Cheshire.

Although termed "Land Souldjers" in the Order in Council, it is evident that they were specially raised for service afloat, for in the preamble to the Order it is stated that it was issued "Upon a Report From the Lords the Comtee for the Affayres of his Ma^{ty}s Navy Royall and Admiralty." Nor is this the only indication, for, though at this period almost all the few regiments then created constantly embarked for temporary service with the Fleet, none of them were entirely armed with muskets, but, as was then the custom, had a considerable proportion of pikemen in their ranks. Service afloat was evidently not popular, as in 1673 we find the Duke of Buckingham, as Lord Lieutenant of the West Riding of Yorkshire, attributing the slowness with which he is able to enlist men for the King's Service to "the maliciously disseminated Rumours of the ill-usage of Soldiers afloat." He suggests that he should be authorized to take twenty or thirty men "a-peece" out of the "3 companies of foote that are heere. For they would quickly fill them up againe with men that are willing to ly idle in towne."¹

Their duties in action would be principally to keep up a fire of small arms, and if pikes were ever required there would doubtless be plenty to hand on board, as was the case up till quite a recent date.²

Authorities do not seem altogether clear as to the special reasons which led to the formation of this regiment. Possibly the King, who, as we know, was in pretty close touch with French affairs, remembered the *Vieille-Marine* and *Royal Vaisseau* regiments formed in that country in 1627 and 1635 respectively to guard the ports and "form the garrison³ of the ships," and thought that he could so add a regiment to his small standing Army without incurring the odium which any increase in its numbers was sure to give rise to at that epoch. For so strong and violent was popular feeling against standing armies at that day in this country that its effect has even affected our military forces up to the present time, in that we have our Army, so to speak, on a yearly lease; authority to maintain it only being granted to the Government by the Army Annual Act.

But no such prejudice existed against the Naval Service, and it may well be that Charles determined to take advantage of this fact. There may have been another reason for its creation, and this was the desire to create a more or less permanent corps of officers and men for the Navy. There was no continuous service for the seamen of our Navy until half through the 19th century. When a ship paid off, her crew were discharged—their term of service was for the commission only.⁴ It may have been considered that it would be a good thing for the officers to have something to do on shore between paying-off one ship and commissioning another, and as a number of the

¹ Hist. MS. Commission, 9th Report, Appendix II., p. 449.

² In 1678, in a company of 100 men, the usual proportions were :—
60 Musketeers, 30 Pikemen, 10 Fusileers—armed with a firelock lighter than a musket—a "Fusil."

³ Vide Note I.

⁴ Vide Note II.

officers of the Maritime Regiment, such as Sir George Rooke, Captain Digby, and Captain George Churchill, afterwards served in command of ships, and even fleets, it seems possible that there was some idea of this kind present when it was decided to make this new departure. At the same time it is only fair to admit that many other officers served afterwards in the Army.

But the question of the supply of naval officers was at this time rather a moot point. There were two classes of officers, those who were good and experienced seamen but not gentlemen ("Tarpaulins"), and those appointed by family or royal interest, who were gentlemen, but had no sea experience and knew very little about their business.

This unsatisfactory and anomalous state of things continued for some time, and the creation of the Admiral's regiment may have been one attempt to remedy it. King Charles made another in 1676, when he instituted what were generally called "King's Letter Boys." These were boys of not over 16, who were to be of good family, and, entering at that comparatively early age, would have a chance of learning their profession properly.

Apparently this system failed, as we find the Marquis of Halifax, writing in 1694,¹ still referring to a popular idea that it was necessary that the officers should consist of an admixture of "Gentlemen and Tarpaulins." He gives it as his opinion that naval officers should all be gentlemen,² but says: "The Gentlemen shall not be capable of bearing office at Sea, except they be Tarpaulins too; that is to say, except they are so trained up by a continued habit of living at sea, that they may have a right to be admitted Free Denizens of Wapping." There is little doubt that he was right in his ideas, but what more than anything else militated against any system in the least approaching perfection was the scandalous custom of those times which permitted a man—or even an infant for that matter—to hold commissions in two or often more branches of the public forces at the same time. It was impossible for him to perform more than a single duty, but he drew pay for all. To quote one example only. In 1678, John Churchill—afterwards Duke of Marlborough—was commanding a brigade in Holland. He had joined the Admiral's regiment with the rank of Captain in 1672, and was now a Lieut.-Colonel in it, while his brother Charles, serving in a line regiment, and his brothers George and Jasper, who were officers in the Navy, all bore marine commissions also.

The new regiment was first quartered at Southampton, except 250 men who were at once embarked. It is probable that these had served before, if not in the regular forces perhaps in the trained bands of the City of London, and so knew something of their duties as soldiers. It would hardly have been worth while embarking absolutely raw recruits. As a matter of fact, it is supposed that the regiment was very largely recruited from the London trained bands—which, by the way, included a yellow regiment—and it is considered to be due to

¹ "A Rough Draft of a New Model at Sea," 1694.

² "A naval officer who is not a gentleman is not a good officer."—Lord Nelson.

this fact that the present corps of Royal Marines enjoys the privilege¹ of marching through the City of London with bayonets fixed, Colours flying, and drums beating. This privilege is shared with the 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards, the East Kent Regiment (the Buffs), and the Royal London Militia, all of which were originally recruited from the same source. Major Donkin relates² that in 1746, as a "detachment of Marines was beating along Cheapside, one of the magistrates came up to the officer requiring him to cease the drum, as no soldiers were allowed to interrupt the civil repose. The Captain commanding said: 'We are Marines.' 'Oh, Sir,' replied the Alderman, 'I beg pardon; I did not know it. Pray continue your route as you please.'" The descent of the corps from the trained bands is also commemorated by the universal nickname "Jolly" for a Marine. "Tame Jolly" was an old cant name for the citizen soldiers,³ and, according to Admiral Smythe,⁴ "Royal Jolly" was a time-honoured phrase for a Marine in contradistinction to the "Tame Jollies" or Militiamen.

The Admiral's regiment did not long continue at Southampton, as it was split up and distributed by companies not only among the principal seaport towns, but even in such inland places as Huntingdon, Norwich, Taunton, Wells, Salisbury, Windsor, and Tunbridge Wells, not to mention several others. Whether they were so located for recruiting purposes, or to preserve the peace, or for what other reason, does not appear. Possibly it was to facilitate billeting, as there were no barracks in those days—certainly it could not have been with any view to the rapid mobilization of the Fleet. An anecdote in which one of these detachments was concerned has come down to us. Its commanding officer was George Rooke—afterwards better known as Admiral Sir George Rooke, and it was stationed on the coast of Essex—possibly at Tilbury. The company lost so many men from ague that the minister of the place refused to continue burying them unless paid his usual fee. Rooke did not discuss the question with the reverend gentleman, "but the next that died he ordered him to be conveyed to the minister's house and laid upon the table in his great hall; this greatly embarrassed the poor clergyman, who, in the fulness of his heart, sent the Captain word that if he would cause the dead man to be taken away he would nevermore dispute it with him, but would readily bury him and his whole company for nothing."⁵

The Admiral's regiment bore its part in all the fierce naval engagements with the Dutch that took place between 1664 and 1680, battles in which we more nearly met our match at sea than has ever been the case before or since; but as in all accounts of such operations the

¹ Another reason has been suggested for the privilege, i.e., that it originated from Warrants issued by Charles II. to the Marines and other regiments who share it, authorizing them to raise recruits "by beat of drum" within the precincts of the City of London.

² "Military Collections and Remarks," New York, 1777.

³ Grosse's Dictionary of Wit and Slang.

⁴ The Sailor's Word Book.

⁵ "Naval Chronicle."

movements of the squadrons and ships have to be related rather than the doings of the individuals forming their crews, no special deeds of its various detachments have come down to us.

We have, however, an account of the repulse of the Dutch attack on Landguard Fort, near Harwich, which was commanded by Captain Darrell, of the Admiral's regiment. This was in 1667, when Admiral De Ruyter, having withdrawn from the Medway, appeared off the Suffolk coast.

An attack on Harwich had been looked for for some time, and besides the Suffolk trained bands and some detachments of cavalry which were encamped in the neighbourhood, the town and Landguard Fort, commanding the entrance to the harbour, had been garrisoned by six companies of the Admiral's regiment. In Harwich itself were the four companies commanded by Colonel Legge, Sir Chichester Wrey, Sir Charles Lyttelton, and Captain Edward Roscarrock, while the fort was occupied by Captain Darrell and Captain Cartwright with their companies.

The entrance to the harbour was to be blocked by "seven colliers and a ship of 20 guns, all disguised as Men-of-War, with Jack, Ensign and pendant," which were moored between Landguard Fort and Harwich, "with holes cut, ready to be sunk in case of the enemy's approach."

On July 2nd the Dutch Fleet appeared off Landguard, and its ships took up their positions to bombard it from all sides at once. Some of them were placed exactly to windward, so that the smoke of their guns swept along the beach and so covered the landing of their troops from the sight of the Marines in the fort. Captain Silas Taylor—the Keeper of the King's store at Harwich—saw the whole attack from the Dovercourt Cliffs, and the next day despatched the following account of it to Whitehall:—

"It was judged that the eight Dutch ships who sent such clouds of smoke upon the Fort out of the Rolling Grounds¹ were merely for that purpose. That they landed about Filstow² Cliffs above 2,000 men, I have reason to believe from my own guess. The Suffolk forces came to them in inclosures (viz., close order) about 4 of the clock, or 5. They spared about 400 or 500, relieved from the Main Body (that stood near the place they landed, with a strong body of pikes, which I plainly saw), to assault the forces above the hill, and with them 2 or 3 drakes,³ with which they maintained the lanes and hedges; so that the Earl of Suffolk got his ground of them in a manner but by inches, because his horse were excluded from the service.

"In the mean, a party of 300 or 400, or more, ran along the beach, in the smoke that the ships from the Rolling Ground had made, up to Landguard Fort, with scaling ladders painted,⁴ of about 20 feet long or more, hand granadoes, etc. They came briskly up, with their cutlasses drawn upon their arms, and their muskets, and came up

¹ The part of the sea just south of Landguard Point.

² i.e., Felixstowe.

³ Small cannon firing shot of about 3 lbs. weight.

⁴ (?) "Planted."

close to the Fort, whose reception to them, when discovered, was as brisk. This assault, with a continued playing of small shot, lasted about half an hour, and they were repulsed. They had got under the sand banks, which our Galliot hoy and the 'Lennox',¹ and the 'Truelove'² played upon from the water, and waited their motion, and they discerned them at this assault about 5 of the clock in the afternoon, dragging off their dead. About an hour after they tried again, but were presently discouraged, and in great disorder ran away, leaving some of their ladders, their hand granadoes, and a case of very handsome pistols; and as the ships saw them within the fort in the Salt Road, they bestowed upon them a bullet welcome.

"About 9 of the clock all was silent, and they, drawn to their body about Filstow Cliff (their boats being on ground, which caused them to stand their ground the longer), and being pressed on by the Earl of Suffolk had as much to do to keep themselves from disorder, especially could the horse but have come at them at that began (*sic*) in the woods above the cliff, about 11 of the clock at night, and lasted till about 2 in the morning; at what time, the water floating their boats, they got off to their ships, who about 6 this morning, were all under sail, and now out of sight, by reason they are shut from us by Filstow Cliff, being in Ouseley Bay; but yet, now and then, I think I hear some of their guns."

Writing again the day following, Captain Silas Taylor adds:—

"I have only this to add to Tuesday's account: that Captain Darrell, Governor of the Fort of Landguard, was wounded by a musket shot in the shoulder, but not dangerously. That towards the evening, there was sent over a strong party of several hundreds of men hence to the other side of the water, under the command of Major Legg,³ who were very welcome to the Earl of Suffolk, but the enemy were drawn off before they could come to them. Several boats laden with dead men were seen by several to put off from the shore."

The *London Gazette* of July 1st-4th that year gives the following account of the attack on Landguard:—

"At daybreak on the following day (July 2nd) they weighed, and having proceeded to the northward for some time, tacked and again stood to the south, passing the Ness towards Harwich at about 7 a.m.

"About 1 o'clock their Fleet, consisting of 47 sail with their Attenders, stood within half cannon shot of the shore towards Filstow Cliffe but out of reach of Landguard Fort, leaving 5 of their number at the Sledway; and then, manning out their boats, landed about 3,000 men at the cliff with a great stand of pikes. Near 2,000 of them marched up and made two assaults upon Landguard Fort, where they were stoutly entertained, and after three quarters of an hour's dispute in the first assault, and about a quarter of an hour's only in the second, they were forced to retire in such haste, that they left their

¹ A privateer commanded by Captain Thomas Holmes.

² A sixth-rate 16-gun frigate, with a crew of 75 men. Commanded by Captain Langley.

³ Of the Admiral's regiment.

ladders all behind them, scarcely being able to carry off their dead which is judged to be about 150 at the least. In this day's service we lost only 3 or 4 men, and as many hurt, with Captain Darrell, who has received a wound in the shoulder."¹

One of these ladders is still in the possession of Mr. Darrell-Blount, of Calehill, Kent, and bears the following inscription:—

"This Scaling Ladder forms part of a trophy of Major Darrell, who, during the Second Dutch War of the time of Charles II., A.D. 1667, in a Sally from Landguard Fort, drove off the Dutch under Admiral De Ruyter."

Though, as we have already said, we cannot expect to find much information about the special doings of the regiment in the naval battles with the Dutch, yet here and there we pick up a crumb which witnesses that they fully "pulled their pound." For instance, Captain Silas Taylor, writing of the Battle of Solebay, says: "Those marines of whom I soe oft have wrote to you behaved themselves stoutly."² The regiment lost no less than four of its captains in this action, besides three subalterns.

Sir Charles Lyttleton, at that time Colonel-in-Command, writes as follows: "The Duke lost 4 of his Capts in ye battle, I meane of his Regiment; and has put in theyre places Mr. Bagot, Lady Falmths brother, my br George, Vaughan's Lt, old Cornwall of ye House of Commons, and Mr. Churchill that was ensigne to ye King's Company. Poore Thom. Bromley was in ye 'Rll James.' His ensign was soe, but wth swimming at least an hower and more, at last was taken up and is well; only his head a little burnt and his mouth hurt; his name Wilson."³

News arriving in the autumn of 1676 that disturbances had broken out in the Colony of Virginia on account of the imposition of taxes which the colonists regarded as unjust, a provisional battalion, a thousand strong, drawn from the Guards, the Admiral's, and the Holland regiments, was formed and placed under the command of Captain Herbert Jeffreys, of the 1st Foot Guards, who was given the rank of Lieut.-Colonel. The Marines contributed a company, or rather the nucleus of one, which was to be raised to full strength by special recruiting. Captain Charles Middleton went in command. Two subalterns accompanied him, and the company was provided with a Colour, which is described as follows: "The field white waved with lemon equally mixt with ye Red Crosse quite through with J.D.Y. in cypher in gold."⁴

After a stay of nearly two years in Virginia, during which time it was engaged in no active service, the battalion was recalled. Some men seem to have remained as colonists, and twenty men of the Admiral's regiment remained another year, possibly as nucleus of a local military force.

¹ *Vide* Note III.

² S.P. Dom. Ca. II., B.310.

³ Hatton Correspondence. Vol. I., pp. 89-92. *Vide* also Note IV

⁴ H.O. Dom Entry Book, Vol. CLXIII., fol. 229.

It would appear that the Admiral's regiment, or Duke's regiment, as it was by this time generally called, was one of the first regiments to have a Grenadier company. Grenades had been in use for something like a century, and in 1652 a demand was made for a supply of these missiles to the Navy at a cost of 2s. 6d. each. But it was not till 1670 that a regular Grenadier company was formed in the French Army. In April, 1678, orders were given to form eighty men of the Duke's regiment, who had just returned from Virginia, into a Grenadier company. Evelyn, in his *Memoirs*, gives the following description of the first appearance of this new class of troops:—

"Returned with my Lord (Lord Chamberlaine) by Hounslow Heath where we saw the new-raisd army encamp'd, design'd against France, in pretence at least, but which gave umbrage to Parliament.

"His Maty and a world of company were in the field, and the whole army in battalia, a very glorious sight. Now were brought into service a new sort of soldiers call'd Granadiers, who were dextrous in flinging hand granados, every one having a pouch full; they had furr'd caps with coped crownes like Janizaries, which made them look very fierce, and some had long hoods hanging down behind¹ as we picture fools. Their clothing being likewise pyebald, yellow and red." The last sentence might certainly be taken as indicating that these "Granadiers" belonged to the Duke's regiment, since yellow and red were the especial colours of their uniform.

Tangier at this period belonged to the English Crown, being a wedding gift to Charles II. on his marriage with Catherine of Braganza. In 1680 the British garrison was hard pressed by the Moors. Four of the outlying redoubts had been taken, and the Governor, Sir Palmes Fairborne, was only too glad to obtain a four-months' truce. On news of this reaching England, it was determined to send out reinforcements at once, and, as in the case of the Virginia Expedition, a provisional battalion was formed by drawing companies from various regiments.

The Duke's Marines, of course, supplied one which was provided with a special Colour at a cost of fifteen guineas and sixpence, and which is supposed to have been somewhat like that carried in Virginia, but was adorned with no less than eighteen cyphers instead of one.

It seems probable that the regiment was further represented by the Marines from the Fleet up "the Streights," which co-operated in the fighting and landed a naval brigade under the command of Admiral Herbert, which without doubt must have included Marines as well as seamen.² The brigade, on landing, had been exercised "by an expert

¹ The Janisaries do not appear to have worn furred caps, but they wore a cap called a Zarcola, with a long strip of felt hanging down from the back as a protection against sword-cuts. Tradition asserts that this was emblematic of the sleeve of Hadji-Bekdash, a Moslem saint, who, when about to die, tore it off, and placing it on the head of a soldier, prophesied that its wearers should become the chief protectors of the Sultans.

² In some accounts they are spoken of as "seamen," in others as "Marines" and others "seamen and Marines."

old Souldier, Captain Barclay,"¹ who was appointed Major to it—received a rousing address from the Admiral and acquitted itself with such determination and bravery "that even 'the noble Admiral this age not producing a finer' was constrained in the first fight to rebuke Captain Barclay 'for suffering too forward and furious advancement, lest thereby they might fall in the enemy's ambushments.' Captain Barclay replied that 'he could lead them on, but the furies could not bring them off.'"²

The provisional (or King's) battalion landed on July 2nd, and included "a hundred and twenty of the Duke's regiment, under the command of a modest young gentleman, Captain Fawtry,"³ but it was not till September 20th that a general attack was made upon the lines of the Moorish besiegers, resulting in the capture and destruction of the most advanced of them. Fighting went on from day to day till October 26th, when the whole available British force moved out to attack the immensely superior army of the Moors which outnumbered it by 12,000 men. In spite of this disparity the British, aided by the guns of the Fleet, completely defeated the enemy, inflicting upon them a loss of 2,000 men. The Moors now judged it advisable to ask for a truce, and while the preliminaries of peace were being discussed, Captain Fawtry was handed over to them as a hostage.

It was at this time customary to call regiments by the names of their commanding officers, a practice which is somewhat a thorn in the side of historians. In accordance with this custom, when on the Duke of York becoming King James II., in 1685, his Marine regiment was handed over to Prince George, Hereditary Prince of Denmark, it became known by his name. In the following year, possibly because the Prince's taste in "fancy waistcoats" did not coincide with that of his predecessor in command, the men of the Marine regiment were clad in red coats, with yellow facings, dark grey breeches, and white stockings. When the Prince of Orange was advancing on London he sent orders to the regiment to go out of the way to Huntingdon, which direction was apparently complied with. Early in the next year it was disbanded.⁴ Some of its N.C.O.s and men were sent over to Holland and incorporated in the Coldstream Guards, then serving in that country, while its Colonel, Prince George of Denmark, was given the command of the Holland regiment (Bufs), which, according to custom, was known by his name during his term of command.

But the Marines had proved themselves too valuable not to be replaced, and in 1690 orders were issued for the formation of two large regiments of fifteen companies each—200 men to a company.⁵ The commands were given to the Earls of Torrington and Pembroke, and, as was the case in the regiment whose place they took, they were to be "all fuzillers without pikes." It does not seem quite

¹ "Tangers Rescue," p. 4.

² "Tangers Rescue," p. 8, and Edye's Hist. R.M.

³ "Tangers Rescue."

⁴ *Vide* Note V. King James' Irish Marines.

⁵ *Vide* Note VI.

clear what uniform these regiments actually wore,¹ but it was intended in the first place that "their clothes are to be blew lined with white, and to have Grenadeers' caps."² The first important engagement in which these new Marines took part was the battle with the French off Beachy Head in June, 1690, in which they must have suffered severely if the following return of losses to arms and equipment in a single company (that commanded by Captain Mitchell) is any criterion. This detachment, or the bulk of it, was on board the "Anne." It lost:—

"Firelock Musq ^{ts}	68
Bayonets	114
Cartouch Boxes	131
Hatchets	56
Granador Pouches	12
Drums	3" ³

The siege of Cork saw both regiments again in action. The fighting began on September 21st, when the Fleet, entering Queens-town Harbour, was fired on by an eight-gun battery near the entrance, which, after being subjected to a few broadsides, was captured by three boatloads of "Stout fellows who, by thick firing, obliged the enemy to quit their guns."

It is more than probable, from their selection for boat service and their evident facility in the use of their weapons, that these "stout fellows" were Marines. Wednesday, the 24th, saw the disembarkation of the Naval Brigade before Cork, which consisted of 600 seamen and Marines, with as many carpenters and gunners as could be spared from the fleet to assist in the construction of the siege works.

Whether the two Marine regiments specially detailed for the expedition were landed separately with the rest of the Army, or whether they were represented by detachments in the naval brigade does not seem to be anywhere stated, but it is related that both seamen and Marines distinguished themselves on this occasion by the readiness and cheerfulness with which they hauled along the heavy guns for the breaching batteries in the face of the opposition from the rebel Irish.

A Lieutenant Townsend, who, it seems extremely probable, was an officer belonging to the 1st Marines, and four of his men, performed excellent service as marksmen from the top of a tall round tower in the churchyard of the Cathedral of St. Finne Barre, which overlooked Fort Elizabeth, the most important of the defences of the city. He himself is said to have picked off Colonel O'Neil, the commandant of the fort, as he was directing his guns.

¹ "Rd. White, Sergt., a tall lusty fat man in a red coat with Pewter Buttons. John Fleming, Sergt. . . . in a Red Coat with blue Loops."—In notices published later of deserters from Marines. From a similar notice we find that in 1694 the 2nd Marines wore "Red lined with Green and Green Waistcoats."—Edye's Hist. R. Marines.

² Luttrell—"Relation of State Affairs," Vol. II., p. 20.

³ Vide Note VII.

About this time there was a great deal of discussion as to the proper position and duties of the two Marine regiments. It was thought by many people that they should serve as "nurseries for the fleet," so that "the King may draw one hundred and fifty able seamen yearly out of each Regiment to encrease the stock of that useful people."¹ The writer of this suggestion goes on to say: "It may be added to what has been said of the usefulness of the said Regiment that the whole body of seamen on board the Fleet, being a loose collection of undisciplined people,² and (as experience shews) sufficiently inclined to mutiny, the Marine Regiments will be a powerful check to their disorders, and will be able to prevent the dangerous consequences that may thence result to their Majesty's service."

The writer, from this and his further remarks, evidently had some idea that from the Marine regiments there might gradually be recruited a corps of continuous service seamen, by the selection of the most suitable men for the purpose who, "when the Grand Fleet shall be laid up," would always be instantly available to fit out and mobilize the extra ships required upon an emergency. It was by no means a bad idea if it could have been worked, but it did not turn out a success.

The Marines, however, both at that time and for a century later, were often the only men to hand to commence the fitting and rigging of ships brought forward for service,³ their seamen having to be collected and enlisted for the commission, which of course took more or less time. The Admiralty probably had some idea of this kind as regards their officers also, for such large numbers of them were embarked in some of our men-of-war between this and the end of the century that it is evident that they must have had some special work other than military to do on board.⁴ This is borne out by the fact that so many of them were naval officers in command of ships at some period of their service. The writer above quoted proposed further "that the said Regiments may have the arms, and be formed to the exercise of Grenadiers, which seems the most proper and agreeable to their constitution; for it is apparent that hand-Grenades would be of admirable effect on many occasions at Sea, and it is visible how useful they would be, as to other purposes, so particularly against the approaches of the Horse in the country of an Enemy."

In September, 1692, detachments were drawn out of the two Marine regiments to go with Colonel Faringdon's regiment to Jamaica, and in November Colonels Lillington and Norcutts were also sent to that island with 100 Marines. At the same time 500 were sent to Admiral Russell, presumably for duty afloat.

On February 14th, 1694, the following order was issued to the officers commanding the Marine regiments: "You are also Required to

¹ S.P. Dom. King William's Chest. B. 8. (September to December, 1690.)

² *Vide* Note VIII. at end of chapter.

³ *Vide* Note IX. at end of chapter.

⁴ *Vide* Note X.

cause your men to be frequently Exercised at the Great Guns for the better Instructing them in that matter."¹

After a service of eight years the two Marine regiments then commanded by the Marquis of Caermarthen and Sir Cloudisley Shovell underwent a considerable transformation. By an order of July 18th, 1698, the two, which must have been considerably reduced in numbers, were combined into one and placed under the command of Colonel Thomas Brudenall, and at the same time the three infantry regiments commanded by Colonels Edward Dutton Colt, William Seymour, and Henry Mordaunt, were turned into Marine regiments and placed upon the naval establishment. These four regiments had each of them a strength of 754 officers, N.C.O.s and men, so that the whole four of them together were barely stronger than one of the original regiments whose place they took.

Like the previous Marine regiments, the new establishment was made the subject of various attacks by the pamphleteers of the day, and the transference of three of them from the line gave one of their most virulent assailants the pretext for alleging that "Their Land Methods have mightily interfered with the Navy Rules, and introduced pernicious Notions into the Fleet Officers, such as Mis-ratings, false musters, and other Abuses which the Sea-Officers formerly were ignorant of." Poor innocent sea-officers, to be led astray by the "bold bad soldiery"! Had all of them entered the Service since the year 1668, when that monarch who "never said a foolish thing but never did a wise one," remarked to the Duke of York: "If ever you intend to man the fleete without being cheated by the Captains and Pursers, you may only go to bed and resolve never to have it manned."²

As a matter of fact the naval and military officers of those times were no better or worse than each other or than other people in their station of life. It requires but a short study of contemporary literature to see that most of them had their price, and all were "on the make"—generally dishonestly. However this may have been, the attacks on the Marine regiments, instigated most likely by the idea that if replaced by seamen the standing forces of the Crown would be so many the weaker, appear to have been temporarily effective, for at the close of the century it was decided to disband them. This was accordingly done, though considerable difficulty seems to have been experienced by the Admiralty in raising enough money to pay them off, so much in arrears had their pay been allowed to get.

NOTES.

NOTE I.—*French Marine Regiments*.—The quotation is from M. Loir's "*La Marine Française*." There were four regiments of Marines raised in France between 1627 and 1719. The following table, taken from "A List of the Forces

¹ Admiral Fairfax's Order Book, 1694-1706. This is the first recorded connection of the Marines with naval gunnery. Luttrell, however, records the raising of twenty-five *Bombardeers* and fifty *Gunners* for service on board the Bomb Vessels in 1694.

² Pepys' Diary, March 18th, 1668.

of the Sovereigns of Europe," published by J. Millan in 1761, gives a few particulars of these corps:—

	Raised.	Strength.	Uniform.	Facings.
6th ...	(Picardie) "La Marine," 1627 ...	4 Battalions	White	Blue
26th ...	"Royal Vaisseau," 1635 ...	3 "	White	Red
43rd ...	(Vermandois) "Royal Marine," 1669 ...	1 Battalion	White	Red
119th ...	"Swiss Marines," 1719 ...	1 "	?	?

Switzerland—a perfectly land-locked country—seems a curious place from which to recruit "Sea-Soldiers."

On December, 24th, 1669, Robert Montagu wrote to Lord Arlington from Paris that "They are as forward in raising troops here as they be (in) Holland. There is an order for raising 2 Regts. of Foot, the Regiments d'Anjou and Vermandois, both of 3,000 men apiece, besides a Company of 150 Cheveux Legers of M. d'Anjou, chosen out of the best of the old horse of other regiments, and a Company of 300 men, 200 whereof are to be gentlemen of quality, and 100 soldiers of fortune, that are to be called the Admiral's Guard, which are always to be upon the Admiral or Vice-Admiral, and out of these the King intends always to choose his Sea-Officers."

"Besides there is to be 3 Regiments of 3,000 men apiece, all seamen; 2 of the regiments the King will allow to serve in merchantmen, and 3,000 are always to be ready at home for his own service, and they shall relieve one another; one year they serve the King, and the other they have the liberty to serve in merchantmen, but all are listed as the King's soldiers."¹

The "Vermandois" was absorbed in the Army, 1671. Other Marine regiments came into being in 1685, which were known as "*Compagnies franches de la Marine*" (1690)—"*Régiments pour le service des colonies d'Amérique*" (1772)—"*Corps Royal d'Infanterie de Marine*" (1774). During the Napoleonic period there was a Marine Artillery Corps and also the "*Marins de la Garde*," who took a distinguished part in the campaigns in Germany and the retreat from Moscow. But these men were actually seamen put into a military uniform and drilled as soldiers. At the Restoration the "*Corps Royal d'Infanterie de Marine*" was re-instituted. In 1831 they became the "*Régiments de Marine*," and in 1838 the present "*Corps d'Infanterie de Marine*" was established. This has grown to considerable proportions and does not now embark for sea service, but has become a Colonial Army.

NOTE II.—A Suggestion for a Marine Corps submitted to Charles II. by Sir Bernard Gascoigne.—The following extract from a letter written to Charles II. by Sir Bernard Gascoigne is of interest. Sir Bernard was an Italian by birth and education, though a member of an ancient English family. He was a professional soldier, who had served under the Duke of Tuscany and had also distinguished himself in the Civil War in England. The letter is undated, but from a reference to the Dutch at Chatham must have been written subsequent to 1667. This is curious, since it almost seems to suggest a corps closely resembling the Admiral's regiment already in existence. Its officers took their own companies to sea with them, and often took command of ships as naval officers:—

"And because from the faithfulness of the seamen in time of rebellion can depend a very great benefit, being well affected, or a great ruine by being mutinous or of a contrary faction (as in the late rebellion experience did demonstrate to us), I judg a thing of a vast importance to raise some foote companies, under the name of Companies of the Sea (as they have done in France under the name of the *Régiment de Marina*), for the use of the sea, each company consisting in 150 soldiers, all mariners by profession, or at least young fellows, fitt to make a seaman, all unmarried if possible will be, which being kept in a constant pay are to be instructed in managing musketts and pikes.

¹ Hist. MS. Com. (Duke of Buccleuch's MS.), Vol. I., p. 456.

"To every one of these Companies is to be chosen for a Captain, one valiant, faithfull sea commander fit to command a Man-of-Warr, the same company one Lieutenant is to be chosen, a good foot officer, and likewise some sergeants for the same company, that have served in the foot, that this Lieutenant and Sergeants shall exercise the company when they are at leisure, in the management of the armes, and the good effect of all this will be that, whensoever His Majesty will send out a Man-of-Warr, the command of the same is to be given to one of these Captaines of the Marina, which having in his ship his owne company and his owne officers, whatsoever more pressed or voluntary marriners are upon the same, having 150 marriners of his owne faithfull to him he is sure to be able to hinder any rebellion, that the other marriners could raise, and be sure master at alle times of his owne ship, in case of civill warrs, and what I speake of one Man-of-Warr, I speake of all the others.

"And in my judgment I thinke it necessary at present to raise 20 such Companies of 150 marriners each one, which will amount to 3,000 in all, and that the same companies are to be commanded by the best, loyall and bravest sea-captaines of the kingdome.

"And to give a demonstration, that these twenty companies of seamen will very little or nothing encrease His Majesty's charges of the Navy, which he is att present obliged to doe, I say:—

"That very seldome or never happens, that for divers occasions his Majesty has not twenty Men-of-Warr at sea, upon which he employing the twenty Captaines and the twenty Companies will by experience find, that the expence will amount to the same or to very little more than that the Navy att this present cost to his Majesty; and from the establishment of these twenty Companies, His Majesty must have this important benefitt, videlicet, to be certaine in case of tumult or rebellion that all the shippes of Warr that are at sea are truly and faithfully att his service, because being armed with honest loyall marriners and faithfull captaines, is not to be feared any rebellion amongst them, whatsoever the rest of the kingdome was in armes.

"The command of these twenty Companies are not to be given by favour or by money given to anybody, but to such Captaines, that by their personall valour and affection towards the present government doe deserve it, neither to be sold from one to one another, as they doe in the infantry, but to be given gratis by His Majesty on election."—F. Hist. MS. Commission, 15th Report, Appendix, Part II.

There is extant a letter from the Duke of Albemarle to the Commissioners of H.M. Ordnance, dated April 15th, 1667,¹ in which he asks to be delivered "30 pikes, 60 muskets with collars of bandoliers with broad belts and thirteene fire-locks, 2 halberts, one partisan, and 2 drums" to Sir Robert Holmes, Knt., and the like numbers of muskets, collars of bandoliers, halberts, drums, and one partisan "to Captain Robert Cooke, for the use of 2 new Companies which his Majesty has been pleased to add to the Duke's regiment of his Majesty's Foot Guards, and which companies are to be commanded respectively by the aforesaid Sir Robert Holmes and Captain Robert Cooke."—As neither of these officers appear in the rolls of the Duke's (Marine) regiment as given in Colonel Edye's "History of the Royal Marine Forces," and Holmes was a Captain in the Royal Navy and the Coldstream Guards, and, as the arms to be supplied differed from those the Duke's "Yellow coats" carried, which were all fire-locks, it seems possible that this was an experiment on the lines suggested by Sir Bernard Gascoigne, for though his letter must have been written afterwards, he had probably before advocated the same system, either verbally or in writing.

NOTE III.—The following is a letter from Captain Darell to his "honoured Friend, Joseph Williamson, Esqre., Secretary to the Right Honble. my Lord Arlington," written as soon as he was able to use his wounded arm:—

"SIR,—If I had my arme as much at libertie as I could wish you should not have prevented me with your letter by which you have very much obliged me. I shall studie on all occasions to deserve so great a favour. I hope you

¹ Hist. MS. Comm., 15th Report, Appendix II., p. 307.

will excuse me for my giving you so early an intelligence as those of Harwich who were spectators. I shall not trouble you at present with reiterating unto you the passages that happened here being. I have acquainted my Lord Arlington with it. I shall be very careful in giving you notice of anything that shall happen in these parts, with this assurance (although by another hand for which I hope you will excuse me), that of all those that make profession of being your servant, none shall be with greater truth than myselfe.

"Sir, Your most humble servant,

"NATHL. DARELL."

NOTE IV.—*Battle of Sole Bay*.—Captain Carleton, in his Memoirs, states that he was present at this action on board the "London," and relates the following dreadful story: "I must not omit one very remarkable occurrence which happened in this ship (the 'Katherine').¹ There was a gentleman aboard her, a volunteer, of a very fine estate, generally known by the name of Hodge Vaughan. This person received, in the beginning of the fight, a considerable wound, which the great confusion during the battle would not give them leave to inquire into, so he was carried out of the way, and disposed of in the hold. They had some hogs aboard, which the sailor, under whose care they were, neglected to feed; these hogs, hungry as they were, found out and fell upon the wounded person, and, between dead and alive, eat him up to his very skull, which, after the fight was over, and the ship retaken as before, was all that could be found of him."

It seems more than possible that the victim of this dreadful affair was Captain Roger Vaughan, of the Admiral's regiment. This officer may well have been a man of "a very fine estate," as he had been Governor of Chepstow Castle, and at the time of his death was a gentleman of His Royal Highness's Bedchamber. Captain Carleton does not say his name was Hodge, but that that is what he was generally known by—it may well have been a nickname. Although Captain Vaughan's Company was distributed in detachments in the "Antelope," "Triumph," and "Ruby," he himself was killed on board the "Katherine," as Major Darell, his brother officer, writes on May 28th, "Roger Vaughan lies dead on board the 'Katherine.'"

NOTE V.—*King James II.'s Irish Marines and their French Representatives of To-day*.—It is not generally known that King James II., after King William and the Duke of Marlborough had brought their campaign in Ireland to a victorious conclusion, raised—among other troops—a regiment of Marines which, strange to say, is to-day represented by the 88th Regiment of the French line. From the remnant of his Irish troops which had followed him into exile in France, he, with the assistance of the French Government, formed a little army consisting of four cavalry, eight infantry regiments, a Royal Bodyguard, and three "Free Companies." The first infantry regiment was "The Royal Regiment of Foot Guards"; the second, "The Queen's Regiment of Foot Guards"; while third on the list came "The Marines," commanded by Henry Fitz-James, Duke of Albemarle, generally referred to as "The Lord Grand Prior." The "Marines" were, apparently, Marines in name only, since King James had no ships upon which to embark them, and they were generally known as the Regiment of "Albemarle." The Lieut.-Colonel was Nicholas Fitz-Gerald; the Major, Edmond O'Madden. There were 12 Captains, 24 Lieutenants, 24 Sub-Lieutenants, 14 Ensigns, and the regiment was 1,200 strong. It was divided into two battalions, each consisting of six companies of 100 men. The other infantry regiments were of equal strength, and the whole force was reviewed by King James at Vannes in 1692, and subsequently by Louis XIV. of France at Brest. It is rather curious that, though the Irish troops had worn grey in the Irish campaign, they now insisted in being clad in red, the distinctive British colour. The regimental organization as settled by King James did not fit in with the French system, and it was eventually decided that each battalion should consist of sixteen companies of fifty men apiece, with three officers, eight N.C.O.s, one trumpeter, and one drummer. Thus the battalion contained forty-eight

¹The "Katherine" was the only ship lost by the English, but her crew rose against their captors, regained possession of her, and brought her back to the British Fleet.

commissioned and 128 non-commissioned officers and thirty-two musicians, who were required to be shoemakers and tailors as well as forming the regimental band.

The "Marines," or "Albemarle's," fought with great distinction—as did the rest of the Irish Brigade—in France, Spain, Savoy, and Piedmont, till they had suffered such severe losses that in 1698 it became necessary to reduce the establishment and reorganize the whole force. The cavalry formed a single regiment only. The infantry, which, including an earlier Irish Brigade in the French service, amounted to twenty-six strong battalions, was reduced to eight regiments of 700 men each. In the new organization there was only one Guard regiment, which now stood fourth on the list, the "Marines" becoming the fifth regiment, and being still known as "Albemarle's." In 1702 the Brigade lost one of its regiments, "Burke's"—originally "The Regiment of Athlone," which was allowed to join the Spanish Army. In 1715 the "Marines" were incorporated with the Lee and Clare regiments and lost their special identity, the combined regiment being generally known as "Clare's," and which achieved a splendid record. Sixty years later, in 1775, "Clare's" was again combined with "Berwick's," and the name disappeared. "Berwick's," in 1791, had two battalions, the 1st being quartered at Besançon, the 2nd in St. Domingo. The regiment was now in reality more French than Irish, and at this time was the 13th of the Line. At the present day it is the 88th Regiment, though it still bears the sub-title of "*Le Régiment de Berwick*." Upon its Colours it bears the names of the Battles of Sediman, 1798; Austerlitz, 1805; Wagram, 1809; and La Moskowa, 1812. It particularly distinguished itself at Wagram, where it stormed the Austrian entrenchments at the point of the bayonet and completely routed their defenders. The Colours of the old "Berwick" regiment were green with the St. George's Cross with a white edge, and a narrow red St. Andrew's cross below it—probably the Saltire of the FitzGerald, which appears in our Union Jack. In the centre was a golden harp with a crown on either arm of the cross. Other crowns appeared on each corner of the flag which bore the motto: "*In hoc signo vinces*."

NOTE VI.—On September 12th, 1672, it was announced that a "Marine Regiment," of which Prince Rupert was to be Colonel, was to be raised for service in the fleet. Commissions as Captains were issued to the following gentlemen: Richard Le Neve, Sir Roger Strickland, John Berry, Thomas Chamberlaine, Sir William Jennings, Sir William Reeves, John Narborough, and Naphthali Ball, and, as Captain-Lieutenant, to James Story. As beyond this no trace of the regiment exists, it is probable that this was another attempt to create a corps of naval officers, for everyone of them served afloat and most commanded ships. One, Sir Roger Strickland, became a most distinguished Admiral. Story, Strickland, and Reeves were specially mentioned by Prince Rupert for their conduct in the battle with the Dutch on May 28th. Sir William Reeves "brought up a Fire-ship, and layd himself to Leeward of Trump, and if the Captain of the Fireship had done his duty, Trump had certainly burnt." Sir William Jennings went over to France when James II. abdicated, and entering the French Navy, served in the battle off Beachy Head, June 30th, 1690.

NOTE VII.—*The Drums and Fifes*.—Drummers are a very old military institution. "Six Drumes" were issued for the use of the "Admiral's Regiment" on its formation in 1664. A MS. written about this period, or probably a few years later, by one Ralph Smith, lays down that "All capitaines must have drommes and fifes and men to use the same, who should be faithful, secrete, and engenious, of able performance to use their instruments and office, and of sundrie languages, for often they bee sent to parley and to summon the enemy's fforts or townes, or divers other messages which, of necessitie, requieth languages." The fifers, it may be noted, were formerly called "whifflers." The following warrant indicates that the Marine regiments at the end of the 17th Century had a rudimentary band: "1693-4, March 22nd. Warrant, under the hand and seal of John Mawbridge, Esqre, His Majesty's Drum Major Generall, 'To presse or cause to be impressed from time to time, such numbers of Drums, Fifes, and Hoboyes as shall be necessary for His Majesty's service either by sea or land,' whereby Captain William Prince, of their Majesties' first Mareen Regiment, commanded by the

Rt. Hon. the Earl of Danby (afterwards the Marquis of Caermarthen), is appointed the lawfull deputy of the aforesaid Drum Major Generall, 'to impress two Drums and two Hoitboys (*sic*) for the service of his company in the aforesaid regiment': the said Captain being, however, expressly forbidden by the warrant 'to impress the listed Drums to the Trained Bands, as by a special order from His Majestie one Drum is allowed to each Company thereof this time of Warr.'"—From Historical MS. Commission, 10th Report, Appendix, Part IV., p. 333.

NOTE VIII.—*Discipline Afloat in 1665.*—Of discipline, there was probably none, for Mr. Hosier, writing from Gravesend, says, referring to the "Loyall Katherine," "I desired the boatswain to call up the men (but he was sitting in his Cabbin and giving out pinte glasses of strong waters to the men, as I understood, for 12d. each), and he informed mee that hee could not find his men, there being such a thrung of men. I then went to one of the Serpts and desired him to comnd his owne company of Soldrs to muster, which accordingly hee did."—Edey's "History of the Royal Marines."

NOTE IX.—Sir William Coventry, writing from the "Royal Charles," dated April 13th, 1665, says: "The old soldiers wch have been allotted to the fleet have done wonderful good service toward the manning them, the Commanders being desirous to change those whoe goe under the name of Seamen for those Soldiers but of the new Raysed men they are all afraid."

The services of the old soldiers in the fitting-out of the fleet seem to have been invaluable. Sir William says: "Three merchant ships have come in poorly manned, but the old soldiers supply the defect of men; from the new raised ones the commanders pray to be delivered."—Edey's "History of the Royal Marines."

NOTE X.—*Complements of Marine Officers Embarked in 1695.*—"Elizabeth," 2 Captains, 3 Lieutenants; "Royal Katherine," 1 Major, 2 Captains, 3 Lieutenants; "London," 2 Captains, 5 Lieutenants; "Vanguard," 2 Captains, 1 Captain-Lieutenant, 3 Lieutenants; "Royal William," 2 Captains, 2 Lieutenants. Other ships in much the same proportion.



CORRECTION.

The article in the August number, entitled "The Treaty of Tilsit and India, 1807-1843," should have been described as by Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Yate, late I.A.

MISSING BATTLE HONOURS.

By CAPTAIN C. T. ATKINSON, Oxford University O.T.C.

IT is an old saying that the British Army is "only an army of regiments," and though there are some who have tried to make the strength of regimental spirit and traditions a reproach, and who argue that the Army as a whole has suffered from it, there can be no doubt that one of the great sources of the Army's strength and efficiency lies in the appeal which *esprit de corps* and regimental feeling make to every member of old and famous units. Mr. Fortescue finds the explanation of the astonishing miracle achieved by the hard-pressed British infantry at Albuera in the fact that to regimental officers and men a battle was "a purely regimental matter" in which every battalion was tried "in the presence of other battalions by an ordeal which would test its discipline and efficiency to the utmost." Anything that fosters and increases the efficiency of individual regiments or battalions strengthens and helps the higher formations, brigades or divisions, of which they form part, and is an advantage to the Army as a whole. A British regiment is no hastily formed collection of men; it has its own individuality, its own corporate existence; it is the product of its own past, which is a factor—and no minor factor either—in its present. The Service battalions which were raised in 1914 entered upon no mean inheritance, and were set no mean standards to emulate. The histories of our regiments are something no other Army can parallel. What Austrian or Prussian regiment can produce a record of service as varied and full of incident as that of the Queen's or the Welsh Fusiliers or the Sixtieth, or can show upon its Colours battle-honours won in every quarter of the globe? Even the reorganization of our infantry in 1881 was a less violent upheaval than were the vicissitudes which the French Army went through between 1789 and 1815, and it can fairly be claimed for the British Army that its units have had far more continuity of existence and are far more closely in touch with their past than is the case in any other service.

The value of this connection with the past is even greater than that of the local connections on which so much store is rightly set. It is of the first importance to bring home to every newly-joined officer or man the standards of discipline, courage, and endurance set by his predecessors in India or the Crimea or the Peninsula, to which it is his privilege to seek to attain, to explain, for example, to a recruit of the Middlesex what it means to be a "Die-Hard." The Lancashire Fusiliers have won many distinctions since the changes of 1881 transferred the old Twentieth from North Devon to Lancashire, but of even the most splendid of these—that heroic landing at Gallipoli, so vividly described in Sir Ian Hamilton's great dispatch—the most that can be said is that it makes April 25th rank level among the regiment's

anniversaries with August 1st, the great day of Minden, where it met and hurled back in confusion the finest cavalry of France. Not for nothing do the six "Minden" regiments—Suffolks, Lancashire Fusiliers, Welsh Fusiliers, King's Own Scottish Borderers, Hampshires, and Yorkshire Light Infantry—keep alive the memory of that day, or the Irish Fusiliers celebrate Barrossa and their capture of an eagle from one of Napoleon's best regiments, or the East Surreys commemorate Sobraon, where, under Sir Harry Smith, the old Thirty-First fought so stoutly against the most formidable enemy British troops have ever faced in India. The men who are fighting to-day in France and Flanders, or on the more distant and less familiar battle-grounds to which this world-wide war has taken the British soldier, should know all they can of the achievements with which theirs have proved so splendidly worthy to be reckoned. History repeats itself. Sir Douglas Haig's despatch of December 28th, 1917, told of the gallant resistance put up in September, 1917, by some companies of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders who found themselves isolated by a successful counter-attack against the units on their flanks, but held on resolutely in the midst of the enemy for many hours till at last relief came. Who shall say that in their time of trial the shade of old Colin Campbell was not near to watch their grim defence, and to call on the Ninety-Third again, as at Balaclava, to be steady and "damn that eagerness?" At the greatest crisis of Lord French's great struggle to stem the German thrust at Calais (November 11th, 1914) the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, less than 400 strong, were called upon to retrieve a desperate situation and to oust from the Nonne Boschen Wood more than double their number of Prussian Guardsmen. Did it go for nothing that nearly a hundred years earlier, at the crisis of another desperate contest of vital importance to England and Europe, it was the 52nd Light Infantry who dealt the decisive blow by counter-attacking and routing another and a greater Guard?

But if a regiment is to be inspired to-day by a determination to be worthy of its predecessors its members must be able to learn what those predecessors did, and what manner of men they were. Not every regiment has its story properly recorded; many of the longest and finest records still await competent treatment, though the number of really adequate regimental histories produced since the South African War is a most welcome and encouraging sign to those to whom the history of our Army and its regiments is more than a mere interest. Colonel Greenhill-Gardyne's history of the Gordon Highlanders and Colonel H. W. Pearse's account of the East Surreys may be mentioned as specially valuable additions to our military literature. But even now many regiments with illustrious stories can show no better account of themselves than the jejune and uninspired volumes produced between 1836 and 1853 by an industrious but unimaginative Horse Guards official named Richard Cannon. Yet one should not speak ungratefully of Cannon, who did useful work according to his lights, while the Horse Guards of pre-Crimean days, a period not always regarded as an age of enlightenment, deserve our thanks for having bidden him compile his chronicles.

Yet even if all regiments had their stories adequately told there would scarcely be time, under present conditions, for newly-joined Seaforths or Queen's regiments whose histories have been well and worthily written, to study these records in full. But all regimental stories are epitomized in their battle-honours, and even the forty honours of the Rifle Brigade do not represent an impossible tax on the memory. Each name in the lists has its meaning; "Salamanca" or "Delhi," "Khartoum" or "Kandahar," "Namur" or "Defence of Ladysmith," each sums up a story which cannot fail to arouse a thrill. The writer was once privileged to narrate to a distinguished regiment to which he was attached for training the story of one of the battles on its Colours. It was an audience to remember. Its eager interest was positively infectious and could not fail to stimulate the lecturer, and the pertinent and searching questions poured in by some of the sergeants when the story was finished are a happy memory and brought home how very much a battle-honour means to the regiment who bears it.

Other things besides battle-honours help to bring home a regiment's past to its present. Just as heraldry epitomizes for the historian the records of the great families who have left their mark in English history, so regimental badges, mottoes, and other distinctions tell their own story. The turreted archway on the badge of the D.C.L.I. tells of the Thirty-Second's heroic defence of Lucknow. Curiosity is at once aroused by the sight of the second badge worn by the Gloucesters at the back of the cap, a standing testimony to the staunchness of the old Twenty-Eighth under Abercromby in Egypt. Attacked at once in front and rear by French cavalry they calmly faced their rear rank about and, standing back to back, beat off every charge. In January, 1915, when a violent German assault on Givenchy-lez-La Bassée broke into that much-contested village and seemed on the point of capturing it, the assailants were beaten off largely because the old Twenty-Eighth once again fought back to back against foes in front and rear and drove them off. Distinctions like the mural crown with "Jellalabad" of the Somerset Light Infantry, or the naval crown super-scribed "June 1st, 1794," conferred on the Queen's and Worcesters to commemorate their part in Howe's famous victory, are possessions of the utmost value. To those who have eyes to read them aright every regimental badge or motto, every minor distinction of dress, is eloquent.

The honours earned by different regiments exhibit every possible variety, both in numbers and in character. Some corps, like the Cheshires and North Staffords, have only Indian and Colonial battles on their Colours; among the five-and-twenty honours to the credit of the Seaforths only "Maida" and "Sevastopol" record actions on European soil. Others again, among them the Royal Warwickshires and Durhams, can claim no Indian honours: the King's Own, too, though they were on the Indian establishment when they won "Abyssinia," are in the same category. The Guards, of course, have no Indian honours, though Africa contributes not a few names to their lists. Sixteen cavalry regiments, including the three of Household Cavalry, bear no

Indian honours, and up to 1899 seven had no honours won outside Europe. But the five cavalry regiments who missed the South African War had all seen active service in India and in Egypt. Eleven cavalry regiments and seventeen infantry have no Peninsular honours, though before the linkings of 1881 the number of infantry units without any record of Wellington's campaigns was over thirty. Similarly seventeen cavalry regiments and twenty-seven infantry missed the Crimea. In point of numbers there is not less variety. In the cavalry the 16th Lancers have nineteen honours, the 21st Lancers only "Khartoum," which recalls the famous charge which won the regiment three V.C.'s. Of the Guards, the Grenadiers have twenty-four honours, the Coldstream twenty-one, the Scots seventeen, while the Irish and Welsh, many as are the honours they have earned since 1914, have as yet none on their Colours. The Royal Regiment of Artillery, though entitled to more honours than any other corps in the service, content themselves with the magnificent and comprehensive simplicity of "Ubique," though individual batteries, Horse and Field, rightly cherish records of war services as splendid and diversified even as those of regiments like the Royal Scots or the Gloucesters. Is not "A," R.H.A., still the "Chestnut Troop" as in 1793, and "I" the battery made ever famous by Norman Ramsay at Fuentes d'Onoro? The 42nd Battery, R.F.A., may well pride itself on being "Bolton's Brigade," who made so great a name at Waterloo, and cannot the 11th Battery claim identity with one of those three artillery units who shared with the six "Minden regiments" the glories of that proud day and earned the special thanks of Ferdinand of Brunswick, no easily satisfied judge? The "Army List" has never shown the war services of individual batteries, as it does the honours of the cavalry and infantry, nor does it trace the changes in nomenclature and organization which the units of the Royal Artillery have undergone. But let it not be forgotten that the 1st Battery, R.F.A., and 1st Mountain Battery, R.G.A., can trace an unbroken connection with the original "Train of Artillery" which John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, handled with such a loving mastery.

Infantry regiments show even greater variety. At one end of the scale are the Sixtieth Rifles with forty honours, at the other the Leinsters, a young regiment whose eldest battalion has only sixty years behind it, have as yet only three. Next to the Sixtieth come the Gloucesters and Rifle Brigade with thirty-four, the Highland Light Infantry with thirty-two, the Gordons with thirty-one, the Black Watch with thirty, the Royal Scots, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and South Lancshires with twenty-nine. But it must not be overlooked that the Sixtieth have never had less than two battalions—in Peninsular days they once mustered eight, though perhaps they may not be too anxious to claim as part of the regiment that very curious collection of German and Swiss deserters from the French service mustered at Cadiz and known as "the Battalion of Foreign Recruits": yet as the 8th Sixtieth, it was for a time officially reckoned. Similarly the Rifle Brigade had three battalions in the Napoleonic Wars, two from 1815, till a third and fourth were added in 1858. The Royal Scots again, always a two-battalion corps, had four from 1804 to 1815 and owe

to their 3rd Battalion "Waterloo" and their long roll of Peninsular names. Moreover, except for the Camerons, all the regiments junior to the King's Own Scottish Borderers represent the union in 1881 of two units, each of which brought to the joint list a separate roll of honours. It is different with the older regiments from the Queen's to the Twenty-Fifth. Their second battalions were newly raised in 1858, and though between then and 1881 these regiments had a double chance of gaining distinctions, opportunities were not specially frequent, and in 1881 the balance was more than reversed. Hence the Buffs, who date back to Charles II., even if their century in the service of the United Netherlands be overlooked, have fewer honours than the Gordons, whose senior battalion was not raised till more than two hundred years after the celebrated review by Queen Elizabeth of the English contingent whom Thomas Morgan led to the help of the hard-pressed Dutch in 1572.

The alliances of 1881 worked curiously as regards honours. Sometimes battalions were brought together whom the exigencies of the service had never previously put side by side. Thus the Gordons combined the Indian honours of the Seventy-Fifth, one of the four battalions raised specially in 1787 for service in India, where they speedily distinguished themselves against the tyrant Tipu of Mysore, with the great record of the Ninety-Second in Egypt, in the Peninsula, and at Waterloo. The Thirty-Seventh (1st Hampshires) with Marlborough's four honours and Dettingen, Minden and Tournay, a record hard to beat, were joined to the Sixty-Seventh, who had Barrossa and honours from India, from China, and from Afghanistan. They had only one honour in common: "Peninsula." Out of the twenty or more distinctions to the credit of the Forty-Second and Seventy-Third, when the latter once again became the 2nd Black Watch, "Waterloo" was the only one which both enjoyed. With the Essex and the Berkshires the battalions brought together in 1881 had no honours in common, those of the Forty-Fourth (1st Essex) and Sixty-Sixth (2nd Berkshires) having been mainly won on Peninsular battlefields; those of the Forty-Ninth (1st Berkshires) and Fifty-Sixth (2nd Essex) in the West Indies, Egypt, Canada, and at Copenhagen, for the Forty-Ninth share with the Rifle Brigade the distinction of having served in Nelson's fleet at the "Battle of the Baltic."

On the other hand, the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, formed out of two famous regiments whose great glories had been accomplished in the closest of co-operation on the hardest-fought fields of Spain and Portugal, had only a total of twenty-three honours when the eighteen of the Forty-Third and the seventeen of the Fifty-Second had been put together. No less than twelve honours appeared on both Colours. Similarly the Forty-Eighth and Fifty-Eighth, now 1st and 2nd Northhamptons, had five Peninsular honours in common, as well as "Louisbourg" and "Quebec." The Fortieth had seven of the Peninsular honours enjoyed by the Eighty-Second with whom they were united as the South Lancashires. What further exaggerated these discrepancies was that while most regiments raised second battalions in the Napoleonic War, others who happened to be abroad at

the beginning of that struggle were never called upon to do so. Thus the Thirteenth, now the Somerset L.I., whom the outbreak of war in 1803 found at Gibraltar, went thence to the West Indies, and except for the capture of Martinique in 1809 and of Guadeloupe in 1810, for which last they somewhat unaccountably were not given the honour, and for some unrewarded service in Canada from 1813 to 1815, had not the chances of distinction they might have enjoyed had they been represented in Europe by a second battalion. These second battalions were originally intended mainly for draft-finding purposes, but many were employed overseas and some even saw more service than their first battalions. Thus it was the second battalion of the Fifty-Third (now 1st King's Shropshire L.I.) who went to Portugal with Hill in 1809 and fought in all the chief battles except Albuera and the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. Their first battalion was meanwhile in India, engaged in much arduous but unrewarded service. It was second battalions who won the nine Peninsular honours of the Sixty-Sixth and the ten of the Eighty-Third (1st Royal Irish Rifles): the "Faugh-a-Ballaghs" themselves, Gough's Eighty-Seventh (1st Royal Irish Fusiliers) of Tarifa and Barrossa fame, were but a second battalion, while the battalion to whom the Twenty-Seventh (Inniskillings) owe their seven honours from Spain was actually their third. Regiments therefore like the Seventeenth (Leicestershire), Nineteenth (Yorkshire), and Seventieth (2nd East Surrey), which never raised second battalions in these strenuous days, may be reckoned as ill-treated by Fortune. To have been caught in the West Indies when war broke out, to come home—as regiments from the West Indies were unfortunately wont to do in those days—with woefully depleted ranks which needed filling up before active service could be hoped for, explains why several distinguished regiments have so little to show for the period in the annals of the Army which till 1914 was its most crowded and most glorious hour. Hardest of all was the fate of the old Eighteenth Royal Irish, who had two battalions indeed, but both in the West Indies, denied all chance of honours and yet losing by disease more men than fell on the hillside of Busaco or on the breaches of Ciudad.

But to reckon honours by numbers only, or even to seem to appraise a regiment's record by that canon, is to lose touch with the realities of regimental history. There are regiments universally acknowledged second to none, whose records any other might be proud to possess, who have relatively few battles on their Colours. Certain honours, again, possess peculiar meaning and value. Albuera is, perhaps, the battle everyone would most wish his regiment had on its Colours, but it is run close by Waterloo and by Quebec and by Minden. Would the Cheshires, who might be accounted unlucky as mere numbers go, exchange "Meanees" for many honours less individual and more widely shared? The two regiments whose valour and steadiness in one of Abercromby's actions outside Alexandria singled them out for the special distinction of "Mandora," the Ninetieth (2nd Scottish Rifles) and Ninety-Second (2nd Gordons)—young regiments then both of them—may well regard that honour with

special pride. To be the only regiment in the service which bears some one honour is no small distinction, especially when it is, as it were, an honour within an honour. Fifteen regiments have "Havannah" for the taking of the Cuban capital in 1762, over thirty earned Egypt in 1801, but the Fifty-Sixth (2nd Essex) alone have "Moro" to commemorate the capture of the castle which was the key to Havannah, and the Fifty-Fourth (2nd Dorsets) earned their peculiar distinction of "Marabout" by storming an important redoubt astride Alexandria, an achievement speedily followed by Menou's capitulation. These honours inside a general honour—"Mandora" is in the same category—are a valuable precedent; the great struggles of the present war—"battles" seems an inadequate description; "super-battles" one hesitates to term them—have seen many episodes suitable for treatment in such fashion. When Lord French wrote of that crisis in the first great fight for Ypres, the touch-and-go struggle of October 31st along the Menin road, "if any one unit can be singled out for special praise it is the Worcesters," he linked the name of the old Thirty-Sixth for ever with the shattered hamlet of Gheluvelt. It would be a thousand pities were so fine a feat merely swallowed up with other exploits well worthy of special commemoration in an all-embracing "Ypres, 1914."

Among the regiments who have the distinction of being the sole possessors of certain honours, three stand out prominently. The Munster Fusiliers—the present representatives of the famous Bengal Europeans—and the Dublins, who combine the even older Madras and Bombay regiments, carry names on their Colours which take one back to many hard-fought struggles of the great days of John Company, desperate contests with the French under Lally and Bussy, battles against overwhelming odds like Buxar. "Plassey" they share with the Thirty-Ninth (1st Dorsetshires), "Sholinghur"—Coote's victory over Hyder Ali—with the Highland Light Infantry and several Madras units of the Indian Army, "Buxar" and "Condore" they have in common, but the Munsters have four honours all their own, and the Dublins no less than nine, including "Arcot" for Clive's ever-memorable defence, and "Wandiwash" for Coote's decisive victory over the gallant but ill-fated Lally. The other regiment is the 15th Hussars, notable as the first regiment in the Army ever granted a battle-honour. This was "Emsdorff," given them by George III. in 1784, to commemorate their brilliant achievement of July 16th, 1760, in Westphalia, when, after dispersing a regiment of French hussars, they charged and routed five battalions of infantry, capturing 2,000 prisoners with nine guns. "Emsdorff," in any case an enviable distinction, is rendered doubly so by the fact that when the 15th made their charge they were little over a year old. Only in March, 1759, had Colonel Elliott, afterwards famous for his stubborn defence of Gibraltar, been authorized to raise a regiment of Light Dragoons, and here it was, in its absolute infancy, scattering cavalry to the winds, routing infantry, capturing guns, and rounding up to every man not one prisoner but four or five. Thirty years or so later the 15th again greatly distinguished themselves: at Villers-en-Cauchies,

side by side with an Austrian cuirassier regiment and under the very eyes of the Emperor Francis II., they charged and broke a vastly superior body of French infantry, taking three guns. And they have yet a third honour unshared by other regiments: "Sahagun," for a brilliant success over a French cavalry brigade in the early days of Moore's masterly retreat to Corunna, one of several cavalry combats in the Peninsula in which British cavalry achieved feats which rather suggest that the Duke's scathing criticisms of his horsemen go unduly far. Only one other regiment won an unshared honour in the Peninsula, and the claim of the Thirty-Fourth (1st Borders) to monopolize "Arroyo-dos-Molinos" is a little hard to defend. That they did splendid work no one denies, nor that they had the peculiar satisfaction of taking prisoners nearly a battalion of their "opposite number," the 34me de Ligne of the French Army, whose drums they have used for many a day. But it was the Seventy-First (1st H.L.I.) and Ninety-Second, whom Hill's despatch specially commended for clearing the town at the point of the bayonet, and the Twenty-Eighth (1st Gloucesters), Thirty-Ninth and Fiftieth (1st Royal West Kent), let alone the 9th Lancers and 13th Hussars, all appear justly entitled to Arroyo. Similarly that the Fifth Fusiliers were conspicuous above all others in Ferdinand of Brunswick's victory at Wilhelmstahl in Westphalia, in 1762, is notorious, but the Guards, the Eighth (King's), and several other units have a very good claim to share that battle-honour.

The distinction of being the only regiment with two naval actions on its Colours belongs to the Welsh Regiment. Many people know that a soldier of the Sixty-Ninth was the first man from Nelson's "Agamemnon" to board the great three-decker "San Nicolas" in Jervis's victory off Cape St. Vincent, but that regiment had already been privileged to share in a great sea-fight at another moment when victory was not less essential to England—Rodney's decisive defeat of de Grasse off Dominica on April 12th, 1782. Indeed, the Sixty-Ninth quite specialized in sea-service, for they served in lieu of Marines under Hood at Toulon and Corsica; one company was with Howe on the "Glorious First of June," and later again detachments were employed in many minor amphibious expeditions in Eastern seas between 1806-1811. Only one regiment can boast that they have won an honour within the confines of the British Isles: the Pembrokehire Yeomanry, whose "Fishguard" commemorates the capitulation of the French expedition which landed there in 1797. A Lancashire regiment, the old Forty-Seventh, now 1st Loyal North Lancashires, was the only unit which brought away an unshared honour from South Africa for its long "Defence of Kimberley." Some of these peculiar honours were formerly shared by British regiments with Indian units which the many re-organizations of the Indian Armies or the cataclysm of 1857 have swept away. Thus of Sale's "illustrious garrison" of Jellalabad the old Thirteenth alone survive. Happily in the parallel case of "Mangalore," so long defended against Sultan Tipu of Mysore, fate has spared the 101st Grenadiers, then the 8th Bombay N.I., who shared the fortunes of that gallant resistance with the 73rd Highlanders.

But if when one looks at the lists of honours of our regiments some corps seem to have fared ill at the hands of Fortune, this has been aggravated by the want of any uniformity of standard in the awarding of honours. Comparison of the battles for which honours have and have not been granted reveals extraordinary anomalies and inconsistencies both in the selection of battles to be so honoured and in the distribution of these honours to individual units. Universal consent acclaims Quatre Bras as one of the finest fights in the annals of our Army, yet Quatre Bras does not figure on any Colours. Marlborough's brilliant assault on the strongly-entrenched camp of the Franco-Bavarians on the Schellenberg, near Donauworth, six weeks before Blenheim, is another startling omission. It may be argued that the regiments entitled to "Schellenberg" and "Quatre Bras" have got "Blenheim" and "Waterloo" and that the unrewarded actions were merely preludes to the greater fights. Even so, not all the Waterloo regiments fought at Quatre Bras, nor were all the Blenheim regiments engaged at the Schellenberg. In any case the four British battalions who stormed the Mahdi's zereba on the Atbara were not refused a battle-honour for that exploit because a few months later they earned another, when Lord Kitchener's great victory at Omdurman brought to a triumphant close the work in which the Atbara marked a stage.

There are omissions positively inexplicable when compared with some battles selected for reward. There are inclusions which make one wonder the more at the omissions. The regiments who stormed Monjuich and took Barcelona have no reward for Peterborough's most brilliant exploit. Abercromby's landing at the Helder in August, 1799—an important success strategically no less than tactically, since it led to the capture of the Dutch Fleet—certainly merits reward, but the only honour given for the expedition then so brilliantly begun is "Egmont-op-Zee," a gallant and stubborn fight indeed but a barren victory. The well-executed descent on Copenhagen in 1807, whereby Canning effectively checkmated Napoleon's Tilsit scheme of combining against England all the navies of the North, is certainly as well worthy of inclusion as the capture of Surinam in 1804. In 1761 Chatham sent an expedition against Belleisle, which after much hard fighting overcame the resistance of a stubborn garrison. Yet this action, in itself the most successful of his expeditions against the French coasts and politically valuable because Belleisle provided a useful set-off to our lost Minorca, has been passed over. There are West Indian islands which we have taken from the French time after time. Guadeloupe was captured by us in 1702, in 1759, in 1794, in 1810, and in 1815. But only the second and fourth of these successes have been deemed worthy of an honour, though in 1794 quite a large force was employed, and there was every bit as much resistance and as much merit as on the occasions rewarded.

Coming to more recent years, the same discrepancies recur. For the fighting begun by Lord Wolseley's expedition to Egypt in 1882 and ended sixteen years later at Omdurman eleven honours have been

granted, "Egypt, 1882," "Tel-el-Kebir," "Egypt, 1884" (Sir Gerald Graham's operations round Suakin), "Nile, 1884-1885," "Abu Klea," "Kirbeka," "Suakin, 1885," "Tofrek," "Hafir," "Atbara," and "Khartoum." For the South African War of 1899-1902 only seven were given, "South Africa" (with the appropriate dates), "Modder River," "Defence of Kimberley," "Relief of Kimberley," "Paardeburg," "Defence of Ladysmith," "Relief of Ladysmith." Clearly an entire difference of standard, much to the disadvantage of regiments engaged in South Africa but never on the Nile. "Kirbeka" and "Hafir" have not half the title to recognition of the brilliant storming of Talana Hill by the Irish and Dublin Fusiliers and Sixtieth Rifles or of the skilful leading and fine fighting of Devons, Manchesters, and Gordons at Elands-laagte. "Wagon Hill" for the stubborn defence of the Manchesters and Sixtieth and the great charge of the Devons on January 6th, 1900, might well have been given even in addition to "Defence of Ladysmith," and it is odd to find Lord Roberts' advance from Bloemfontein to Pretoria unrecognized. Clasp were given more liberally, but "Dreifontein," the action on March 10th, 1900, when the Welsh and the Essex so greatly distinguished themselves, and "Diamond Hill," the fight near Johannesburg on June 12th, 1900, might well have been battle-honours also. That the awards for South Africa erred in the direction of lavishness cannot be maintained; nor, indeed, can such a charge be justified against the Egyptian and Soudan campaigns. "Kirbeka" rescues from oblivion the gallant efforts of that river column who toiled up cataracts under a tropical sun to Gordon's rescue; "Tofrek" records a splendid rally by the 1st Berkshires, 15th Sikhs, and 17th Infantry; "Hafir," the most questionable—for the regiment which bears it was only in reserve—was a well-planned and executed operation, and was earned by much endurance and many hardships. Indeed, the real criticism on the Egyptian list is the omission of the decisive repulse at Ginniss (December 30th, 1885) of the advance down the Nile of the Dervishes, flushed by their success at Khartoum. It was a sharp and successful fight, and might well grace the Colours of the Yorkshires, Berkshires, Durham L.I., and Camerons: at least it qualifies for "Nile, 1885," the three without that honour.

Indeed, there are few battle-honours which have been too easily given. Actions which might at first sight be thought hardly worthy prove, when carefully considered, well qualified for inclusion. Obscure Indian or Colonial expeditions, such as those of the Persian Gulf which won the York and Lancasters "Arabia," or the fighting represented by the East Lancashires' "Canton," unfamiliar not only to the "man in the street," but to many diligent students of our Army's annals, have been the occasions for the endurance of hardships and for gallantry in action: their names may not excite enthusiasm or call up heroic associations like Minden or Badajoz but they were honours well earned. All that is to be said against some of these is that they make omissions like Quatre Bras more glaring than ever. Really only one expedition can be called over-rewarded, even in comparison. To award four honours for Outram's campaign in Persia

in 1856-1857 does seem unduly generous. It was a creditable performance, and the 33rd Cavalry of the Indian Army made one fine charge in which they broke infantry in square, but the expedition did not merit as many honours as were bestowed for the whole Crimean War or for Marlborough's ten campaigns.

The gist of the whole matter is that the awarding of battle-honours has never been put on a systematic footing. No fixed standards have ever been established. Every principle that can be laid down as a guide to granting them can be shown to have been violated. Even the most obvious, if perhaps somewhat harsh, rule that no honours should be awarded for unsuccessful actions has fortunately been broken. The Black Watch have among their thirty honours none of which they may be more legitimately proud than "Mangalore." But in the end the gallant remnants of the garrison of Mangalore were starved into surrender. "Kahun" again, borne by the 105th Mahratta Light Infantry, commemorates a most gallant defence of a little fort near Quetta during the First Afghan War which ended in an honourable capitulation. "Kahun" and "Mangalore" are valuable precedents for the granting of what all will acknowledge as among the best-deserved honours even of this war, Townshend's great stand at Kut. Whatever else is given "Defence of Kut" should be. To refuse it will be ungenerous, pedantic and pusillanimous.

An attempt was, indeed, once made to enunciate a principle to govern the awarding of honours. In 1881 a committee presided over by Sir Archibald Alison sat to consider the question. To its labours we owe the presence on our Colours of Marlborough's four chief victories, Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenarde, and Malplaquet, till then unrecognized; but its ruling that only such victories should be rewarded as "either in themselves or in their results have left a mark on history which renders their names familiar not only to the British Army but to every educated gentleman," has only to be considered for a moment to be recognized as quite unworkable. Many most heroic deeds have immortalized minor actions. Should Emsdorff be omitted because not one man in a hundred knows of it? In all the annals of the Indian Army what story can rival that of the defence of the Saragai Redoubt on the Samana Ridge in Tirah by a handful of the 36th Sikhs, every man of whom died at his post? But how many people outside the Indian Army know what "Samana" stands for? If there is any subject about which the average "educated gentleman" is grossly ignorant it is the exploits and achievements of the British Army. With all due respect to the Oxford School of Modern History, the great historians and great teachers who built it up were under a strongly-marked bias in favour of so-called "Constitutional History" which has caused that aspect to be much over-emphasized. To fail to distinguish between the Assize and the Constitutions of Clarendon was wont to put a candidate in grave danger of the plough, but Saratoga and Salamanca have been confused with impunity, and ignorance as to the victor of Plassey regarded as venial in one who knew the number of rotten boroughs in Cornwall. It may be admitted that Oxford has made provision for the study of Military History,

and that the man who has taken the Oxford History School knows a good deal of his country's history, of which ninety-nine per cent. of his countrymen know nothing; but if the battles to be recorded on our regiments' Colours are only to be those "familiar to every educated gentleman," even the Sixtieth will have few enough. Moreover, if after the war our educational Bolsheviks get their way and substitute unlimited Natural Science and Commercial Spanish for literary and humanistic training, the outlook for a better-balanced study of history is not very promising.

And when one comes to talk about "results," one is on very slippery grounds. The positive results of Ramillies or Salamanca are easily estimated. But there are negative results too, and in war these are sometimes not less important. Relatively unsuccessful operations, like those of the British troops employed on the East Coast of Spain from 1812 to 1814, may divert from the critical spot reinforcements which would have turned the scale. The fate of an army has often turned on some seeming trifle, and to take "results" as the criterion for awarding honours is altogether too problematical and too indefinite. It would be far more satisfactory to adopt as the standard the display of military virtues—tenacity, resourcefulness, skill and courage; briefly, incidents which may legitimately be remembered with pride by the regiments concerned.

Some years after the Alison committee had reported another committee was formed under Sir Spencer Ewart, the fruit of whose efforts was seen in the rectification of no small number of anomalies and the addition to our battle-honours of several most deserving names. It had the wisdom, however, to refrain from publicly enunciating any set of principles. This committee it was who advised the award of "Tangier, 1662-1680," to commemorate the first services of the British Army outside Europe, a most striking episode which richly warranted recognition. To the Army who fought under William III. and Marlborough, Tangier was what the Indian frontier, Nigeria, the Soudan, and South Africa have been to their descendants to-day—a school of hard service against a brave and resourceful enemy. At Tangier Marlborough saw his first service, and the Royal Dragoons—who began life as the Tangier Horse—the Grenadiers, the Royal Scots, and the Queen's—the "Old Tangier Regiment"—have no more honourable name even in their illustrious rolls. To this committee is due, among other good works, the grant of "Namur" to the regiments who helped William III. to gain his chief success over his life-long adversary Louis XIV., the rectification of several anomalies as to West Indian honours, the recognition of the good services of the British cavalry at Warburg in Westphalia in the Seven Years' War, and at Beaumont and Willems, where in 1794 they twice broke and routed infantry in square. But the committee—or the authorities to whom it reported—left many anomalies unredressed and many meritorious actions still in official oblivion.

Some of the most glaring anomalies have been already mentioned—the omission of Quatre Bras, the Schellenberg, and Barcelona. A little arithmetic will show where the bulk lie. Honours have been

awarded for just over two hundred battles or campaigns. Only nine of these are prior to the Seven Years' War, seventeen belong to that contest, eleven to the years 1763 to 1793, twenty-one to the war against Revolutionary France, forty-eight to the Napoleonic War and to the contemporary Indian and Canadian campaigns. Since 1815 nearly fifty honours have been earned in India and Afghanistan, a dozen in South Africa, eleven in Egypt and the Soudan, four in the Crimea, and the remainder are distributed between East and West Africa, Burmah and the Persian Gulf, China and New Zealand. Clearly it is the earlier of our Army's wars which have been unduly neglected, and our oldest regiments who have in consequence suffered most. There are omissions of note in later periods. Even in the Peninsula El Bodon has been overlooked, though the gallantry of Picton's infantry and Anson's cavalry was beyond praise. The "Fighting Fifth" (Northumberland Fusiliers) and Seventy-Seventh (2nd Middlesex) rivalled Minden by a dashing attack on a French cavalry brigade from whose clutches they rescued a Portuguese field-battery, and the 11th Hussars, then Light Dragoons, covered themselves with glory by repeated and successful charges against Montbrun's greatly superior squadrons. No cavalry regiment has ever surpassed what the 11th did that day. It is equally curious to find unrecognized Wellington's masterly passage of the Bidassoa, the frontier river between France and Spain, and that not even "Sabugal" commemorates the expulsion of Masséna from Portugal. One would have liked to see such fine fighting as that of the Twentieth at Roncesvalles and of the Ninety-Second at Maya distinguished by special mention, and the great counter-stroke of Sorauren would be a fitting parallel to Salamanca; but "Pyrenees," which embraces Sorauren and Maya and Roncesvalles, is a fine honour. There are also several cavalry combats which ought to be rescued from oblivion, notably Lumley's brilliant action at Usagre (May 25th, 1811), and Cotton's at Villagarcia (April 11th, 1812), highly creditable both of them to the regiments engaged—the 3rd and 5th Dragoon Guards, 4th, 13th, and 14th Hussars, and 12th and 16th Lancers. But it is to Marlborough's days that the outstanding omissions belong.

That but four honours should have been given for Marlborough's long series of campaigns may partly be explained by the relative infrequency of pitched battles at that period in the development of warfare. Flanders and Northern France were covered with fortresses. Every town of any importance was defended and garrisoned. Every road, every river-line bristled with fortifications, and campaigns usually resolved themselves into a series of sieges or elaborate manœuvres round fortified lines stretching right across broad tracts of country. Such a fortified line was Villars' celebrated "*Ne plus ultra*," running from the mouth of the Canche by the Scarpe and Sensée to the Scheldt and Sambre, which Marlborough pierced at Arleux in 1711 by dextrous manœuvring, hard marching, and cunning stratagem. But if battles were few sieges were many, and in these there was much hard work and bitter fighting. British troops have seen few more stubborn struggles than the costly and desperate assaults on Lille in 1708 or the taking

of Menin in 1706. The storming of Venloo and Liege in 1702 will always be connected with the name of General Cutts, the "Salamander," famous for being always in the hottest of the fire. The siege of Douai, again, in 1710, was an achievement which certainly should be on the Colours of the Yorkshires, Scots Fusiliers, Welsh Fusiliers, South Wales Borderers, Cameronians, and Borders, all of whom took part in the heavy fighting which led to its capture. Webb's brilliant little victory at Wynendael during the siege of Lille, familiar to all readers of "Esmond," is another curious omission, possibly to be accounted for by the uncertainty about the units actually present, though the Royal Scots and the Cameronians were certainly there. But no such uncertainty excuses the omission to recognize the heroic and effective stand made by the Queen's at Tongres in May, 1703. Marlborough was besieging Bonn, and, as a counter-stroke, Villeroi advanced down the Meuse, hoping to catch unconcentrated and at a disadvantage the Allied force under the Dutchman Auverquerque which was covering the operation. He seemed on the point of success. But at Tongres the Queen's aided by Dalrymple's Scottish regiment (subsequently disbanded), barred his path. For over twenty-four hours this little force battled manfully against overwhelming odds, and not in vain. Tongres fell, but when Villeroi arrived before Maestricht it was to find Auverquerque's force drawn up in good order and supported by the guns of the fortress. The delay had made the difference. To mark his sense of the good service done by the garrison of Tongres, when Marlborough took Huy that August, he kept the garrison in strict confinement until the French agreed to release the prisoners taken at Tongres, and yet "Tongres" is not on the Colours of the Queen's. Moreover, as they were among the regiments specially selected in 1704 to support the effort of the Archduke Charles, the Allies' candidate for the Spanish Succession, to possess himself of Spain itself, the Queen's missed the march to Blenheim as well as Ramillies, Oudenarde and Malplaquet. They have nothing to show either for their services in Spain, though they had plenty of hard work in that country. They are not the only regiment in this plight. The Norfolks, Devons, Somersets and Leicestershires all fought in the Netherlands in 1702 and 1703, helping to take Venloo, Liege, and other places, but were sent to Spain before Blenheim and have nothing to mark them as having been among Marlborough's men. What is wanted to cover such cases is a general honour of "Flanders" (with the appropriate dates) for all regiments who served there under Marlborough. Similarly "Peninsula, 1704-1712" (or whatever the right dates), ought to be given to all the regiments who took part in the Spanish operations of the Spanish Succession War, while "Barcelona" should get a separate honour, which would go, among others, to the Grenadiers, the Coldstreams, and the Somerset L.I. There were other actions besides Barcelona quite worth a separate honour, such as Stanhope's victory at Saragossa in 1710, where the Royal Warwickshires, then the Sixth, distinguished themselves, but the general honour is urgently needed. It is a method which does allow of recognizing the services

of regiments who have been so unlucky as to serve in a great campaign but to miss the main actions; the Lincolnshires, for example, got "Peninsula" for their services on the East Coast of Spain, and the method is capable of extension to redress other anomalies. In the Austrian Succession War of 1743-1748 many of our regiments fought in Flanders, and not without credit. Fontenoy was undoubtedly a defeat for us, but solely through the failure of our Dutch and Austrian allies to support the magnificent battalions which forced their way into the heart of the French position, held on against counter-attacks and only retired at last when Saxe threw in all the weight of his reserves. The victory lay with Saxe, but Cumberland's heroic infantry bore off the lion's share of the honours. If the rule of only recognizing victories may not for once be set aside and "Fontenoy" given to the regiments who may well pride themselves on having fought there, "Flanders, 1744-1748," would not be without justification, for Fontenoy was not the only action in those campaigns in which British troops acquitted themselves right well. At Rocoux, in 1746, it was no fault of the six British battalions present that the French won the day, and the Nineteenth (Yorkshires) and Thirty-Third (1st Duke of Wellington's) were greatly distinguished. And next year was fought at Lauffeld, or Val, near Maestricht, an almost exact repetition of Fontenoy, though, as it lacks the dramatic touch imparted to Fontenoy by the episode of the Irish Brigade, Lauffeld is almost unknown to the general reader. Once again the British infantry accomplished wonders, and victory seemed theirs when the sudden defection of the Dutch exposed to the French a gap in the Allied centre. Taken in flank, disordered by the rush of the fugitive Hollanders, unsupported by the Austrians, always slow to move and reluctant to quit the strong positions it was their wont to occupy, the British infantry were forced back, only to be saved from disaster by the gallantry and self-sacrifice of their cavalry comrades. Led by the stout old Huguenot, Ligonier, whose name will always be associated with his famous regiment the "Black Horse," now the 7th Dragoon Guards, the British cavalry delivered a charge not less gallant, and certainly more effective, than the Light Brigade's at Balaclava. Ligonier was wounded and taken, his regiments suffered grievously, but they achieved their end. There are some reverses more glorious than many successes, and Lauffeld is among them. But no regiment that fought there has even a "Flanders" on its Colours to recall that gallant day.

To give an honour for the Duke of York's efforts to stem the flood of French conquest in Flanders in 1793-4 is more questionable. It is not a period in our military history which excites much satisfaction. In 1793 England was less ready for war than ever before or since—a hard saying but beyond dispute, and the performances of her ill-found, ill-staffed and hastily-levied army proved it. But these disastrous years won the Black Watch their Red Hackle and the West Yorkshires their famous regimental march, "Ca Ira," and they saw many gallant deeds, several of which have found their way to our Colours. These are the cavalry fights at Villers-en-Cauchies, at Beaumont (near Le Cateau), and at Willems; the Guards' great charge

at Lincelles, the one honour peculiar to the three old regiments of the Brigade of Guards; the Fifty-Third's (1st Shropshire L.I.) splendid defence of Nieuport against overwhelming odds; and the great fight which Abercromby's "Fighting Brigade" of Fourteenth (West Yorkshires), Fifty-Third, and Thirty-Seventh made at Tournai. But there were others too. Abercromby's regiments stormed an entrenched camp at Famars in masterly style, and even in the last stages of the campaign of 1794 British regiments more than once damped the ardour of their pursuers by sharp counter-attacks, which showed that even under the most unfavourable circumstances they were enemies to be respected. It is a little hard on some of these regiments, notably the Seventy-Eighth (2nd Seaforths), then a young corps little over a year old, who did very well, that their actions are quite unrewarded, but to give "Flanders, 1793-1794," would be generous rather than necessary. The same may be said of the operations in North Holland in 1799 when, as already mentioned, several regiments got Egmont-op-Zee, though the really important success, Abercromby's landing, has been passed over and the repulse of the Franco-Dutch counter-attack of September 20th, in which the Twentieth greatly distinguished themselves, was a more real success than Egmont-op-Zee. One justification for giving "North Holland" would be that the main reason for the failure to improve the initial successes lay in the misconduct and indiscipline of our Russian allies, not in our own men, just as in 1814 Lord Lynedoch's campaign in the same quarter was marred by the failure of Bülow and his Prussians to co-operate cordially or loyally. Even so Lynedoch's men, mostly units just home from the West Indies and full of raw recruits, did some good fighting at Merxem and only just failed to storm Bergen-op-Zoom.

But there are plenty of omissions far more inexcusable. The great importance of the operations in Westphalia between 1758 and 1762 has been summed up in the famous phrase attributed—rightly or wrongly—to Chatham, that he would "conquer America on the plains of Germany." That this was what the Westphalian operations did is indisputable. Foiled in their efforts against Hanover, the French had no Continental conquests to set off against their losses overseas. The British infantry at Minden and Granby's horsemen at Warburg did just as much to add Canada and the Carnatic to the British Empire as the regiments who scaled the heights of Abraham with Wolfe or shattered the hopes of France on the hard-fought field of Wandewash. And yet several regiments have no honours to show that they served under Ferdinand of Brunswick for three campaigns and fought in several general actions. In 1760 a brigade of Guards joined Ferdinand, and with them came the Fifth Fusiliers, King's, Eleventh (Devons), Twenty-Fourth (S. Wales Borderers), Thirty-Third (1st Duke of Wellington's), Fiftieth (Royal West Kent), and two Highland units, numbered Eighty-Seventh and Eighty-Eighth, which were disbanded at the peace. These eight, together with the six Minden battalions, had casualties at Warburg far exceeding those of the cavalry to whom alone "Warburg" was granted. In 1761 there was a severe action at Villinghausen, in which the French were

completely defeated with heavy loss—a victory most creditable to the British contingent, who bore the brunt of it, and yet unrecognized. The claim of the Guards and of the King's to share "Wilhelmstal" with the Fifth Fusiliers has been mentioned, but the least that should be done is to give a general honour of "Westphalia" to the British contingent. Both "in themselves" and in their results its achievements were of the greatest importance, however unfamiliar they may be to the average "educated gentleman."

But it is even more surprising to find the actual operations in North America during the Seven Years' War represented by only two honours. These are among the proudest that any regiment can bear: "Louisbourg" recalls the landing which was the most brilliant in our annals till even it was put into the shade on April 25th, 1915, at Cape Helles: "Quebec" has its memories of Wolfe's heroic death. But there were other achievements which ought not to be overlooked. If Wolfe's troops had the most glorious share in the operations of 1759 a considerable share of the success of the campaign was due to the forces under Amherst which were co-operating at Niagara and on Lake Champlain, and his final campaign of 1760, which completed Wolfe's work, has been justly praised as a marvel of careful organization and skilful execution. The Twenty-Seventh (1st Inniskillings), Black Watch, Forty-Fourth (1st Essex), Forty-Sixth (2nd D.C.L.I.), and Fifty-Fifth (2nd Borders), who served in these arduous operations, have nothing to show for their undeniable contribution to the conquest of Canada. A general honour, "Canada," would again seem the natural award.

General Ewart's committee certainly remedied most of the anomalies arising out of our repeated amphibious operations in the West Indies, but it might well have extended its researches into other waters. The regiments originally raised as Marines for the Spanish Succession War, who still drink "the King" seated in remembrance of the maritime start of their career, the Thirtieth (1st East Lancashires), Thirty-First (1st East Surreys), and Thirty-Second (1st D.C.L.I.), shared in Rooke's celebrated destruction of the Plate Fleet at Vigo in 1702, and in his victory, for victory it certainly was if judged by its results, at Malaga in 1704, and might well be awarded those honours. It is a hard decision which has denied the Scottish Borderers the right to put "June 1st, 1794," on their Colours on the ground that only three companies were with the headquarters of the regiment in that action, and so is the omission of any award to the battalions who bore the lion's share of the reduction of Corsica in 1794, an achievement which, the popular impression notwithstanding, was not the sole work of Nelson but mainly due to the troops under Dundas and Moore. And there were other operations in the Mediterranean in the course of the Napoleonic Wars which fully merit recognition. In 1805 a British expedition was sent to Naples to co-operate with a Russian contingent in an advance northward to join the Austrians. Before it could achieve anything Ulm and Austerlitz had put an offensive out of the question, but the British troops fell back to Sicily, and from 1806 till Napoleon's overthrow in 1814 that island was kept out of the Emperor's

clutches by our troops no less than by our fleet. Indeed, any reasonable estimate of the relations of Army and Navy will acknowledge the presence of the British garrison in Sicily as essential to our naval control of the Mediterranean. Sicily was an all-important source of supply to the fleet, and without troops to hold it the Navy must have been tied by the necessity of securing the island against Murat. Indeed, the one serious attack which the French attempted, in September, 1810, was foiled not by naval action, for the French seized the chance of a calm which rendered sailing ships impotent, but by the vigilance and readiness of the garrison, the Royal Scots Fusiliers distinguishing themselves particularly by a counter-attack on a battalion which had succeeded in landing. More might certainly have been done to make Sicily the base of offensive operations. Maida, the most effective counter-stroke attempted, was not properly followed up, and the operations on the East Coast of Spain which the troops from Sicily conducted were marred by the incompetence of Murray and the instability of Lord William Bentinck, but for all that the regiments who held Sicily pulled their weight in the boat. The reduction of the Ionian Islands by a detachment from Sicily might certainly obtain an honour for the Royal Sussex, and the British contingent present at Bentinck's capture of Genoa in 1814, his one really successful undertaking, did well and deserve some record. At least the Scots Fusiliers ought to get something for repulsing Murat's attempted invasion, even if a general honour of "Sicily" might not be given to all who helped to hold this vital position.

To go further afield, to review Indian and Colonial campaigns—there are many gallant deeds in the annals of the Indian Army which merit rescue from oblivion—would but multiply instances without establishing additional points. But that, despite the labours of the Ewart committee, a good deal remains to be done to remedy anomalies and to establish a fairer and better-balanced distribution of honours is indisputable. If it is in the selection of battles to be honoured that the greatest anomalies exist, there are still some in their distribution to individual regiments. Why should the Coldstream, the Scots Guards, and the Black Watch not have "Salamanca," when the Twenty-Fourth (S. Wales Borderers) and Seventy-Ninth (Cameron Highlanders), of the same division and, like them, mainly in reserve, have been given it? The Fiftieth had more casualties at Fuentes d'Onoro than seven regiments who have the honour they are denied. One principle which has been generally observed, in the main a sound one, certainly needs somewhat elastic administration if it is not to lead to a considerable crop of "hard cases." It is that no honour should be given to a regiment which has merely been represented at some battle by a detachment only. Needless to say there are plenty of exceptions to this: all three regiments of the Household Brigade got "South Africa, 1899-1900," though the Household Cavalry who served there were a composite unit of one squadron from each regiment. The 11th Hussars had only a troop in Egypt in 1801, yet they got the honour, and so did the Fortieth (1st South Lancashires) who had only four companies present: the 8th Hussars, it may be mentioned, had

a squadron in the force which Baird brought from India to co-operate with Abercromby, yet never received the honour. What makes this principle so productive of hard cases is the practice, so frequent in the 18th century and not without examples in later years, of forming the flank companies of infantry battalions into picked units of Grenadiers and Light Infantry, much to the detriment of the depleted battalions thus robbed of their best men and often condemned in consequence to inactivity. Thus the light companies of one of the brigades of Cole's Fourth Division were present at Albuera and had nearly 150 casualties, though the main body of the brigade, which included the Twenty-Seventh (Inniskillings), Fortieth and old Ninety-Seventh (whose honours have been given to the present 2nd Manchester), only came up when all was over. An even stronger case for giving the battle-honour to regiments represented by flank companies only is Barrosa. There three regiments of the Gibraltar garrison, the Ninth (Norfolks), Forty-Seventh (1st Loyal North Lancashires), and Eighty-Second (2nd South Lancashires) had their flank companies hotly engaged and lost between them nearly 250 out of about 600 present. Every one of them lost more than the Rifle Brigade, who had only four companies present and yet got the honour denied to the other three. In similar plight are the three regiments who found the "Louisbourg Grenadiers" so prominent in Wolfe's capture of Quebec. These were the Twenty-Second (Cheshires), Fortieth, and Forty-Fifth (1st Sherwood Foresters), of whom the first two battalions took the field again in the final move on Montreal in 1760 for which an honour, though well merited, has not been given. It is this practice of forming picked battalions which is the only justification for denying "Warburg" to the British infantry, as the battalions which got up in time to support Granby's cavalry were two of Grenadiers, one formed from the Minden battalions, the other from the six which came out in 1760. But where casualties were heavy and fighting strenuous it seems pedantic to refuse to reward regiments for the deeds of their picked men. No one would suggest that the regiments represented in the two "Battalions of Detachments" in Wellington's army in 1809, battalions formed from the stragglers and convalescents of Moore's army, should receive "Douro" and "Talavera," but there are many occasions on which a detachment has worthily upheld the traditions and added to the reputation of its regiment. The Twenty-Fourth had only a company at Rorke's Drift, but the heroism of that handful is the brightest spot in the chequered story of the Zulu War.

Another principle generally observed, but occasionally violated, is that honours should only be conferred on regiments whose identity with the unit engaged in the actions honoured is absolutely well established. Thus the Camerons find no title to "Wandewash" or "Manilla, 1761," in the fact that Draper's regiment, who fought in those actions and was subsequently disbanded, was numbered the Seventy-Ninth: nor does "Quebec" fall to the lot of the Seaforths because the Fraser Highlanders who did so brilliantly there had the same number as the present 2nd Seaforths, raised as the Seventy-Eighth in 1793. Where, as with the Ninety-Fourth (2nd Connaught

Rangers), disbanded in 1818 but re-formed in 1823, there has been a definite revival of a broken unit the objection does not apply, but the grant to the 19th Hussars of 1858 of the honours which the old 19th of 1781, disbanded in 1821, won under Cornwallis in Mysore and with Wellington at Assaye, stretches generosity a little far, though it is welcome as recalling a most distinguished corps. But the strict legitimacy of the connection can hardly be maintained; it is no better than the very shaky title (to "Waterloo" and to Peninsula battles like Barrosa) which the present 15th Hussars and 73rd Infantry Regiment of the German Army derive from a connection through the Hanoverian Army, broken up in 1866, with the famous King's German Legion of the Napoleonic Wars.

There will be a hard task before those who some day have to decide on the honours to be given for the great struggle that, alike in scale and in intensity, has left all our previous wars in the shade, in which the forces employed in the merest "side-shows" have far exceeded Wellington's at Waterloo, let alone the handfuls who decided the fate of Canada and India. One thing is certain, too many honours can hardly be given for actions so splendid, numerous as they have been. But the true way to arrive at an understanding of what ought to be given is to study the actions already honoured, and when this is done what strikes the inquirer more than anything else is the great number of gallant deeds undeservedly overlooked and the long array of what may fairly be reckoned "Missing Battle Honours."



THE EUROPEAN BRIGADE UNDER SIR ARCHIBALD ALISON IN THE ASHANTI WAR, 1873-4.

By MAJOR-GENERAL C. W. ROBINSON, C.B.

FORTY-FIVE years have passed since the British Ashanti Expedition of 1873-4 was despatched to the Gold Coast under the command of Major-General Sir Garnet (afterwards Field-Marshal Viscount) Wolseley.

It has its special place in history as the first in which any large body of European troops had fought in the dense forests of this part of tropical West Africa, and it was carried through amid scenes and incidents very novel in their character.

Successful, both in plan and execution, it struck the first crushing blow to the tyranny, superstitions, and horrible human sacrifices that for centuries had drenched the soil of Ashanti in blood.

In short, it was the pioneer expedition from which, after some twenty years of peace—followed by an almost similar period, broken by occasional unrest, and the expeditions of 1895 and 1900—has emerged the very different Ashanti of to-day, forming under civilized administration a well-ordered, rapidly developing portion of the British Empire.¹

Sir Hugh Clifford, in an interesting paper upon the Gold Coast,² remarks that all who venture to allude to that country must pay their tribute to the "West African fetish," of its "deadly climate." The epithet "deadly" has no doubt come down to us from a state of things in the past upon the Coast, now no longer prevailing under the more suitable habits of life, the greater attention to hygiene, and the scientific discoveries in the domain of mosquito- and insect-carried germs of recent years.

But why I mention this more particularly, is that one, among other, benefits accruing to residents upon the Gold Coast from the expedition of 1873-4, was the increased knowledge of the climate, with its effect upon Europeans, necessarily gained from practical experience, under campaigning conditions of three battalions of white troops, and their medical staff.

In this expedition these three battalions, forming the "European Brigade," took, under their able Brigadier, Sir Archibald Alison, a prominent part, and their survivors are fast becoming few in number.

¹ The "Gold Coast" now comprises the Gold Coast proper—or the "Colony"—from the sea (the Gulf of Guinea) northward, to the Prah River, with its dependencies of "Ashanti" to the north, and, beyond that, the "Northern Territories," a more open grass country, where cattle and horses thrive.

² "The Gold Coast," by Sir Hugh Clifford, K.C.M.G., *Blackwood's Magazine*, January, 1918.

These thoughts have led the writer, whose good fortune it was to serve with the brigade throughout the campaign upon the Staff of its able Brigadier,¹ and who can thus speak from personal knowledge of occurrences during it, to put together, in a brief outline of the expedition, this story of the services of the European brigade, quoting very frequently from Sir Archibald Alison's own reports, and, by permission, also from his private letters from the Coast.

Probably no more cruel despotism than that of Ashanti, up to the period of this campaign, ever existed.

In 1853 Sir Stephen Hall, Governor of the Gold Coast, wrote that the slaves sacrificed in one year in Coomassie² alone (the capital of Ashanti) numbered on the average 3,000, and that, upon great occasions, as many had been slaughtered on one day.

Much of what lay before the Expeditionary Force was, from incomplete knowledge of the theatre of war to which it was to proceed, shrouded in uncertainty. The dangers and difficulties that the troops would have to face—the dense, humid, almost impenetrable forests, the miasma-laden swamps, the virulent fevers—though in part existing—were depicted in unduly black colours. Sir Evelyn Wood writes:—

"We must not forget the cloud of evil auguries under which the expedition started . . . the officers who were insured had to pay premiums of 43 per cent."³

The view generally entertained at about this period of the Gold Coast, and life upon it, is pithily expressed in the following humorous lines:—

"It's a dreary kind of region, where the river mists arising
Roll slowly out to seaward, dropping poison in their track,
And, accordingly, few gentlemen will find the fact surprising
That a rather small proportion of our garrison comes back.

"It is filthy, it is fetid, it is sordid, it is squalid;
If you tried it for a season you would very soon repent;
But the British trader likes it, and he finds a reason solid
For this liking in his profit at the rate of cent for cent.

"Furthermore, to help the trader in his laudable vocation
We have heaps of little treaties with a host of little kings,
And at times these coloured caitiffs, in their wild inebriation,
Gather round us—little hornets—with uncomfortable stings."⁴

¹ As Brigade-Major of the European Brigade.

² Or "Kumasi," meaning the place of (or under the shadow of) death. I use the spelling Coomassie, as it is that upon the clasp to the medal for this campaign.

³ "Our Fighting Services," by Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C., 1916, page 517.

⁴ These lines first appeared in *Fun*, it is said, about 1863, but are given also in "Campaigning in Western Africa and the Ashanti Invasion," by Captain E. Rogers, 1874, page 32. In former days, under the conditions and unsuitable habits of life then prevailing upon the Coast, about half the force recruited for the Royal African Corps is stated to have occasionally died or been invalided within the year.

No military expedition was ever more absolutely forced upon a British Government than this. The Cabinet, reluctant to go to war at all, was also extremely averse to employ upon the campaign battalions composed of European troops; and the reason for this, as well as for the timidity, amounting to absolute terror of the Ashanti Army, evinced at times during the expedition by some of the native kings with their followers, who formed our allies, can only be adequately explained by a brief digression into Ashanti history.

The negro races now to be found between the mountains north of Coomassie and the Gold Coast are said to have been driven from the far north, many centuries ago, by the Arabians, who subsequently founded Timbuktu. Among them the warlike Ashantis soon became the terror of all others, and settled down themselves into a loose confederacy of semi-independent tribes, each under its own king or chief, frequently fighting with one another, but nevertheless all acknowledging the King of Coomassie as their paramount head, and as the "King of Ashanti," whose succession to the throne, or "golden stool," at Coomassie became a ceremony lasting for weeks, and involving an appalling sacrifice of slaves.

As time went on most of the minor kings, such as those of Denkera, Assin, Wassaw, Akim, Fanti, and others had been so harassed by their over-lord, the King of Ashanti, that they had degenerated in warlike character, and trembled before his armies. Such was the state of things when the King of Ashanti in 1807, Osai Totu Quamina, first came into collision with the British African Company, which had settlements upon the Gold Coast including the fortified post of Cape Coast Castle, and carried on trade with the interior under a Royal Charter. In this year he invaded the Fanti country adjoining the sea coast, butchered the inhabitants, fired upon Cape Coast Castle itself, and then marched back to Coomassie. These invasions were repeated two or three times within the next fifteen years, Cape Coast Castle being more than once blockaded and fired upon.

In 1824 a tragic event occurred, when Osai Totu Quamina, having sent an army into the Denkera and Wassaw country, repeated the blockade of Cape Coast Castle, and, in addition to this, sent a threatening message to the British Governor, Sir Charles Macarthy, that he would place his skull upon the Royal Death Drum at Coomassie.

The Governor attacked the Ashantis with a very inferior force, consisting of natives with a few British officers, and was surrounded in the bush and defeated on January 21st, 1824. He was slain, and his head having been sent to Coomassie, his skull was afterwards placed as threatened upon the death drum, being used as a drinking vessel at the King's great feasts.

These events had greatly lowered the prestige of British power among the natives of the West Coast, friendly and hostile alike; and this prestige was but partially restored in 1826 by a British victory at Dadowah over King Okoto, the successor and brother of Osai Totu Quamina. King Okoto was slain in this battle, and in connection with what is narrated above, the following incidents are curious

enough to be worth mentioning. Upon the very day on which Sir Charles Macarthy was killed, Osai Totu Quamina, who had sent him the threatening message, died in Coomassie. When, subsequently, King Okoto was slain at Dadowah he was carrying about with him a dried human head.¹ This, under the belief that it was that of Sir Charles Macarthy, was sent to London, but subsequently it was ascertained to have been the head of Osai Totu Quamina.

Thus Osai Totu Quamina died on the same day as Sir Charles Macarthy, and although the head of Sir Charles was conveyed to the Ashanti capital, his own head was fated to be borne over some thousands of miles to the British Capital of London—in which some may see retributive justice.

To avoid being tedious we pass rapidly over the period between this and 1873.

By 1852 the British had purchased from the Danes their forts upon the Coast, and formally guaranteed to the Fantis protection from the British Crown if attacked—a very important measure. This did not deter the King of Ashanti, however, from a further invasion of Fanti territory in 1863, returning afterwards to Coomassie, confident that British power to punish him extended no further than the range of the fort guns at Cape Coast Castle and of the men-of-war lying in the offing.

In 1869 the Ashantis carried off to Coomassie, and imprisoned there, certain Europeans, viz. Messrs. Kühne, Ramseyer (with wife and child), Bonnat, and Palmer.

In 1872 a native interpreter—Mr. Dawson—sent up by the British Governor with despatches to Coomassie, was also detained there as a prisoner.

Finally, in 1873, King Coffee Calcalli,² who was then on the throne, entered our Protectorate and threatened to take Cape Coast Castle and Elmina. Throughout that summer his army was only kept at bay at the cost of many lives, by the gallantry of bluejackets, marines, West Indian troops, Houssas,³ and local levies, and at length it had become too clear for question that if there was ever to be any permanent peace within our Protectorate or upon the Coast, and security for trade with the interior, the Ashanti situation must be drastically dealt with. It is useless to discuss here the relative degree in which British Governments from time to time, the trading companies, and the Ashanti kings, chiefs, and soldiery, had been to blame for the state of things that had grown up. Missions, negotiations,

¹ Beecham's "Ashanti and the Gold Coast." It was the gruesome Ashanti custom to carry about as charms or trophies the remains of their own and their enemies' renowned men and warriors.

² Spelt also "Kofi Kalcarrie," and in other ways. He was grandson of Osai Totu Quamina.

³ The Houssas came originally from the direction of the Valley of the Niger and the Northern Territories. They are said to have in them a strain of Arab blood, and are often Mahomedans. They make good fighting men, and have enlisted in numbers in our fighting forces and police in West Africa. Some 20,000 to 30,000 are stated to have been fighting in 1917 on our side in the present war with Germany, in Togoland, the Cameroons, and other places. ("The Black Man's Part in the War," by Sir Harry H. Johnston, G.C.M.G., 1917, page 24.)

threats, concessions, had all alike failed to provide a remedy. So the curtain at last rose upon the expedition of 1873-4, under Sir Garnet Wolseley, King Coffee Calcalli being then upon the golden stool at Coomassie.

The direct objects of the expedition are thus defined in a memorandum prepared by Sir Garnet Wolseley:—

"The first object to be attained, as I understand the circumstances existing on the Gold Coast at present, is to free the Protectorate from Ashanti invaders, and *secondly*, having accomplished this, to advance into the Ashanti territory, and, by the seizure and destruction of Coomassie, strike a decisive blow at the Ashanti power, not only directly by the loss and severe punishment inflicted upon its Government, but, by the moral effects of a great victory, to destroy for ever its military prestige and influence over the neighbouring nations."¹

To secure these objects, Sir Garnet's plan of campaign was to march from Cape Coast Castle direct upon Coomassie, and the Government had, before this, also arranged that a force about 10,000 strong, under Captain (afterwards Sir John) Glover, R.N., composed largely of native allies, should move from the mouth of the Volta, east of Cape Coast Castle, to Pong, and thence to the westward towards Coomassie.

Captain Glover was to conform to the general instructions of Sir Garnet Wolseley as Governor and Commander-in-Chief upon the Coast; but his force was widely separated from that under Sir Garnet's direct command, and its operations had no close connection with those of the European brigade. We can therefore only allude to them very cursorily in this narrative.

Sir Garnet specially requested that he should be given a force of European troops when ready for it, but after landing upon the Coast on October 2nd, 1873, decided not to call for this until the best season of the year had set in.

Thus, in the accomplishment of the first object of the campaign—viz., the clearing of the Protectorate from the enemy, and the preparation for the final advance—the European regiments took no part. This arduous task was ably carried out by the combined efforts of special service officers, small naval and military forces, including West Indian troops, and corps raised upon the Coast.² These bore, during the autumn of 1873, the burden and heat of the day. Necessarily, too, what they accomplished was not effected without some serious fighting; and at Essaman, Abrakrampa, and elsewhere many casualties were suffered. The present Admiral (then Captain) the Hon. Sir E. R. Fremantle, with Colonel McNeil, V.C., and several other officers and men, both naval and military, were wounded, and Lieutenant Eardley Wilmot, R.A., was killed. In its march from the coast to the Prah,

¹ Brackenbury's "Narrative of the Ashanti War," Vol. I., page 117.

² One of these native corps, "Wood's Regiment," was raised by Lieut.-Colonel (now Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn) Wood, V.C. Another, "Russell's Regiment," by Major (the late General Sir Baker) Russell. Both these regiments did very good service throughout the campaign.

later on, the European brigade much benefited by what its predecessors had done for it in creating and improving communications, bridging rivers and streams, erecting huts, laying out camps with water supply arranged for, and in many other directions.

But for the second object of the campaign—i.e., the overthrow of the Ashanti Army and the occupation of Coomassie, Sir Garnet Wolseley was firm in his demand for white troops, a demand to which the Government only yielded very reluctantly, the reason for this reluctance being, in some measure, that in 1863-4 a body of West Indian troops, having been left inactive for five months near the River Prah, had suffered terribly from fever and dysentery. An impression had thus been created that European troops ought not to be exposed, if it could in any way be avoided, to so trying a climate.

As to the necessity, however, of their employment, Sir Garnet wrote thus from the Coast: "Every day's bitter experience of the native kings and chiefs convinces me more and more fully that no decisive blow can be struck at the Ashantis, and that this war can never be brought to an end except by disciplined European troops. . . . Under no circumstances, it appears to me, could I rely on native troops alone to pursue the war into the enemy's territory."

The strength of the European force required, he placed at two battalions of twenty-nine officers and 654 N.C.O.s and men each,¹ and eventually he desired a third battalion. It had been his wish at first that these battalions should be composed of picked detachments from twelve selected corps, under a selected commanding officer and major; but the authorities decided, in the end, to send the first three battalions, or the roster for foreign service (after troops already under orders for India) as a brigade under a selected brigadier.

The battalions ordered out were the 2nd Battalion 23rd (Royal Welsh Fusiliers), the 42nd (1st Battalion Royal Highlanders, or "Black Watch"), and the 2nd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade, each of which had in the past gained renown upon many historic battlefields.

The selection for the responsible post of Commander of this European brigade fell to Colonel Sir Archibald Alison, Bart., C.B., then Assistant Adjutant-General at Aldershot, who on December 10th, 1873, was gazetted to the appointment with the rank of Brigadier-General. His record as a soldier was already a distinguished one. He had served both in the Crimea and Indian Mutiny; been severely wounded and lost his left arm while Military Secretary to Lord Clyde, the Commander-in-Chief at the relief of Lucknow, and had evinced marked ability in more than one Staff appointment of responsibility.

Few men were, in military circles, as widely known, esteemed, and liked.

During his term as Assistant Adjutant-General at Aldershot (between 1870 and 1873), following immediately upon the Franco-German War, military instruction at the camp had been making great strides in advance. Field days, with opposing forces and umpires; tactical schemes, both indoors on models, and out of doors in the field; manœuvres upon a large scale, such as those of 1871, and 1872 near

¹ Brackenbury's "Narrative of the Ashanti War," Vol. I., page 120.

Salisbury (in which corps and divisions took part), war games, and garrison instruction were all being actively carried out, and in connection with these matters, Sir Archibald's military judgment, natural eye for country, and quick grasp of a situation, had made their influence felt. "Whenever," writes one who knew him at this period, "doubts or difficulties caused discussions to arise, and the Adjutant-General was seen galloping up—the word was passed: 'Here's Alison; he will settle it all right.'"¹

It would be altogether to misunderstand the conditions under which the expedition of 1873-4 set out, to suppose that at this time British knowledge, in a military sense, of Ashanti in the least resembled that possessed to-day.

Missionaries and travellers, such as Dupuis, Bowditch, Hutton, and Beecham had, it is true, visited parts of Ashanti, and some been to Coomassie and written of what they had seen, but none had done so from a military standpoint. Indeed, of barbarous and semi-barbarous Africa in general, infinitely less was known then than now.² In 1873 no Ulundi had been fought in Zululand, no Matabele War in Rhodesia, no Omdurman in the Soudan. What information existed the Intelligence Department of the War Office had put together, but this and maps of the country were necessarily very incomplete.

At Sir Garnet's request, dated October 13th, 1873, the European troops were despatched to the Coast with a promptitude hardly anticipated by those out there. The 2nd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Arthur Warren, was the first to arrive off Cape Coast Castle, in the "Himalaya," on December 9th; the 2nd Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. Savage Mostyn, in the "Tamar," on December 12th; and the 42nd (1st Battalion Royal Highlanders, or "Black Watch"), commanded by Lieut.-Colonel John Chetham McLeod, C.B., in the "Sarmatian," on December 17th, which vessel brought out also the Brigadier, Sir Archibald Alison, and other officers, and made the record passage for that period of fourteen days. When these troops arrived on the Coast, certain preliminary preparations for their march to the Prah had not been fully completed, so that it was determined to land only those who were wanted at once for special duties, and to send the European battalions to cruise for a short time at sea.

Among several others landed, however, were Sir Archibald Alison; Captain J. Cecil Russell, 12th Lancers, his A.D.C.; Lieutenant Maurice Fitzgerald, Rifle Brigade, extra A.D.C.; Colonel G. R. Greaves to be Chief of the Staff to Sir Garnet Wolseley, the Major-General Commanding³ (vice Colonel McNeill, V.C., who had been

¹ "Some Military Memories of Sir Archibald Alison," *Cornhill Magazine*, March, 1907.

² Lake Tanganyika was first circumnavigated by Stanley two years after the date of this campaign; the Congo Free State was founded still later and explored by him in 1876-7.

³ In these pages Sir Garnet Wolseley will be often alluded to as "The Major-General"; Sir A. Alison as "The Brigadier."

wounded); Lieut.-Colonel Pomeroy Colley, afterwards very active in organizing the transport; and Captain the Hon. Paul Methuen.¹

From Sir Archibald Alison's journal during his voyage out in the "Sarmatian," which was one not marked by any special incident, I quote but two extracts: "December 6th: Hard at work drawing out tactical orders which Greaves and I have agreed to submit to Sir Garnet Wolseley"; and (December 15th, shortly before reaching the Coast): "Hot, sweltering weather. Yesterday the thermometer in my cabin stood at 89°."

Sir Archibald, with his Staff, were assigned quarters in Cape Coast Castle, where the writer joined him, having landed from the "Himalaya," to be Brigade-Major to his brigade, a few days previously.

Cape Coast Castle, originally the fort of "Cabo Corso," was taken from the Portuguese by the Dutch, afterwards acquired by the "Royal African Company of England" in 1672, and subsequently enlarged. The rambling buildings within this old fortified post,² some of which in their lower portions date back several centuries and were designed for the requirements of the evil days of the slave trade, stand so close to the ocean that the beating of the surf reverberates through them continuously, while the penetrating sea moisture impregnates everything left exposed to it. Admiral Ryder, writing of the hospital ship "Victor Emanuel" on the Coast, says: "Boots blacked in the morning were covered with green mould in the evening."³

Beneath a flat stone in the courtyard, with the letters L.E.L. upon it, rest the remains of Letitia Elizabeth Landon, once a widely-read English poetess and authoress, and who died here in 1839, while the wife of Mr. George Maclean, the Governor of the Coast.

Winwoode Reade, in "Savage Africa" (1863), thus refers to this memorial of her: "Sad and strange to stand by the grave of a poetess in this jail and pest-house of nature, this plague-spot of the universe."

But we did not find Cape Coast Castle, with its many galleries, corridors, and rooms open to the sea-breeze, at all a bad quarter, although its vicinity, and specially the ruined native town, were vile and insanitary in the extreme.

While the European battalions were cruising at sea, Sir Garnet Wolseley drew up "Instructions to the Force"⁴ as to mode of fighting and other matters; and these were sent out to them at their appointed rendezvous by the gun-boat "Beacon."

¹ It may be of interest to say that the officers above-mentioned became later Major-General J. Cecil Russell, C.V.O.; Captain Sir Maurice Fitzgerald, Bart., Knight of Kerry; General Sir George Greaves, G.C.B.; Major-General Sir Pomeroy Colley, K.C.B. (killed at Majuba, South Africa, February 27th, 1881), and Field-Marshal Lord Methuen, G.C.B.

² It seems never to have been, strictly speaking, a castle. Wags say that the name "Cape Coast Castle" was adopted because there is no cape and no castle.

³ JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION (May 29th, 1874. page 383).

⁴ These cannot be conveniently given here, but are to be found in Brackenbury's "Narrative of the Ashanti War," Vol. I., page 361, *et seq.* They are very interesting, and as applicable to-day as in the past, to a striking extent.

He had by this time determined as part of his plan of advance that Captains Butler and Dalrymple,¹ entrusted with missions to the Kings of Akim and Wassaw, should take command of two separate columns composed of such native allies as they could secure, and move forward to the east and west of the main force respectively, in order to act upon its flanks and distract the enemy as to the line of attack. The future movements of these columns, although they were distinct from those of the European brigade, are briefly referred to further on.

MARCH TO THE ASHANTI FRONTIER.

Before Christmas everything was well advanced for the march to the Prah, the various stages upon the route being:—

<i>From Cape Coast Castle.</i>						<i>Miles.</i>
						<i>(Approximately)</i>
Inquabim	6 $\frac{3}{4}$
Acroful	13 $\frac{1}{2}$
Yankoomassie Fanti	24 $\frac{1}{2}$
Mansu	35 $\frac{1}{2}$
Sutah	46 $\frac{1}{2}$
Yankoomassie Assin	58 $\frac{1}{2}$
Barraco	67 $\frac{1}{2}$
Prahsu (on the bank of the Prah)	73 $\frac{1}{2}$

Thus the total distance from the Coast was roughly seventy-four miles, the two first marches, to Inquabim and Acroful, having intentionally been made short ones.

Between Acroful and Yankoomassie Fanti, a little to the east of the road, was Dunquah—to become a main depôt of supplies—and at Mansu, about half-way to the Prah, a small fort was constructed and a hospital established.

On Christmas Day, 1873, Sir Archibald Alison writes²:—

"Yesterday, in the early morning, Russell (his A.D.C.) and I went up with Major Home³ to Inquabim, the first station on the road to the front. Our start would have amused you. Home went in a hammock, carried by eight men. Russell and I in a Victoria, which he got from a merchant in the town, drawn by eight negroes, two and two, in rope harness with two others pushing behind.

"The station consists of six large, airy huts for sixty men each, with bamboo guard-beds for them all, and small huts, containing four each, for the officers, washing places for the men, and filtered water for drinking. Coming back in the heat of the day, I suffered a little from the sun on the head—quite a trifle, for I walked up from my carriage to my quarters in the fort. I never saw anything like Russell's

¹ Afterwards Lieut.-General Sir William Butler, G.C.B., and Major-General W. L. Dalrymple, C.B.

² The extracts from Sir Archibald's letters given on these pages are, unless otherwise stated, those to Lady Alison, to which I have had access.—C.W.R.

³ The C.R.E.—afterwards Colonel R. Home, C.B., R.E., a most active engineer officer, whose services throughout this campaign were invaluable.

attention and kindness, and that of Dr. McNulty. They applied the cold douche to my head most vigorously. In a couple of hours I was better, and the heat gone. I have been thinking a great deal about you all to-day. There was a very striking service this morning with a short, but very good sermon.¹

"Our mess consists of Russell, Robinson, Fitzgerald, Cope, and Farquharson of the 42nd; and we had as guests—Lieutenant Jekyll of the Engineers, and Dr. McNulty."²

On December 27th Sir Garnet Wolseley, with headquarters, left for the Prah, where Wood's and Russell's regiments had by this time assembled, the Brigadier, Sir A. Alison, remaining at Cape Coast Castle in command, and for the purpose of disembarking the regiments of the European Brigade upon their return from cruising at sea.

The desire of the Major-General was that the Rifle Brigade should be the first battalion to land, as they were armed with, and accustomed to, the short rifle with its sword bayonet (the arm of rifle regiments), and that the brigade should march up by half battalions, on successive days beginning on January 1st, 1874, each moving straight from the ship to Inquabim—the baggage of each half-battalion having been landed the day before.

At this point it is desirable to say something as to the arms, transport, and equipment of the European Brigade and the weapons of the enemy.

It was known that the operations would have to be conducted mainly in dense forests, along paths often choked by fallen trees, underbush, and creepers of every description, through which the soldiers could see occasionally but a few yards, and would constantly have to hack their way.

For this reason it was considered that the short rifle of the Rifle Brigade, with its sword bayonet having a cutting edge, would be both a more handy and effective weapon than the long rifle, with its triangular, pointed bayonet, not adapted to cutting purposes, forming at this period the usual infantry arm. It had been arranged, therefore, to issue the short rifle and sword bayonet to the 23rd and 42nd Regiments for this campaign, but from some cause they were not supplied to them before they embarked for the Coast, but sent after them in the "Dromedary," an extremely slow vessel, the late arrival of which at Cape Coast Castle caused some anxiety.

With respect to transport for the conveyance of supplies and baggage, there was practically no animal transport of any description—horse, mule, or donkey—available upon the Coast, where animals, it was said, were not found to thrive. A few mules only (seven or eight) had been obtained from Lisbon, and one of these—a large white one—had been allotted to Sir Archibald Alison, who rode it at times

¹ If I recollect rightly, by Chaplain the Rev. R. S. Patterson.

² Among these, those I have not already mentioned became afterwards Sir Anthony Cope, Bart. (Rifle Brigade), Major F. Farquharson, V.C., Colonel Sir H. Jekyll, R.E., K.C.M.G., and Colonel G. W. McNulty, C.B.

through the campaign.¹ Supplies had to be made up in such packages as from weight (50 lbs.) and size could be carried upon the heads of native carriers, of whom the greater number were women. The artillery taken to the front consisted of 7-pounder mountain guns, manned by Houssas. Rockets also were provided.

The Ashantis had no artillery, and but a few rifles.

They fought, however, not with spears or bows and arrows, but with firearms, their principal weapon being the Dane gun, a long flint-lock musket, acquired from traders. Of these they had any number, and when loaded with a heavy charge of black powder—upon which bullets, slugs, and pieces of iron were crammed—they formed in the bush, at close range, a very effective weapon.

As to equipment and dress. The 42nd had left their kilts and Highland bonnets in store. Each European soldier was served out with a greyish tweed frock and trousers, wore gaiters, and carried on his person, among other articles, a small pocket charcoal-filter and up to seventy rounds of Snider ammunition. A waterproof sheet, greatcoat, and *tente d'abri*, or shelter tent (to cover three men) were carried for him.

A small veil or piece of mosquito netting, and a respirator, were also provided for each man.

I cannot recollect having ever seen the respirator worn, though it may have been so at night occasionally. At all events the European soldier in this campaign, with his grey frock, protected also by respirator and veil against the poison of the atmosphere and the germ-carrying mosquito, was in some respects the prototype of his khaki-clad, anti-gas-provided successor in Flanders to-day. At stationary camps large permanent filters were established, and drinking water was, in addition, boiled. The health of the men, in short, was very carefully considered.

On December 27th the 42nd came in from their cruise at sea, just after the Major-General had left for the front. Unfortunately, there had been cases of erysipelas on board. One, on December 20th, had terminated fatally, and three others had followed, although no fresh case had occurred since the 24th. On account of this the Principal Medical Officer strongly recommended that the regiment, as a precautionary measure, should be moved from the ship and marched up country as soon as possible.

On December 29th the 23rd came in, and on the 30th the Rifle Brigade; and also upon that night the long expected "Dromedary," with the short rifles and sword bayonets for the 23rd and 42nd. Sir Archibald Alison writes on the following day (December 31st):—

"I have been driven nearly distracted with anxiety about the non-arrival of the 'Dromedary,' which has the short rifles and sword

¹ The microbe of the "Tryp" (which is found in parts of the interior, and is said to affect human beings with sleeping sickness) is destructive to animals, as also the "tsetse" fly. Sir Archibald's mule kept fairly well. Captain Rait (afterwards Colonel Rait, C.B.) had a horse brought out from England with him. It went through the campaign, but fell out of condition a good deal before its close.

bayonets of the 42nd and 23rd on board, but it came in last night, and I am having them transhipped now."

The baggage of the headquarters half-battalion of the Rifle Brigade having been landed on the 31st, the march to the Ashanti frontier or the Prah began next day, and was continued by successive half-battalions in the following order¹:—

On January 1st, 1874, headquarters and left-half battalion Rifle Brigade, with detachment R.E.

January 2nd, 1874, remaining half-battalion Rifle Brigade.

January 3rd, 1874, headquarters and half-battalion 42nd Highlanders.

January 4th, 1874, remaining half-battalion 42nd Highlanders.

January 5th, 1874, headquarters and half-battalion 23rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers,

and the other half battalion of the 23rd was to have followed the next day (January 6th).

With respect to the disembarkation of the Rifle Brigade on January 1st, Sir Archibald Alison writes:—

"I have had a hard morning of it disembarking the first half of the Rifle Brigade. It was well done. They landed at about 3.20 a.m., and reached the end of the first march by 6.35 a.m., before the heat began. None of the Rifles fell out, and but one man of the detachment of Engineers."

By each successive half-battalion of the brigade the disembarkation was also most smoothly carried out.

But at this stage a serious interruption to the march occurred in the desertion, up country, of a large number of the native carriers, causing great anxiety to the whole force.

The extent of this desertion, with the measures taken to cope with the emergency, are fully described by Sir Archibald in the following letters:—

"Cape Coast Castle, January 5th, 1874.

"All was going on well until the night before last, when I was knocked up at twelve o'clock by a telegram from Dunquah to say that the whole of the native carriers coming down to take up the 23rd Fusiliers had deserted in a body; that desertion was rife along the line, and that emissaries had been taken, inciting the carriers to desert. Telegrams and letters kept coming in all night. In the morning I saw the civil authorities and afterwards had a meeting with the merchants.

"I spoke to them strongly, and asked them to give up all their exempted men to Government to be employed as carriers. They unanimously agreed to do so. I surrounded the town with the 1st West India Regiment and had every house searched by the police for carriers; and I got the civil government to give me 200 men. About 400 also came down from Dunquah. By these means I got

¹ The brigade staff and officers of each battalion of the European Brigade are given at the end of Part II. of this paper.

over the difficulty, started the first half of the 23rd this morning and was going to send off the remainder to-morrow, when, in the afternoon, I got very anxious letters from the Prah, to say that the wholesale desertion of the carriers had brought the expedition to the very verge of a standstill, that, as a last resource, Wood's regiment and the 2nd West India were to be set to work to act as carriers near the Prah, and that I was at once to send up the 1st West India Regiment from this to Mansu to be employed there for the same purpose.

"To do this, I was to retain the 23rd on board ship and to employ their carriers to take up the 1st West India. I have had, therefore, to march the half of the 23rd back from Inquabim¹ here, to re-embark them to-morrow morning.

"This will be a sore trial to the men. The two last days have been anxious and disheartening ones to me."

"January 13th, 1874.

"Russell² got back at 9.30 this morning from Moree, having made a most successful expedition of it. He completely surrounded the village in the dark, and secured the canoes so that not a man escaped. He captured 150 fine strapping men, many of them deserters."

Sir Archibald Alison's exertions at this juncture are thus alluded to also by Captain (afterwards Sir Henry) Brackenbury, Military Secretary to the Major-General, in his narrative of the Ashanti War (Vol. I., page 28):—

"The Brigadier-General, remaining at Cape Coast Castle, continued to take the most active measures for the collection of carriers . . . He raised the allowance in lieu of rations from 3d. to 6d. a day for each carrier and employed native agents to communicate with the kings and chiefs, offering them £50 for every 500 able-bodied men whom they would bring into the field and keep there, while the kings themselves were to have £10 a month for every 100 men, and £6 a month for every 100 women. He also took steps to supply corn instead of rice as food for the carriers, the food which they like being plantains and 'cankey,' which is made of pulverized Indian corn. He also took steps to drive for carriers in the surrounding villages. Beulah and Napoleon were searched, but with scarcely any success, though they were surrounded. Elmina was visited also."

As the event proved, these and other measures practically solved the difficulty as to carriers, but it must be added that this was largely due to the organizing ability and personal exertions of Colonel Pomeroy Colley.

At this juncture, under arrangement with the Deputy Controller, M. Irvine, C.M.G., an able officer, he took over as Director the charge

¹ Orders had been sent recalling this half battalion, which had marched on the 5th, but they did not reach it in time to prevent it from moving on to Acroful, from whence it was brought back, and re-embarked upon the "Tamar."

² Captain Cecil Russell, A.D.C., who had been sent with twenty of the West India Regiment and twenty police to make a night march to Moree in search of deserters.

of the transport, and, aided by Commissary O'Connor and other energetic assistants, he soon, by consideration for tribal customs, hours of work, food, time of payment and so on of the carriers, as well as by strict dealing with would-be deserters, shirkers, and idlers, brought order out of chaos.

But the possibility of a repetition of desertion in the future still remained as a sort of sword of Damocles over the force. Therefore the Major-General now determined to bring up no more Europeans than he considered absolutely essential, and to take on only the headquarters and 100 of the 23rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers instead of the whole of the regiment—a decision that was necessarily most disappointing to that corps.

The carrier service having been reorganized, this portion of the 23rd moved on January 15th, 1874, to the front, followed by Sir Archibald Alison with the Brigade Staff, and the onward march to the Prah, through the Ashanti forest, was resumed. The character of this wonderful forest upon the first two days' march is thus described by Sir Archibald:—

"Anything so lovely as this immense African forest I not only never saw, but could not, by any effort, have conceived. The trees are constantly above 200 feet high, with great huge straight stems, looking as if they had been planted at the Flood, and grown hard ever since. Then the creepers and under foliage, with their immense leaves, are just like a great sub-tropical garden. This morning I pushed on alone in my hammock, and it was like being carried through Fairyland in the deep silence of the forest, in perfect shade, but with the sun shining on the tree tops 150 feet above our heads.

"We were able, on the Brigade Staff, between walking and an occasional resort to a spare mule and hammock, if available, to make double marches, passing on the way some of the half-battalions of the brigade.

"At intervals there was heavy rain, after which the atmosphere became usually extremely hot and oppressive.

"At Dunquah we met the civil commandant of Saltpond, Major Brownall, who had been once a prisoner in the Ashanti hands for five months, and gave us an interesting account of his experiences at that time.

"Near Yankoomassie Assin we crossed the site of an old Ashanti camp, the huts of which stretched for a long distance on both sides of the path. In all of them there were platforms, something like a guard-bed, raised above the ground level, for sleeping on, as a precaution against fever.

"At this station (Yankoomassie Assin) we saw the Rev. Mr. Kühne, who had just been permitted by the Ashanti King to leave Coomassie, after having been imprisoned there for some five years. To our amusement his hut, in order to free him from too much intrusion from camp followers, had been labelled: 'Contagious Cases.'"

Sir Archibald, with the Brigade Staff, reached the Prah on January 20th, where he found the Rifle Brigade, and where a good

treble bridge had been thrown across the river—here about eighty yards wide. The Major-General had, before this, informed him that, having ascertained that the Ashanti army was not assembled anywhere near the Prah, he had determined to cross it with the troops he had with him and concentrate the European brigade not at the river, but further north. For this reason he instructed him to pass the brigade over the river at once and then follow on himself, handing over command at Prahsu to Colonel (afterwards Sir Francis) Festing, R.M.A.

On the 21st, therefore, the Rifle Brigade crossed the Prah. On the 22nd and 23rd the detachment, Royal Welsh Fusiliers and the 42nd Highlanders with the reserve ammunition, followed, while Sir Archibald and the Brigade Staff pushed on upon the 23rd to Acrofumu (twenty-six miles), reaching that station after a rather tiring day at about six p.m. From Prahsu Sir Archibald writes on January 21st:—

"This is my birthday (forty-eight). I little expected this day last year to spend it on the banks of the Prah. I had a talk at Yankoomassie Assin with the missionary who was sent in by Coffee Calcalli. He does not think the Ashantis will fight. He says their army, which was down at the Coast, returned in very bad spirits; the men have been allowed to go to their homes, and he does not think they will rejoin. . . .

"Within the last few days the Rifle Brigade has sent sixty-four men, sick, down to Cape Coast Castle, and the 42nd are beginning to go down. Poor Captain Huyshe's¹ death has cast a gloom over headquarters, where he was much beloved. I found young Parke here looking ill, and have kept him with me, at all events till we reach Adansi, as Extra Orderly Officer."²

The march was now continued through the enemy's country, and we give below the chief villages or towns between the Prah and Coomassie, as they will all be alluded to further on in connection with the operations:—

PRAHSU TO COOMASSIE.

(With the approximate distance of each village
or town from Prahsu.)

	<i>Miles.</i>
Essiaman	13
Accrofumu	26
Moinsey	35
Quisah (over the Adansi Hills)	40
Fomanah	40 ³ / ₄
Ahkankuassie	52
Quarman	57
Egginassie	58
Amoaful	59
Agemmamu	64
Ordahsu	74
Coomassie	81

¹ Of the Rifle Brigade and D.A.Q.M.G. at headquarters. He died of fever and dysentery, and was buried close to the Prah River on 20th January, 1874.

² Lieut. C. E. Parke, Rifle Brigade, now of Henbury House, Wimborne, Dorset. Shortly afterwards, however, he was invalided to the coast.

On January 23rd envoys came in from the King of Ashanti with a letter to the Major-General, and accompanied by the following released prisoners—Mr. Ramseyer, wife and two children, who all went down at once to Cape Coast Castle; and Monsieur Bonnat, a Frenchman, who remained with our force and was most useful from his knowledge of the country and people.

The King expressed his desire to continue negotiations for peace, and was informed in reply that if he delivered up all the Fanti prisoners in his hands, paid at once 2,500 oz. of gold (i.e., half the indemnity already demanded), and sent in certain hostages for his good faith,¹ who would all be well treated, then the Major-General would halt his troops. In the meantime his army would advance slowly, to allow time for the King to decide upon his course of action.

Permission was requested by the King to retain Mr. Dawson, the native interpreter, a prisoner in Coomassie, to act for him in any negotiations, and this was sanctioned.

The next day's march brought Sir Archibald and the Brigade Staff to Moinsey, at the foot of the Adansi Hills, and that of the day after to Quisah, from which Sir Archibald writes on January 25th, 1874:—

"We halt here for a couple of days to get the reserve ammunition and field hospital up. I am in great hopes that, now we are over the hill, the men will be quite fresh and well again. It was so pleasant coming down, to cross a clear, running mountain stream, and hear the constant sound of running water."

About Quisah and Fomanah there was a short halt, and here the regiments of the European Brigade were concentrated together for the first time since leaving the coast, the Rifle Brigade being at Fomanah, the headquarters of the Major-General; the detachment, 23rd and the 42nd, at Quisah, about three-quarters of a mile or so from them, with Sir A. Alison. About 200 more men of the 23rd were about this time ordered to disembark and proceed north, accompanying carriers and supplies, but they did not reach the extreme front.


On January 26th there was a reconnaissance towards the villages of Adubiassie and Essang Quanta, in which a company of the Rifle Brigade took part in support. Our men were fired upon, four prisoners taken, and the village was burnt, one of the prisoners being sent to Coomassie with a message to the King, explaining that it had been destroyed because our troops had been fired upon first by his soldiers, and urging him, if he still desired peace, to send in the Fanti prisoners and the hostages demanded at once. Fomanah was a large town, the chief one of the Adansi district. Within its houses there were many evidences of the fetish customs and barbarous sacrifices of the Ashantis. Strips of white cloth were stretched from tree to

¹ The hostages demanded were the Queen Mother (who was a power in Coomassie), the king's heir, Prince Mensah, and the heirs of the kings of Juabir (spelt also Dwabin), Kokofu, Mampon, and Becquah.

tree as an offering to the "fetish"¹ to bar our approach: the scouts also found a dead man impaled near the path, with no doubt the same object, and in the Major-General's quarters was a sacrificial altar clotted with fresh blood.

On January 27th Sir Archibald writes further from Quisah:—

"The day before yesterday Sir Garnet inspected the Rifle Brigade at Fomanah. I was there, of course. Yesterday he came here, and inspected the 42nd and 23rd. All my regiments were looking well, all very keen to have a fight; and I don't think it will be a long one when it once begins. . . .



ASHANTI HOUSE AT QUISAH OCCUPIED BY SIR ARCHIBALD ALISON AND HIS STAFF—SHOWS SIR ARCHIBALD'S BEDROOM.—*From a sketch by Captain J. Cecil Russell, 12th Lancers, A.D.C.*

"We (my staff and I) are living in a very clean native house, on the exact plan of a house in Pompeii, a small court, with four little rooms, one on each side, opening into it. The architecture is clearly Moorish. There is a double arch and pillar in my bedroom just like those at the Alhambra. Russell and Fitzgerald are very well, both capital A.D.Cs. You would be amused if you could look in now, and see me sitting beneath a bamboo shed under a big tree in the main street of the village, writing this at my old autumn manoeuvre table, with a black police orderly sitting at the foot of the tree before me; Sergeant Shand, and Robinson, writing officials beside me; and the natives and men of the 42nd passing up and down

¹ "Fetish,"—from "Fetishe," a Portuguese word for witchcraft, is a term given by Europeans to the divinities of the blacks. The Ashanti deities, good and evil, are numerous, and are supposed to dwell in some instances in rivers, trees, rocks, and animals. They, their worship, and the offerings presented to them (from human sacrifices to pieces of fowls on bits of string, food, eggs, etc., often smeared with blood), are equally termed fetish, and their priests "Fetish men." —(Beecham's "Ashanti and the Gold Coast," 1841).

the quaint street. I enclose a sketch Russell is making of my little bedroom, taken from our courtyard. You'll see I have to climb up a high step."

By this time an advanced guard for the force had been organized under the command of Colonel McLeod, C.B., 42nd Highlanders, with Captain Farquharson, V.C., and Lieutenant Wauchope,¹ both of his regiment, as his staff officers.¹ The regiments of the European Brigade followed, as a rule, immediately behind this advanced guard (in front of which were Gifford's Scouts), detaching to it also some of their companies.

It is unnecessary, in this account, to give the precise composition of the advanced guard on each day, but it may be understood, unless otherwise mentioned, that it included, in addition to the above European companies, a detachment of Rait's Artillery, either a 7-pounder, or Rocket Detachment, or perhaps both, a detachment of the Royal Engineers, with labourers to cut the bush, and portions of the Naval Brigade, and Wood's or Russell's native regiments.

Shortly afterwards some of the 23rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers were engaged as part of it in a reconnaissance in a south-westerly direction to the village of Boborassie, where some Ashantis were said to be assembling.

Here, as at Adubiassie, the British force was fired upon first and the village was then burnt. Captain Nicol, Adjutant of the Hants Militia, a special service officer, was killed, as well as nine others killed or wounded.


Letters from the Ashanti King now came in, dated January 26th and 27th, again imploring the Major-General to halt, though without complying with his terms: but it was made evident that the King was not to be trusted by the following ingenious warning received from Mr. Dawson, his native interpreter. Unable to do more without arousing suspicion, he had contrived to insert upon one letter: "See 2nd Cor., Ch. II., v. 11," which was found, on reference to a New Testament, to run thus: "Lest Satan get an advantage of us, for we are not ignorant of his devices."

The King was therefore informed that the troops would not halt until the terms demanded had been complied with.


On the 30th the force advanced to Insarfu. At this place and at Ahkankuassie the baggage, field hospital, and ammunition column were parked, arrangements being made also to move on early the following morning prepared for an anticipated battle a few miles in advance, where the scouts had reported the Ashanti Army to be collecting in position.

(To be continued.)

¹ Afterwards Major-General A. G. Wauchope, C.B., C.M.G., killed in action at Modder River, South Africa, December 11th, 1899.



The route between Odumase and the Akyem River was a very rough track, alternately over ranges and across rivers.



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THE KIAO-CHAO CAMPAIGN.

By MAJOR T. E. COMPTON.

IT was as the ally of England that Japan entered the European conflict, which has since developed into the greatest world-war ever known. Whatever preoccupations the appearance of the Teuton in China may have caused her, Japan, after her recovery of Port Arthur in 1905, had no quarrel with Germany, from which country her schools of medicine and science and, above all, her army had obtained great benefits. Her naval power was, however, almost entirely due to England.

It was only natural that the Island-Empire of the Far East, in the process of grafting Western ideas upon the outworn Chinese civilization of her isolated past, should seek advice and material help from the mighty Island-Kingdom of the West, whose Navy in those days, not so very long ago, held command in every sea. Only thirty-one years ago, in 1887, the present writer saw a German squadron steaming out of Hong-Kong Harbour, *and it consisted of five wooden ships*. In the same year, on board the packet-boat that took him to Japan, he had the honour of meeting the British Naval Adviser to the Japanese Admiralty; and on the return voyage a captain of *Chasseurs à pied*, the last remaining member of the French Military Mission, quitting the shores of what he doubtless considered an ungrateful country.

This was in November, 1887, and the dispensing with the services of the French Mission marked the new Japanese policy of getting for all the services of the State what were thought to be the best advisers from all the nations of Europe. The Navy was put into the hands of the British and the Army into those of the Germans, for advice on all matters affecting their organization, training, and staff duties. From the year 1888 German methods were adopted by the Japanese General Staff and War Office, to which methods and to the thorough pre-war staff training conducted by the German Mission, their Manchurian successes of 1904-5 were duly and publicly ascribed by the Japanese Generalissimo.

In 1914, therefore, no cause of quarrel existed between Japan and Germany, while there were several reasons favouring the continuation of their good relations. But if there were good reasons why public opinion in Japan, especially among the many professional men who had received a part of their education in Germany, should be more or less friendly disposed towards that country, there was a still greater and for the Japanese Government an altogether overpowering reason why Japan should be loyal to England. For the British alliance had kept the ring in 1904-5, and had assured to the Japanese nation a fair fight with the Russian Colossus in Manchuria. Throughout that

Far East from the very first. The recent declaration of the Tokio Government with regard to the Allied intervention in Siberia, by way of Vladivostock and Manchuria, was entirely consistent with this attitude of loyal co-operation with the Entente and the United States in the Far East, whenever opportunity offered.

For three years Japan's assistance to Russia took the form of furnishing munitions of war. Till now, armed intervention in aid of Russia has been neither practicable nor desirable; but on the outbreak of war, in 1914, a military operation near at hand, that could be carried out in conjunction with her ally, England, was both obvious and easy of fulfilment.

The German Colony of Kaio-Chao dates only from 1898, although for many years previous to that date German commerce with China had been very active. Commercial travellers and missionaries had pushed German propaganda far and wide, and the intention of the German Government to obtain a footing in the Celestial Empire had long been looked upon as a foregone conclusion in the Far East. It was only a question of occasion and opportunity, which in 1897 were forthcoming by the assassination of two German Roman Catholic missionaries in November of that year.

German diplomacy seized at once on this event as the long-wished-for opportunity, and, on the plea that the Chinese Government had not met the demands for reparation with sufficient readiness, a naval squadron under the command of the Kaiser's brother, Prince Henry of Prussia, sailed for the China Sea with the intention of obtaining by force a concession of territory and the harbour of Kiao-Chao. This was the occasion of the notorious "mailed fist" manifesto, which indeed still remains the Kaiser's attitude towards foreign nations. He wishes to be friends with all the world, but to deserve this blessing all the world must do as he desires, otherwise the mailed fist! Such an impossible attitude could only end, as it is ending now, in a death-struggle: the uprising of the world against the mailed fist.

Prince Henry duly arrived with his squadron at the Bay of Kiao-Chao, in the Chantung Province of China, about 130 miles south-west of Wei-hai-Wei, where he landed marines and blue-jackets at the port of Tsing-Tao. This port was admirably situated both as a commercial *entrepôt* and as a naval base in the Far East. All China's offers of indemnity and reparation for the murder of the missionaries were refused, and the Chinese Government was given to understand that nothing but the cession, on lease, of Kiao-Chao would be accepted. Eventually, a treaty was signed, by which China abandoned to Germany, for ninety-nine years, the Bay of Kiao-Chao, with its lagoons and islands, and the peninsula on the southern extremity of which Tsing-Tao is situated, a territory of about 200 square miles.

A characteristic feature of this treaty was the fixing of a neutral zone, for a distance of fifty kilometres from the shores of the bay, in which zone China had no right of interference without the consent of Germany. The exploitation of the coal mines of the province of Chantung, together with very extensive railway concessions, were also reserved to Germany by this treaty.

Having secured these valuable concessions, Germany proceeded to organize the ceded territory as a fortress and commercial depôt. The fishing village of Tsing-Tao, on account of its position commanding the entrance of the port—only two and a half miles broad—was transformed into the capital of the colony. At the outbreak of hostilities it had become one of the chief ports of export in North China, the fifth in importance of the whole Empire. There were two anchorages for ships of the greatest tonnage, and three jetties. On one circular jetty shops for 2,000 workmen were erected, in which all ship repairs could be carried out, and small steamers built on the spot. There was a floating dock of 16,000 tons. The quays were completed in 1913. The population of the colony appears to have consisted of approximately 100,000 Chinese, 2,000 Europeans, exclusive of the European garrison, about 4,500 strong.

Tsing-Tao was the headquarters of the German China Squadron, of which, on the declaration of war, only obsolete craft, including two old cruisers (one Austrian, the "Kaiserin Elizabeth"), four gunboats, a torpedo-boat, and a destroyer (the two latter fifteen and sixteen years old respectively), were present in port. The torpedo-boat, however, the "S.90," proved itself a useful auxiliary in the defence of the place.

The rest of the squadron, all the modern part of it, was absent. The "Scharnhorst," the "Gneisenau," "Leipzig," "Nürnberg," and "Emden," under Admiral von Spee, were cruising; and on the arrival of the "Dresden," the squadron, with the exception of the "Emden," made for South American waters. The North German Lloyd liner, "Prinz Eitel Friedrich," was converted into a cruiser at Tsing-Tao, receiving the armament of two of the gunboats, and, with the "Emden" and four colliers, was employed on the trade routes in attacking British and Allied commerce. The exploits and fate of the "Emden" are well known.

To the east and north-east of the town of Tsing-Tao a series of hills cover the port from the land side, and these had been utilized to form two lines of permanent fortifications, designed, probably, in the year 1898, or soon after. The outer line was only from three to five miles from the town, consisting of Siao-Tchoun-Tchau and the Prinz Heinrich Heights (1,325 feet). The inner line comprised Forts Moltke and Bismarck (with barracks). Forts Kaiser, Iltis and Huchuin Huk fired seawards. The harbour was closed by a minefield, and there was a mine-layer in the port.

Owing to the increased range of modern guns, the land defences had been advanced another five miles, almost to the limits of the concession, field-works and entrenchments being prepared on the line Tau Chau—Tchai-Ko, with an outpost line in front and a second line in rear on the heights of the left bank (south) of the River Litsun, more or less midway between the river and the permanently fortified front of Siao-Tchoun-Tchau—Prinz Heinrich Hill.

The place was strong, almost impregnable against attack from the sea, and strong also against attack from the land side by a European expedition. But against Japan it was obviously weak,

because the garrison could be outnumbered, as might be thought advisable, by the land forces of a powerful empire, having command of the sea in those parts, from bases close at hand; and complete blockade was inevitable. Still, although with all communications cut, and entirely surrounded, the surrender of the fortress and colony must be only a question of time, the situation of Tsing-Tao at the extremity of a peninsula facilitating attack, 4,000 to 5,000 well-trained and disciplined troops in a fortified and commanding position might be expected to put up a strong and determined resistance, requiring a very considerable Allied military force (convoys and assisted by a powerful fleet) for its reduction.

Japan's ultimatum, delivered at Berlin and at Tokio to the German Ambassador on August 15th, required (1) the immediate withdrawal of Germany's naval forces from Japanese and Chinese waters, and (2) the evacuation of Kiao-Chao in the course of one month, the Japanese Government reserving to itself the eventual restitution of the territory to China.

Germany replied, on the 23rd, by withdrawing her Ambassador from Tokio and Japan declared war the same day; but as, in the circumstances, no other reply had been expected, a squadron conveying a large number of transports had already been despatched into the Yellow Sea.¹

On the 25th Austria went through the formality of declaring war on Japan.

For the details of the operations about to be described I am indebted to the *Paris Illustration*.²

At Tsing-Tao, in response to a telegraphic order from Berlin, the Governor made all preparations for opposing a desperate resistance to the Japanese. The railways within the concession were destroyed, together with all the monuments and prominent objects offering facilities for ranging. All Chinese villages north of the fortified front were evacuated and levelled. On August 18th he telegraphed to the Kaiser that the garrison would do its duty to the last.

On August 22nd Japanese subjects quitted the colony, and shortly after a Japanese squadron arrived before the Bay of Kiao-Chao. On the 27th the commander notified by wireless telegraphy the blockade of the coast of the German colony, and proceeded to land marines on the islands of Tai-Kung-Tao and Tchai-Tcha-Tao and to lay mines. On the 28th the "Suvo" (flagship of Admiral Kato), the "Tango," and the British warship "Triumph," bombarded the forts protecting the entrance of the bay.

On the 29th a second Japanese squadron, having for mission the surveillance of the communications with North China, arrived upon the scene, relieving the main squadron from all duties other than those immediately connected with the object of the expedition. Preparations for the disembarkation of troops on the coast of the neutral zone, north of German territory proper, in the Bay of Lao-Chan, were now

¹ A diplomatic note was published affirming Japan's intention of acting in all circumstances in accordance with her treaty engagements.

² March 9th, 1918.

in progress, and certain detachments of light troops and cavalry were landed early in September. The disembarkation of the main body was begun on the 18th, under the protection of the guns of the fleet; but the operation does not appear to have been seriously interfered with by the enemy.

The Commander-in-Chief, General Kamio, had under him three other Japanese Generals, Tuanchi, Hesagowa, and Yayamato, which would seem to indicate a division as about the strength of the Japanese Expeditionary Force, to which strength must be added some 2,500 British troops from the North China command, under Brigadier-General Barnardiston. This latter detachment landed on September 24th.

The Japanese cavalry force and light infantry, with technical troops, first disembarked, as mentioned above, had been landed before the main army, chiefly for the purpose of seizing the railway station of Kiao-Chao (west of the bay of that name and three miles inland) and occupying the line, militarily, as far as Tsi-Nan-Fou, the capital of Chantung.

Tsimo, an important town of the neutral zone, ten miles north of the German frontier, was also occupied.

By the end of September the railway, up to and including Tsi-Nan-Fou, was taken over by the Japanese. China protested, but Japan replied that, although the greater part of this line (Tsing-Tao to Tsi-Nan-Fou) was in Chinese territory, the railway had been constructed by Germany, was administered by that Power, and had been made use of for conveying supplies to the fortress of Tsing-Tao. It was therefore impossible, strategically, to allow the enemy to control the traffic of the line during the operations. The matter was settled amicably by leaving the administration of the railway in the hands of the Japanese, the Chinese directing the traffic. The question whether the line should be considered Chinese territory, or an extension of the territory ceded to Germany, to stand over till the end of the war.

The rapid seizure of this railway by the Japanese cavalry and technical troops, appears to have, quite possibly, prevented its systematic destruction by the Germans, although, in the circumstances, the threat to destroy it may have been only bluff with the object of inducing China to resist by force its occupation.

The Japanese main advance began on September 19th, the German outposts in the neutral zone being driven in after a sharp engagement and their supplies captured. On the 26th, General Kamio attacked the enemy's advanced position in his own territory, roughly on the front Nan-Chan—Tchai-Ko. Several lines of entrenchments were taken, and Nu-Ku-Kou (on the east coast of the Bay of Kiao-Chao) occupied by the right wing, while the Allied left entered Tchai-Ko. Fifty prisoners and four machine-guns were captured.

The German warships in the Bay of Kiao-Chao now came into action against the Allied right, and throughout the 27th the Japanese about Nu-Ku-Kou and Nan-Chan were cannonaded by the "Kaiserin Elizabeth," "Iltis," "Jaguar," and "S.90." No progress could be made during the day, until, towards evening, Japanese hydroplanes

went up, and, flying over the bay, regulated the fire of the fleet, which then succeeded in silencing the hostile craft. This obstacle to further advance having been overcome, Tsang-Kou was reached on the 28th by Japanese patrols.

On the left and centre Allied troops crossed the River Litsun and reached the heights south of that river on the 27th. On the 28th the Japanese and British, who were on this flank, attacked the enemy's positions midway between the Litsun and the permanent line of forts. In spite of determined resistance, all the positions dominating the aforesaid permanent front were taken by twelve noon. The enemy's great inferiority in numbers made, indeed, these defensive actions on a wide front in great measure simply retarding actions, and exceedingly difficult to sustain for any length of time. Either he must let his flanks be turned, or, by too great extension, be weak everywhere. The Allied warships, "Suvo," "Tango," and "Triumph," by bombarding the enemy's right flank and rear with 10- and 12-inch shells, contributed sensibly to the success of the attack.

The Allies were now before the front of the outer line of the permanent fortifications, their right being at Tsang-Kou, on the Bay of Kiao-Chao, and their left at Cha-Tsy-Kou on the Yellow Sea. Their front formed an arc, which completed the close investment of the fortress of Tsing-Tao, at a distance of from six to eight miles from the town. The more difficult part of the enterprise had now to be tackled, and considerable preparations were necessary before a further advance could be attempted.

The fleet continued to bombard the forts, aerial reconnaissances informing the Japanese Admiral of the results.

The German defences were cleverly concealed, and by a policy of vigilance, combined with economy of ammunition, the garrison of the fortress succeeded in twice surprising their opponents by a vigorous and unexpectedly active defence, and in this way considerably prolonged the siege. The first occasion was on October 2nd, when a detachment of Japanese Marines, seeking to gain ground, were surprised and driven from their original position by a counter-attack. The intervention of the Japanese reserves was required to re-establish the situation.

After this incident nothing of importance was attempted on the land side till the 14th, when the first combined bombardment of the place was begun.

On the coast side the cannonade was continued nearly every day. The German gunboats sowed mines in the roads outside the harbour, and the Allied torpedo-boats and minesweepers were continually engaged in destroying them under fire from the guns of the forts. One minesweeper was seriously damaged and another blown up by a mine. On the other side of the account, the German destroyer "Taku," was sunk by the Japanese siege guns. On October 8th the enemy gunboats, "Tiger" and "Fuchs," and the cruiser "Cormoran" (all three disarmed to fit out the "Prinz Eitel Friedrich" and the Russian steamer "Retzan") were sunk in the Bay of Kiao-Chao.

On the 10th the solitary German aeroplane tried to bombard the mine-sweepers, but was chased away by a Japanese aviator. On the 12th the Russian gunboat "Itis" was reduced to silence by the Japanese cruisers "Chitose" and "Takachiho." According to German reports, this latter vessel was sunk with nearly all hands, on the 17th, by the torpedo-boat "S.90."

The commander's report of his command at Kiao-Chao, which includes this exploit and a previous action with the British destroyer "Kennet," is of much interest, assuming, of course, that the incidents reported upon actually happened. It was published in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of March 30th, 1915. The following are extracts from this report:—

"We bombarded the enemy's outposts and patrols that we could see about Nuko-Ku, and we saw the 'Jaguar' and the 'Kaiserin Elizabeth,' which were up to this time (September 27th) in the port, impede with their fire the enemy's movements. But soon the Japanese brought up their artillery and put in position three or four heavy batteries, which prevented us from approaching too near the coast. The 'Jaguar,' however, paid little heed, and fought admirably, but was too bold. At last we were obliged to come back nearer the port. We were not touched, and, like the 'Jaguar,' remained in action till the end.

"On October 17th the Japanese experienced a heavy loss in the cruiser 'Takachiko,' which was sunk by the 'S.90.' This torpedo-boat, under cover of darkness, left the port and crossed the blockade line unperceived. We cruised for some hours outside the port, without meeting any hostile ships.

"About half-past one (in the morning of the 18th) a cruiser with one funnel and two masts appeared in the obscurity. We made immediately for the enemy at a sharp angle. The cruiser did not see us, for our stokers succeeded in making us approach her almost without smoke. At about five or six hundred yards from the ship I ordered the firing of two torpedos. At three hundred yards we fired the third torpedo.

"At the moment only of the explosions the enemy sounded the alarm. The explosions were terrible, especially the third. All around our boat enormous *débris* fell into the sea. Events followed each other with extraordinary rapidity. I saw the Japanese cruiser literally explode. Boilers, masts, cannons, funnels, tossed up in the air in an immense column of fire three hundred feet high. We steamed away, but it was only by lucky chance that none of the men on deck were injured. A bit of steel, weighing 6lbs., fell close to me, and a slab, three feet in diameter at least, fell in the sea after passing over us."

The lieutenant-commander makes a great deal of these comparatively minor dangers, but has little to say of the loss of the crew of the cruiser. How he gets the details of Japanese and British losses is difficult to understand if, as will be seen, he is interned in China.

The report continues: "Japanese destroyers rushed at once to the scene; but on account of the darkness, which rendered saving life

difficult, only nine men and one officer were picked up. Two hundred and fifty-four of the crew went down with the ship.

"The 'S.90' was pursued, but escaped in the darkness. Not being able to return to Tsing-Tao, or to reach Shanghai, she was blown up with the last torpedo, on the China coast, sixty miles from Kiao-Chao. The crew reached Nankin and were interned there."

Lieut.-Commander von Brunner also reports an engagement between the "S.90" and the British destroyer "Kennet," which took place on August 22nd, at sixteen miles south-east of the island of Tai-Kung-Tao. The "S.90" was making for Tsing-Tao, and the "Kennet," according to von Brunner, tried to cut her off. The engagement lasted half an hour, in which time the "S.90" fired 262 rounds. Beyond a stay of the aft mast broken, the "S.90" sustained no damage and had no casualties. "The British destroyer had received some projectiles in her funnels, on the deck, and on the bridge. She had her commander and three men killed and eight wounded."

A destroyer is probably a better target than a torpedo-boat, but how Lieut.-Commander von Brunner got these details is not stated.

On October 13th, General Kamio having informed the Governor by wireless of the Mikado's desire that non-combatants should have the opportunity of retiring from the fortress before the bombardment began, it was arranged, under a flag of truce, that the Japanese should escort a vessel to Tientsin, having on board the United States Consul, the wives and children of Germans, and a certain number of Chinese.

This action on the part of our Allies is only what we should expect from them. Although for centuries isolated from Christendom, and thus, until about the middle of the 19th century, necessarily absolutely ignorant of European manners and morals, yet they emerged at last, to our surprise, a chivalrous and civilized people. How highly civilized they must have been in Chinese civilization is proved by their extraordinary rapidity in assimilating the Western. General Kuropatkin, in his report on the operations of 1904-5, said that they were a good enemy, that in the chivalrous conduct of war left nothing to be desired.

How different is the German idea of frightfulness, born of a philosophy which, if suitable to war in Clausewitz's time, a hundred years ago, is altogether unfitted for the 20th century, as the event has undoubtedly shown! The civilized world spurns it in disgust and combats against it in righteous anger. Any sacrifice is better than a triumphant German militarism.

The burning and destruction of villages, which the Boche has had to evacuate on the Western Front by the recent Allied victories, has been gloated over in the German Press as the latest example of frightfulness.

On October 14th, immediately after the departure of the non-combatants, the bombardment of the forts and of the town of Tsing-Tao was begun by the Japanese siege artillery and by the warships. Forts Illis and Kaiser were partly destroyed by the latter; but Huchua Huk must have been a well-designed fort, for after receiving fifty

12-inch shells, besides those of other calibres, it still continued in action. A 9.5-inch shell, possibly from this fort, struck the "Triumph" amidships, obliging her to retire for repairs, to a Japanese port probably, as she was undoubtedly back again by the end of the month.

On the night of the 15th—16th Prinz Heinrich's Hill was taken by assault. Thanks to the cover of darkness, this commanding height, 1,550 feet high, was captured with only 150 casualties; but unfortunately at this juncture a typhoon intervened and caused a complete cessation of all military operations. Those who have lived in the Far East will well understand how impossible it would be to conduct any form of attack in a typhoon. The pontoons and landing stages in the Bay of Lao-Chan were destroyed during the gale.

As soon as the weather moderated the bombardment was resumed with 6-inch, 8-inch, and 9-inch siege guns and the heavier guns of the fleet. On October 29th the reservoir was captured, and instead of water, Tsing-Tao received over 200 12-inch shells, and on the 30th 240 more. The decisive assault was fixed for the 31st, the birthday of the Mikado; but local attacks were frequent, and an armistice asked for by the Germans, nominally for burying their dead, was refused. As the enemy's total losses in killed and died of wounds were only 170 for the whole campaign, it is probable that this demand for an armistice was made for reasons connected with the defence rather than for the purpose assigned.

During October 30th, the bombardment redoubled in violence, preparatory to the grand attack by 6,000 Japanese infantry, which had been timed to take place at six o'clock on the morning of the 31st. The enemy's forts appeared to have been reduced to silence, when suddenly, before the assault could be delivered, they opened fire on the siege batteries and troops.

It was a complete surprise to the Allies, and the carefully prepared attack, with which it had been intended to celebrate victoriously the Mikado's birthday, had to be, for the time being, abandoned. The Germans had protected their guns with blocks of stone and earth during the bombardment, and thus had been able to bring them into action again at the decisive moment.

Although there could only be one end to the struggle, this precaution prolonged the agony for another week.

The advantages of surprise being, on the 31st, rather on the side of the enemy than with the Allies, the assault was postponed and the bombardment resumed. On November 2nd a fire was provoked near the port, and two forts only were replying with any persistence. The fort of Siao-Tchoun-Tchau was in flames.

On the 3rd Admiral Kato proposed capitulation to the Governor (Captain Meyer Waldeck, of the Imperial German Navy) under honourable conditions. No answer having been received on the 4th, the bombardment was continued and increased to its fullest extent, reducing all the enemy's batteries to silence, by damaging the guns and emplacements, with the exception of Fort Huchuin Huk. The reserves of petrol caught fire. Fort Bismarck was silenced by H.M.S. "Triumph." A counter-attack attempted by the Germans by night was repulsed.

The British *communiqué* of November 4th stated that the fort situated to the east of Mount Itlis, constituting an important point of support to the right wing of the land front, as well as the works of Siao-Tchoun-Tchau, had been seriously damaged. The arsenal had suffered, and that, in Tsing-Tao, the petrol reserves were on fire. The Germans had replied feebly to the bombardment.

As a matter of fact, their ammunition was at this time running short, and for that reason alone they could not reply adequately to the bombardment. Their remaining ships in port were sunk. In these circumstances, under the protection of their overwhelming artillery fire, the attackers were able to advance their lines to close assaulting distance of the German positions. Fort Itlis and its advanced batteries were taken on the 5th, after the fort had been reduced to a mass of ruins and over twenty guns destroyed by the bombardment.

On the 6th the only German airman at Tsing-Tao, who would appear to have had a charmed life throughout the campaign, after burning his hangar, left for Shanghai by way of the air, and arriving safely was there interned.

The efforts of the Germans to repair the damages caused by the bombardment were now of no avail, and at a quarter to two on the morning of November 7th, the general attack on the fortress was begun by the capture of the fort of Siao-Tchoun-Tchau on the western flank of the defence. Two hundred prisoners were taken in this fort. At five a.m. the attack on the central positions was delivered. Forts Moltke and Bismarck were successively carried.

At six a.m. the white flag appeared on the flagpost of the observatory of Tsing-Tao. At half-past seven it floated from all the forts of the sea front, and twenty minutes later the capitulation preliminaries were signed by the governor of the fortress. The exact terms of surrender and other details, as accepted, were relegated to a commission composed of Major-General Yamanashi and Major Takahashi for the Japanese, and Colonel Sachsels for the Germans, with two legal officials as assistants, one Japanese and one German.

The place of assembly for this commission was Fort Moltke.

On the 8th the Allied troops (which included one or more units of our Indian Army) made their triumphant entry into Tsing-Tao. The forts not already captured, chiefly those on the sea front, and the public establishments were handed over on the 9th.

The Japanese losses in the final assault were only thirty-six killed and 182 wounded. The British had two officers wounded. Thus the capture of the great German fortress of the Far East had been accomplished with but slight loss to the land forces, and without undue sacrifice by the Japanese and British Navies. But on November 11th another casualty had to be added to the list of Japanese naval losses. The Torpedo-boat 33 sank while mine-sweeping in the Bay of Kiao-Chao. Ten men were killed and sixty wounded by the explosion.

The Germans lost 170 killed or died, and 636 wounded during the siege and operations preceding it. Of the crew of the Austrian cruiser, "Kaiserin Elizabeth," eight were killed and eight wounded. Besides the prisoners, some two to three hundred, taken by the Japanese during the operations, 3,600 surrendered at the capitulation.

All the enemy warships (with the exception of the torpedo-boat "S.32") and the floating dock were found sunk in the port.

The honours of war were accorded to the garrison (the officers retaining their swords), which was interned in Japan. The governor, Captain Meyer Waldeck, appears to have been wounded, but how seriously is not stated.

Baron Funachchi replaced him as the Japanese governor.

After Port Arthur, Tsing-Tao was, comparatively, an easy undertaking. Japan, moreover, in this case, had no other military operations on hand, and, as already remarked, could therefore detail whatever force was considered by her military authorities sufficient for the capture of the fortress and railway. She had the further advantage, with her British Ally, of unquestioned command of the China Seas, and was thus able to transport the troops in perfect safety to the point of disembarkation, which operation was not in any way interfered with by the enemy. In regard to numbers and *matériel*, the expedition would appear to have been almost exactly appropriate to the task allotted to it.

Fort Huchuin Huk, which, after constant bombardment with 12-inch shells, remained in action till the end, illustrated the strength of well-sited and well-organized sea defences against naval attack.

In the loss of Tsing-Tao and the Bay of Kiao-Chao the German spirit of domination received a severe blow. Chagrin, mixed with inordinate pride and boastfulness, and, in the case of the Kaiser, deliberate untruth as to the origin of the war, mark the following comments on the event, which appeared when the news reached Germany.

The first is that of the *Lokal Anzeiger*: "A miserable village of Chinese fishermen had become a striking testimony of German *Kultur*. In a few years it had been transformed into a town, the most beautiful, the most elegant, and the most up to date in all the East. This had awakened the jealousy of the narrow-eyed people of the Eastern Islands. But the violent impudence of these yellow thieves will never be forgotten here, nor that of England who aided them. The moment of settlement of accounts will surely come, and there will be then a cry of joy throughout Germany, as unanimous as is at this moment our feeling of grief."

The second comment is from the pen of the Kaiser himself, in reply to a telegram of condolence from the President of the Reichstag: "Tsing-Tao was a model establishment of German *Kultur* in distant seas. It had cost many years of labour. Its heroic defence is a new and sublime example of that spirit of sacrifice to death, which the German people, Army, and Fleet, have shown so often in the course of this defensive war, and which to-day they maintain against a world of hate, envy, and covetousness, a war that, if God wills, shall not be in vain."

It is really an extraordinary phenomenon that a nation, boasting as Germany has done so much of its culture, can be so untruthful and so barbarous in its methods of war.

The remarkable article, in the *Friedenswarte* for July-August of this year, by a well-known German writer, who signs himself "Artabanus," entitled "Facts and Conclusions," seems to denote an awakening of public opinion in Germany to the limitations of *Kultur*. He says, among other home-truths, which he calls "essential phenomena of four years of war": "No. 6. A Press quite on the same spiritual level as the people (moderately endowed, in its entirety, from an intellectual point of view, but industrially very advanced) and its leaders.

"No. 7. A Psychology that has pervaded the cultivated classes and others, gaining over University professors to the errors of the Greek Sophists, since they support the principle: '*there is no such thing as Right. Might is Right.*'"

In a note Artabanus adds: "Exchange between civilized nations reposes on reciprocal confidence. Prussian Ministers make no allusion to this truth, but confine themselves to the assertion: '*We deliver our products cheap, ergo, other nations will buy them. We have devastated, pillaged, massacred. What matters? Others want our goods.*'"

"It is thus they judge others by themselves."

It is, perhaps, significant that this article was allowed to appear



THE EXPEDITION TO OSTEND IN 1798.

BLOWING UP THE GATES OF THE BRUGES CANAL.

By G. E. MANWARING.

WHEN the French were elaborating their plans for an invasion of these islands in 1798, various proposals were considered by the British Government as to the most effective means of resisting such an attempt should it be made. Among them was one from Captain (afterwards Rear-Admiral Sir) Home Riggs Popham, who early in April of that year submitted to Earl Spencer, then First Lord of the Admiralty, a detailed and carefully thought out scheme for a joint naval and military expedition to Ostend, with the object of blowing up the basin gates and sluices of the Bruges Canal. In order to avoid the vigilance of the English cruisers the Canal was being used to convey a portion of the invasion flotilla from Flushing to Ostend and Dunkirk, and Popham pointed out to the Government the facility with which these important works could be demolished, thus interrupting the internal navigation between Holland, Flanders, and France, and preventing the concentration of the Dutch sections of the flotilla.

Popham, who was an advocate of offensive measures, had achieved considerable distinction as Naval Staff Officer with the Army on the Continent during the years 1794-5; and his intimate knowledge of maritime Flanders eminently fitted him for conducting such an operation. When he submitted his plan to Earl Spencer he was in command of the Deal to Beachy Head section of the Sea Fencibles, a naval militia which he had organized and carried into effect in the spring of 1798.

Although the general scheme which he propounded met with the approbation of the Government, the Admiralty, on account of Popham being "a very young captain" (he was then in his thirty-sixth year), hesitated to trust him with the undertaking. Popham thereupon appealed to General Sir Charles Grey, who was an ardent supporter of his scheme and policy, and finally, after some protest, the Admiralty decided to appoint him. Nevertheless, the half-hearted way in which they entered into the preparations for the expedition unduly delayed its departure, a delay which involved the loss of a spell of fine weather, and prevented the complete success of the enterprise. It was not until May 13th that Popham was able to report that the preparations had been nearly completed.

The troops which were to take part in the expedition numbered about 1,400 officers and men, under the command of Major-General Eyre Coote. All were embarked by the 13th, and Popham wrote that he hoped to put to sea that evening if the weather appeared at all settled. The squadron, which assembled at Margate, comprised

twenty-seven ships, and it is perhaps not uninteresting to note that both the naval and military commands devolved upon men who were still in their thirty-sixth year. The troops comprised four light companies of the First Guards, as many of the Coldstream and Third Guards, the light and grenadier companies of the 23rd and 49th Regiments, the 11th Foot, about 100 men of the Royal Artillery, and nine men of the 11th Light Dragoons.

By the 14th of the month all arrangements had been completed and the squadron proceeded to sea; but owing to a violent gale it was detained off the Kentish coast until the early morning of the 16th.

Its ultimate destination had been kept a profound secret, and it was not until the squadron had put to sea that Popham explained the object of the expedition, and furnished the commanders with instructions and charts to enable them to take up their respective stations in the night without making signals. Five ships were appointed to make "a feint to land to the westward of the town at daylight, and to endeavour to silence the batteries," and five others were "to keep the harbour open and be ready to set fire to any vessels on the east side, cut them out, or sink them." Part of the original plan was to sink obsolete ships in the harbour at Ostend; but for some reason or other this part of the programme was subsequently abandoned. Popham left nothing to chance, and his plans included the provision of armed cutters which were "to take stations at anchor if possible, at two leagues asunder, in a proper bearing, to lead the squadron directly to its object."

In order to assist the troops in their hazardous undertaking, a number of seamen were to be landed under the command of Captain Winthrop, of the "Circe," while Captain McKellar, of the "Minerva," with two lieutenants and a party of seamen and soldiers, was appointed to attend to the mines and carry them to the gates as expeditiously as possible. Popham hoped that a landing would be effected on the night of the 16th, but owing to an unfavourable change in the weather this was found impossible. Two days afterwards it was ascertained from a captured vessel that the transport schuyts, fitting at Flushing, were proceeding immediately by the canals to Ostend and Dunkirk, and both Popham and Coote were convinced of the necessity of making the attempt at once, "even under an increased degree of risk."

At one a.m. on the morning of the 19th the squadron reached its intended anchorage in front of the town, but the wind, shifting to the west and blowing hard, raised a heavy surf on the shore. While both commanders were deliberating whether to put to sea or not and await a more favourable opportunity, the "Vigilant," an armed lugger, succeeded in cutting out a pilot-boat from under the lighthouse battery. From the examination of those on board it was learnt that Ostend, Nieuport, and Bruges were held only by small garrisons, and Coote begged that the troops might be landed to accomplish the great object of destroying the Canal gates, trusting that the weather would moderate sufficiently for their safe re-embarkation. To this spirited proposal Popham at once agreed, and the men

were landed as speedily as possible without waiting for the pre-arranged order of debarkation. So successfully was this conducted that the enemy were not aware of their presence until some hours afterwards, and it was not until a quarter past four in the morning that the Ostend batteries opened fire on the ships, which was instantly replied to by the three nearest gun-vessels. Soon afterwards the bomb-ketches "Hecla" and "Tartarus" began throwing their shells with great quickness and precision into the town, setting it on fire in several places, and inflicting considerable damage on the ships lying in the basin. By five o'clock practically all the troops were on shore with their artillery; and the mines, petards, gunpowder, and other materials for blowing up the Canal gates had also been landed.


Before six o'clock Coote had expressed his confidence in being able to blow up the sluices, but owing to the state of the weather Popham records that he became "very anxious for the situation," and in consequence all the gun-boats that had been anchored to the eastward of the town were instructed to get as near the shore as possible to cover and assist the troops. Coote, however, eventually succeeded in pushing forward four companies to seize the approaches to the lock. The rest of the troops had been successfully disposed of so as to prevent the enemy from crossing the harbour from Ostend and interrupting the operations. By 10.20 a.m. the locks and sluices, which had taken five years to complete, were successfully blown up, as well as several vessels intended for transporting troops.

Having now accomplished the mission with which they had been entrusted, the troops made haste to return to the beach, which they succeeded in regaining by eleven a.m., with the trifling loss of five killed and wounded. Popham hoped to have re-embarked them all by mid-day, but the wind and surf had increased to such an extent that it was found impossible to take off a single man. Anxious for the safety of his force, and in the hope that the wind would moderate by the following day, Coote decided to entrench himself on the sandhills near the coast. In this position the troops lay on their arms throughout the night, impatiently waiting for a favourable opportunity to get back to the ships, an opportunity which unfortunately never presented itself. During the night the wind increased in violence, and about four o'clock the next morning two strong columns of the enemy were perceived advancing on their front, and others upon their flanks, having been hastily collected from Ghent, Bruges, and Dunkirk. The action which followed was maintained with great gallantry against overwhelming odds for several hours, and it was not until Coote himself had been severely wounded, and the helplessness of the position had become apparent, that it was decided to capitulate. The losses of the force then amounted to 163 killed and wounded (including two naval officers and fourteen seamen), and the prisoners totalled 1,134 officers and men.

Then as now the carrying out of such offensive measures as this acted as a splendid tonic to the nation, besides worrying the enemy and keeping him in a constant state of alarm. Contemporary opinion

on such a policy finds its expression in a letter from the Marquis of Buckingham, written soon after Popham's expedition. "I am extremely happy in the success of your very important and very well-directed attempt upon Ostend," he wrote. "The arrangements and the secrecy do great honour to Government, and I trust that you will be encouraged to persevere in this offensive war, which is the only real defensive war. You know how much I have groaned over the want of desultory attempts on the Flemish and Dutch coasts, and you will judge how much I have been gratified by the complete success of this blow. I call it complete, for the subsequent misfortune could not have been foreseen, was not necessarily connected with the blow, and, even if it were so, must have been met with your eyes open and faced for an object so important as that which you have accomplished."

The same indomitable spirit, and the same splendid daring that was displayed in 1798, pulsates to-day through the heart of the nation, but we wonder how many of those who sailed from the Kentish coast for Ostend in 1918 were aware that their ancestors had embarked from that self-same shore, on a similar mission, one hundred and twenty years before.



A REGRETTABLE INCIDENT.

By MAJOR E. E. FORBES.

ON September 10th, 1780, there occurred at the village of Perambaucum, near Conjeveram, in the Madras Presidency, a "regrettable incident" which aroused considerable feeling at the time, led to much suffering, and is commemorated to this day in a spirited fresco on the walls of a garden palace at Seringapatam. But for some extraordinary reason it has never (so far as is known) found its way into a military text book, although the problems it presented were difficult, have several times been presented, and the method of their solution might advantageously have been included in the studies of talented youth.

A number of men were involved, all deservedly famous in their day; the affair constituted the unfortunate baptism of fire of a distinguished regiment, and afforded one of its officers, himself subsequently a Paladin of renown, the unique experience of undergoing four years' miserable captivity in a fortress at whose eventual capture, on "the glorious 4th May, 1799," he was destined to bear a conspicuous part. It is, therefore, not merely instructive, but, still better, vividly interesting as well.

During July, Hyder Ali, illiterate but vigorous Sultan of Mysore, swept down the ghauts and invested Arcot. The whole country round Madras swarmed with his excellent light cavalry, and on the 24th a large body of them appeared before the astounded city. On that day belated measures were taken to relieve the situation. Various far-flung detachments were called in, and it was decided by the amateur strategists of the Governor's Council, His Excellency Major-General Sir Hector Munro,¹ Commander-in-Chief, thereto assenting, to march as early as possible on Conjeveram. This strategic movement, it was opined, would bring the Army to a populous and well-found town, roughly half-way between Madras and Arcot, where generous depôts could be established, the outlying detachments conveniently welcomed, and presumptuous Hyder overawed.

Lord McLeod² was accordingly sent for from the cantonment of Poonamallee, where he had lately arrived with his newly-raised regiment of Highlanders, then numbered the 73rd. But as he vigorously objected to the contemplated plan of campaign, Sir Hector Munro assumed the command.

On August 26th he moved from the Mount with a force "estimated" by himself at 5,209 of all ranks,³ and reached Conjeveram three days later.

Among the detachments ordered to return to the Presidency was one at Nellore, under Colonel William Baillie,⁴ composed of some 3,000 men.⁵ On August 24th it had reached Goomerapandy, twenty-seven miles north of Madras, when Sir Hector Munro's directions

1-5 See Notes at end of article.

were received diverting it to Conjeveram. The route was changed, and on the 27th it arrived at Vungul, on the Corteliar River. During the night the stream rose, and could not be crossed until September 3rd.

On that day Hyder took up a position six miles west of Conjeveram, "containing" Munro, and sent off a force under his son Tippoo to fall upon Baillie.⁶

On the 6th Baillie was engaged from 11 a.m. to 2 p.m. near Perambaucum, fourteen miles north of Conjeveram. He beat off his assailants, but reported to Headquarters that he could not advance further, and asked the Commander-in-Chief to move to his help. The letter was delivered to Munro on the 8th.

Meanwhile Hyder had established himself between Conjeveram and Perambaucum, compelling Munro to change front from west to north.

The occasion was exacting. Munro decided that he could not leave his stores at Conjeveram, but ordered a "strong detachment," under Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher,⁷ to proceed to Colonel Baillie's assistance. His reasons can best be given in his own words, contained in his report of the 21st to the Government:—

"I found myself now in a very critical situation; the only hope of provisions was from the paddy I had collected in the pagoda; the enemy were encamped within two miles of me; had I marched with my whole force he most certainly would have possessed himself of my ground and Conjeveram, and thereby cut me off from all my provisions. In this case we must have starved.

"I therefore, with the concurrence of the officers of the army with me, resolved to send a strong detachment to Lieut.-Colonel Baillie, who was still at Perambaucum, fourteen miles from me on the Tripasore road; and to remain with the rest of the troops to watch the enemy's motions.

" I flattered myself so strong a detachment, when joined to Lieut.-Colonel Baillie's corps, would enable him to join me, and I desired Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher to tell him to begin his march in the evening of September 9th, and march all night towards me."

Pursuant to these arrangements, Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher set off on the night of the 8th. His guides were in Hyder's pay and did their best to mislead him, but he cleverly outwitted them and brought his party safely into Baillie's camp early on the morning of the 9th. A notable example of a successful night march.

At Conjeveram tents were struck, and the men lay under arms. Firing was heard about midnight, but it soon ceased and occasioned no disquietude.

At 8 p.m. on the 9th Baillie resumed his march. Fire was opened on his column, but soon silenced, and the troops were preparing to continue their way when, against the Commander-in-Chief's orders and Fletcher's protests, Baillie determined to halt until daylight. He was then nine miles from Conjeveram.

During the night Munro remained stationary. Hyder sent off his guns and infantry towards Perambaucum, and at 4 a.m. on the 10th,

⁶⁻⁷ See Notes at end of article.

followed to assume command. He was a personage of great shrewdness, and held a correctly low view of his son's capacity.

At dawn Baillie again set forward. He had gone two miles when four or five guns opened on his left, and Tippoo's "select horse" charged. The charge was repulsed with heavy loss, and the N.I. Grenadiers advanced on the troublesome guns. They took some, but being charged in flank by fresh bodies of cavalry, fell back in disorder.

Baillie now formed in line along the bank of a nullah, and an artillery duel ensued for an hour.

At 7 a.m. clouds of dust were observed, drums heard, and the appearance of red-coated troops aroused the fallacious hope that Munro was at hand. It proved instead to be the vanguard of Hyder's army. From fifty to sixty guns soon opened, two tumbrils blew up, and the camp followers, rushing in for protection, caused considerable confusion. Fletcher, apprehensive for the rearguard, took the Grenadiers of the 73rd to its assistance and was never seen again.

Baillie, severely wounded, now formed square on a rising ground hard by. Ammunition was giving out, but thirteen cavalry charges were beaten off. Further resistance, however, seemed hopeless. At last, about 10 a.m., Baillie tied his handkerchief to his sword as a flag of truce and ordered Baird, now second-in-command, to cease fire. The signal being disregarded, the men were directed to ground arms. This had no sooner been done than the Mysoreans rushed in, and a scene of indiscriminate slaughter ensued, only terminated by the intervention of some French officers.

A testimony from one of these bears eloquent evidence to the gallantry of the ill-fated detachment, and incidentally reveals the numbers by which it was overwhelmed:—

"Too great encomiums cannot be bestowed on the English commander and his troops, for in the whole of this trying conflict they preserved a coolness of manœuvre which would have done honour to any soldiers in the world. Raked by the fire of an immense artillery, the greater part of the action within grape-shot range, attacked on all sides by not less than 25,000 horse and thirty battalions of sepoys, besides Hyder's European troops, the English column stood firm and repulsed every charge with great slaughter. The horse driven back on the foot, the right of our line began to give way, though composed of the best troops in the Mysore Army."

It is said that Hyder had in fact thought of abandoning the adventure, being ever disposed to save his guns by an early withdrawal: but changed his mind on a timely caution from M. Lally that Munro was behind him.

Of eighty-six European officers, including staff and surgeons, thirty-six were killed or died of wounds, and fifty, of whom thirty-four were wounded, were taken prisoners. The loss of men was in proportion, but 200 Europeans, most of them wounded, fell into the enemy's hands.

At dawn of this eventful day firing had been heard at Conjeveram, and Munro marched four miles towards Perambaucum. Smoke was then seen rising on the left, but direction was nevertheless changed

to the right, although it was "obvious" to many present that the guides (in Hyder's pay as usual) were leading the column away from the scene of action.

Two miles further on, a wounded sepoy brought news of Baillie's disaster. It seems probable that the fight was not then over; but, despite Lord McLeod's urgent remonstrances, Munro retired on Conjeveram.

The town was reached at 6 p.m., heavy guns and stores were thrown into a large tank, and early on the 11th the army was in full retreat on Madras. It was closely pressed by Hyder's horse, and the rearguard, composed exclusively of N.I. ("a most suggestive circumstance"), lost 500 men before gaining Chingleput at dawn on the 12th. Camp at Marmalong, near the Mount, was gratefully entered at 1 a.m. on the 14th.

The whole episode was a severe blow to our prestige, and was naturally severely criticised, especially in India. But criticism is often indulged in by those who are imperfectly acquainted with the facts and unlikely to have done any better themselves. A survey to be useful must be impartial, and it must try to realize as far as possible the actual conditions existing at the period under review. In every war the commanders have to consider and make the best of numerous conditions, many unfavourable to the plan they conceive to be the best. Its execution may be hindered or fatally compromised by circumstances beyond their control. They are not unfettered, and the element of luck plays a large share in their success or failure. In the present instance Sir Hector Munro had many defenders, amongst them those who suffered from his conduct. His personal courage was beyond suspicion, and he knew his business as well as any of his contemporaries.

Napoleon had not yet been heard of, and so our forefathers were without the benefit of his apothegm that "an army marches upon its belly." In India, at any rate, lack of food constantly interfered with the best-laid plans. Those of Sir Hector Munro were no exception to the rule. Being a careful commander, the difficulty evidently obsessed him. No decent commissariat arrangements existed. Agents of our august ally, the Nawab of Arcot, were supposed to provide supplies, and invariably failed to do so. We were not in a state to flout his assistance. Hence we had to rely upon what we rightly surmised would prove a broken reed, and endeavour to smile when it pierced our hand. Munro, at Conjeveram, was practically tied to his base. He could not move anywhere for two or three days without facing starvation.

Again, Sir Hector Munro's army was without cavalry or respectable transport, whilst Hyder's possessed both to an eminent degree. Our operations against the Sultan accordingly resembled a game of blind man's buff, in which we were the blind man. His infantry was mediocre, but he could seldom be brought to action unless he chose, and nearly always broke it off when he wanted. At other times he manoeuvred around us at will. Furthermore, he indulged in "methods of frightfulness" which cowed every native of the country he chose to cross, and had a superb Intelligence Department. Every source

of information was tainted. The very guides upon whom we had to rely were in his pay. The trouble was not insuperable, as Fletcher proved in his brilliant night march; but it partly explains why Munro failed to find Baillie. The echoes of the guns are deceptive, as Grouchy learned at Waterloo.

Some of these difficulties we encountered in South Africa during 1899-1901, and those who have experienced them will most profoundly mourn the lack of mobility which has so often been our besetting military sin.

Campaigning was conducted aforetime in India in leisurely, comfortable style. Immense quantities of stores, hordes of public and private followers, accompanied the smallest column. A Captain had a palatial tent, suitably equipped; a General was apportioned scores of attendants. All these increased the strain upon an exiguous commissariat, had to be guarded, and, as at Perambacum, hampered the movements of the troops.

The order to concentrate at Conjeveram has been pointed to as a blunder. Lord McLeod protested against it; and in all probability Baillie could have reached Madras in perfect safety. Hyder was in practical possession of the surrounding country. A sounder military disposition might have been for Munro to wait at the Presidency until joined by the detachment, and it may be assumed that he did not overlook it.

But he was a member of the Governor's Council, the majority of that august body plumped for Conjeveram at the instigation of the Nawab of Arcot, and he may have considered that political reasons were sufficiently cogent to outweigh military. Arcot was our ally's capital, Hyder's proceedings were a deep affront to that potentate and compromised our own honour throughout the Carnatic. The occupation of Conjeveram would at least redeem a part of the Nawab's possessions, and afford (so the Nawab averred) an excellent and well-provisioned base of operations.

The decision arrived at was one subordinating military to civil arguments. There have been many such since, but it unfortunately provided a lurid instance of their innate viciousness. Even then, however, it might have been pulled off, but for terribly bad luck.

Apparently, when Baillie reached the north banks of the Corteliar, on August 25th, the stream was fordable. In that case, if he had crossed at once, he might have executed his mission successfully. But there must have been difficulties he considered insuperable, and, not being a prophet, he waited "till he could see about him." It was the rainy season when rivers descend in sudden spate, and in the event he was delayed nine days. That gave Hyder ample time to arrange a warm reception for him. It doubtless equally warned Munro of his danger.

When, on September 8th, Munro received Baillie's letter of the 6th, he was confronted with a complication which cannot have surprised him. Two courses would seem to have been open. Conjeveram offered several strongly-walled and easily-defensible positions. He could have left his prized provisions under a strong guard within

them, and marched with his main force to join Baillie. Hyder stood in the way, but he was reasonably certain of defeating if he could once catch him, and he would have fought close to his base. Hyder driven off, Baillie would have been comparatively safe. The two forces could soon have united, and the campaign opened under promising prospects.

Failing this, he could, as he did, send a "strong detachment" to Baillie, and himself remain at Conjeveram. There was the risk to be considered that the detachment might be intercepted and crushed by Hyder. It fell, as a matter of fact, upon his outposts, but managed to elude them.

If the detachment succeeded in reaching Baillie, Munro was perhaps justified in hoping that the combined force would be strong enough to push its way to Conjeveram. British troops were accustomed to defeating vastly superior numbers. Munro had done it conspicuously at Buxar. But the same reasoning failed to suggest that it would proportionately be far simpler for him to trample on Hyder than for Baillie to essay that feat.

Munro was torn between anxiety to succour Baillie and concern for his stores. He was not an irresolute man, but in his perplexity he succumbed to what is alleged to be the last resort of the weak-minded, and called a council of war. It was a pity. Those assemblages have rarely proposed heroic measures. Their constitution invites compromise. They do not relieve the commander from responsibility, but oft-times merely provide him with an excuse for doing something he would rather not.

In this case they hit on the idea which was carried out. It was not the best one, but it was calculated to save the General's face and preserve the scanty stock of provisions. McLeod and others objected, but the casting vote was given by an officer said to have been actuated by the base fear of being superseded if Baillie returned. The story is almost incredible, yet its currency affords an estimate of the opinion generally formed of the verdict. It may be believed that Munro would personally have preferred to march on Perambacum, but he accepted the compromise.

His orders to Baillie were sound, but they omitted the possibility of that officer's being unable to carry them out, and no arrangement was made to meet that contingency. Baillie did consider obedience impossible. He would not have done so except upon extreme urgency, and although he may be blamed, it is germane to recollect that, if matters are to be conducted well, "the man on the spot" must be trusted. The superior at a distance cannot be acquainted with local conditions at any given moment, and must leave their management to the subordinate who is confronted with them. Disregard of that golden rule has several times led to disaster.

Baillie was fully aware of the danger he ran by halting on the evening of the 9th. He weighed the situation, and decided that the risk entailed in advancing during darkness was greater than that of waiting for daylight. He may have been wrong. Fletcher thought he was so. But he may have been right. It is impossible to say what might have happened under conditions which did not eventuate.

Two considerations may have influenced him. He was within an easy march of Conjeveram, the sound of his guns could be heard in the Headquarters camp. And he never doubted that Munro would come to his help. All through the narrative that note is insistent. There is no proof that he had been given any such promise; probably he never supposed that it was needed.

As it turned out, his disobedience of the instructions sent him contributed towards the misfortune that befell. It was one of the examples of bad luck that dogged the campaign.

Munro's wanderings on the 10th are less easy to account for. His guides were notoriously untrustworthy, and it is difficult to imagine that he was ignorant of the fact. Yet they were permitted to lead the troops a wild goose chase, while Baillie's whereabouts was well known. The news given by the scared sepoy was admitted as confirmation of the worst, although firing was still going on within a few miles.

It can only be concluded that Munro was flustered and despondent. Perhaps he was in bad health. He had already left an important decision to a council of war, and the details of the hurried retreat he executed on Madras (as, for instance, that "suggestive" placing of N.I. alone in the rearguard), indicate that for the time he had lost grip. Illness has before now altered the course of events. Napoleon was not his old self at Waterloo. It was another stroke of hard luck that, at Conjeveram, Munro should have been in like evil case.

Sixteen years after the tragedy an officer of the 71st visited what the men of the corps still called "the field of blood." Many traces yet existed of the struggle. They have long since disappeared. But up at Seringapatam, whither Hyder presently repaired, and where so many of the prisoners were evilly treated, a few mementos yet survive.

On the walls of the Durya Doulut a Mysorean artist fancifully depicted the scene. Baillie is represented by his palankeen, lackadaisically inhaling the perfume of a rose, and there are other exuberant touches. The work was preserved by the future Duke of Wellington's orders when he occupied the house in 1799, and contains useful hints on the uniforms worn.

Baird's prison was a temporary structure near the palace, and only its site remains. But the breach made by our avenging batteries in the walls of the fortress, and the ford across which he led the assaulting column on that "glorious 4th May, 1799," are clearly marked. There is something peculiarly depressing about the place, it seems accursed. The only sound to be heard is the plaint of the waters of the turgid Cauvery, everlastingly singing a remorseful dirge.

NOTES.

1.—After serving in the 48th Foot (present 1st Northamptonshire), Sir Hector Munro brought the corps, then numbered 89th (and since reduced), to India in 1761. He was the illustrious victor of the Battle of Buxar, October 23rd, 1764. He commanded the Madras Army from 1778 till his return home in 1781; capturing Pondicherry in the former year, and serving under Sir Eyre Coote at Porto Novo, and reducing the Dutch settlement of Negapatam, during the latter. It adds to

the sadness of the regrettable incident that it should have occurred during the command of so gallant a soldier.

2.—Lord McLeod, eldest son of the Earl of Cromarty, had risen to the rank of Lieut.-General in the Swedish service, when, in 1778, an opportunity occurred for joining that of his own country. Several towns as well as private gentlemen were raising regiments; memories of "the '45" were growing kindlier. He was graciously received by the King, and had soon enrolled two battalions of McLeod's Highlanders. With the 1st, recruited at Elgin and temporarily numbered 73rd, he landed at Madras. The battalion soon afterwards became the 71st (now the 1st Highland Light Infantry). It suffered severely from sickness during its first month on the deleterious coast, and was then moved up to comparatively salubrious Poonamallee. At the Battle of Porto Novo its pipers beguiled tedium by strutting along the sand hills playing lustily, and delighted Sir Eyre Coote presented the regiment with a set of silver-mounted pipes.

3.—European cavalry, 35; artillery, 315; 73rd, 638; 2nd/1st Europeans, 351; Grenadiers (2nd/2nd Europeans), 105; cadet company, 32; 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 21st N.I., 3,391; company of marksmen, 111.

4.—During 1764 the King's troops serving on "the coast" sailed for England. They were the 79th (Draper's), 84th (Coote's), 89th (Highland), and 96th; 584 rank and file, however, joined the Company's service, and several officers did the same, such of them as induced fifty men to accompany them being granted the rank of Captain. Amongst these was Lieutenant William Baillie, of the 89th. He long commanded the 4th N.I. After the disaster at Perambacum he was imprisoned at Seringapatam and died there, not without well-founded suspicion of having been poisoned, like many others. Most of the N.I. battalions were commanded at this time by selected ex-officers of King's regiments, and the billet, being a highly lucrative one, was much sought after, with the happiest results on the efficiency of the sepoy. This was further enhanced by the attachment of a European sergeant (also from a King's regiment) to each company.

5.—Artillery, eighty-one of all ranks; European infantry, 113; N.I., 2,606; a company of marksmen. The N.I. were composed of the 1st, 7th, and 11th Carnatic and the 2nd Circar battalions. The nomenclature had been adopted in 1769, when certain battalions were told off for employment in outlying districts and dubbed Circar, as against those who continued normally to serve in the Carnatic. The former were much scattered, deteriorated, and some were disbanded. At a later date all were called Madras. When the Presidential Armies were abolished a few years ago, and all Indian regiments placed on one list, the survivors of the Madras N.I. were once more styled Carnatic.

6.—Hyder's army was thought to consist of 28,000 cavalry, 15,000 regular, and 40,000 irregular infantry, 5,000 pioneers, and 2,000 pertinacious rocket men. He especially prided himself upon his guns, which were drawn by the famous Mysore oxen and remarkably mobile. But contemporary historians are lax in mentioning the number of guns employed on either side. The force detached under Tippoo is variously given at from 40,000 "horse and foot" with twelve guns, to 5,000 foot and 6,000 horse with eighteen guns. There were further in Hyder's host two troops of French cavalry under M. Pinoran, 500 European infantry under M. Lally "the younger," and 100 guns.

7.—Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher had been a Captain in the 42nd Highlanders, and, entering the Company's service about 1760, was given command of the 11th N.I. His detachment consisted of 301 Europeans and 706 natives, or 1,007 in all. Grenadier company 73rd under Lieutenant Lindsay; light company 73rd under Captain Baird; two Grenadier companies Europeans; ten Grenadier companies 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 21st N.I.; a company of marksmen. Lieutenant Lindsay was one of the fortunate few who survived the catastrophe, and gave much information. He was a strong defender of Sir Hector Munro. At the age of fifteen, Lieutenant David Baird had been gazetted Ensign in the 2nd Foot in 1772. That gallant corps was then at Gibraltar, but returned to England in 1775 after an absence of fifty years! Upon the formation of the 73rd Baird was posted to it as Captain-Lieutenant, and in June, 1778, was promoted to a Captaincy antedated six months.

THE LIGHT INFANTRY COMPANY OF YORE.

By A. D. L. CARY.

CURIOSLY enough, it was not until late in 1770 that Light Infantry companies were officially recognized, although the need for them, trained and equipped as such, was apparent in 1757. In this year, Lord Howe, realizing their potential utility, raised regiments for the purpose, and, as is recorded in Lieut. W. A. Gordon's diary of the Siege of Louisburg, 1758, three of the regiments taking part in that siege, viz., the 22nd, 40th, and 45th, possessed Light Infantry companies. This example was followed in March of the following year, when the 60th, or Royal American Regiment, formed at Albany a Light Infantry company, consisting of one sergeant, one corporal, and twelve private men, from each company. By warrant, dated December 25th, 1770, Light Infantry companies were added to eighteen marching regiments of foot then stationed in North America. Four years later the following regiments in South Britain had Light Infantry companies, viz., the 3rd, 11th, 21st, 32nd, 36th, and 70th. It was not, however, until June, 1783, that they became a distinct feature of the regimental system. It would have been a pleasant task to record from 1783 onwards all the changes in clothing and equipment that distinguished the Light Infantry company from the grenadier and battalion companies, but this, it is feared, can never be accomplished, for the following reason: Towards the middle of the year 1837 the curator of the sealed patterns of clothing deposited in the office known as the "Board of General Officers appointed to inspect and examine the clothing of the Army," was horrified to find that they were extensively infected by moths. In consequence of this discovery, the Board of General Officers decided to lose no time in getting together as complete a set as possible of patterns of articles of clothing and appointments for preservation in the Tower of London, whither they were transferred in due course. The moths were thus baulked of their prey, but they were speedily revenged, as, unfortunately, the whole collection was consumed in the fire that raged, with most disastrous results, at the Tower on October 30th, 1841.

The most, therefore, that can be done under these circumstances, is to bring to notice such of the changes in clothing and equipment during the period of the official existence of the Light Infantry company (1783-1858), as the writer of this article, mindful of the dictum of Captain Cuttle, has been enabled to jot down from time to time. In the accoutrement warrant of July 21st, 1784, it was laid down that the horn and bullet bag worn by Light Infantry men were to be discarded, and a priming horn, to hold 2 oz. of powder, was substituted in lieu. The same warrant decreed that the horn and hatchet were not to be

fixed to the accoutrements as hitherto, and that the cap, which was to be of black leather, should be in exact conformity to the sealed pattern which at a later period was no doubt attacked by the moths, and eventually perished in the flames. On February 1st, 1796, the Adjutant-General informed the Secretary to the Clothing Board (as it was styled colloquially) that the pocket flaps of Light Infantry companies should be made oblique or slashed, and later, on September 4th in the following year, he intimated that a green feather was to be worn by them, in contradistinction to the red and white feather to be worn by battalion officers and men, and the plain white feather of the grenadiers. Towards the close of the year 1799 the Adjutant-General intimated to the Clothing Board that the tufts used by the grenadier companies were to be white, while those of the Light Infantry were to be of dark green. He added that all soldiers were to wear the button of their respective regiments in the centre of the cockade, except the grenadiers, who were directed to wear the grenade in the centre of the cockade, and the Light Infantry men a bugle horn in the centre of their cockade. By General Order of February 19th, 1810, it was laid down that captains of flank companies who had the brevet rank of field officer, were to wear wings in addition to their epaulettes. In the case of the Light Infantry a bugle horn was placed below the device, which was a star. Captains and subaltern officers were directed to wear a wing on each shoulder. If they belonged to the Light Infantry company a bugle horn was added. The epaulettes and wings worn by field officers and captains were to be of bullion, while those of the subaltern officers were to be of fringe. In November, 1814, the Adjutant-General informed the Secretary to the Clothing Board that the wings of the coats of the flank companies might be ornamented with fringe, and that the shoulder-strap of the battalion companies could have a small fringe tuft. From the meagre official correspondence of the period, dealing with matters appertaining to clothing, which is still in existence, we learn that the Horse Guards forwarded to the Clothing Board on April 19th, 1817, among other approved patterns, a Light Infantry private's shako, with green plume complete. It is probable that in 1823 some alteration was made in the wings and tufts worn by non-commissioned officers and men, as there is a reference in a volume at the Public Record Office to a memorandum which was addressed by the Adjutant-General to the Army Agents, dated June 17th, 1823, in which he informs them that patterns of the articles referred to therein, which were to be worn by N.C.O.'s and men, distinguishing grenadier, Light Infantry, and battalion companies, had been deposited at the office of the Clothing Board. Coatees to be worn instead of jackets by N.C.O.'s and men of regiments and companies of Light Infantry is the next change in the clothing of the latter, of which the writer has a note. It is notified by the Clothing Board to the Horse Guards in a letter dated March 16th, 1826, and is prefaced by the remark that it is in reference to a recent alteration in the pattern coat of the infantry. In January, 1834, a new forage cap was adopted for the infantry—Light Infantry companies were directed to wear a bugle over the brass figures. The

Horse Guards Circular Memorandum of January 16th, 1855, laid down that the worsted ball tuft worn by Light Infantry companies was to be green, and the socket to hold it to be gilt. The hundred years' existence of the Light Infantry company came to an end when, by Horse Guards Circular Memorandum of 29th January, 1858, it was decreed that regiments and battalions of the line (Foot Guards and Colonial Corps excepted) should in future consist of ten service companies and two dépôt companies.

The Light Infantry company consisted of strong active men picked from the battalion companies, and was maintained by the inclusion therein from time to time of the most promising recruits. The arms were generally carried at the slope and with fixed bayonets. Flanking or advanced parties were, however, permitted to carry them trailed, and without bayonets, with the object of taking deliberate aim. It acted frequently as scouts, either on the flank or in the front or the rear of the body of troops to which it belonged. By their deeds the Light Infantry men showed incontestably that they were the eyes of the Army, and any claim to have been indispensable that might be put forward by the shades of these departed warriors would doubtless be ungrudgingly allowed by their comrades in arms, to whose success in many a hard-fought struggle they so materially contributed.



SOME SURVIVALS IN MILITARY COSTUME.

By LIEUTENANT-GENERAL F. H. TYRRELL.

THE question is sometimes asked whether the termination of the present World War will witness the resumption of all the pomp and parade of military display and martial finery which have lent such splendour to the Courts and camps of the monarchs and the States of Europe from the time of the Field of the Cloth of Gold downwards to our own more democratic days. The rifle and aeroplane scouting have banished feathers and finery and military millinery from the modern battlefield; but the natural delight in brilliant colours, and the artistic eye for picturesque costumes, will most likely override considerations of utility and economy and restore to royal pageantry and civic processions their former adjuncts of martial music and military display. It may be worth while noting that the period immediately following on the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars which involved all Europe for more than twenty years, from 1793 to 1815, was the period in which the expense and extravagance of military tailoring reached its high-water mark. The experience of the horrors and the sacrifices of war seems to have been obliterated by the contemplation of its glories and its heroisms; and military costume, the extravagances of which had been limited by the severe exigencies of twenty years of campaigning, now blossomed forth with a new magnificence that was both useless and tasteless. Head-dresses of abnormal height, garments absurdly tight, epaulettes and aiguillettes that cost more than the coat on which they were worn, tall plumes, furred pelisses, embroidered sabre-tasches, and expensive bedizenments of all kinds added to the vanity and increased the discomfort of the soldier.

Much of this extravagant display was due to the example set by Napoleon, who, like many other great men, had a keen appreciation of the weak points of human nature, and found his profit in playing upon them. He himself habitually wore the simple undress uniform of a Colonel of one of his regiments of Guards; but he knew the value of the maxim that "Fine feathers make fine birds," and he introduced many new varieties of uniforms into his army; and he evidently set some value on the appearance made by troops on the field of battle, and its effect upon the nerves of the enemy. The Grenadiers of his Imperial Guard wore their undress cocked hats on the march and carried their huge bearskin caps in a linen bag slung on the outside of their knapsacks. The crimson side-plume was carried separately in a tube strapped to the bayonet scabbard. On the morn of battle the plumes were affixed and the caps put on before the corps went into action.

Napoleon reintroduced the lance and the cuirass into the cavalries of Europe, from whose ranks they had been long since banished by the invention of firearms. The lance, the weapon of chivalry *par excellence*, had quite vanished from the armies of Western Europe, but was still retained as their favourite weapon by the Poles and Cossacks, who found it most useful in encountering the Turkish horsemen. The Turk was an expert and practised swordsman, but he used a scimitar, which was not convenient for parrying a thrust, so the lance was the most effective weapon for discomfiting him. When Napoleon raised the Polish "Legion of the Vistula" he equipped its soldiers, both cavalry and infantry, with the square-topped cap, which was the national head-dress of the Poles, and he armed the cavalry regiments with the lance as their national weapon.

Fifty years before, Marshal Saxe, the gallant and gifted son of the strongest man and the most beautiful woman in Europe, Augustus of Saxony, and Aurora von Königsmarck, had made an attempt to introduce the lance into use in the French Army. His father had been elected King of Poland, and the brilliant bastard had become acquainted with the armament and tactics of the horsemen who had followed Sobieski when he turned back the tide of Turkish conquest from Vienna's walls. The front rank of the Polish cavalry was composed of nobles and esquires armed with the lance, while their henchmen and batmen, armed with firelocks, covered them in the rear rank. Count Saxe formed a regiment on this model for the French King's service: the front rank was armed with lance and pennon, and its men were dressed in the Polish fashion with square caps, and long-skirted coats with girdles. The rear rank was dressed and equipped like dragoons, with carbine and sabre. They wore brass helmets, and the colour of the uniform of both ranks was green, as was the case at that time in the regiments of dragoons in the French Royal Army. This regiment, after the death of its patron, was either disbanded or converted into dragoons, and the lance was again discarded until Napoleon raised his Legion of the Vistula. This Polish legion mustered three regiments of lancers; both ranks carried the lance with a red and white pennon; the long skirts of the coat were discarded, but other features of the Polish costume were retained, such as the girdle and the plastron of contrasting colour; the jackets and overalls were blue, and the lance caps, facings, plastrons, and stripes on the overalls were yellow for the first two regiments, buff for the third.

Besides these three regiments Napoleon raised another of Polish lancers to form part of his Imperial Guard. This famous corps was dressed in dark-blue jackets, with crimson lance cap, epaulettes, facings, and plastron, and crimson overalls with a double blue stripe. Hence some writers have alluded to its uniform as crimson, and one author speaks of "Poniatowsky's splendid Hulans in their gorgeous crimson uniforms."

The fame gained by these Polish lancers made the lance once more popular as a cavalry weapon in Europe. "These lancers," says the Marquis of Londonderry in his history of the Peninsular War, "were peculiarly daring in their attacks, and merciless in their

operations." Austria and Prussia already possessed a few regiments of lancers recruited from their newly-acquired Polish provinces, and now all the armies of Europe hastened to add a fifth variety of cavalry to the already existing cuirassiers, dragoons, chasseurs, and hussars. Great Britain was the last to follow the lead of her arch-enemy, and it was not till after twenty years of warfare had been terminated by Waterloo that some regiments of British light dragoons were converted into lancers, and were given the square-topped "czapka" and some of the other insignia borrowed from the old Polish costume.

One of the regiments thus converted was the XIXth, which adopted the lancer uniform of blue with yellow lance cap, facings, and plastron, and it thus made a very striking appearance on parade. This regiment was disbanded, along with the XVIIIth Hussars, in one of our periodical fits of economy. When it was again reformed from the English cavalry, raised for the Honourable East India Company's Service during the Indian Mutiny, it was equipped as hussars, and is now Queen Alexandra's Own Royal Regiment of Hussars.

Fas est et ab hoste doceri. And the lance was not the only innovation which was adopted by the British Army after its experience of encounters with the French cavalry at Waterloo. The cuirass was the last remnant of the defensive armour which had protected and encumbered the chivalry of Europe in the days of the crusades; and at the close of the eighteenth century it continued to be worn only by a few privileged corps, as it is at the present day, more for show than for use. In the French cavalry it was worn only by one regiment, the Seventh of the Line, and in the British it had been discarded altogether, even by the Household Cavalry. Napoleon revived the use of the cuirass, as he had revived that of the lance: he formed twelve regiments of cuirassiers, to which a thirteenth and fourteenth were added in 1812. He added no regiment of cuirassiers to his Guard, but the whole corps of cuirassiers was looked upon as a *Corps d'élite*, and consequently its regiments had no *Compagnie d'élite*, as all the other cavalry regiments had. In each regiment of dragoons there was a company of picked men, who wore a bearskin cap instead of the brass dragoon helmet, and in each regiment of Chasseurs à Cheval and of hussars there was one company *d'élite*, which wore as its head-dress a fur busby instead of the shako worn by the rest of the regiment. It is a matter for argument whether it is advisable to form bodies of picked men for especially arduous and dangerous service, like the old grenadiers and light companies of our battalions of infantry. Such a system has obvious advantages; but its opponents argue that the disadvantage of the removal of all the best men from the mass of the troops to concentrate them in particular units counterbalances any advantage that may be so gained, and on the whole weakens the army rather than strengthens it. At all events, Napoleon was a firm believer in the efficacy of picked troops; not only every battalion of his infantry, but every battalion of artillery and every regiment of cavalry had its picked company or troop, while his Imperial Guard constituted a whole army corps of picked soldiers. In this select body the regiments were wholly composed of grenadiers and chasseurs, either

horse or foot, and in them therefore there were no picked companies; and the same arrangement prevailed in the regiments of cuirassiers, in which all the troops or companies were reckoned as *élite*.

Although the general consensus of expert opinion, reinforced by the craze for uniformity which obsesses the military mind, has led to the abandonment of the system by which the best men of an army were segregated in special units, the present war has seen its revival in the *Stoss-Truppen*, storming or shock troops, special formations employed by the Germans to fulfil the functions of the Forlorn Hopes and *Enfants Perdus* of former wars in mediæval times, and of the grenadiers and fusiliers in later days.

Napoleon's cavalry also included two regiments of carabiniers, whom he equipped with the cuirass. These had formerly been the Regiment of Carabiniers in the old Royal Army, which had a peculiar organization, and was always kept at a greater strength than any other regiment of cavalry. The Republican War Staff split the unwieldy regiment into two, numbered the 1st and 2nd Carabiniers, and Napoleon gave them a new uniform, changing their blue coats for white ones. He was anxious to preserve the traditions of the old Royal Army, and at one time entertained the idea of reverting to the old white uniform; and perhaps the change of the carabiniers' coats from blue to white was an experiment in this direction. He gave them brass cuirasses and brass helmets with the comb surmounted by a crest of red *chenille*. The facings of the 1st Regiment were crimson, those of the 2nd sky-blue. They wore white leather breeches and jack boots, as did the cuirassiers, whose coats were blue and their cuirasses of steel. Their steel helmets were encircled by a band or turban of black bearskin, and had an upright red hackle feather at the left side, and a black horse-tail hanging from the comb of the helmet down the wearer's back. The facings of their uniforms were arranged in groups of three; the regiments numbered from 1 to 3 had scarlet facings, and the other groups had orange, yellow, and crimson, respectively, and Nos. 13 and 14 had purple (*lie-de-vin*) facings. All the regiments wore the red worsted epaulettes, which were the distinguishing mark of grenadiers in the French infantry.

The example set by Napoleon was followed by all the great Military Powers of Europe, and regiments of cuirassiers again appeared on the battlefields of the Continent. Britain did not follow suit until after Waterloo, when the three regiments of Household Cavalry assumed the cuirass of the antagonists whom they had overthrown at Waterloo, in their famous charge under Lord Edward Somerset.

The experience gained in more recent wars has not proved favourable to the retention of the cuirass. The Austrian cuirassiers used to wear a black breast-plate, without any back-plate, over their white uniforms, but after the war of 1866 all the cuirassiers were deprived of their armour and turned into dragoons. The same thing happened in the Russian Army after the experience of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877: only the Chevalier Guards and the cuirassiers of the Russian Imperial Guard retained their armour for show on parade. The German cavalry stick to old traditions, and continue to display the

steel corslets of their cuirassier regiments on parade, but neither they nor the French take them into the field. The German Kaiser lately introduced a cuirass of black leather into his army as an experiment, probably because it would look well over the white tunics worn by the German cuirassier regiments: it could only have been designed for use on parade. The officers of the Prussian Garde-du-Corps wear in State or levée dress a scarlet cloth cuirass lined with buckram over their white uniform tunics; so the cuirass may possibly continue to be worn as an ornamental addition to military dress after it has ceased to serve any useful purpose, as was the case with the gorget, the crescent-shaped piece of armour which protected the wearer's throat and closed the gap between the helmet and the cuirass of the mediæval man-at-arms. The chivalry of Europe did not abandon without regret the armour around the use of which so much tradition and so much sentiment have clustered in past ages; and long after its general disuse kings and captains continued to have their portraits painted in full suits of armour, and even in the eighteenth century they were generally depicted as wearing steel cuirasses under their laced coats. And the gorget, worn by officers of all arms and all ranks as an ornament, commemorated the vanished glories of the days of mail-clad chivalry down to the middle of the nineteenth century. It was made of gilt metal or of silver, and was suspended round the wearer's neck by a chain or a ribbon, and often bore the emblem of the monarch or the badge of the regiment in whose service or in whose ranks it was worn. An old English song, extolling the calling of the soldier, says:—

“He cuts such a dash with his gorget and sash,
“And makes such ado with his gaiter and queue.”

The gorget was still worn in the French Army under the Second Empire, and the writer remembers seeing it in wear by the officers of the 3rd Battalion of Chasseurs in garrison at Boulogne in 1866. It was a silver crescent preserving the convex shape of the ancient piece of armour, and was worn only on full-dress parades, or when the wearer was orderly officer of the day, as a sign that he was on duty, as a sash was worn in the British Army. This was the last public appearance of the gorget, which has now joined its companion pauldrons and brassards and tassets on the shelves of military museums.

The red and blue cords worn on the pouch-belts of the 1st and 2nd Life Guards respectively are preserved as a memorial of the ancient practice of distinguishing military corps by a coloured stripe in their baldrics or shoulder-belts. When the Life Guards were first raised they wore buff coats, and the three troops were distinguished from each other by the colour of the silk stripe which ran along the centre of their pouch-belts—red for the King's troop, blue for the Queen's, and some other colour for the Duke of York's. When the three troops were reformed in two regiments in the reign of George III., the distinctive marks of the King's and Queen's troops were continued in the 1st and 2nd Regiments of Life Guards, and continue to be worn by them to this day.

The four companies of the French King's Garde-du-Corps were similarly distinguished from each other by a particular colour for the silk stripe in their belts, which was also the colour of their standards and horse-furniture. The colour of the 1st or Scots company was white; those of the three French companies were blue, green, and yellow, respectively.

Fifty years before the embodiment of the Scots company, the most ancient of the Garde-du-Corps, a similar arrangement had been introduced into the army of the great Asiatic conqueror Amir Taimur, called Tamerlane by European historians. One of the orloks or marshals who commanded an ordu or army corps of that monarch's army ordered that each of the ten tomans or divisions of 10,000 sabres which composed his ordu should have a distinguishing colour for their standards, head-dress, kamar-bands, and horse-trappings; and we are informed that Taimur, on passing the ordu in review, was very much pleased with their appearance. At the same time the six corps (*alai*) of paid cavalry in the Ottoman Turkish Army were distinguished by the colour of their standards, which were red, yellow, red and yellow, red and white, green, and green and white. The same method of distinguishing corps prevailed in the Banner Army of the Manchu Emperors of China, whose first line troops were organized in eight corps with banners of eight different colours, while the second line, or auxiliary army, had similarly eight corps with bordered banners, which were of the same colour as those of the first line army, but were bordered with a contrasting colour.

The Scots company of the Garde-du-Corps was one of the first, if not the very first, formation of regular soldiers in the standing armies of Europe. Archibald, Earl of Douglas, nicknamed Tine-man or Lose-man, from the circumstance that he lost every battle that he ever fought, brought with him to France a body of Scots knights and men-at-arms, to aid the French against the English under Henry the Fifth. When the Earl was killed in his last lost battle at Verneuil, the Dauphin, afterwards Charles VII., took the Scottish knights and men-at-arms into his own pay, and formed them into two companies of horse, one of Gardes-du-Corps for his own personal escort, and the other of Gendarmerie or heavy cavalry, which became afterwards the senior corps of the French Cavalry of the Line. Three French companies were subsequently added to the royal bodyguard, and they were put into a regular uniform dress by Louis the Fourteenth. All the four companies were dressed alike in coats of royal blue, with silver lace and buttons, and scarlet facings, waistcoats, and knee breeches. On mounted parades white leather breeches and jack boots were worn. The four companies were only distinguished from each other by the different colours of their standards and horse furniture and of the stripes in their pouch-belts. Only the Scots company, instead of white, had scarlet for the colour of its shabrack and holster flounces, as white would have been liable to soil. Their three-cocked hats were bordered with silver lace and adorned with white cockades. When the knightly helmet was laid aside by the chivalry of Christendom the broad-brimmed beaver hat of Spanish fashion

took its place as the favourite military head-dress. It was worn by officers, troopers, and musketeers, while the pikemen continued to wear a steel head-piece and body armour. A steel skull cap was also worn by the cavalry under their beaver hats. It soon became the fashion to loop up one side of the hat to the crown, and a band and button was used to fasten it in place: this gold lace band and button are still to be seen on the cocked hats worn by our General and Staff officers, and now serve only as an ornament. The tassels of gold bullion which adorn the ends of the cocked hat at back and front are also survivals from the old Spanish beaver, the crown of which was encircled by cords with tasselled ends. When the broad-brimmed beaver was converted into the *chapeau tricorne* of the eighteenth century by looping up its brim on three sides, the cords and tassels continued to be worn with it. They were of gold or silver, to match the lace of the coat, or of gold or silver mixed with silk of the colour of the regimental facings. When shakos and bearskin caps replaced the cocked hats as the head-dress of infantry soldiers, the cords and tassels were transferred to the new-fashioned headgear, and were festooned round the tall cap, the tassels hanging down at one side. The Prussian infantry were thus decorated until the shako was replaced by the pickel-haube. Until the year 1860 the head-dress worn by the Sepoys of the Madras Army was thus garnished with bands of braid terminating in a rosette at the edge of the crown, from which hung two cords ending in tassels. These bands and tassels were white for infantry of the Line, black for light infantry regiments and rifle companies. The black silk cockade on the modern cocked hat is also another survival of a once universal custom. The cockade was at one time looked upon as an indispensable adjunct to a military head-dress, and when we began to raise companies of Sepoys in India a difficulty arose as to the cockade, as it was made of leather, and the Hindus objected to wearing any article made of leather on their heads. Consequently the cockades worn by them in their caps and turbans were made of brass. The colour of the cockade was generally uniform throughout all ranks of an army, but there were exceptions; the cockades worn in the French Royal Army were white as a rule, but those in the hats of the Company of Gendarmes (heavy cavalry) of the Maison du Roi, or Household Brigade, were black, probably to match the black velvet facings of their red uniform. In Great Britain the black cockade was worn throughout the army, and denoted an adherent of the House of Hanover; the partisans of the exiled Stuarts wore white cockades. When the cocked hats fell into disuse, the cockades were transferred to the shakos of the soldiers, and to the top hats of grooms and lackeys. On the shako the cockade was generally worn at top above the front plate and beneath the plume or pompon. Tricolour cockades continue to be worn in the French Army on some head-dresses, as the black ribbon cockade is still worn on our cocked hats. The cocked hat itself is the survival of a past fashion, and its total extinction may perhaps not long be deferred. It has disappeared entirely from the armies of Germany and Russia; in Italy it is worn only by the carabinieri or military police; in France it

survived recently as the headgear of the gendarmerie and the undress wear of the Garde Republicaine; it is still the full dress hat of General and Staff officers in Great Britain, France, and Austria. Until recently officers of the Household Cavalry wore cocked hats in levée dress; but separate orders of dress for these State functions have now been discontinued.

The mitre-shaped cap adopted as the head-dress of grenadiers on their first formation, towards the latter end of the seventeenth century, is said to have been copied from a janissary model. Evelyn, in his diary, speaks of the new kind of soldiers called grenadiers, wearing "caps with coped crowns like janissaries, with hoods hanging down behind, as we picture fools." This hood was borrowed from the janissary head-dress, which had a strip or curtain of white felt hanging down over the shoulders of the wearer. The story ran that this was worn in memory of the sleeve of the saint Haji Bektash, who invoked a blessing on the corps on its first formation, stretching out his right arm, with its long hanging white sleeve, over the heads of the front rank of the column. Perhaps the real reason of the hanging strip of felt was to protect the nape of the neck of the wearer from the sun or from the stroke of a sabre.

All ranks and grades in the janissaries were discriminated by the shape and fashion of their caps and turbans; the ordinary cap of the janissary soldier was a tall mitre-shaped cap of white felt, with a gold lace band round the base, a brass plume-case in front, and a curtain or hood depending from the back. One of these caps is to be seen in the museum at Karlsruhe, among the trophies taken by Prince Ludwig of Baden from the Turks at the Battle of Salankaman in Hungary, fought on the 19th August, 1692. The gold band of this cap has been removed and a band of green cloth substituted for it. The Turks have another legend to account for the gold bands on the janissaries' caps. They say that at the sack of Apollonia a janissary had obtained a golden bowl as his share of the plunder, and to conceal his prize clapped it upon his head, and pulled his cap over it. He was going away with his prize when the Sultan Murad met him and perceived the rim of the gold bowl showing beneath the edge of the man's cap. The Sultan was so pleased with the effect, that he ordered that all the caps of the janissaries should for the future have a gold edging; so the cap, which was called uskuf, from the Italian *scuffia*, thereafter got the name of zar-kulah (Persian for gold cap).

Just at the time of the first formation of grenadiers in European armies, a craze for the imitation of Turkish fashions had been brought in by the wars in Candia and Hungary; and Augustus the Strong, Elector of Saxony, who had commanded an Imperial army against the Turks in Hungary, formed a company of foot, habited and equipped as janissaries to serve as his royal bodyguard when he was elected King of Poland. An album containing prints of the costumes worn by the officers and soldiers of this company is preserved in the Royal Library at Dresden.

It has been surmised that the reason for the adoption of a conical head-dress for grenadiers was that, in order to be free to throw their

grenades, they had to sling their muskets over their shoulders, and the wide-brimmed hat worn at the time was inconvenient for this purpose.

A grenadier cap of the seventeenth century is now preserved in the museum in the town of Perugia. It is shaped like the front half of a bishop's mitre; the front is of black varnished leather, bearing the badge of a brass dragon, the crest of Perugia; the back is stuffed and lined with scarlet cloth, prolonged into a tasselled bag or hood hanging down behind. This useless appendage to the grenadier cap was gradually discontinued. The front of these caps was made of cloth embroidered with badges and devices, as in the British Army; or of brass or white metal as in Russia and Germany. The tall mitre-shaped cap of Frederick the Great's Grenadiers, fronted with white metal and backed with scarlet cloth, is still worn by the Leib Kompanie or Bodyguard Company of the First Regiment of Prussian Foot Guards, in which the Prussian Royal Princes serve their apprenticeship to the trade of arms. One other instance of the survival of this historic head-dress is in the Pauloffsky Regiment of Grenadiers of the late Russian Imperial Guard; but it may have been already obliterated along with other past glories of Russian military tradition by the iconoclastic zeal of the new Republican rulers. The story goes that if one of this regiment's grenadier caps happened to have its front plate pierced by a bullet in action, the perforation was carefully preserved and was reproduced in every new issue of caps.

Towards the middle of the 18th century bearskin came into fashion as the favourite material for grenadiers' caps. At first the high front of the cap was made of bearskin, and the back of cloth, sometimes of the colour of the regimental facings; finally the whole cap was made of bearskin. These caps most commonly had metal front-plates bearing national or regimental badges, and were adorned with side plumes, and garnished with cords and tassels. At one time all the grenadiers of all the armies in Europe, with very few exceptions, wore the bearskin cap. But the fashion has long been on the wane. The bearskin is now only retained by some crack corps in the armies of Great Britain, Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden. There was a veteran company of Palace Guards at Petrograd which wore the dress of eighteenth century grenadiers with bearskin caps up to the time of the late Revolution; but it has probably now ceased to exist.

Some fifty years ago some curious old patterns of grenadier caps, formerly worn by Sepoy grenadiers in the Honourable Company's service, might be seen on the heads of men of the "City Troops" at Hyderabad in the Deccan, in the annual parade called the Langar Procession, when all the armed forces of the city and country passed in review through the narrow streets of the city, before the eyes of their Sovereign, who sat in a balcony of his palace to receive their salutes. Each Mansabdar,¹ Amir, or Rajah rode in his state howdah

¹ A military chief who receives as mansab, or allowance, a fixed sum of money from the Royal Treasury to defray the expense of the maintenance of a stipulated number of men-at-arms for the service of the State.

on a gorgeously caparisoned elephant with its head and trunk painted with arabesque patterns in brilliant colours, and followed by his motley train of swashbucklers: horsemen in hauberks of chain-mail, with curtains of the same hanging from their steel helmets of Persian pattern with spikes and nose-guards; others with white turbans twisted round steel skull caps, and cuirasses of yellow felt, looking like Moorish horsemen of Andalusia returning from a foray upon the lands of the Duke of Medina Sidonia; followed by tall Afghans on foot, wearing high chocolate-coloured turbans, loose white coats, and petticoat-trousers, with broad girdles stuffed full of knives, daggers, and ammunition, and carrying the blunderbusses, called *carabina* by the Persians; sinewy Arabs in white cotton kilts, with 'kerchiefs on their heads, and matchlocks long as fishing rods on their shoulders, and coils of match at their girdles; Sikhs in blue punchinello caps encircled by steel quoits with a sharp outer edge, which their forbears used as missile weapons; "all the warlike gear of old, mixed with what we now behold." Camels with the swivel-guns, called *zanburaks* (little hornets), mounted on their saddles, and escorted by their camel gunners; then the city troops, battalions and companies called by courtesy regulars, arrayed in all the cast-off and worn-out splendours of the old regiments of the late Honourable East India Company's Army. Blue cloth caps of sugar-loaf shape, with a sloping crown rising to a point on one side, and adorned with a brass cockade, were conspicuous in a very varied collection of head-gear. One corps dressed in white, with a white head-dress, resembling the broad-topped shako formerly worn by European soldiers, was called the Maisaram Regiment; it was the old French brigade of Sepoys raised by the French for the service of the Nizam of Hyderabad in the eighteenth century, and long commanded by Monsieur Raymond, whose name had in the course of time been abbreviated into "Maiseram." The words of command in this corps were still given in French, or at least in a travesty of that language. The sight of this annual procession was worth ten years of civilian life to a military antiquary, but it is doubtful whether it could be now enjoyed; probably the Maisaram Regiment and its companion corps have been by this time transformed past all recognition into Reformed Troops or Imperial Service Troops, and have exchanged their picturesque disorder for a monotonous uniformity; while the felt cuirasses and steel brassards have most likely become the prey of European collectors.

The brass match-box, or tube, to carry the slow match, used by the grenadiers to ignite the fuse of their grenades, continued to be worn on the shoulder belts of grenadier corps for long after the grenade had ceased to be carried by them. It was worn as an ornament on the belts of the grenadiers of the King of Sardinia's army as late as 1830. It has now entirely disappeared from the parade ground, and the few surviving specimens of it are in military museums.

The war of sieges, inaugurated by the genius of Vauban, introduced the hand grenade into modern warfare; and the war of trenches, originated by the enhanced range and accuracy of fire-arms, has again brought the old grenadier's missile into general use with increased

powers and wider activities. Even the rifle grenade is no novel invention; the Museum of the Royal United Service Institution possesses an ancient flintlock musket with a cup-shaped muzzle, used in former wars by the grenadiers for firing a grenade.

The epaulette, though still worn in the British Navy, no longer survives in the British Army, except in the shape of the cloth "wings" still worn by musicians. The epaulette, perhaps, may have originated in the use of shoulder knots of riband to denote rank or to distinguish corps. In an album of old Turkish costumes in the Khedivial Library at Cairo, the janissaries are depicted wearing coats with a welt on the shoulder shaped like the wings worn by grenadiers and light infantry in European armies. Epaulettes and wings were often used to denote the rank of the wearer; a pair distinguished a field officer or a captain; a single epaulette signified a lieutenant or an ensign, according to the shoulder on which it was worn. In the crescent-shaped wings worn by grenadiers and light infantry officers in our army, made of gilt chain and fringed with gold bullion, three rows of bullion denoted a captain, two sufficed for a subaltern. The captain's pair of wings cost £10 10s., the subaltern's £7 7s.; these expensive ornaments generally cost more than the coat on which they were worn. The flat top of the strap of the epaulette was often utilized for the display of badges of rank or regimental devices.

Metal scales, or "shells," were worn by officers in undress uniform instead of fringed epaulettes; hence the term "shell-jacket." In the ranks metal shoulder scales were worn by the cavalry; there was reason in this, for they protected the wearer's shoulder from a sabre cut. In the infantry woollen or worsted epaulettes were worn; in the British Army they were white for regiments of foot, yellow for the artillery and engineers. The worsted fringed epaulettes worn by the rank and file in the French Army were red for the grenadiers, green for chasseurs, and yellow for the battalion companies; the artillery had red, the marines yellow, and the gendarmerie white epaulettes. These distinctions were preserved until the flank companies were abolished, when the grenade badge and the red epaulette of the grenadier were made common to all infantry of the Line. The French Army is now the only one in Europe that still retains the epaulette for the rank and file; in Russia, Germany, and Italy it is worn only by officers *en grande tenue*. In Austria-Hungary it is not worn at all, and in Great Britain it is worn only by one corps, and that is the very oldest military formation now existing in Europe, His Majesty's Honourable Company of Gentlemen-at-Arms.

The aiguillette bids fair to survive its old companion the epaulette. It is now a mere ornament, but it was formerly the *aiguille*, or needle, used for clearing the touch-hole of the petronel and musketoon, which was the arm of the mediæval schwarzreiter or mousquetaire, with the cord or lanyard that fastened it to his accoutrements. When its use was discontinued by the improvements in fire-arms, it was retained as a badge of rank or simply as an ornament: in the former sense it adorns the uniform of an aide-de-camp, in the latter capacity it is still worn by the French gendarmerie and the

Italian Carabinieri, and by some regiments of cavalry, including our own Household Regiments.

A singular survival is that of the "flash" or bow of black ribbon which decorates the back of the collar of the tunic of the officers of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers. This famous old regiment was the last to wear the queue or pigtail in which the hair of soldiers and sailors was dressed in the eighteenth century, its royal Colonel objecting to the discontinuance of the appendage long after it had been discarded by the rest of the army.

Horace Smith wrote in his parody of the loyal effusions of contemporary poetasters:—

"God bless the Guards, though worsted Gallia scoff;

"God bless their pigtails, though they're now cut off."

After the cherished queue had gone the Welsh Fusiliers still preserved in memory its silken tie, which they continued to wear like a badge of mourning, affixed to the nape of their necks. Their officers have now been distinguished in this manner for a century past, and in the new battalions raised under the title of the regiment since the beginning of the present war the flash is worn on the collar of the khaki coat. It is well that these regimental distinctions should be preserved, trifling as they may appear from a utilitarian point of view, for they foster *esprit de corps* and pride in the profession of arms. "Man does not live by bread alone."

The most absolute and most interesting survivals in military costume are to be seen in the uniform dress of His Majesty the King's Company of Yeomen of the Guard and in His Holiness the Pope's Company of Swiss Guards, clad to-day in the liveries which they first donned, more than four centuries ago. Since the suppression of the French King's Maison du Roi at the outbreak of the Great Revolution, and the dissolution of the Turkish corps of janissaries by Sultan Mahmud the Reformer in 1826, our King's scarlet-clad Beefeaters and the parti-coloured Halberdiers at the Vatican may lay claim to be the oldest military formations still existing in Europe, and still wearing the same dress, and bearing the same weapons, with which they paraded the purlieus of Whitehall and the aisles of St. Peter's in the time of bluff King Hal and Pope Sixtus the Fifth. May their martial figures and brave apparel long continue to serve as examples of the appearance made by the soldiers of the fifteenth century to future generations in centuries to come!

THE ARMY AFTER THE WAR: ANOTHER VIEW.

By LIEUT.-COLONEL NORMAN C. KING, London Rifle Brigade.

THE article by "Clericus" in the JOURNAL for August raises many points of great interest, and it may not be amiss to discuss the subject from other points of view. He appears to contemplate a large increase in the standing Army, but, however desirable this may appear to soldiers (and there is no doubt that most of them would wish for it), the prospects of such a state of affairs do not seem bright. After every war in which this country has taken part since the days of Cromwell, the first thing that has been done has been to cut down the numbers of the Army at once. It will be in the recollection of many that, during the South African War, the Secretary of State was taken to task for having allowed the Army to become so small, and new battalions were raised. Immediately the war was over the cutting-down process was begun, whereby no small hardship was done to many officers and N.C.O.s. In the case of one battalion of Guards, it was only saved by a little timely "camouflage" until the storm had passed by. The Englishman's cry is always "Business as usual," and, though he would be the first to point the finger of scorn at a man whose house was burnt down if it was uninsured, he entirely declines to insure his own Empire. The natural result is that he is very hard hit when the crisis arrives, and has to spend in a short period sums of money which might have been spread over a long one. So far he has never learnt from experience. It may be argued that the nation has never been the Army as it is now, and that things in future will be different. It is much to be hoped that they will, but whether these hopes will be realized is another matter.

Again, there is talk of a League of Nations, and Mr. Lloyd George, in his speech at Manchester in September, said: "There must be no more war." However much the good intentions of those who argue on these lines may be admired, it is almost incredible that students of history can imagine that war can be abolished while human nature remains what it is. Still these ideas have many followers, and this will be another factor in preventing any large increase in the standing Army.

From the point of view of the good of the community, no one who has had to do with the training of drafts during the past four years can doubt the efficacy of naval and military training, especially in the case of young men. The writer has had through his hands a very large number of men and boys; latterly, the men have been of the unathletic class and the boys from eighteen years onwards.

The improvement, both physical and moral, during training is incredible, and it will be a thousand pities if such a means of raising the physique of the nation is abandoned. The chief drawback is the enormous amount of money which has to be sunk in munitions, clothing, etc.; the money is unproductive, except in improving the men of the country, and all the materials will be obsolete or worn out many times before the day on which they are wanted for war. This, however, is a difficulty which must be faced.

There is also a pacifist element abroad which cannot be left out of account. The brotherhood of man is almost another phase of the idea of a League of Nations. Both are based on a conception of human nature as it might, and perhaps ought, to be, but not as it is. However, this feeling cannot be left out of account. It may be said that men returning from the war will all be on the side of the large Army, and their votes will turn the scale. Perhaps it will be so. They will not, however, be organized in bodies: they will have many grievances of their own, and they will readily fall a prey to astute talkers and organizers. It will not, therefore, be wise to count on them.

On all these grounds an increase in the standing Army appears to be doubtful, and it will not be a bad plan to discuss in general terms what can be done if it does not materialize.

CADETS.

It has been proved in the Colonies that a good cadet system is almost a necessity as a foundation for an army. There can be no doubt that it is very beneficial for the nation. Seeing how many boys are now given free education, and in some cases free meals also, not to mention other free benefits, it is not much to ask that when they leave school they should give something to the country in return.

"Clericus" suggests that the age should be from sixteen to eighteen, and he goes on to say that "Cadets would, as a general rule, be accommodated in barracks, huts, or public buildings."

With regard to the age, it is a matter for consideration whether it should not be extended to nineteen. If a boy has to take up his military training as a man at eighteen, it will mean that boys at the great public schools, who do not mean to make the Army a profession, will have to leave school at that age. It is generally agreed that the last six or twelve months at a public school are the most important of all, as it is during this period that character is made by responsibility. The numbers of boys affected may not be large, but it includes many who will have to lead others in after life, and it is, therefore, not negligible.

As to accommodation in barracks, etc., it would seem, as a general rule, quite unnecessary that boys should be called up, except for an annual camp, which might well be under canvas. A boy can be taught the elements of the military art perfectly well by training in his spare time, supplemented by camp, and it would be most undesirable in normal times to take them away from their homes and herd

them in large mixed communities at an early age : in the case of those who were earning their living it would seriously affect them and often prevent their obtaining satisfactory employment.

TERRITORIAL ARMY.

The first principle to insist upon is that everyone down to "B.3" should be enrolled, and should be called up from time to time to perform the duties which would devolve upon him during war. This would ensure, in the first place, that, upon the outbreak of war, every man could be used to the best advantage either in the Army or in his own trade or business. All men would be catalogued and earmarked for the position in which they would be most useful to the State. It would also prevent all skrimshanking. In the second place, it would mean that all men were under military law, and sectional strikes for wages and privileges would become impossible. For this reason, such a proviso will certainly be strenuously fought by many Labour leaders, but there can be little doubt that it is essential, and one which ought to be insisted upon.

It is suggested that all men of nineteen, who have not been enlisted as band boys, etc., must pass through the Territorial Army, and that volunteers of good character may be permitted to join the Regular Army. By this method the Army would become a *corps d'élite*, and, if service in it were a certain passport to good employment in Government service, there would be no lack of volunteers. Even as things are it would be easy to get men who have done a few weeks' training, and have felt the joy of physical fitness, cleanliness, and self-respect, especially those who have tried earning their living in cities, to volunteer, and, if they could see the world with a certainty of a good job later on, there would be no lack of men coming forward.

If careful physical statistics are kept, it will be easy to see how the nation is progressing, and they will be the greatest possible help to those who are trying to better the condition of the poor. The advantages of living a healthy life, even for so short a period of six months, will be incalculable, and the sound ideas of physical fitness which will be taught will be certain to produce lasting effects.

ORGANIZATION OF THE TERRITORIAL ARMY.

Under the above scheme there would be a large increase in numbers, and it is suggested as a basis that every regiment should form a brigade of three battalions on the Continental system. This would absorb many men right away. To provide for the rest, fresh units might be formed where the population of the district justified it. Without the figures it is impossible to go into detail; all that can be done is to make suggestions on broad principles.

TRAINING OF THE TERRITORIAL ARMY.

It will not be feasible to train for any long period, but an initial term of not less than six months for infantry, and possibly rather

longer for other arms, should be insisted upon. This, on the top of cadet training, should be enough to make men into soldiers, and should be supplemented by an annual training of a month for a few years, which would gradually decrease to a month every two, and then every three years. There would thus be two terms of recruit training in a year.

A *depôt* should be formed for each regiment and run on the lines of the Special Reserve. A Regular commandant, assisted by other Regular officers and N.C.O.s, would supervise the training of all recruits of his regiment. The whole regiment would be called up once a year for training under its colonel or brigadier.

PAY FOR THE TERRITORIAL ARMY.

The first principle is that all arms should receive the same rate of pay. There is no need to induce men to take up the less popular branches, and there is no real reason to make any difference, unless it be that those employed in lower capacities, e.g., "B.2" and "B.3," should receive less than those who are doing the harder work.

During the initial term of training it should be quite sufficient to give pocket money at the rate of sixpence a day. The men have everything found for them, and it appears unnecessary to give them money to squander. During the annual training the rates might be higher for the older men, but this and separation allowances are matters for consideration.

If a higher rate of pay is thought necessary, it might take the form of deferred pay issued by means of a Government security bearing interest. This security should not be transferable for a certain period of years, and meantime the interest should be payable in cash. This would point the advantage of saving, and would no doubt tend to induce men to keep what they had and very possibly to add to it.

OFFICERS FOR THE TERRITORIAL ARMY.

Everyone should have to do his initial term in the ranks. At the end of that time those desiring commissions should, if recommended, have to pass examinations, and should have to take out courses, more or less at their own convenience. From time to time they could go to the *depôt* to assist in training recruits. As far as possible their careers should not be interfered with, but some process, far simpler than the present one, should be devised whereby any officer who was unsatisfactory could be returned to the ranks. N.C.O.s could be trained on the same lines.

ADDITIONAL TRAINING.

The headquarters of Territorial Force units which now exist should be utilized to provide a meeting place for men who had done their initial term, and should be run on club lines. Men should be encouraged to meet there so as to promote *esprit de corps*, and to do extra drills and training for which some small payment should be

made. Schools of Arms should be formed, and everything possible done to keep men together so as to form a really homogeneous unit.

TERRITORIAL "CORPS D'ELITE."

It is well known that there have been in the past a number of regiments composed of men in the higher walks of life, who have paid subscriptions, and have generally contributed largely to the cost of their own training. These regiments have mostly been in London, but there have been some in the larger provincial cities. Whether or not they should be permitted to continue is a debateable point.

Their opponents contend that to allow men to make a choice, especially if they are of a well-to-do class, is opposed to the spirit of a democratic army. They say, further, and this is a much stronger argument, that to congregate in the ranks of a few regiments a number of men who would be invaluable as officers and N.C.O's, if spread about, is not a sound policy.

The advocates of these regiments contend, on the other hand, that they do find a number of officers for others, and that in time of stress they form a magnificent reservoir into which the authorities can dip for special jobs. If allowed to exist, they would, no doubt, be willing to forego many emoluments, and undertake further duties, than those imposed upon other regiments.

It is not easy to form an opinion on this matter, and it must be left to the authorities to decide what is best for the State. The only stipulation should be that all must be treated alike without exception.

COLONIES.

It is to be hoped that the Dominions overseas will adopt a scheme similar to the one at home. If this is done, there will be no difficulty in continuing the training of men who go out to British possessions, as they will simply be transferred. The case of men who leave the Empire will require some consideration; it is not easy to see how their training is to be carried on.

Q.M.A.A.C.

"Clericus" advocates the retention of this corps. Without a wide experience, it is not possible to express a sound opinion, but, from a regimental point of view at home, it can confidently be said that the scheme is not an unqualified success. The administration, uniform, hostels, etc., cost a large sum of money; the work could equally well have been, as it was being, done by men of low category, without all these new changes; and there is much to be said against introducing women into the middle of a large camp of men. If men are sorted out properly, it will be easy to find the right ones for the work to be done, and they will be able to be taught the work of cooking, waiting, etc., which they will be required to do in war. The state of affairs which existed from 1914 to 1917 is no criterion of what would be the case in

future, for during those years arrangements had to be improvised; under a properly thought-out system things would be different.

It is most necessary, however, that a large nursing corps should be formed, and that women should be thoroughly trained in all the duties pertaining to it. There would not be any difficulty whatever in arranging this if the corps were organized and run on sound lines.

REGULAR ARMY.

Under the scheme already set out, the Regular Army would be recruited from volunteers from the Territorial Force. Its numbers need not be much greater than they were before this war, though provision would have to be made for officers and N.C.O.'s for Territorial depôts and Cadet Corps. The present rate of pay of other ranks is good, and, if a man had a certainty of good employment after his service, it should be sufficient. The pay of officers is another matter. It is considered by many that an officer should be able to live on his pay, but it must be remembered that the Army is a profession, and in no profession is a man able to live on his earnings until after a long apprenticeship. Medicine, law, architecture, chartered accountancy, all require a long period of training, and often the payment of a heavy premium besides, during which time the student receives nothing at all. In the Army an officer has free quarters, fuel, light, and rations; he lives in a club at a daily rate far below what it would cost him to live in civil life. His amusements are cheap, and he has a servant of his own for a trifling sum. The shoe pinches when he has passed thirty, and there is much to be said for an increase of the pay of senior captains and those above them. It would not be unreasonable to increase the pay according to length of service, even though there was not a corresponding rise in rank; this would equalize matters for those regiments in which promotion is slow as compared with others. Officers should also be given opportunities of being engaged in the Government service after a certain time: this, coupled with a pension, would be a great inducement to men to take commissions.

CONCLUSION.

The foregoing is only a rough outline of a plan which might be adopted. Summarized, it may be described a universal Territorial Service as a main stem, with a small select Regular Army as a spear head. If more can be obtained, it will be all to the good, but the soundest policy is to make for that which may be obtainable, and not to put forward ideas which are very unlikely to be realized.

AN AFRICAN ARMY: SOME POSSIBILITIES.

By CAPTAIN J. F. WHITACRE ALLEN, M.C., The Buffs.

DURING the course of the war there has been a considerable amount of loose talking and writing on the military possibilities of our native African possessions.

Many people have taken up the line of totalling the native population subject to our rule in Africa, and then calculating that we should be able to turn them into soldiers in the same proportion as has been done in the United Kingdom.

These same writers often totally ignore the considerable efforts already put forth by our African dependencies, besides neglecting to take into consideration the different characteristics of the various tribes and races, merely forming their opinion of Africans as a whole from some tribe or body of troops with whom they have come into contact.

When contrasting Europeans with Africans as soldiers, there are certain salient facts that must always be remembered:—

First, the great difference in the average level of intelligence, and the lack of men who possess sufficient brains to enter the more scientific branches of the service.

Secondly, practically every European nation produces good fighting men when the raw material has been subjected to discipline and training—many African and Indian races can never produce fighting men, partly because of their lack of any martial qualities and also because of the very low level of their intelligence.

Thirdly, the extraordinarily high percentage of Africans who possess some physical infirmity which totally disables them from becoming efficient soldiers. Those who have only seen regiments of African troops and have not seen the villages from which they come, have no idea of the number of blind, lame, and badly-developed males.

Fourthly, the difference in the fighting characteristics; dash is the best quality of the African as a soldier, coupled with cunning and physical endurance in their own country. Africans are more liable to panic than Europeans, and have not the same capacity for withstanding hardships of a novel kind, whether mental or physical, as is possessed by the latter. The African is an adept at withstanding heat and thirst and hunger, because these conditions are normal to him in many parts of his country; but they are extraordinarily susceptible to damp and cold and to the ills which these bring in their train.

The savage (and it is from untutored savages that most of our good native recruits are drawn and will continue to be drawn) starts by being unfamiliar with the white man. He is shy, and is very liable to become flustered and frightened, and, if treated badly, to sulk. It is necessary to be patient, to show him that provided he does his

work he has nothing to fear from the white man, to take a personal and kindly interest in him, and, above all, to be just and fair and to keep one's word. He can always appreciate justice and does not mind punishment, even a punishment which sounds harsh to our ears, because native punishments are more drastic than those to which we are accustomed, provided he thinks he has done wrong. In many of these respects the African "Tommy Atkins" resembles our own to a very great extent, and it is surprising how fond one becomes of the men after close association with them.

These qualities have their drawbacks, as the native looks up to his own officers very much more than white troops do, is more dependent on them, and to have good African troops it is necessary to have the very best officers. The old idea about anyone being good enough to go out and soldier with African native corps has been proved to be absolutely erroneous in the course of this war. There have been many cases in which European officers have absolutely failed with native troops, not from lack of soldierly qualities, but because they have not possessed sufficient human sympathy to bring them into touch with the black man. It follows that African troops are much more at sea when they are deprived of their own familiar officers than are white soldiers placed in a similar position. The latter shake down to new officers very quickly, largely on account of their superior intelligence and self-reliance.

It must not be thought that Africans accept any white men—they are almost as critical as European troops, and in the course of this war they have seen so many more whites than usual, both in action and out of it, that they no longer hold the high opinion of Europeans as a whole that they formerly did.

Before we proceed to discuss what Africa might do in the future in the way of providing a native army, it will be as well to recapitulate some of the achievements of our African troops, carriers, etc., during this present war.

There are four campaigns which have been fought in Africa against German troops: the East African campaign, which is still proceeding; the South-West African; the Cameroons and Togoland.

Togoland was a very small but brilliantly conducted affair, and was all over in about three weeks. The Germans were run off their legs and surrendered at the end of August, 1914. The fighting on the Allied side was done by native African troops, men of the West African Frontier Force on our part, and Senegalese on the French.

The Cameroons was a bigger affair (though almost minute when compared with present-day standards) and much more protracted, as it did not finish till February, 1916. Here again nearly all the fighting was done by native African troops—there were a few white sailors, marines, gunners, signallers, and mechanical transport; but 95 per cent. of the casualties inflicted in action were borne by the African regiments. The French, again, used Senegalese troops, the Belgians used their own native Congolese, and we employed native troops from Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, West India, and the Gambia—quite a cosmopolitan little expedition, judged by pre-war standards.

South-West Africa, on the other hand, was entirely a white man's campaign.

Lastly, there is the campaign in German East Africa. It is true that there are no longer any German troops in German East Africa; but at the time of writing the German commander and some of his troops are still at large in Portuguese East Africa, and the campaign cannot really be considered as over until he and his troops are disposed of.

German East Africa has been by far the biggest and most hotly-contested of the African campaigns. We have borne by far the larger share of it; but the Belgians have contributed a very useful contingent of native troops from the Congo, and the Portuguese have also helped.

We have employed a few English troops in the campaign, and at one time or another quite a considerable number of white South African troops.

The signal services and supply services and the various departments have been run by Europeans at all times.

The two biggest contingents have been those furnished from India and various parts of Africa.

The African troops have consisted of the King's African Rifles, and contingents from Nigeria, Gold Coast, the Gambia, and the Cape Corps—a force of "coloured boys" from South Africa, who have fought very well, and agreeably surprised many who were very doubtful of their success. Native West Indian troops have also done very useful work.

During the fighting of the last nine months, which has been the severest of the whole East African campaign, it is the African troops who have borne the heaviest share of the casualties.

All these African formations, with the exception of the Cape Corps, were in existence before the war. In those days they were staffed almost entirely by regular officers and N.C.O.s. There were two main bodies of troops, both under the Colonial Office.

The King's African Rifles, which consisted of three battalions (once of four battalions, but one was disbanded two or three years before the war), were distributed over Nyassaland, Uganda, and British East Africa—an enormous extent of country. They were under an Inspector-General, who was a Brigadier.

On the other side of Africa there was the West African Frontier Force, also under an Inspector-General.

The Nigeria Regiment had four strong battalions of infantry, one regiment of mounted infantry, and two batteries of small mountain guns.

The Gold Coast provided a strong battalion of infantry and a battery of similar guns.

Sierra Leone had a battalion of infantry, and there were some mountain guns belonging to the Royal Garrison Artillery, but manned by natives. Also in Sierra Leone there was the West African Regiment—men of the same type as those composing the Sierra Leone Battalion, West African Frontier Force, but under the War Office, not the Colonial Office. In addition, some of the West India Regiments were always in Sierra Leone—these, though not strictly West African troops, have a great deal of Africa in their blood.

Lastly, the small colony of Gambia contributed a company to the West African Frontier Force.

This gave us, before the war, a force of three battalions in East Africa, and one of three batteries, one battalion mounted infantry, and six battalions and one separate company of infantry in the West African Frontier Force, together with the West African Regiment and the West India Regiment—in all nearly a division of infantry and a small force of mounted infantry and artillery.

Nothing has been said of the Egyptian Army. During the course of the war they have been too busily employed in their own borders to take part in the other campaigns. As an instance of the fine work done by them, mention may be made of the very successful expedition carried out under Colonel Kelly against Ali Dinar, sometime Sultan of Darfur.

It will be seen that our African Army before the war was by no means big. In proportion to population it was very much smaller than that of Great Britain; and yet certain people expected us to raise an army of hundreds of thousands of African troops at the same time that nearly every trained African soldier was desperately needed in the firing line, and officers and N.C.O.s competent to train recruits, and who could be spared for the work, were very few and far between.

A great deal in the way of expansion has been done, more than most people realize. In addition to the new bodies of troops actually formed—drafts sent out to the older formations—a very large number of natives have been employed as carriers. The number of carriers greatly exceeds the number of fighting troops, and probably nearer two than one hundred thousand natives have been employed on this work. Transport conditions in the interior of Africa are pretty sketchy, railways are few and roads are bad; many roads after heavy rain become impassable for motor traffic; often the line of communication is a mere track, climbing up hill and down dale, quite impassable for wheeled transport. In these cases everything devolves upon the native carriers; ammunition, food, stores of all sorts, and the sick and wounded all have to be carried.

If it had not been for the African carriers the campaigns in West Africa (Cameroons) and East Africa could never have been concluded.

When we total up the number of Africans employed by us on war work during this war, either in the firing lines or else behind them, it will run into hundreds of thousands.

As to the future, there is no doubt we could raise and maintain from Africa a standing army of considerably larger size than we now have.

Taking the various sources for recruiting—there are four—Egypt and the Egyptian Sudan, British East Africa, Uganda and Nyassaland, which now supply the King's African Rifles and South Africa, and lastly, West Africa. It is not likely that the strength of the Egyptian Army could be raised to any considerable extent, and it is very unlikely that the white population of South Africa would ever consent to having a body of armed troops raised from the natives within their borders.

This reduces us to the districts supplying the West African Frontier Force in West Africa and those from which the King's African Rifles are recruited.

Probably the finest material for soldiers is supplied by one of the smallest of our dependencies—Nyassaland. The Yaos are brave and more intelligent than most African natives. It would be hard to beat some of the Nigerian and Gold Coast men, but probably the average standard of those troops recruited from the Yaos is the highest of all.

Uganda and the British East African Protectorate also furnish much fine material for soldiers within their own borders, and probably from these three colonies it would be possible to raise a force of two infantry divisions, with a small force of mounted infantry and mountain artillery.

Nigeria and the Gold Coast would have to bear the brunt of supplying the new formations in West Africa, and there would not be much difficulty in raising a force of similar strength in this part of the world.

This gives us our Army—not a large one it is true, but quite a compact force, and one which could easily be expanded in case of necessity. Its formation would not be any excessive drain upon the man-power of our Colonies, and other nations could not justly accuse us of having militarized our African subjects.

As to its employment:—

A certain proportion of it will always be wanted to maintain order on the frontiers of our possessions. There are parts of Africa over which "*Pax Britannica*" does not yet hold undisputed sway: generally on the borders between our possessions and those of other European Powers, sometimes in the hinterland of our own Colonies—such as parts of the thick jungle country in Southern Nigeria—in the wild mountainous tracts of Northern Nigeria, and in parts of East Africa.

In the event of war it would be possible for us to look after our own possessions in Africa without help from Europe, to cope with any enemy forces in the Continent, and probably, in addition, to release a large number of white troops doing garrison duty in the East. As to sending an Expeditionary Force to Europe, the employment of natives has not been an unqualified success there, although they have done some very fine work, and they would be much better employed in more tropical climates.

Turning to the conditions of service in the force. Short service does not answer with the African. An original period of enlistment for at least six years would be most suitable, the man being allowed to extend for further periods of six years at the discretion of his commanding officer.

It would be quite easy to expand the force to its required dimensions from its present establishment by:—

(a) Raising an additional number of battalions.

(b) Turning the present battalions into regiments of three or four battalions, as is the Continental arrangement, and which is much the same as was done when forming the service battalions of our own line regiments.

This latter plan has the advantage that the newly-formed battalions inherit the traditions and associations of the parent battalion, and the old battalion depôt expands to regimental size, instead of new depôts being formed.

Next with regard to reserves:—

This question could easily be met by regulations ensuring that if a man did six years' Colour service he would then do six years' service in the reserve; if twelve years' Colour service, then three years' reserve service. Men in the reserve would do a certain period of training every year at the nearest regimental depôt to their homes, being paid during their training and having their travelling expenses defrayed. It would be important to insist on this period of training, for a black man forgets quickly.

It would not be necessary to pay the men highly, especially if a portion of the pay is kept back as deferred pay and given to the man as a lump sum at the end of his service. What is quite a small sum to us will often enable a black man to set up on his own and become quite a capitalist. It would also be an added inducement if certain posts in the Government service were always kept open for old soldiers.

Yet another point: In East, West, and Central Africa there are a number of chiefs, or kings, or whatever is the local term for them. They range from persons of considerable importance, like the King of Uganda and the big Emirs of Northern Nigeria, down to small headmen. Most of them have numerous sons. In olden times, before their warlike proclivities were curbed, the occupation of these youths was war and warlike exercises. Now this is denied to them, unless they choose to enlist in the ordinary way, a proceeding for which they, somewhat naturally, do not show any inclination. It would be quite possible to form cadet colleges for these young chiefs, one in East and one in West Africa, largely on the lines of the Imperial Cadet College in India. There they would be given a proper and useful education, taught English, and trained to become native officers. It would be necessary to handle them very carefully during their training, and to pay much attention to all forms of sport.

Finally, there is the question of officering the troops.

First, will the officers be permanently with the African Army for all their service, as is the case with the Indian Army, or will they be seconded from their British regiments for a certain period of years for service in Africa, as at present happens with the Egyptian Army, West African Frontier Force, and King's African Rifles?

Secondly, are there to be white N.C.O.s with the African troops, as is the case at present, or only officers as in the Indian Army?

Dealing with the officers. The system in force with our various African formations of seconding officers from their British regiments for a period of years has stood the test of this war very well. Take it all round, the climate of Africa is much worse than that of India, and it is certainly, with the exception of South Africa and a few large towns, very much less civilized. It is doubtful if many men could stand thirty years' service in tropical Africa. There is always the danger, too, that if a man is put away in small stations for year after

year, which naturally will not be quite up to date, and where he will not be in touch with the latest military developments, that his military efficiency will suffer and he will get out of touch with the higher side of his profession.

If officers and N.C.O.s were seconded for a period of five years at a time, with a furlough home after their second year, they would probably be able to stand the climate well and also keep up to date. It might be made compulsory for officers and N.C.O.s to pass certain language tests in the local language. This war has shown the importance of officers being able to converse, even if not fluently or grammatically, with a native soldier in his own tongue.

After a period of five years' service had been completed, it would be permitted to officers and N.C.O.s to be seconded for another five years, provided that their services were wanted and also that they had done at least two years' service with the British Army before they went out to the African Army again. The higher commands would be selected from the English Army at large, much as is the case with some of the commands in India, preference naturally being given to men who had done good service with African troops.

With regard to the employment of N.C.O.s with native troops—Africans require a larger proportion of white men than Indian troops, and the only men who are educated enough to do clerk's work generally come from the coast, and in most cases do not get on well with the tribes from which the rank and file would be recruited. If they were employed, they would be used merely as clerks and not as N.C.O.s. One or two good white N.C.O.s to a company make an extraordinary difference, both on service and in peace time, and in addition they act as a "white reserve" to fall back on.

Lastly, the question of cost. The Imperial Government would have to contribute most of the "new money" required, and after the scheme was in working order the Government of the colony or protectorate and the Imperial Government would each contribute a fixed proportion of the yearly cost, the Imperial Government always helping, as the African Army would be a distinct asset to the Empire at large.



THE WAR.

ITS NAVAL SIDE.

150 GERMAN SUBMARINES DESTROYED.

The narrative of the naval events of the war is in this issue of the JOURNAL brought down to the end of September, 1918. During this quarter no alteration was made in the constitution of the Board of Admiralty.

On July 30th Sir Eric Geddes, in a general review of the war situation, said that during the past twelve months the position had changed in many directions. "A year ago we were faced with a situation which up to that time was considered by many almost inconceivable and insoluble. Our available Mercantile Marine power was being sunk at a rate which would soon have brought us to the point of inability to win the war, and we were without tried and recognized means of combating it. We had, therefore, to provide for a building programme of anti-submarine craft, mines, and other appliances and of merchant ships on a very increased scale." The First Lord went on to say that up to the time of his speaking this country had borne the burden to a preponderating extent of fighting the submarine; the new output of anti-submarine ships, mines, and appliances had been preponderantly ours, and the responsibility of combating the menace had been ours also. He looked forward to the day, however, when in the not very distant future this country would feel the relief of a flow of destroyers and anti-submarine craft from the United States, which when it started would become a formidable torrent; then he hoped to be able to divert some portion of this country's resources from meeting the heavy demand for warships and auxiliary craft to the replacement of its Mercantile Marine losses.

King George, on the conclusion of his fourth visit to the Grand Fleet since the outbreak of war, took occasion in his message to the Commander-in-Chief to express the pleasure he had had at seeing the splendid ships of the United States in line with our own, and of meeting Admiral Rodman, together with the officers and men under him. His Majesty, whose visit terminated on July 23rd, also referred to the value which their British colleagues put upon the comradeship of the American seamen and their pride in their achievements.

In July, Mr. Franklin Roosevelt, the Assistant-Secretary of the United States Navy, arrived in London on a tour of inspection. Accompanied by Sir Eric Geddes, Mr. Roosevelt made an inspection of the Fleet, the dockyards, and other naval establishments, and reciprocal messages were exchanged between the vessels of war and the naval officials in connection with the associations brought about on these occasions. In a speech at the American Luncheon Club in London, Mr. Franklin Roosevelt referred to the fact that there were at the time of his speaking over 250 American naval ships on this side of the Atlantic, and that number was being rapidly added to. Messages were exchanged between King George and President Wilson on the occasion of the former's visit to an American battleship in European waters. His Majesty expressed his admiration of the high efficiency and general smartness of the American naval forces, referring also to the happy relations existing between the American seamen and their British comrades. President Wilson, in reply, expressed his appreciation and pleasure at the co-operation of the two Services, which he felt sure would bring great advantages to the cause of the nations associated against Germany.

The Inter-Allied Naval Council met on September 13th at the Ministry of Marine in Paris, under the presidency of M. Georges Leygues, French Minister of Marine. The following representatives of the Allies were present :—

United States.—Admiral Sims.

Italy.—Admiral Thaon di Revel.

Japan.—Rear-Admiral Iida.

Great Britain.—Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss.

France.—M. J. Cels, Under-Secretary of State for the Navy; Vice-Admiral de Bon, Chief of the General Staff; and Vice-Admiral Salaun, Director-General of Submarine Warfare.

The following changes in German naval commands were reported during the quarter :—On August 2nd a Berlin official telegram announced that Admiral von Holtzendorff, Chief of the German Admiralty Staff, had been retired "on account of bad health," and Admiral Scheer, Chief of the German High Seas Fleet, appointed his successor. It was also said that the Kaiser had promoted Admiral von Holtzendorff to be a Grand Admiral, and had commended his work at the German Admiralty. On September 4th the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung* announced that Captain von Lewetzow had been appointed Chief of the Naval War Department at Headquarters. On September 21st Berlin telegrams received in Amsterdam reported the appointment of Vice-Admiral Behncke "to represent Admiral von Capelle," Naval Secretary of State, who was on leave. An official Berlin telegram on October 7th announced the appointment of Vice-Admiral Ritter von Mann Edler von Tischler as Secretary of State for the Naval Department in succession to Admiral von Capelle. The Vice-Admiral was succeeded by Captain Lohlein as the head of the Submarine Department. It was suggested in many quarters that Vice-Admiral von Hipper, who commanded the battle-cruisers at the Battle of Jutland, would succeed Admiral Reinold Scheer in the supreme command afloat.

An important statement was made by the Prime Minister in a review of the naval and military situation on August 7th in the House of Commons. The Navy had destroyed at least 150 submarines, said Mr. Lloyd George—more than half of these in the past year. Other points made on the same occasion were that the tonnage of the Navy had increased during the four years of war from 2,500,000 tons to 8,000,000 tons, which included the auxiliary fleet. Everywhere, he said, British ships were convoying, patrolling, minelaying, minesweeping, escorting, and chasing submarines over vast and tractless areas. In the month of June alone the British ships of the Navy steamed 8,000,000 miles. The Premier went on to explain that, although possibly not more than 300,000 men were required afloat for the British Navy and the Mercantile Marine, at least 1,500,000 men were required for the manning and maintaining of the Fleet, and of these probably 800,000 or 900,000 were men of military age. In concluding his tribute to the Navy and the gigantic character of its task, Mr. Lloyd George mentioned that within a fortnight of the opening of the German offensive in March, 1918, 268,000 men had been sent across the Channel to fill the gaps in our Army, and within a month 355,000 had been sent over the Ferry. Moreover, the Army in France soon had more guns and machine-guns than it had ever had. In July 305,000 American troops were brought across the Atlantic, and of these 188,000 were carried in British ships.

Mr. Bonar Law, at the Guildhall, on September 30th, referred also to the part played by the Navy in the war. But for it, he said, the American troops could not have come. "But for the British Navy the war would have been over long ago, and not in a victory for the Allies." The Chancellor of the Exchequer also pointed out that if we were not building merchant ships more quickly than the enemy sank them it was due to the fact that our resources for shipbuilding

were taken up with providing the vessels to fight the submarine menace and supplying ships to carry and escort the American troops.

During the quarter official announcements were made establishing a special Reserve of Officers of Royal Marines. Improvements in the pay and prospects of the Royal Indian Marine were also announced. Admiralty orders were also issued affecting Warrant and Petty Officers in regard to pay, promotion, pensions, and conditions of service generally. These concessions were reported to be the result of the recommendations of the committees which recently made investigations under Rear-Admiral Hyde Parker and the Director-General of the Paymaster Branch, Sir John Chapple.

Following on the statement made by Mr. Lloyd George as to the number of German submarines which had been sunk, the Secretary of the Admiralty, on September 6th, made the following announcement :—

Although it is not intended to adopt the practice of giving proof of official utterances of His Majesty's Ministers, it has been thought desirable to give the names of the Commanding Officers of 150 German submarines which have been disposed of, in order to substantiate to the world the statement made by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on August 7th, and denied in the German papers, that "at least 150 of these ocean pests had been destroyed." The statement includes no officers commanding the Austrian submarines, of which a number have been destroyed, and does not exhaust the list of German submarines put out of action. The fate of the officers is given in each case, and it will be seen that the majority (116) are dead; twenty-seven are prisoners of war; six are interned in neutral countries where they took refuge, and one succeeded in returning to Germany.

ALBRECHT, Kurt	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
ALBRECHT, Werner	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
AMBERGER, Gustav	Kapitänleutnant (P.W.)
AMBERGER, Wilhelm	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
ARNOLD, Alfred	Oberleutnant z.S. (P.W.)
BACHMANN, Günther	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
BARTEN, Wilhelm	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
BAUCK, W.	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
BAUER, Cäsar	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
BENDER, Waldemar	Kapitänleutnant
(This officer was not lost when his submarine sank, and he succeeded in returning to Germany.)	
BEROKHEIM, Egewolf Freiherr von	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
BERGER, Gerhardt	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
BERNIS, Kurt	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
BRANSCHIED, Albert	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
BRAUN, Charles	Oberleutnant (Res.) (dead)
BREYER, Herbert	Oberleutnant z.S. (P.W.)
BUCH, Gustav	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
DEGETAU, Hans	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
DIECKMANN, Victor	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
DITFURTH, Benno von	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
EDELING, Karl	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
EHRENTAULT, Otto	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
EXTETER, Max	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
FEDDERSEN, Adolf	Leutnant z.S. (Res.) (dead)
FIRCKS, Wilhelm Freiherr von	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
FISCHER, Karl-Hanno	Leutnant z.S. (dead)
FRÖHNER, Eberhardt	Leutnant z.S. (dead)
FÜRRINGEE, Gerhardt	Kapitänleutnant (P.W.)
FÜRRINGER, Werner	Kapitänleutnant (P.W.)
GAISTER, Hans	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)

GEBESCHUS, Rudolf	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
GERCKE, Hermann	Korv. Kapitän (dead)
GERLACH, Helmut	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
GERTH, Georg	Kapitänleutnant (P.W.)
GLIMPF, Hermann	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
GRAEFF, Ernst	Kapitänleutnant (P.W.)
GREGOR, Fritz	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
GROSS, Karl	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
GÜNTHER, Paul	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
GÜNTZEL, Ludwig	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
GUNZEL, Erich	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
HAAG, Georg	Leutnant z.S. (dead)
HANSEN, Klaus	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
HARTMANN, Richard	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
HECHT, Erich	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
HEINKE, Curt	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
HELLER, Bruno	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
HENNIG, Heinrich von	Kapitänleutnant (P.W.)
HEYDEBRECK, Karsten von	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
HIRZEL, Alfred	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
HOPPE, Bruno	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
HUFNAGEL, Hans	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
KEYSERLINGK, Harald von	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
KIEL, Wilhelm	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
KIESEWETTER, Wilhelm	Kapitänleut. (Res.) (interned)
KLATT, Alfred	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
KOLBE, Walther	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
KONIG, Georg	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
KORSCH, Hans Paul	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
KRATZSCH, —	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
KRECH, Günther	Kapitänleutnant (P.W.)
KREYSERN, Günther	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
KROLL, Karl	Korv. Kapitän (dead)
KÜSTNER, Heinrich	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
LAFRENZ, Claus P.	Kapitänleutnant (P.W.)
LAUNBURG, Otto	Oberleutnant z.S. (P.W.)
LEMMER, Johannes	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
LEPSIUS, Reinhold	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
LILIENSTERN, Rühle von	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
LORENZ, Heimut	Oberleutnant z.S. (interned)
LORENZ, Hermann	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
LÖWE, Werner	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
LÜHE, Vicco von der	Oberleutnant z.S. (P.W.)
MENZEL, Bernhard	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
METZ, Artur	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
METZGER, Heinrich	Kapitänleutnant (interned)
MEY, Karl	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
MILDENSTEIN, Christian	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
MOECKE, Fritz	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
MOHRBUTTER, Ulrich	Oberleutnant z.S. (P.W.)
MORAHT, Robert	Kapitänleutnant (P.W.)
MÜHLAU, Helmut	Kapitänleutnant (P.W.)
MUHLE, Gerhardt	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
MÜLLER, Hans Albrecht	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
NEUMANN, Friedrich	Oberleutnant z.S. (P.W.)
NIEMER, Hans	Oberleutnant z.S. (interned)
NIEMEYER, Georg	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
NITZSCHE, Alfred	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
NOODT, Erich	Oberleutnant z.S. (P.W.)
PRETZ, Willy	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
PLATSCH, Erich	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
POHLE, Richard	Kapitänleutnant (dead)

PRINZ, Athalwin	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
PUSTKUCHEN, Herbert	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
REICHENBACH, Gottfried	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
REIMARUS, Georg	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
REMY, Johannes	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
RÖHR, Walther	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
ROSENOW, Ernst	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
RÜCKER, Claus	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
RUMPEL, Walther	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
SALTZWEDEL, Rudolf	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
SEBELIN, Erwin	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
SEUFFER, Rudolf	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
SCHMETTOW, Graf M. von	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
SCHMIDT, Georg	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
SCHMIDT, Siegfried	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
SCHMIDT, Walther G.	Oberleutnant z.S. (interned)
SCHMITZ, Max	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
SCHMITZ, Walther	Oberleutnant z.S. (P.W.)
SCHNEIDER, Rudolf	Kapitänleutnant (dead)

(This was the officer who torpedoed the s.s. "Arabic" on August 19th, 1915.)

SCHULTZ, Theodor	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
SCHÜRMANN, Paul	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
SCHWARTZ, Ferdinand	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
SCHWEINITZ UND KRAIN, Graf von	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
SCHWIEGER, —	Kapitänleutnant (dead)

(This was the officer who, whilst in "U.20," torpedoed the "Lusitania" on May 7th, 1915. "U.20" was lost on the Danish coast in November, 1916, but Kapitänleutnant Schwieger survived to bring disaster to another submarine, viz., "U.88," which was lost with all hands in September, 1917.)

SITTENFELD, Erich	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
SMITHS, Wilhelm	Oberleutnant z.S. (P.W.)
SOERGEL, Hans	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
SPRENGER, —	Kapitänleutnant (P.W.)
STECKELBERG, Oscar	Oberleutnant z.S. (interned)
STEIN ZU LAUSNITZ, Freiherr von	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
STEINDORFF, Ernst	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
STENZLER, Heinrich	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
STOSBERG, Arthur	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
STOSS, Alfred	Kapitänleutnant (P.W.)
STÖTER, Karl	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
STUER, Fritz	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
SUCHODOLETZ, Ferdinand von	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
TERBENJOHANN, Kurt	Kapitänleutnant (P.W.)
TRÄGER, Friedrich	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
UTKE, Kurt	Oberleutnant z.S. (P.W.)
VALENTINER, Hans	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
VOIGT, Ernst	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
WACHENDORFF, Siegfried	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
WACKER, Karl	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
WAGENFÜHR, Paul	Kapitänleutnant (dead)

(This was the officer who sank the s.s. "Belgian Prince" on July 31st, 1917, and so barbarously drowned forty of the crew whom he had ordered to line up on the submarine's deck. The submarine ("U.44") was sunk with all hands about a fortnight after this outrage.)

WALTHER, Franz	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
WEDDIGEN, Otto	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
WEGENER, Bernhard	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
WEISBACH, Erwin	Kapitänleutnant (dead)

WEISBACH, Raimund	Kapitänleutnant (P.W.)
WENDLANDT, Hans H.	Oberleutnant z.S. (P.W.)
WENNINGER, Ralph	Kapitänleutnant (P.W.)
WIGANKOW, Günther	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)
WILCKE, Erich	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
WILHELMS, Ernst	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
WILLICH, Kurt	Kapitänleutnant (dead)
WUTSDORFF, Hans Oskar	Oberleutnant z.S. (P.W.)
ZERBONI DI SPOSETTI, Werner von	Oberleutnant z.S. (dead)

The above names by no means exhaust the list of those who have committed atrocious crimes against humanity in their submarines. The names of others guilty of particularly wanton or despicable outrages are known at the Admiralty, and special endeavours are being made to bring their careers to a swift end. Among these are Korvettenkapitän Max Valentinor, who was responsible for the barbarous sinkings, amongst others, of the Norwegian s.s. "Magda," the Spanish s.s. "Pens Castillo," the Italian s.s. "Ancona," and the British s.s. "Persia"; Kapitänleutnant Wilhelm Werner, who excels in the sinking of hospital ships; Korvettenkapitän Freiherr von Forstner, who, when in command of "U.28," sank the British steamers "Falaba" and "Aguila" under circumstances of the utmost brutality. Others who might be mentioned are Korvettenkapitän Forstmann and Korvettenkapitän Gansser.

NAVAL OCCURRENCES.

NORTH SEA.

AMERICAN TRANSPORT SUNK.—The United States Navy Department has announced the sinking of the transport "Covington" (16,000 tons) by enemy action on July 1st while being convoyed by destroyers. The convoy was on its way to the United States. Six of the crew were missing.

HOSPITAL SHIP OUTRAGE.—On July 2nd the Germans issued the following semi-official statement with regard to the sinking of the hospital ship "Llandoverly Castle," the loss of which was recorded in the August issue of the JOURNAL, page 511:—"Like all similar assertions of the British Admiralty, it is probably in this case also incorrect that a German 'U'-boat is responsible for the ship's fate. It appears from later news that no one on board the steamer observed a 'U'-boat or a torpedo. At all events, the cause of the loss may be attributed to a British mine." It was later officially reported that there were only medical staff and ship's crew on board, that the submarine, after having sunk the vessel, steamed about in the wreckage without offering any assistance, and also fired about a dozen shells in the vicinity of the wreckage.

MINES IN KATTEGAT.—On July 3rd it was reported from Stockholm that Swedish minesweepers in the Kattegat had found two German mines anchored at a depth dangerous to shipping in international waters west of Marstrand. The Swedish Minister in Berlin was ordered to make a protest to the German Government.

LIFEBOATS SHELLED.—On July 3rd, while two French luggers, the "Nord" and the "Madeleine," were being towed by a British tug in the North Sea, a German submarine appeared on the port quarter of the "Madeleine" and opened fire. Four rounds were fired, the first of which killed the master. After this, the crew abandoned the vessel with the body of the master. The submarine had in turn attacked the other two vessels, but returned and shelled the "Madeleine's" boat, killing all the crew except the gunner and a sailor, who were afterwards rescued.

GERMAN SEAPLANE RAID.—On July 10th the Admiralty issued the following :—
 "A British submarine patrolling off the east coast of England was attacked on the afternoon of July 6th by five enemy seaplanes with bombs and machine-gun fire. It is much regretted that an officer and five men were killed. The submarine herself suffered only very slight damage, and was towed back into harbour by another submarine."

GERMAN OFFICIAL.—On July 8th an Amsterdam message gave the following German official telegram :—"Two squadrons of seaplanes of the Marine Corps, under the command of 1st Lieutenant of the Reserve Christiansen and Lieutenant of the Reserve Becht, severely damaged the British 'U'-boats 'C.25' (?) and 'E.51' (?) by bomb hits and machine-gun fire on the afternoon of July 6th off the mouth of the Thames. Enemy destroyers endeavoured to tow in both submarines. 'C.25' (?) was last observed in a sinking condition."

FURTHER REPORT.—On July 10th the Amsterdam correspondent of the *Central News*, in amplification of the above, gave the following semi-official report :—

"On Saturday afternoon the air squadron left the Flemish coast on a reconnoitring expedition.

"In the Thames Estuary the airmen observed submarine 'C.25' and attacked it. The crew on deck were killed by machine-gun fire, and finally only the commander remained alive.

"He kept on firing against the airmen with a rifle until he, too, was killed.

"At the end of the fight, which lasted twenty-five minutes, after firing away all their ammunition the air squadron returned.

"A second squadron then arrived while the 'C.51' (?) was towing the 'C.25,' and attacked both submarines.

"Bombs were dropped, and the 'C.25' was hit twice.

"The airmen expended all their ammunition, and then went back.

"In the meantime the first squadron had returned, and they observed the sinking of the 'C.25' and the towing of the 'C.51' (?) to port."

PRIZE RE-CAPTURED.—On July 11th a message from Copenhagen stated that on the previous day a German submarine off Risør, and inside territorial waters, stopped the Norwegian steamer "Hauk," and a prize crew was placed on board. The submarine and steamer then proceeded south. A Norwegian torpedo-boat, witnessing the capture, went in pursuit of the submarine, stopped the steamer, and brought the German crew on board the submarine again, the steamer being afterwards towed into a Norwegian harbour.

SUPPLY SHIP SUNK.—On July 19th a message from Washington said that the Navy Department had been informed that the United States supply ship "Westover," 5,000 tons, bound for Europe, was torpedoed and sunk in European waters on the 11th. There were eighty-two survivors. Ten people were reported missing, including two officers.

TRANSPORT TORPEDOED.—On July 20th the Secretary of the Admiralty made the following announcement :—"H.M. transport 'Barunga' (ex-German s.s. 'Sumatra'), outward bound to Australia, conveying unfit Australian troops, was torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine on July 15th. There were no casualties." The discipline of the Australian troops on board was said to be magnificent, and it was probably due to this that there were no casualties.

BRITISH SLOOP TORPEDOED.—On July 20th it was officially stated that one of H.M. sloops was torpedoed and sunk by enemy submarine on July 16th. No officers were saved, and twelve of the crew were the only survivors. All the next-of-kin had been informed.

GERMAN COAST BOMBED.—On July 20th the Admiralty announced that a detachment of the Grand Fleet operating off the Jutland coast on the 19th had returned to the base, having carried out a bombing attack on the Zeppelin sheds at Tondern, Schleswig, by Royal Air Force machines despatched from the vessels. In a flight made in the early morning all machines reached their objective and made direct hits on a large double shed, which was completely destroyed, fire rising to 1,000 feet. In a second flight all machines but one reached objective. A large shed was seen to have a hole in the roof from which smoke came. On a second shed direct hits were made, but fierce anti-aircraft fire and the smoke of the first shed prevented our seeing whether destruction of the second shed was complete. The attacks were made from a height of 700 feet to 1,000 feet. Four of our machines failed to return. Three landed in Denmark. All ships returned without any casualties. According to the *Ribe Stiftstidende* of July 19th, an eye-witness of the aerial attack stated that the inside of a great hangar was burnt out and two Zeppelins were destroyed. A Copenhagen account stated that the raiders had destroyed a large ammunition dump near Tondern.

BERLIN OFFICIAL REPORT.—On July 19th it was reported from Amsterdam that a Berlin official telegram stated that only some material damage was done in the aerial attack on the airship establishments near Tondern (Schleswig-Holstein).

TORPEDOED CREW RAMMED.—On July 19th it was stated that a French steamer had been attacked and sunk by a "U"-boat. The crew got away from the ship in two boats, but both of these were rammed by the German submarine, one of them being cut in two. There was only one survivor.

LIFEBOAT SHELLED.—On July 5th a small British ship was attacked by a "U"-boat. The latter fired over fifty shots, and the vessel at first replied until her gun jammed. The captain ordered all hands into the lifeboat. The submarine kept firing on the lifeboat, and finally made for it, deprived the seamen of their food, smashed the mast and sail, four oars, and two compasses, and left them with only two oars, 120 miles from the nearest land. They were eventually rescued by a trawler.

H.M.S. "MARNE."—On July 23rd the Admiralty announced that by a happy coincidence, on the same day that German troops were being driven back again across the River Marne by the Allied armies, a German submarine was sunk by H.M. destroyer "Marne" (Commander G. B. Hertford, R.N.).

"JUSTICIA" SUNK.—On July 25th it was reported that the American transport "Justicia," a White Star liner of 32,000 tons, had been sunk by a flotilla of "U"-boats off the north coast of Ireland. On July 26th the Admiralty issued the following:—

"The 'Justicia' was attacked by torpedo at 2.30 p.m. on July 10th, when that vessel, with other ships, was being escorted by torpedo-boat destroyers and other craft.

"The torpedo exploded in the engine-room, which immediately filled, while the compartment abaft was also flooded. Although the water-tight compartments were undamaged, the ship's boats were provisioned and lowered to the rails, and tugs stood by as a precautionary measure. At 4.30 p.m. two torpedoes were fired, one of which was diverted by gunfire from the ship, while the other missed. The 'Justicia' was then taken in tow at eight p.m., and a fourth torpedo was also diverted by gunfire. A number of the crew were then taken off the 'Justicia,' towing being proceeded with.

"At 4.30 a.m. on July 20th a fifth torpedo was seen to pass just ahead of the vessel. At 9.15 a.m. two torpedoes were seen approaching from the port quarter, one striking No. 3 hold, while the second struck No. 5 hold.

The ship began to settle rapidly and sank, stern first, at 12.40 p.m. The third engineer of the 'Justicia' died of his injuries and fifteen men are missing from the engine-room staff as the result of the first explosion. The whole of the officers and crew were saved.

"The submarine which was reported as having been sunk by H.M.S. 'Marne' was one of those endeavouring to get into position to attack the 'Justicia.'"

REPORT OF ASSAILANTS.—On August 14th it was claimed by the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung* that two of the German submarines which participated in the sinking of the White Star liner "Justicia" off the north coast of Ireland on the morning of July 20th last had returned.

MERCANTILE CRUISER TORPEDOED.—On July 23rd H.M. armoured mercantile cruiser "Marmora" (Captain Walter E. Woodward, D.S.O., R.N.) was torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine. Ten of her crew, including seven specially entered mercantile ratings, were missing, presumed killed.

DESTROYER RUNS ASHORE.—On July 24th one of H.M. torpedo-boat destroyers ran ashore, and subsequently sank. Thirteen of her crew were missing, presumed drowned. The next-of-kin were informed in both cases.

ZEEBRUGGE BLOCKED.—On July 23rd the frontier correspondent of the *Amsterdam Telegraaf* reported that all the repairs which the Germans had carried out on the Mole and locks at Zeebrugge had again been destroyed by Allied airmen. Two torpedo-boats had been sunk by bombs in the harbour, and the canal was still closed.

NORWAY'S JULY LOSSES.—During July fourteen Norwegian vessels of an aggregate gross tonnage of 15,444 tons were destroyed through causes of the war, and fifty-five Norwegian sailors lost their lives.

BRIG TORPEDOED.—On August 1st the Norwegian brig "Alkher" was sunk by a German submarine off the Norwegian coast. The Germans carried off all the provisions and instruments on board. All the crew were saved.

DESTROYERS MINED.—On August 2nd two of H.M. destroyers were sunk by enemy mines, with the loss of five officers and ninety-two ratings. All the next-of-kin were informed.

AMBULANCE TRANSPORT SUNK.—On August 6th the Admiralty made the following announcement :—

"The homeward-bound ambulance transport 'Warilda' (Captain James Sim, master) was torpedoed and sunk on August 3rd.

"The following are missing, presumed drowned :—

Military officers	2
Commandant, Queen Mary's Army Auxiliary Corps	1
Other ranks	112
United States troops, other ranks	1

"Casualties among crew :—

Officers	1
Crew	6

Total 123

"The next-of-kin are being informed."

It was later reported that the sinking took place in the English Channel. Messages from Germany stated that nothing could be said on the matter until an account was received from the submarine commander.

DANISH SHIP TORPEDOED.—On August 7th the Danish Foreign Office announced the receipt of a telegram from the Consul at Bergen reporting that the schooner "Ludwig," of Frederica, was torpedoed in the North Sea off the Norwegian coast on the 3rd. The crew were saved.

SWEDEN'S LOSSES.—On August 5th it was announced that the Swedish mercantile Marine had lost 186,000 tons of shipping during the war, and 200 of her sailors had perished.

SUBMARINE SUNK.—On August 5th the French dispatch-boat "Oise" sank an enemy submarine off the coast of Brittany. The "Oise" was mentioned in a French Order of the Day on August 26th.

ATROCITY AGAINST FISHERMEN.—On August 7th Dr. Macnamara, in answer to a question, said that his attention had been drawn to the case of the loss of four fishermen from two sailing trawlers which were sunk by a German submarine on July 26th off the east coast. The men were placed on board the submarine, and on the approach of a patrol boat she submerged, leaving the crew struggling in the water. The matter, said Dr. Macnamara, had been reported to the Ministry of Information for propaganda purposes.

DUTCH VESSEL ATTACKED.—On August 8th the *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* reported that a Ymuiden fishing vessel had been attacked on August 7th by a German submarine near the Haaks Lightship. The skipper was killed.

GERMAN DESTROYER SUNK.—On August 9th a reconnaissance carried out by Royal Air Force contingents working with the Navy observed a German destroyer sunk eight miles north-west of Zeebrugge. It was stated in the Danish Press that the bodies of German seamen had been seen in the Heligoland Bight wearing lifebelts. These belts indicated the dead men as coming from the German destroyer "S.62," which was in all probability sunk by a British mine.

"U"-BOAT IN MINEFIELD.—On August 10th the details of the fate of the German submarine commander who sank the "Lusitania" were given. His name was Schweiger, a captain-lieutenant, and at the time when he perished, in September, 1917, was in command of the "U.88." This submarine, in company with another, had left a German port and both were submerged, when the commander of the companion "U"-boat encountered a heavy chain. He concluded this to be a recently-laid British minefield not yet known to the Germans. Shortly afterwards the commander of the companion submarine felt a very heavy explosion near by, and, coming to the surface, tried to communicate with "U.88" by means of signals and wireless. He got no reply, and "U.88" has never been heard of since.

AIRCRAFT ATTACK WARSHIPS.—On August 13th the Admiralty issued the following announcement:—

"British light forces, accompanied by aircraft of the R.A.F. contingent, reconnoitred the West Frisian coast yesterday morning.

"The British forces were heavily attacked by German aircraft, and six motor boats failed to return. With this exception we suffered no damage or casualties."

"The aircraft attacked a German airship north of the island of Ameland and destroyed it, bringing it down into the sea in flames from a great height."

Later unofficial reports stated that twenty German aeroplanes and a Zeppelin attacked the British flotilla, and that probably only two British motor-boats were sunk by the enemy. Two others were supposed to be adrift at sea. According to the *Handelsblad* nineteen British sailors from the sunken motor-boats were saved, four of whom were wounded.

GERMAN ACCOUNT.—The German official account of the Frisian coast fight stated that strong British naval forces were sighted off Vlieland, composed of at least twenty-five battleships and armoured cruisers, with numerous destroyers and torpedo-boats; also six fast boats, apparently with orders to lay mines on a big scale. "Our aeroplanes and airship destroyed three of the fast boats," said the *communiqué*, and disabled the remainder of them. Bomb hits were made on an armoured cruiser and torpedo-boat; the latter was badly damaged and was last seen in a sinking condition. Our sea forces immediately proceeded to the place of the encounter, but were unable to force the already retreating enemy to accept battle. We lost one airship (Commander Proells) and one aeroplane. In the course of the defence and attack the Borkum and Norderney battle squadrons, under the command of Lieutenants Frendenberg and Hammer, especially distinguished themselves.

ADMIRALTY ACCOUNT.—With reference to the above, the Secretary of the Admiralty stated that our losses had been correctly stated, and that no ship was hit or damaged in any way whatever.

DUTCH INTERN MOTOR-BOATS.—On August 23rd it was announced that two British motor-boats which took part in the fight near Ameland had been taken to Helder from Terschelling by Dutch torpedo-boats. It was officially reported on October 1st that these two vessels and a third, which was found abandoned and floating, were to be interned with their crews.

DENIAL OF MINING.—On August 12th it was stated that, in reply to a Dutch Note, the British Foreign Office had denied the alleged laying of mines by the British naval forces within Dutch territorial waters.

BELGIAN COAST BOMBARDED.—On August 13th the Amsterdam *Telegraaf* reported that the coast region near Bruges and Zeebrugge was heavily bombarded on the previous morning.

NORWEGIAN VESSELS SUNK.—On August 13th the Norwegian vessel "Frida" was fired upon by a submarine and sunk. A lifeboat rescued four of the injured men of the crew. In consequence of the sinking of the Norwegian steamer "Sommerstad," the Government has, according to the *Norges Handelsjöfarts Tidende*, addressed a remonstrance to Berlin.

HEAVY GUNFIRE HEARD.—On August 12th gunfire of a heavier character than on any previous occasion was heard at the Skaw. Several large warships were observed passing at high speed.

SAILORS WASHED ASHORE.—On August 15th a Copenhagen message stated that "During the last few days hundreds of bodies of German sailors have been driven ashore on the west coast of Jutland. Some of the bodies originate from a German torpedo-boat, 'A.79,' which was blown up in January near the Dogger Bank, but the other corpses have been in the water only a few days. Two bodies from a German submarine have also been driven ashore." A report from Ringkøbing said that four of the sailors were identified as belonging to the torpedo-boats "S.62" and "S.66."

REPORTED MUTINY.—On September 7th a message purporting to throw light on the above was furnished. According to the Copenhagen correspondent of the *Aftenposten* a mutiny broke out in the German Navy. The mutineers refused to embark on the submarines to which they had been assigned, and, seizing four torpedo-boats, they made full speed to Norway. They were overtaken by German warships and a regular naval battle ensued, in the course of which at least two

of the torpedo-boats were sunk and their crews drowned. Another message stated that the drowned sailors belonged to the crews of the German destroyers "F.62," "F.66," "F.138," and "A.79."

TWO DESTROYERS MINED.—On August 15th two of H.M. destroyers struck mines and sunk. Twenty-seven men were missing, presumed killed by the explosion or drowned. One man died from wounds. The next-of-kin were informed.

AMERICAN STEAMER SUNK.—The Navy Department announces that the American steamer "Montanan," 6,659 tons, was torpedoed and sunk in foreign waters on August 16th, with a probable loss of three members of the civilian crew. Eighty survivors were landed.

RELIEF SHIP SUNK.—On August 20th a telegram to the newspaper *Aftenposten* from Haugesund reported that a large Dutch steamer, the "Gasconier," with the Belgian Relief Commission's mark distinctly visible on her sides, was seen from the shore to be sunk by a German submarine at two o'clock in the afternoon off Utsire. Six of the crew perished, and the rest were taken in a more or less injured condition to the hospital at Haugesund. It was stated in other reports that the vessel had been mined, but her captain regarded this as out of the question owing to the nature of the attack.

GERMAN TRAWLER INTERNED.—On August 21st Dutch destroyers held up and brought to Terschelling an armed German trawler which they encountered in Dutch waters near by. It was later decided to intern the vessel, which was the patrol boat "Nuernberg."

NAVAL PATROL ENCOUNTER.—At one a.m. on the morning of August 23rd German motor-boats attempted a reconnaissance in the neighbourhood of Dunkirk. They were driven off by the British and French patrolling vessels, assisted by the land defences, and one enemy motor-boat was believed to have been destroyed. No damage or casualties were sustained by any of the Allied forces.

GERMAN VERSION.—On August 23rd a Berlin official telegram announced that "Light German sea forces belonging to the marine corps on Thursday night (22nd) attacked enemy sea forces off Dunkirk roads. Torpedo hits were obtained on three enemy torpedo-boats, two of which were sunk. In spite of strong counter-action our sea forces returned without loss."

DUTCH MINING LOSSES.—On August 26th it was reported that the Dutch Government maintained the responsibility of the British Government for the loss of the torpedo-boat "G.11" and of the mine-layer "Franz Naerebout," (?) in consequence of British anchored mines being in Dutch territorial waters.

GERMAN LIE REFUTED.—In the issue of June 15th the *Kieler Neueste Nachrichten* made allegations of brutality against the crew of H.M. trawler "Iceland," which rescued the crew of a German seaplane in June, 1917. These were warmly refuted by Lieutenant Douglas, commanding the vessel, who denounced them as lies. He asserted that the Germans were given every comfort, especially the officer, about whose treatment the Germans made special mention, and that they were medically attended to, and given food, clothes, and cigarettes.

NORWEGIAN SHIPS LOST.—During August thirteen Norwegian vessels, with a gross tonnage of 22,976 tons, were lost.

DUTCH LUGGERS SUNK.—On August 24th the Dutch luggers "KW 125," "KW 26," "KW 169," "KW 175," "Neerlandia II," ("KW 34"), "Neerlandia III," ("KW 38"), and "Stella" ("YM 237") were sunk by a submarine

near the Haaks Lightship. The crews of the four first-named vessels were saved by the hospital ships "Sindora" and "Zeeland," while the crews of the other three were brought to Ymuiden by luggers. The seven torpedoed boats, which were engaged in the ordinary Dutch fishing trade, were forced by the current and the wind into a locality which, according to the submarine commander, was forbidden water. It was reported that other luggers were also sunk.

OSTEND RAID DISPATCH.—On August 28th the Admiralty issued a dispatch from Admiral Keyes about the second blocking operation at Ostend, when the "Vindictive" was sunk between the piers.

SWEDISH STEAMER SHELLED.—On August 26th a German submarine fired on the Swedish steamer "Emma" from Helsingborg, bound for Gothenburg with a cargo of coal. On a guardship intervening, the submarine disappeared, and the steamer continued her journey. The vessel was later reported to be the "Irma," not the "Emma."

NORWAY'S WATERS VIOLATED.—On August 29th the Norwegian Admiral-in-Chief reported that on the previous day a submarine of unknown nationality fired on a Swedish collier in Norwegian territorial waters between Christiansand and Arendal. The collier, although hit, was able to continue her voyage. One man on board was wounded. The attack was immediately verified by coastguards and by a Norwegian torpedo-boat. Another *communiqué* by the Admiral announced that the lighthouses of Utsire and Boevoersholm, near Haugesund, would be extinguished from September 7th onwards.

DUTCH SHIPS REPLACED.—On August 29th an agency telegram from Batavia to the Dutch Press stated that six German ships—"Silesia" (4,489 tons), "Uhenfels" (5,577 tons), "Gernis" (6,550 tons), "Westmark" (5,870 tons), "Castell Pelesch" (3,464 tons), and "Linden" (4,188 tons) had been transferred to the Rotterdam Lloyd, the Holland-Amerika Line, and the Royal Dutch Lloyd, to replace the six Dutch ships which were torpedoed off the Scilly Isles on February 22nd, 1917.

DUTCH GRATITUDE.—In connection with the last-named event, several boatloads of survivors were picked up by two of His Majesty's trawlers, while the remainder were piloted into St. Mary's by the St. Agnes lifeboat. As a token of gratitude to the British, the Dutch League of Neutral Countries decided to award medals to the officers and crews of the British lifeboat and trawlers. In a letter addressed to the First Lord of the Admiralty with regard to the presentation, the Dutch authority said:—"May you consider this act as one of the numerous moral and intellectual ties which bind England and Holland together. Our warmest admiration is for those who give their lives for the liberty of the world, and we are glad to have this occasion for expression of these feelings."

RETURNING TRANSPORT SUNK.—On September 7th the U.S. Navy Department announced that the homeward bound transport "Mount Vernon," formerly the "Kronprinzessin Cecilie," was torpedoed 200 miles off the French coast on the 5th, but was able to reach port. It was reported that there were no casualties.

AMERICAN STEAMER SUNK.—On the same day the Navy Department also announced that a submarine sank on September 3rd the American steamer "Lake Owens," of 2,308 tons, by gunfire in foreign waters. Five members of the crew were reported missing.

GERMAN DESTROYER LOST.—On September 7th a message from The Hague said:—"The *Telegraaf* learns that a German warship, one of a flotilla which cruised last night before the island of Ameland, either was torpedoed

or ran on a mine. No explosion was heard, but the vessel was seen suddenly to overturn. Immediately afterwards four boats were observed near by."

DESTROYER IN COLLISION.—One of H.M. destroyers sank on September 8th as the result of a collision in fog. There were no casualties.

NORWEGIAN CREW SHELLED.—On September 9th the sole survivor of the Norwegian ship "Eglantine" reported that a submarine sank the vessel without warning. The "U"-boat then bombarded the crew who had taken refuge in the ship's boats. The captain and five men died of wounds, while the mate went mad.

ARMED STEAMER TORPEDOED.—On September 20th the Admiralty announced:—"One of H.M. armed boarding steamers was torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine on the 12th inst. Eight officers, including one Mercantile Marine officer, and fifty men, including twenty-five Mercantile crew, are missing, presumed drowned."

"GALWAY CASTLE" SUNK.—On September 12th the Union-Castle liner "Galway Castle," which left the Channel two days before for South Africa, with about 1,000 souls on board, was torpedoed without warning. Rescue work was impeded by rough seas, and 154 persons were reported missing:—Passengers, 20 first class, 10 second, and 90 third; crew, 34. A large proportion of the passengers were women and children, and there were many invalid soldiers. Vessels of the Royal Navy reached the scene rapidly and rescued the survivors with promptitude. These were landed at Plymouth. The sinking of the vessel was reported to have given a great fillip to South African recruiting.

"KONINGIN REGENTES" ENQUIRY.—In connection with the torpedoing of the "Koningin Regentes" (reported in the last issue of this JOURNAL), the Dutch Government, on August 23rd, announced that it was convinced that the vessel was struck by a torpedo. Both the British and German Governments were requested to make enquiries. The British Government replied:—

"1.—Some hours after the arrival of the hospital vessels at Boston the British Navy found anchored German mines at about 53-1 north latitude 1-25-25 east longitude. As this point was almost in the usual route of hospital vessels, apparently the latter had fortunately escaped them. Consequently it was desired to know whether the vessels had deviated from the usual route, and the British naval authorities had asked the captain which course the hospital vessels had taken.

"2.—No arrangements had been made to embark German prisoners on board the 'Koningin Regentes,' as there was sufficient room on the two other vessels.

"3.—The British submarine seen one and a half hours before the torpedoing in the vicinity of the hospital vessels did not launch a torpedo on June 6th. At the time when the 'Koningin Regentes' was torpedoed this submarine was west of the Leman lightship, at least twenty-five miles from the scene of the disaster."

The reply was communicated to the German Government.

GERMAN SAILOR'S EVIDENCE.—On September 14th a *Telegraaf* report said that an interned German sailor, on oath, stated that the "Koningin Regentes" was torpedoed by order of his commander. The sailor gave the name of the commander, and the number of the "U"-boat.

NORWEGIAN LOSSES.—According to information from the Norwegian Government, during September eight Norwegian vessels, of an aggregate of 11,943 gross tons, were destroyed through causes of war. In the same period six Norwegian sailors lost their lives through the same causes.

MONITOR BLOWN UP.—On September 21st the Admiralty reported:—"One of H.M. monitors was sunk in harbour on the 16th inst. as the result of an internal explosion. One officer and nineteen men were killed by the explosion, and fifty-seven men are missing, presumed killed. All the next-of-kin have been informed."

SWEDISH MINESWEEPER MINED.—On September 25th a telegram from the Skaw stated that the Swedish minesweeper "Gunhild" struck a mine six miles off the cape at five p.m. on the previous day. The commander and nineteen men were drowned. The rest of the crew, ten in number, were saved by two torpedo-boats. One died of his injuries. The explosion was of terrible force, and it was considered certain that the mine belonged to a new minefield laid by the Germans.

GERMAN MINELAYING.—On September 30th the paper *Goeteborgs Posten* reported with reference to the loss of the Swedish gun-boat "Gunhild," by striking a mine, that on September 18th the "Gunhild," while occupied in mine-sweeping, suddenly caught sight of a large German torpedo-boat, which as soon as the "Gunhild" turned away began using its wireless. Two large German destroyers then appeared on the horizon. The "Gunhild" on approaching them noticed that they were engaged in laying new mines. The same morning six German torpedo-boats or destroyers were observed from Skagen, very far out at sea, laying mines. The spot where the "Gunhild" sank was a mile and a half north of the place where the Swedish and German boats had met.

GERMAN EXPLANATION.—Germany's version of the destruction by a mine of the Swedish minesweeper "Gunhild," says that it was England who first barred the Kattegat with mines, and that Germany was compelled to follow suit. The "Gunhild," the report adds, was destroyed in non-territorial waters by an accident of a kind always to be taken into account in mined waters.

BRITISH GUNBOAT LOST.—One of His Majesty's torpedo gun-boats sank on September 30th in consequence of a collision with a merchant vessel. One officer and fifty-two men were missing, presumed drowned. The next-of-kin were informed.

KAISER TO HIS NAVY.—On September 25th the Kaiser arrived at Kiel. Addressing a deputation from the garrison of Wik, he reminded them of their duty towards the Fatherland, and recalled the Battles of Coronel and Jutland, and "the brave attacks of our torpedo-boats on the enemy coasts, which was proof of the spirit prevailing in the Fleet."

SWEDISH CUTTER MINED.—On September 28th a message from Gothenburg, Sweden, reported a mine disaster in which the Swedish fishing cutter "Arthur" was blown up and the crew of four men killed.

PIGEON SAVES AIRMEN.—On September 29th it was reported from Scotland that a few days earlier a Royal Air Force seaplane, engaged on an anti-submarine patrol over the North Sea, was compelled to descend on the water. A heavy sea was running and the machine was in danger of being dashed to pieces. The airmen released a carrier-pigeon with a message, and twenty-two minutes later the bird had travelled twenty-two miles to its loft. Assistance was immediately sent to the airmen, who were in great danger of drowning when rescued.

NORWEGIAN MINEFIELD.—On September 29th the Chief of the Norwegian Admiralty announced that mines were being laid in certain Norwegian territorial waters on the south-west coast, and these waters would from October 7th be closed to ordinary traffic. It was reported that this step was to protect the waters against "U" boats, which could reach the North Sea from the Skagerak only by

passing through this region. The British authorities, it was reported, drew the attention of the Norwegian Government to this fact.

BELGIAN COAST ATTACKS.—On September 28th the following Belgian *communiqué* was issued:—"At daybreak this morning the Belgian Army attacked the German positions between Dixmude and the north of Ypres. The attack began with a violent artillery preparation, lasting some hours, by Belgian, French, and British batteries. At the same time vessels of the British Fleet bombarded the coast defences of the enemy and vulnerable points of his communications."

FURTHER BOMBARDMENT.—An Amsterdam message on September 28th stated:—"This morning, between 2.30 and four o'clock, the Belgian coast was shelled by warships. Zeebrugge Harbour and the harbour at Ostend were very heavily bombarded. The bombardment was most violent, and the sky was lit up by searchlights and star shells. The coast batteries were in action." A later report said:—"The bombardment of the Belgian coast was resumed at seven o'clock this morning, a heavy roar of guns proceeding from the direction of Ostend and Nieuport. Apparently the warships again participated in the action."

AIRMEN AND WARSHIPS.—Dealing with the attack by British warships on the Flemish coast, the frontier correspondent of the *Telegraaf* stated that a hundred aeroplanes took part. The ships directed a terrible fire on the coast. The main attack was made on Zeebrugge and its environs and along the canal to Bruges. Fires were observed at these points and some tremendous crashes indicated the explosion of ammunition depôts. The main attack lasted about two hours.

OFFICIAL ACCOUNT.—A detailed account of the co-operation of the British Navy in the Belgian advance was issued from Dunkirk on October 3rd. Describing the bombardment of September 28th, it said:—

"By midnight of the 27th, the ships, mostly large monitors, were in position, and those nests of great batteries which lie along the coast to either hand of Ostend were enduring such a bombardment as they had not known before. Their names and calibres are all known to us, from 6in. to 15in., and from 'Cecilia' to 'Deutschland,' while inland cross-roads, railways and areas were also among the targets selected. The guns of the Royal Marine Artillery in Flanders bore their part.

"The night was windy, with continuous rain, swelling at times to strong squalls. Two great monitors pounded Zeebrugge, where there has been much activity of late, with 15in. shells; battery after battery was engaged and goaded into battle blindfold; and the noise of it filled the night till the soldiers south of Dixmude could hear it through the uproar of their own artillery.

"Later examination of Zeebrugge and the coast region, by aeroplane confirm the impression that the Germans were for the moment overwhelmed, possibly even to the point of making preparations for an evacuation. Zeebrugge, with its mole-protected harbour, was still, despite the blocking of the canal, to some extent a port. Ships had frequently been seen alongside the mole, and it was much used by torpedo-boats and destroyers. Of late days, only a few small torpedo craft have been reported. Traffic by canal and railway between Zeebrugge and Bruges has greatly diminished, and the latest machines to explore the place report that even the anti-aircraft fire has virtually ceased."

BRITISH MONITORS HELP.—On October 2nd a statement regarding the operations on the Belgian front included the following:—"British monitors, in co-operation with the artillery, are raining projectiles on the enemy's rear positions, devastating cantonments, sweeping his roads of communications, paralyzing the movements of

reserves, and inflicting heavy losses on troops marching to the battlefield even before they arrive there."

"U"-BOATS BY LAND.—On October 1st the *Belgique*, published at The Hague, stated that the Germans had entrusted a Bruges factory with sending to Germany seven submarines which have been locked up in Zeebrugge harbour and unable to return to Germany by sea owing to the blockade of the harbour.

EVACUATION REPORTS.—On October 5th the frontier correspondent of the *Telegraaf* reported that some of the wharves of Bruges Docks had been set on fire. Big guns had been removed from Knocke and material for coast defences which had been stored near the Moerbekehoorn Canal had been removed and the sheds destroyed. Under the supervision of soldiers, civilians had to destroy all machines. The entire garrison left the castle of Moerkerke. Work at Zeebrugge had been stopped and the civilians had been removed. The correspondent added:—"These are most important signs, but nevertheless they must not be exaggerated. A large number of anti-aircraft guns have been placed ten or fifteen kilometres east of Bruges, where shells are now seen to be bursting. For the first time the Germans in the coastal districts have realized the serious menace of the fighting at Roulers, Staden, and Zarren. German ships are no longer being unloaded at Ghent, and apparently the unloading of material which has already been brought there is no longer considered to be of importance. At Ghent itself the loading of material is taking place in haste."

NAVAL AIR ACTIVITIES.

HOME WATERS IN JULY.—During July the activity of our airmen working with the Navy was exceptional. In home waters the usual anti-submarine patrols were successfully carried out, and also hostile aircraft and escort flights. Many bombing raids were undertaken against important enemy towns such as Bruges, Zeebrugge, Ostend, and the aerodrome of Varsseenaere. At Zeebrugge bursts were observed around the lock-gates and near two submarines, and at Bruges direct hits were obtained on a submarine shelter, railway, and merchant ships. At Ostend damage was effected on the harbour entrance, powder-factory, hostile batteries, and on warehouses and sheds on the quay. In the air raids on Ostend from July 1st—3rd four hits were registered on an enemy destroyer off Bassin d'Echouage, and in those from July 4th—7th four destroyers and four torpedo-boats near Zeebrugge were attacked with bombs. A direct hit was obtained on a large enemy destroyer off the Flanders coast. Enemy destroyers and trawlers have also been attacked with machine-gun fire. A direct bomb-hit was made on a trawler which was subsequently observed to be in a sinking condition. Enemy shipping in several harbours was attacked, and a 230-lb. bomb hit the stern of the leader of four enemy destroyers, columns of smoke being seen to rise, but further observation was prevented. During the many raids on towns in enemy occupation, naval raiders were actually mentioned as having dropped sixty tons of bombs in July, and many fights with enemy aircraft occurred in their execution. In the course of the latter, thirty-two hostile machines were destroyed, and twenty-seven driven down out of control, our own losses being fifteen machines missing, of which one landed in Holland. On the night of July 7th enemy aircraft attacked Dunkirk, but no material damage was done.

ZEEBRUGGE REPORTED EVACUATED.—On July 11th an Amsterdam message stated that the civil population of Zeebrugge had been evacuated and sent northward in the direction of Knocke.

FUTILE ENEMY RAIDS.—During the quarter ending September 30th the Germans only attempted three raids on England, all of which proved utterly futile. On July 19th it was officially reported that at 6.30 p.m. on the previous day a hostile aeroplane, flying at a great altitude, appeared over Thanet. Fire was opened on the machine, which at once turned east and proceeded to sea. Again, on July 21st, the Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Home Forces, announced that at 9.25 a.m. on the morning of July 20th a hostile aeroplane, flying at a great altitude, crossed the Kentish coast. On fire being opened the machine at once turned eastward and proceeded to sea. In neither of these raids were any bombs dropped.

ZEPPELIN WRECKED IN RAID.—On August 6th the following announcement was officially made:—"Hostile airships approached the East Anglian coast about half-past nine last night, but did not penetrate far inland." Later in the same day the Admiralty issued the following report:—"Five enemy airships attempted to cross our coast last night, but while still at sea were attacked by R.A.F. contingents working with the Navy. Three were brought to action, one of which was shot down in flames forty miles from the coast, and another was damaged, but probably succeeded in reaching its base." On August 8th the Germans admitted the loss of the airship together with her captain and crew, the former being Captain Strasser, the leader of the Zeppelin detachment of the German Navy. The destroyed Zeppelin was afterwards known to be the "L.70."

CONSTANTINOPLE RAIDED.—Several times during the quarter bombing raids were made on Constantinople. On July 7th half a ton of bombs was dropped, and just after midnight on July 27th the basin and dockyard were successfully attacked. On the night of August 25th a raid was carried out, and two nights later an attack was directed against the arsenal and dockyard on the Galata-Pera side of the town; the War Office and barracks on the Stamboul side. Again, on the nights of September 20th and 21st the town was again bombed. Hits were made on Haidar Pasha station buildings north of the Admiralty, and in Stamboul. A seaplane hangar at Nagara was also believed to have been damaged. The operations were carried out in co-operation with Greek naval aircraft, and many thousands of propaganda leaflets were dropped in Stamboul. In the course of these raids two British and one Greek machines failed to return.

MEDITERRANEAN AIR OPERATIONS.—Considerable activity on the part of aircraft working under the Navy in the Mediterranean, Adriatic, and Ægean Seas was reported during the quarter. British machines, in co-operation with Greek naval aircraft, carried out anti-submarine patrols and reconnaissances from the various stations in the Ægean, and flights of the same kind were carried out in the other seas. Several raids were made on Kuleli Burgas bridge and station on the Oriental Railway, in which great damage was observed. Similar raids, with good results, were carried out against the stations and bridges on the Oriental Railway at Karagatch and Uzun Keupri, an enemy aerodrome in the latter place having one of its hangars completely destroyed. Bombing raids were also frequently directed against Nagara, Galata aerodrome, the seaplane base at Gallipoli, and Chanak, by British machines in co-operation with a Greek unit.

AUGUST AIR ACTIVITY.—During August the usual convoy, hostile aircraft, and anti-submarine patrols in home waters were carried out by Royal Air Force contingents working with the Navy. Enemy submarines were sighted and attacked, and mines located and destroyed by seaplanes, aeroplanes, and airships. Reconnaissance and photographic patrols were also executed. Enemy shipping was several times attacked, and a direct hit was observed on a hostile destroyer, a big explosion later being seen. On August 9th enemy minesweepers operating off Zeebrugge were heavily bombed. A great number of raids were undertaken

against the usual important military objectives of Zeebrugge, Ostend, and Bruges, and also against aerodromes, anti-aircraft batteries, billets, dumps, works, and canals. As a result of an attack on Varssenaere aerodrome, six machines lined up were set on fire, and a fire was started amongst hangars on both sides of the aerodrome. Two Gotha hangars were hit and one demolished. Large petrol dumps were also set on fire, the blaze being still observed three hours later. At Bruges many good bursts were seen, direct hits being made on a submarine shelter and on store sheds. In the course of these raids, engagements with enemy aircraft were frequent, during which thirty-five hostile machines and one captive balloon were destroyed, and thirty-five sent down out of control, the British losses being only ten machines and one which landed in Holland. Upwards of 116 tons of bombs were actually stated as having been dropped in the raids. In this month also the American Navy's air campaign began.

A MONTH'S RECORD.—At the commencement of the month of September the weather considerably hampered the operations of the R.A.F. contingents working with the Navy. In spite of this, anti-submarine patrols in home waters and convoy patrols were maintained, submarines were sighted and attacked, and enemy mines were located and destroyed; many bombing raids were also carried out. The submarine shelters and workshops at Bruges docks were several times attacked with good results, also the docks at Ostend, coastal motor-boat depôt at Blankenberghe, and shipping at Zeebrugge. A number of aerodromes were bombed, including that at Uytkerke, which was attacked from a low altitude, one hangar bursting into flames, a hut demolished, and fires started in the workshops. Enemy minesweepers and destroyers were bombed and harassed with machine-gun fire. A squadron of large seaplanes carried out a long reconnaissance in the Heligoland Bight. Much fighting occurred during the month with hostile machines, and it is officially reported that at least fifty-one hostile aeroplanes were destroyed by the airmen attached to the Navy, and forty-one driven down out of control. Thirty-three of our machines were announced as missing, of which two were thought to have landed in a neutral country. Two enemy kite-balloons were also destroyed, one of which fell in flames on the balloon camp, setting fire to three hangars, all of which were burnt out.

HELP FOR ARMY.—On September 29th the following was issued by the Admiralty in connection with the co-operation of the Navy's air forces with the Belgian Army:—

“Royal Air Force contingents working with the Navy are co-operating in the Belgian offensive, and during yesterday approximately thirteen tons of bombs were dropped. Two trains were set on fire, and several ammunition dumps destroyed. Massed motor transports and a hostile battery were also attacked, and casualties were inflicted by low-flying machines on concentrations of infantry, horse-gun teams, and other enemy formations, whilst spotting was successfully carried out for British monitors shelling the German coast defences. During the latter part of the day hostile aircraft in large formations—working well on the enemy side of the lines—were encountered. Four enemy machines were destroyed, and four driven down out of control. Thirteen of our machines are missing, the majority of which failed to return from over the enemy lines after a sudden and violent rainstorm in the early hours of the morning.”

MEDITERRANEAN.

SPIES AND “U”-BOATS.—On July 7th a message to *The Times* from a correspondent in Madrid intimated that, so contemptuous a regard for Spanish neutrality had the German submarines which made attacks on Spanish vessels,

that they were aided in their task by confederates on shore who were sometimes found to be local authorities. As proof of this the writer instanced the torpedoing of the French vessel "Provence," which led to the allegation that the Port Commandant of Palamos, a small port north of Barcelona, was in the habit of conveying timely information as to the sailing of ships to the heads of the German spy service. He was put in prison, and at the time of the report was awaiting trial. The same offence was proved against Senor Portillo, Chief of Police of Barcelona, who is said to have brought about the sinking of three ships—the "Villa de Soller," the "Mercedes," and the "Vita"—by this means. He was also lodged in gaol.

MINISTER'S VESSEL SUNK.—On July 17th a telegram from Athens said that a Spanish steamer having on board the Spanish Minister to Greece, Senor Lopez de Vega, who was on his way to Spain, was torpedoed by a German submarine. The vessel was flying the Spanish Royal Ensign. The Minister and his family were rescued. It was later announced that four days before the vessel, the "Robert," left the Piræus both the German and Austrian Governments were informed of the Minister's voyage.

GERMAN APOLOGY.—On August 1st it was announced that Germany had expressed regret to Spain for the torpedoing of the ship in which the Spanish Minister to Greece was a passenger, and that she proposed to nominate experts to decide on an indemnity for persons concerned.

MARINE MINISTER RESIGNS.—On July 23rd it was reported that the Spanish Minister of Marine, General Pidal, had resigned as the result of a difference of opinion between him and the Prime Minister concerning the interpretation of the clauses of the military law as applied to the Navy. He was succeeded by Admiral Miranda, the Commander of the Fleet at Ferrol.

SUBMARINE "U.C.56."—On July 26th a message from Santander to *The Times* gave a detailed account of the internment of the "U.C.56" there. On May 21st the submarine came into Santander under her own power, her engines being observed to be working freely. She carried no torpedoes but was fitted as a minelayer. She was immediately taken charge of by the port authorities and an armed guard put on board. Engineer-Inspector Don Joachim Concas, of the Spanish Navy, directed the removal of essential parts of the vessel so as to make it impossible for her to move under her own power. She was then, on May 28th, towed round to Maliano and a Spanish gunboat moored alongside of her. Her crew were taken to Alcala-de-Henares and interned there, with six exceptions, these being her captain, Commander Reisser, a petty officer, and four mechanics who were allowed to remain at Santander on the commander giving his parole. Since the arrival of the submarine in the port, signalling seawards had been repeatedly observed, a projector of great power being used. Wireless transmitters had also been detected sending signals in cipher. On examination of the submarine by the engineer-inspector, it was found that wilful damage had been committed to the vessel, in order that she should have excuse for entering the port, from which to organize destruction on the coast.

MR. BALFOUR'S STATEMENT.—On August 5th Mr. Balfour, in answer to a question by Commander Bellairs in the House of Commons, said:—"His Majesty's Government have made repeated representations to the Spanish Government drawing their serious attention to the necessity of taking the most stringent measures to prevent any violation of their neutrality by the crew of the 'U.C.56,' and have in particular urged upon them the necessity of removing the commander

of the submarine from Santander to a place of internment inland, and of preventing such actions as the charging of batteries on board the submarine."

CAPTAIN'S INTERNMENT.—On August 5th a Santander telegram stated that on the previous day the captain of the interned submarine "U.C.56" was ordered to proceed to Alcala-de-Henares for internment. This step by the Spanish Government was reported as being taken in response to representations from the Allied Embassies.

"U.C.56" REMOVED.—On August 20th a Reuter message from Santander stated that the interned submarine "U.C.56" had been removed from the jetty at that port to the Gamazo Dock. On August 24th it was said that the Port Engineer at Santander had dismantled her wireless mast and her helm.

FRENCH LINERS SUNK.—On August 13th it was officially announced from Paris that the Messageries Maritimes steamer "Djemnah," with military passengers, in an escorted convoy, was torpedoed by a submarine on the night of July 14th and sunk. Of those on board 442 were missing. On July 19th, also in the Mediterranean, the "Australien," belonging to the same company, was torpedoed, set on fire, and foundered. Seventeen of the crew were killed. Nine hundred and forty-eight passengers were saved. Three passengers were missing.

DESTROYER SUNK.—On August 14th the following was announced by the Admiralty:—"One of H.M. destroyers, which had been seriously damaged by collision, was torpedoed and sunk by enemy submarine in the Mediterranean on the 6th instant. Two officers and five men lost their lives owing to the collision. The next-of-kin have been informed."

TRANSPORT MINED.—On August 21st it was reported in Paris that the Messageries Maritime steamer "Polynisien," *en route* from Bizerta to Salonica with Serbian troops, struck a mine and sank on the morning of August 10th. Six Serbian passengers, eleven Indian firemen, and two sailors were missing.

FRENCH SHIP TORPEDOED.—On the night of August 15th the French steamer "Balkan," sailing from France to Corsica, was torpedoed and went down in less than a minute; 102 persons were known to have been saved.

PATROLS ATTACKED.—On August 31st it was reported that two patrol vessels belonging to the French Naval Division off the Syrian coast were attacked on four occasions during the morning of August 28th by a squadron of enemy seaplanes. The patrols returned their fire, hitting one of the seaplanes and damaging it.

SPANISH PROTEST.—On August 20th the Spanish Press published a Note sent by the Government to the German Government on the question of the sinking of Spanish vessels by German submarines. In this it was pointed out that on account of the serious reduction in the Spanish Mercantile Marine in consequence of Germany's submarine war, it had been decided that "should a fresh case of a Spanish vessel being torpedoed occur, to replace the Spanish tonnage sunk by that of the German ships anchored in Spanish harbours." This, it was pointed out, in no way implied the definite confiscation of the German ships, but would amount only to a temporary expedient to be settled when peace was negotiated.

GERMAN ANSWER.—On August 24th the *Cologne Gazette* published from Berlin a reply to the above Note, stating that the German Government expected that contemplated arrangements concerning safe conducts would admit of finding a way to limit the difficulties of Spanish trade outside the prohibited area as far as

possible. "It is to be observed that exceptional treatment in submarine war in favour of one Power is impossible. Germany cannot renounce the right of combating her enemies by means of the submarine war." It was thus implied that torpedoings outside the prohibited area might be compensated for by Germany.

SPANISH SHIP SUNK.—On August 29th it was stated in a message from Santander that the "Casara," a Spanish ship requisitioned by the Government, had been torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine. Six of the crew were drowned. A Cabinet meeting was held to discuss this, but Señor Dato, the Spanish Foreign Minister, intimated that Spain was still to follow her policy of neutrality.

THE "ALEXANDRINE."—On August 31st *Le Journal*, of Paris, published a Madrid report stating that the Spanish vessel "Alexandrine" had been torpedoed.

ANOTHER SHIP SUNK.—On August 31st Señor Dato announced to the Cabinet that the Spanish steamer "Atxeri-Mendi," carrying coal from England to Spain, had been torpedoed. He also said that he had telegraphed for details of the sinking in order to take the measures decided upon.

SPANISH ACTION.—On the night of August 31st, after a Cabinet meeting, the Spanish Government seized one of the German steamers interned in Spain in accordance with the warning given to Berlin.

GERMAN STORY.—On September 11th it was reproduced from the *Echo de Paris* that the German Ambassador at Madrid was advancing the theory that British submarines were responsible for the recent torpedoings of Spanish steamers.

"U" BOAT SHELLS SHIP.—On September 14th a Paris message announced that a telegram from Hendaye to the *Petit Parisien* stated that the report was confirmed of the shelling of a Spanish vessel off the Canaries by a German submarine.

GERMANY AGREES.—On September 25th it was announced that Admiral von Hintze, German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had said in the Reichstag Main Committee that Germany had agreed to hand over to Spain one German ship interned in Spain for the duration of the war for each Spanish ship sunk by German submarines in the barred zone.

SPANISH SHIP SHELLED.—On October 3rd it was officially stated from Madrid that the steamer "Francoli," which had been requisitioned by the Spanish Government, had been torpedoed fourteen miles from Cape de Palos. It was later learned that the vessel was sunk by twenty-five shots from the submarine.

FRENCH STEAMER SUNK.—On September 13th the steamer "Amiral Charner," on the way from Bizerta to Malta with a cargo of horses and materials, and carrying 174 crew and passengers, was torpedoed. Six lives were lost.

COAST TOWNS CAPTURED.—On September 24th an official message from Palestine stated that in the north our cavalry had occupied Haifa and Acre with slight opposition. These ports, on the Syrian coast, were seized with naval co-operation.

ADRIATIC.

JULY NAVAL RAIDS.—Considerable activity was shown by the Italian and British naval air units in July in the bombing of the Austrian ports and military works. On the night of July 16th airships and bombing planes dropped with great success eight tons of bombs on important parts of the fortress of Pola, and on the 19th a large squadron of Italian seaplanes bombarded the military works at Antivari and the vessels moored there. These airmen descended to a

very low altitude and obtained remarkable results, creating visible and serious damage. In spite of violent anti-aircraft fire they all returned safely to their base. On the previous day, while the Italian machines were attacking Pola and Lagosta, a British squadron effectively bombarded the enemy seaport of Cattaro, where a combined counter-attack was carried out by hostile machines but was successfully driven off. All the British airmen returned safely to their base. On July 21st the military works and anchorages at Cattaro and Antivari were bombed with good results, and during the following two days many bombs were dropped on Durazzo, in which steamers moored in the Port were hit, several depôts struck, and fires observed. All the aeroplanes returned undamaged. A raid on Cattaro on July 25th by British naval machines resulted in damage to the aerodrome and submarine base there. An enemy raid on the Italian coast on the same night resulted in no damage. On July 31st Italian airmen bombed Durazzo, sinking two small ships used for transporting troops, and the military and harbour works at Pola, causing several fires, especially in the localities of the submarine and aviation stations, all the machines returning safely.

DAMAGED BATTLESHIPS.—On June 17th the *Tribuna*, of Rome, stated that at the same time when Captain Rizzo torpedoed the Austrian Dreadnought "Wien" in December, 1917, an Italian torpedo-boat, commanded by Commander Ferrarini, launched two torpedoes against the battleship "Budapest." The Austrians did not admit the loss of this vessel, but it was understood that after an examination by a technical commission, the "Budapest" was disarmed and used as naval barracks.

NAVAL SCRAP DETAILS.—The Italian wireless of July 6th reported that "Details to hand regarding the naval action in the Upper Adriatic on the night of July 2nd show that two groups of torpedo-boats were exploring near Grado. The first group saw an enemy squadron composed of four destroyers and a cruiser, and opened fire. The firing lasted for twenty-five minutes and forced the enemy to retire. At four o'clock in the morning our squadron began the bombardment of the coast against batteries on the Tagliamento Point, helped by signals from hydroplanes. An Austrian hydroplane was obliged to land on the Austrian coast, but was captured by an Italian torpedo-boat. The three aviators were made prisoners and the machine destroyed by gun-fire."

FURTHER AIR RAIDS.—During August the Italian and British naval air forces carried out several raids against important enemy works and bases. The port of Durazzo was several times bombed, and in the raid on that port of August 7th British machines caused a fire which was visible from a distance of fifty miles. Raids with similar effects were undertaken against Pola and Cattaro. On the night of August 9th half a ton of explosives were dropped on the station and railway lines at Santo Stino-di-Livenza. On August 11th naval chasing squadrons bombed military objectives at Parenzo, destroying one hangar and causing several fires. On the night of August 15th Italian naval planes took part in aerial bombing actions against the enemy across the Lower Piave, and others bombed the arsenal at Pola and a torpedo-boat anchorage. On August 16th British and other machines attacked Durazzo and San Giovanni-di-Medua (north of Durazzo). On the following day a naval squadron dropped manifestos on Zara and the neighbouring islands. During the month American naval aviation forces were added to the existing Allied airmen operating in the Adriatic, and these took part in several bombing raids and other patrols and reconnaissances.

RAIDS INTO ALBANIA.—On July 26th a British squadron bombarded Ragorina, Albania, causing a fire to break out in storehouses on the Elbassan Railway.

On July 28th and July 30th Italian seaplanes bombarded enemy installations and trenches in the neighbourhood of the Ardenica Monastery. All the Italian airmen returned safely to their bases.

NAVAL AID.—On July 17th a report from Rome relating to the success of the Allied troops in re-conquering territory in Albania indicated that good work was done by the Italian Navy in helping towards the victory. British monitors also, it announced, bombarded Semenì, destroying the enemy's defensive works and dispersing his forces with heavy loss.

ITALIAN SAILORS' PRIZE.—On July 20th a Rome message stated that the crews of the two motor-boats which sank the Austrian Dreadnought "Szent Istvan" were to receive £40,000 prize money.

ADRIATIC CHASERS.—On July 27th the American *Army and Navy Journal* said that, so impressed were Italian naval constructors and engineers with the new type of American "Eagle" boats, to be used as submarine chasers, that the Italian Government had ordered twelve of them for use in the Adriatic. These were to be built by the Ford Manufacturing Company, of Detroit.

CAPTURE AND RE-CAPTURE.—On August 3rd the Admiralty report of British naval air activity announced that in connection with the land operations at Avlona, one of our machines was forced to land within the enemy lines. Both pilot and observer were rescued the following day on the Allies advancing and capturing an Austrian aerodrome.

AUSTRIAN FLEET UNREST.—On August 2nd a Central News Correspondent wired that two escaped petty officers of the Austrian Navy who arrived in Italy had intimated that conflicts were occurring daily on board Austrian ships, and that sailors of Italian nationality had all been landed as suspects. A dispatch from Vienna which was received in Berne on September 26th stated that a monster trial of Austrian naval mutineers was to commence at Cattaro on October 15th. More than 400 seamen of the Austrian Navy were charged with treason, the occasion being the mutiny in the Austrian Fleet which took place in July of this year in the Gulf of Cattaro.

DETAILS OF MUTINIES.—On September 1st the Berne newspaper *Volksrecht* published first-hand details of the Austrian naval mutinies. It appears that towards the end of last year there was a mutiny among the Styrian, Croatian, and Dalmatian sailors who killed many of their officers and threw others overboard. The Government quelled the revolt and pardoned the men concerned. In February of this year another and more serious mutiny broke out among the Slav and Magyar sailors, these being later joined by others, until out of twelve warships only one, the "Novarra," remained unaffected. The crew of the "Sankt Georg" were the first to raise the red flag, and ten others quickly followed, all the officers on board being arrested by the men. At Cattaro the 32nd Regiment was ordered to fire on the mutineers, but refused. All the demands of the men were subsequently conceded, but the unrest still continued.

ESPIONAGE TRIAL.—On August 1st the verdict in the trial of the four men accused of complicity in the blowing up of the Italian battleship "Benedetto Brin" was delivered. Two of the accused, Carpi and Moschini, the latter being a sailor, were sentenced to the full penalty of a traitor's death by shooting in the back. The other sailor, Bartolini, was committed to hard labour for life, while the fourth, Azzoni, was acquitted for lack of evidence against him.

SUBMARINES BOMBED.—On August 3rd a Rome message announced that Italian aviators had rained bombs on two Austrian submarines in the Adriatic.

"U"-BOATS DESTROYED.—On August 18th a report stated that five "U"-boats had recently been sunk in the Adriatic.

AMERICAN HELP.—On August 13th Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Under-Secretary of the American Navy, in an interview said his mission to Italy chiefly concerned the discussion of future naval operations in the Adriatic and Mediterranean. He said that, as America intends to increase her help to Italy, the Italian ports must be used to their fullest capacities, so that goods shipped to Italy should be discharged at Italian instead of French ports. This would also save congestion of railroad traffic. He added:—"In order to accomplish this the Mediterranean must be made safe from submarines, and we expect that the American and Italian Navies will easily see to this. We also want to close the Adriatic, and prevent the exit of Austrian submarines, and paralyse the efforts of the enemy fleet."

RAID BY D'ANNUNZIO.—On August 21st it was reported from Italian Headquarters that Major Gabriele d'Annunzio, Italy's poet-airman, had by himself carried out a raid on Pola as a reprisal for an Austrian night raid during which a bomb dropped within a yard of him, but failed to explode. On the afternoon following this Major d'Annunzio flew with his pilot across the Adriatic to Pola where he dropped fourteen bombs on the arsenal and returned safely to his aerodrome. He said afterwards that not a single Austrian chaser machine went up after him. Earlier that day an Italian single-seater came down with a damaged engine out in the Adriatic, and immediately Austrian destroyers and seaplanes came out after it. Before they could get there another Italian seaplane pilot swooped down, took the airman from the damaged machine up behind him, and, sitting astride, sank the crippled plane and made off, leaving the Austrians behind.

AUSTRIAN STEAMER TORPEDOED.—On August 20th the Chief of the Italian Naval Staff reported that the Italian submarine "F.7" had entered the Gulf of Quarnero. Seeing near the island of Pago a large Austrian steamer going south, the "F.7" placed herself in a position to attack, and succeeded in hitting the vessel amidships with a torpedo, which sank her. The submarine returned unharmed to her base. The commander of the "F.7" was Lieut.-Commander Mario Falangola, who last February sank another large enemy vessel in the Adriatic.

NAVAL AIR RAIDING.—During September the activity of the Italian and British naval airmen was great. Aeroplanes on many occasions successfully bombed the enemy's rear lines, while large groups of seaplanes dropped, at the beginning of the month, several tons of bombs on the Ardenika Monastery and on the Ponto Novo, over the River Skumbi, which was hit in the centre and set on fire. Nearly every day machines flew over Durazzo for reconnoitring and bombing the military works and harbours. On September 5th they dropped many bombs there which damaged vessels at their moorings. One vessel was hit by a large bomb. On the same day a squadron of seaplanes, co-operating with light units, successfully bombed and machine-gunned, from a low altitude, enemy torpedo-boats and small convoys which had sought the protection of the coastal batteries near Dulcigno. Two of the machines which were obliged to come down on the sea were recovered with their pilots by Italian torpedo-boats. On September 17th, 19th, and 20th the roads of Durazzo were bombed with two tons of explosives. Two steamers were seriously damaged, and a big fire was observed near the enemy aircraft station. On September 15th the submarine station at Pola was bombed by American and Italian naval aircraft, and again on the 19th. On the latter day also the airsheds at Lagosta were subjected to an attack. On the 14th big fires were caused on military barracks in Albania. During the month and in the course of these raids, two Italian machines were reported as missing. On the

20th over a ton of bombs was dropped on the arsenal of Pola and the dockyards and depôts of the Ulivi Reef, and on the 21st on the Albanian front and the hangar at Ragozzina.

AUSTRIAN AIR RAIDS.—On September 5th an enemy raid on Ancona was frustrated by anti-aircraft fire and the prompt action of naval and military chasing planes. A few bombs which the enemy dropped did not strike the town and caused no damage. The hostile machines were pursued nearly as far as Pola, and in a fight which took place with enemy seaplanes which ascended from there, one hostile machine was seen to fall out of control into the sea. On September 20th the enemy bombed Venice without doing any military damage.

FRENCH SUBMARINE LOST.—On September 28th a message from Paris stated that the French submarine "Circe," commanded by Lieutenant Viaud, was torpedoed on the 20th instant at Cattaro by an Austrian submarine. Ensign Lapeyre was the only survivor.

ABANDONED DREADNOUGHT.—On October 1st a Central News telegram from Rome said that it was learned from Pola that the Austrians had been compelled to abandon their attempts to refloat the Dreadnought of the "Viribus Unitis" class, and that it would probably be blown up in order to free the harbour.

DURAZZO BOMBARDED.—On October 3rd Signor Orlando announced in the Chamber at Rome that at mid-day on the previous day Italian warships and British cruisers appeared before Durazzo, and, under the effective protection of Italian and Allied torpedo-boats and American submarine chasers, succeeded in passing through the minefields and in eluding submarine attacks. They approached close to the harbour works of Durazzo and fiercely bombarded them until the complete destruction of the base and the Austrian ships moored there was effected. Our ships, despite the enemy's fire, audaciously dashed to the attack and fired torpedoes against an Austrian torpedo-boat destroyer and steamer, while another vessel, which was recognized as a hospital ship, was left entirely alone. At the same time British and Italian airmen co-operated in the work of destruction effected by the ships. Other Italian and Allied naval forces took up their stations in battle order against ships which might merge to aid Durazzo. They waited in vain. No loss or damage was suffered by the fighting units, except slight damage caused by a torpedo from a submarine at the extreme end of the stern of a British cruiser, which, however, continued to take part in the fight and returned under its own steam to its base. The Prime Minister concluded by sending the warm greetings of the Chamber and the country to the Italian and Allied Navies.

SUBMARINES SUNK.—On October 3rd the following statement was issued by the Italian Admiralty:—"It has been ascertained beyond doubt that the splendid American submarine-chasers, during their patrol and escort work for the protection of the larger vessels which yesterday bombarded Durazzo, destroyed two enemy submarines."

AUSTRIAN REPORT.—On October 4th the Austrians issued the following:—"On October 2nd, about 30 units of enemy naval forces and a large number of enemy airmen bombarded the town and harbour of Durazzo for two hours. The material damage done is unimportant. An attempt made by the enemy to penetrate into the harbour with torpedo-boats and gliding-boats (*Gleitboote*) failed under the fire from our land defences and our naval forces, during which one enemy gliding-boat was sunk."

ATLANTIC.

AMERICAN TRANSPORT SUNK.—The American Navy Department announced that on the night of July 1st the transport "Covington" (formerly the Hamburg-America liner "Cincinnati," 16,339 tons gross), homeward bound, was sunk in the war zone. Six members of the crew were missing. There were no passengers aboard. The "Covington" was torpedoed while proceeding with a fleet of other transports convoyed by destroyers. She remained afloat until next day. No submarine was sighted.

NORWEGIAN BARQUE SUNK.—On July 7th a Norwegian barque, the "Marosa," was torpedoed by a submarine and sunk 1,200 miles off the Atlantic coast. The crew were saved.

SURVIVORS RAMMED.—On July 16th the French steamship "Lydiane," homeward bound, was torpedoed off the north coast of Spain. Nothing was seen of the "U"-boat until the survivors (some of the crew had been killed by the explosion) had taken to the boats. Then it rose to the surface and began sinking the laden boats one after the other by ramming them, despite the fact that in one was a woman. She was hurled high into the air by the submarine bow as it struck the boat. Some of the boats were rammed six times before they were destroyed. Meanwhile the "Lydiane" still floated, and leaving for a moment their congenial task of murdering the helpless crew, the pirates began to fire at the ship, which ultimately sank. Then they turned once more to the work of murdering such of her crew as were left alive. Of the forty-two only five survived.

SUBMARINE ACCIDENTALLY SHELLED.—On July 25th it was announced from Washington that an American submarine of the latest design was fired at off the New England coast by an Allied armed ship, but was not hit. The submarine, which was cruising submerged, suddenly appeared near the Allied vessel, and the latter opened fire.

"CARPATHIA" SUNK.—On July 17th the Cunard steamer "Carpathia" was sunk by an enemy torpedo in the Atlantic, west of Ireland, while on the outward voyage. Survivors state that the vessel was sunk by a German submarine at about 9.15 a.m. All of the passengers and crew were saved except three firemen and two trimmers, who were supposed to have been killed by an explosion in the engine-room. The survivors numbered 215, including thirty-six saloon and twenty-one steerage passengers.

ITALIAN STEAMER TORPEDOED.—On July 30th a New York message stated that the Italian steamer "Guiseppe Garibaldi" had been sunk 200 miles off the Brazilian coast.

"PORTO" SUNK.—On August 2nd the American Navy Department announced that a German submarine on the 27th July sank the Portuguese barque "Porto" when 550 miles off the Atlantic coast. The crew, consisting of eighteen men, were landed at an American port by a British steamer. The "Porto" was destroyed by a bomb placed in the vessel's cargo of cotton.

"MACEIO" SUNK.—On August 6th a telegram from Corcubion stated that the captain and seventeen men from the Brazilian steamer "Maceio" (late the German "Santa China," 2,310 tons) had been landed there. The "Maceio" was torpedoed by a submarine. Two rafts containing forty-four men were missing.

FRENCH CRUISER TORPEDOED.—A Paris message on August 17th stated:—"The old cruiser 'Dupetit Thouars,' which was co-operating with the American Navy in the protection of shipping in the Atlantic, was torpedoed on the 7th inst. by a submarine. American destroyers rescued the crew. Thirteen are missing."

"U"-BOAT ATTACKS BARGES.—On July 22nd a Washington message reported :—"A tug and three coal barges were sunk yesterday by a German submarine off Cape Cod, the people on board being saved. The submarine used her guns, and some of the shells fell on the mainland, without, however, inflicting any casualties." The tug was afterwards learned to be the "Perth Amboy."

FISHING SCHOONER SUNK.—On July 23rd a submarine sank the fishing schooner "Robert Richard" off Cape Porpoise, Maine coast. The crew were able to escape.

ALIENS IN WALES.—On and after August 19th the Home Office issued instructions that no alien master, officer, or member of the crew of a neutral vessel trading with neutral European ports would be allowed to land at any South Wales port. All business must be conducted in the ship. Severe penalties, it was added, would follow breaches of this order.

NORWEGIAN SHIPS SUNK.—On August 23rd it was reported that two Norwegian steamers, the "San Jose" and another, and a large sailing vessel, the "Nordhay," had been sunk in the Atlantic.

THREE AMERICAN STEAMERS.—On August 24th the Navy Department announced that a German submarine sank in foreign waters the following American steamships : "Lake Edon," a chartered cargo transport, on August 21st; "Westbridge," on August 16th; and "Cubore" on August 15th.

GERMAN SUBMARINES BASE.—According to a *Times* cablegram on August 9th from Toronto, the Halifax *Herald* had offered a reward of £1,000 for information as to the whereabouts of the base, on the Nova Scotia coast or the seaboard of the Bay of Fundy, used by the German submarines now operating in North Atlantic waters, and would also give £100 for information that might lead to the arrest of any one of the enemy agents who, the *Herald* alleged, were infesting Halifax.

DESTROYER ATTACKS "U"-BOAT.—A report was received by the Navy Department, August 13th, that an American destroyer sighted an enemy submarine about 100 miles east of the Virginia coast and dropped fifteen depth bombs on the spot where she submerged. The submarine did not reappear, but traces of oil were seen on the water, whereupon two more depth charges were dropped.

NORWEGIAN STEAMER SUNK.—On September 2nd it was announced that a Norwegian steamer, "Borgsdal" (? "Borgestad"), had been torpedoed in the Atlantic and probably sunk. Twenty-five men had been landed at Cape Race.

TROOPSHIP TORPEDOED.—On September 12th it was announced in the *New York Herald* that a message from London stated that a transport with 2,800 American troops on board was struck by a torpedo fired by a German submarine on September 6th. All on board the vessel were saved.

STEAMER SINKS "U"-BOAT.—The clever sinking of a large German submarine by an American Navy gun crew aboard the American steamer "Frank H. Buck," off the Atlantic coast on September 3rd was announced by the American Navy Department on September 10th, after the report of the captain had been received. Two shots from the steamer struck the submarine squarely, and she blew up and went to the bottom. The American Navy Department announced that the captain of the "Buck" highly commended the efficiency and conduct of Chief Gunner's Mate Joseph Steffens, U.S.N., and the entire armed guard under his command.

MISCELLANEOUS.

NEW AUSTRALIAN WARSHIP.—On July 27th the Australian warship "Adelaide" was launched at Sydney, and named by Lady Helen Munro-Ferguson, wife of the Governor-General. The slip she was built on was to be immediately used for another new warship. In connection with the launching, the following message was sent by the Minister for the Australian Navy, Mr. Cook, who was on a visit to England:—

"Congratulations to all concerned on fine achievement. The 'Adelaide' will be another buttress of the steel wall of Empire, a welcome addition to the Australian unit now so worthily maintaining the best British naval traditions in the North Sea, and a further assurance of ultimate victory. Advance, Australia!"

AUSTRALIAN SEAMEN.—It was announced on August 12th that a war risk bonus was to be granted to all seamen in ships owned by the Australian Government. Proportionately higher rates were also to be paid to all seamen in the danger zones.

AUSTRALIAN MINISTER'S VISIT.—On August 16th Sir Joseph Cook paid a visit to the Fleet, and particularly the Australian vessels. Special attention was paid to the "Australia" and other vessels of the Australian unit. While on board the "Australia," Sir Joseph spent some time with the officers and men, listening to their North Sea experiences. Four of the Australian sailors who took part in the Zeebrugge exploit were presented.

AUSTRALIAN NAVY COMMAND.—It was announced at the beginning of October that Rear-Admiral Sir Lionel Halsey had succeeded Rear-Admiral Arthur Leveson, C.B., in command of the Australian Navy.

ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES.—On October 4th a message from Sydney gave the report of the Royal Commission on Navy Administration recommending that Admiral Creswell should retire from the position of First Naval Member of the Navy Board. It was further recommended that the Naval Board be reconstructed with four members—namely, the Minister for the Navy as President, and Naval, Business, and Finance Members. Admiral Clarkson was recommended as the Business Member, Chief Paymaster Treacy as Finance Member, and Mr. King Salter as General Manager of the Naval Dockyards and in charge of ship construction. The last-named to be provided each year with a definite programme of work. The Cabinet has decided to adopt the recommendation involving Admiral Creswell's retirement. The other proposals were deferred pending the return of Sir Joseph Cook.

CANADA'S NAVAL FUTURE.—On September 7th, Colonel Ballantyne, Canadian Minister of Marine, in an address to the Sons of Empire at Montreal, said that he wanted a strong and sound naval policy for Canada. He hoped that such a policy would soon be inaugurated, and suggested a future in which a Canadian Fleet would form part and parcel of the Imperial Fleet, but as a Canadian unit under the control of the Dominion, except in time of war, when it would pass under a single united command.

CANADIAN AIR SERVICE.—On August 9th the Department of Naval Service announced the immediate organization of a Royal Canadian Air Service, having as its primary object the defence of Canada's coasts. In order to facilitate the formation of this force, a commander of the Royal Air Force has been lent to Canada, and its organization will be on similar lines to that of the Canadian Navy.

NAVAL COLLEGE AT HALIFAX.—On October 5th, Colonel Ballantyne stated that the Royal Naval College was to be permanently established at Halifax. One hundred thousand pounds was to be placed on the Estimates for the building and equipment of the college during the next Session of Parliament.

MERCANTILE MARINE CONCESSIONS.—On September 4th it was announced that the King had approved of a special medal being granted to masters, officers and seamen of the mercantile marine for services performed in the danger zone during the war. The medal will be issued at the end of the war, and clasps will be awarded where conspicuous service has been rendered. His Majesty has also approved a standard uniform for the mercantile marine, and an Order in Council on this subject will be issued shortly. The Order mentioned was published in the *London Gazette* of September 6th.

TORPEDO BADGE.—During August it was decided that a torpedo badge was to be issued to officers and men of the Mercantile Marine who had been in a torpedoed vessel. The award will not apply to officers and men of the R.N.R. and R.N.V.R.

GERMAN SHIPS IN CHILE.—On September 6th a message from Santiago de Chili reported the attempt of the crews of German ships in Chilean harbours to destroy their vessels. The steamers "Rameses," "Sebara," and "Redophis" at Corral had their engines completely wrecked. At Valparaiso the machinery of the steamer "York" was destroyed and thrown overboard, and at Antofagasta the engines of the steamers "Carnac," "Thesalia," "Hathor," and "Alda" were destroyed by dynamite. On September 26th the Chilean Government ordered the naval authorities to occupy with armed forces all German ships interned in Chilean harbours.

ARGENTINA'S NAVAL PLANS.—The Argentine Government, on August 14th, laid before the Chamber a Bill asking for 18,000,000 piastres for the purchase of war-ships, submarines, aeroplanes, and merchant vessels.

GERMAN SHIPS TRANSFERRED.—On September 7th a contract was signed between the Peruvian and American Government, transferring the control of the German shipping in Peruvian ports to the United States. These comprise six steamers and four sailing vessels of a total tonnage of more than 25,000 tons.

HAITI DECLARES WAR.—On July 15th a telegram from Port-au-Prince, the capital, announced that Haiti had declared war against Germany.

"KAWACHI" BLOWS UP.—On July 12th the Japanese battleship "Kawachi" blew up in Tokuyama Harbour and sank. More than 500 of her crew were killed.

TRIBUTE TO JAPAN.—On August 16th Mr. A. J. Balfour, speaking at a luncheon at the Automobile Club, said that no one could go from Great Britain to Egypt, India, or Australia, without obtaining ample evidence of the work done by the Japanese destroyers and other naval units in preserving the safety of the seas. "Our Japanese Allies," continued Mr. Balfour, "extended their naval activities from the Pacific and the Far Eastern seas to the Mediterranean. At this moment Japan was adding to her naval obligations by sending her troops to the rescue of our Allies, the Czechs. . . ."

WOMEN AT SEA.—According to a written answer by Dr. Macnamara, the Admiralty consider it to be necessary during the war to restrict severely the travelling of women and children overseas, on the ground that their presence adds to the responsibility, and hampers the freedom of the master of a ship in attacking an enemy vessel, if met with. It was also stated that the necessity of saving women

and children made demands upon the self-sacrifice and chivalry of the men, which ought not to be imposed on them.

D.O.R.A. REGULATIONS.—On September 28th, by a Defence of the Realm regulation, the Admiralty, Board of Trade, or Shipping Controller may give directions for the painting of any ship in a manner specified, or for the alteration of the structure of any British ship.

SHIPPING AND SUBMARINES.—The following table shows the amount of tonnage of the British Mercantile Marine sunk, and the amount of shipbuilding produced in the first eight months of the year:—

1918. Month	Loss. tons.	Production. tons.
January	218,621	58,568
February	254,303	100,038
March	224,666	161,674
April	228,067	111,533
May	231,780	197,274
June	165,514	134,159
July	182,524	141,948
August	176,401	124,675

The gross tonnage of British ships produced in September was 144,772.

WORLD'S SHIPPING LOSS.—A monthly Admiralty statement of the losses of British, Allied, and neutral merchant tonnage due to enemy action and marine risks was issued on September 26th. It showed this loss for the first eight months of 1918, as follows:—

1918	British.	Allied & Neutral.	Total
January	218,621	138,887	357,508
February	254,303	133,835	388,138
March	224,666	176,797	401,463
April	228,067	85,348	313,415
May	231,780	133,203	364,983
June	165,514	115,594	281,108
July	182,524	141,248	323,772
August	176,401	151,275	327,676

The official statement added that the British losses from all causes during August were slightly higher than for the month of June, which was the lowest month since the introduction of unrestricted submarine warfare. If British losses from enemy action alone were considered, August was better than any month since September, 1916. The Ministry of Shipping stated that the tonnage of vessels entering and clearing United Kingdom ports in August was 8,158,639. This was higher than in any previous month this year, the nearest approach to it being 7,777,843 tons in May. The lowest month was February with 6,326,965 tons.

LOSS AND PRODUCTION.—On August 8th an Admiralty statement gave the figures of loss and construction of world's tonnage for the first two quarters of 1918:—

	1st Quarter. tons.	2nd Quarter. tons.
World's construction	870,317	1,243,274
World's loss	1,147,109*	959,506

*Adjusted by official figures issued September 26th.

DIARY OF THE WAR.

ITS MILITARY SIDE.

Sites of unusual artillery activity marked *; enemy reports in [].

JULY 1st—31st, 1918.

BRITISH-FRENCH FRONT.

1ST, *British*.—Night June 30th—July 1st. Aveluy Wood, S. of Morlancourt, posts captured. N.W. of Albert, position improved: over 50 prisoners, etc. * N. of Albert, S.E. of Arras, E. of Robecq, Merris, Ypres Comines Canal.

French.—Night June 30th—July 1st. S. of the Aisne, N. of Cutry, captured "strong point." S. of the Ourcq. Passy-en-Valois—Vinly, line advanced E. of Chézy—Vinly railway. S.E. of Mosloy, attack repulsed, 200 prisoners.

2ND, *British*.—Night 1st—2nd. N.W. of Albert, attack repulsed (gained footing at one point).

French.—Night 1st—2nd. W. of Château-Thierry, position improved Vaux—Hill 204. Americans captured and held Vaux and heights W.: advanced 1,000 yards on $1\frac{1}{2}$ -mile front. Over 500 prisoners (6 officers), etc. 2nd, S. of the Aisne, captured St. Pierre Aigle.

3RD, *British*.—Night 2nd—3rd. * N.W. of Albert, most of ground recently won lost.

French.—Night 2nd—3rd. Oise—Aisne. N. of Moulin-sous-Touvent, advanced 900 yards at some points on 2-mile front: 437 prisoners (7 officers). Vaux, attack broken.

4TH, *British*.—Night 3rd—4th. Villers Bretonneux—Somme. 3 a.m., Australians and Americans captured and held Hamel, Hamel and Vaire Woods: average depth of advance, 2,000 yards. E. of Ville-sur-Ancre, Australians advanced line 500 yards on 1,200 yards front. Over 1,500 prisoners (40 officers), etc.

French.—Night 3rd—4th. Oise—Aisne. W. of Autrèches. 7.30 p.m., advanced line 900 yards on $1\frac{1}{2}$ -mile front. Later, Autrèches—Moulin-sous-Touvent, further advance anticipated counter-attack. 1,300 yards gained at some points on over 3-mile front. 1,066 unwounded prisoners (18 officers), etc. 4th, * Oise—Aisne. St. Pierre Aigle.

5TH, *British*.—Night 4th—5th. Hamel, attack "easily repulsed." 5th * Scherpenberg.

French.—* S. of Aisne, Cutry—Montgobert.

6TH, *British*.—Night 5th—6th. N.E. of Villers Bretonneux, Australians advanced line on 2,000 yards front. * Villers Bretonneux—Ancre.

French.—W. of Château-Thierry. Hill 204, progress.

7TH, *British*.—* Fonquevillers, Hinges, Béthune.

French.—* S. of Aisne (Longpont, Corcy).

8TH, *British*.—Night 7th—8th. Astride Somme, Australian slight advance on 3,000 yards front. * Astride Somme, N. of Beaumont Hamel, Béthune.

French.—Night 7th—8th. * Villers Cotterets Forest—Marne. 8th, N.W. of Longpont. Attacked approaches to Retz Forest on 2-mile front: captured Chavigny Farm, ridges N. and S. $\frac{1}{2}$ -mile advance: 346 prisoners (4 officers).

9TH, *British*.—Night 8th—9th. * S. of Somme.

French.—Night 8th—9th. Montdidier—Oise. W. of Antheuil, 3.30 a.m., attacked on $2\frac{1}{2}$ -mile front: captured and held Porte, des Loges Farms. Advanced 1,900 yards at certain points. 530 unwounded prisoners (14 officers). S. of Aisne. Chavigny Farm, progress. * Chavigny Farm, W. and N. of Château-Thierry (especially Hill 204). 9th, Chavigny Farm, attack broken.

10TH, *British.*—Night 9th—10th. Merris, progress. * Villers Bretonneux (attacks repulsed)—Ancre. 10th, Morlancourt, Hinges, Locre.

French.—Night 9th—10th. * N. of Montdidier, Chavigny Farm. 10th, N. of Chavigny Farm, captured Grille Farm and quarries. Penetrated approaches to Longpont, N. part of Corcy. Over 800 prisoners.

11TH, *British.*—Night 10th—11th. E. of Villers Bretonneux, progress. * Somme. 11th, S.W. of Merris. Australians captured 120 prisoners, etc.

French.—Night 10th—11th. Retz Forest, progress. Captured all Corcy, railway station, St. Paul Château and Farm. 50 prisoners (1 officer).

12TH, *British.*—* Hinges, "and other points."

French.—Night 11th—12th. S. of Aisne. "Occupied" Longpont, Javage Farm (N.E. of Faverolles). * Left bank Meuse. 12th, W. of Avre. Attacked on 3-mile front Castel—N. of Maily Raineval: captured Castel, Anchin Farm, several "strongly organized spinneys": advanced 2,200 yards at some points. 500 prisoners.

13TH, *British.*—Night 12th—13th. Vieux Berquin, Merris, progress: 96 prisoners. * Beaumont Hamel, Strazeele, Locre. 13th, S. of Arras.

French.—Night 12th—13th. Montdidier—Oise. Porte Farm, advanced 500 yards. S. of Aisne. N. and S. of Longpont, progress. Crossed Savières near Catifet Farm.

14TH, *British.*—Night 13th—14th. E. of Dickebusch, advanced on 2,000 yards front, captured position near Ridge Wood: 328 prisoners. * N.W. of Albert, W. of Kemmel Hill, S. and S.E. of Ypres.

French.—Night 13th—14th. * Senecat Wood, Cantigny, Cournay-sur-Aronde. 14th, Corcy.

15TH, *British.*—Night 14th—15th. S. of Villers Bretonneux, progress. * S. of Arras, N. of Béthune, Locre, Dickebusch.

French.—Night 14th—15th. * Midnight, on 50-mile front, Château-Thierry—Main-de-Massiges. 15th, 4.30 a.m. Enemy attacked E. of Reims, on 25-mile front Prunay—Main-de-Massiges: W. of Reims, on 23-mile front Coulommès—Fossoy. E. of Reims. "Impregnable defence." Prunay lost. Enemy held Prunay—N. of road as far as Suippes—N. of Souain—Perthes-lez-Hurlus. Battle positions intact. 15 enemy divisions in line, 10 in reserve: objective, "to reach Marne on their right" ($12\frac{1}{2}$ miles). W. of Reims. Fossoy—Dormans. Marne crossed at several points: "furious struggle" Reuilly—Courthiézy—Vassy. W. of Fossoy, American counter-attack drove enemy back to N. bank: 1,000 prisoners. Dormans—Reims, "tenacious resistance" Chatillon-sur-Marne—Cuthery—Marfaux—Bouilly. N. of Marne, enemy contained on outskirts of Chatillon—S.E. border Rondemat Woods: S., on S. outskirts St. Aignan—La Chapelle Monthodon—Bouquigny Wood. Moreuil-le-Port held. 1,000 prisoners. Average enemy advance 2—3 miles on 20-mile front, greatest at Belval, Comblizy.

16TH, *British.*—Night 15th—16th. Villers Bretonneux, "sharp fighting," progress. * Albert, "different points" N. 16th, Locre.

French.—Night 15th—16th. No enemy movement. W. of Reims. St. Agnan—La Chapelle Monthodon, dominating heights near La Bourdonnerie, Clos Milon Farms ($\frac{1}{2}$ mile N.), recaptured. 16th, E. of Reims, Beaumont-sur-Vesle, Suippes, N. of Cronnes, E. of Tahure, attacks heavily repulsed. Positions everywhere maintained. W. of Reims. N. of Marne, enemy thrust up river gained Reuil: S., held at Oeuilly—Levrigny. Attack by fresh enemy forces gained footing in

La Bourdonnerie Farm: held on S. borders Bouquigny, Nesle Woods. Montvoisin lost and recaptured. Marne—Reims. Fighting in Courton Woods. Attack on Vrigny "completely collapsed."

17TH, *British*.—Night 16th—17th. E. of Villers Bretonneux, progress. * Somme, Ancre, N. of Scarpe, N.E. of Béthune, N. of Bailleul. Later, Villers Bretonneux (gas), Albert.

French.—E. of Reims. Beaumont-sur-Vesle—Sillery, attack broken. All positions intact. W. of Reims. S. of Marne. N. of St. Agnan—La Chapelle Monthodon, fighting. N. of Comblizy—Festigny, enemy held on S. borders Bouquigny—Chataigniers Woods. Montvoisin, regained footing. Marne—Reims. N. of Reuil, fighting in Roi, Courton Woods. W. of Nanteuil la Fosse—Pourcy, Italians repulsed attack. Vrigny—S.W. of Reims, no change.

[Now 18,000 prisoners.]

18TH, *British*.—Night 17th—18th. S.E. of Villers Bretonneux, Australians advanced line on over 1-mile front. E. of Hebuterne, position improved. * N. of Bailleul.

French.—E. of Reims. N. of Prosnes, attack by Guards "completely collapsed." Prunay recaptured. W. of Reims. S.W. of Nanteuil la Fosse, "enemy push stopped dead." Aisne—Marne, 4.30 a.m. Without artillery preparation, with Americans attacked enemy positions on 27-mile front, Fontenoy—Belleau. Left. Reached plateau (Mont de Paris) commanding Soissons—Chaudun. 8 mile advance, 5,000 prisoners, 30 guns. Centre advanced 3—5 miles. "Violent fighting" Villers Hélon—Noroy-sur-Ourcq. Right. Advanced beyond Marisy Ste. Geneviève—Hautevesnes—Belleau.

19TH, *British*.—Scots captured Meteren. S. of Meteren, Australian progress: line advanced on 4,000 yards front. 433 prisoners, etc.

French.—W. of Reims. S. of Marne. Montvoisin recaptured, enemy thrown back to Oeuilly. N. of Marne. In Roi Wood, Courton Wood (La Poterne—Pourcy), line advanced 1,000 yards W. Italians carried Ardre Mill, ground near Bouilly. Over 400 prisoners, 4 guns, etc. Aisne—Marne. Left. Held ground on plateau S.W. of Soissons—Chaudun. Centre, advanced at some points 2 miles beyond Vaucastille—Villers Hélon—Noroy-sur-Ourcq. Right. "Won by sheer fighting" plateau N.W. of Monnes, height N. of Courchamps: advanced 2 miles beyond Torcy. Now over 17,000 prisoners, 360 guns, etc. 51st, 60th British divisions arrived on the Ardre.

[Since 15th, 20,000 prisoners.]

20TH, *British*.—Night 19th—20th. S. of Hebuterne, line advanced on 1-mile front: "sharp fighting." * St. Venant, Ypres. 20th, Hebuterne—Bucquoy, enemy evacuated Rossignol Wood.

French.—Night 19th—20th. Aisne—Marne. Reached Vierzy (captured, lost, recaptured by Americans): passed Molloy Wood (E. of Villers Hélon): captured Neuilly St. Front, Licy Clignon. W. of Reims. S. of Marne. Fossoy—Oeuilly, advanced towards river. 20th, Aisne—Marne, advance continued: stubborn defence. Reached Ploisy, Parcy Tigny: passed St. Remy Blanzly, Rozet St. Albin. Further S. held "general line" of Priez Plateau (N.E. of Courchamps). W. of Reims. Enemy retired across Marne, abandoning 45 guns: whole of S. bank regained. Marne—Reims. Violent fighting. With British, advanced in Courton Wood—Ardre Valley on Ste. Euphrase. 1,000 prisoners. Since 18th, over 21,000 prisoners, over 400 guns.

21ST, *British*.—"Nothing of special interest."

French.—Night 20th—21st. Entered Château-Thierry. N. and S. of Ourcq, Marne, heavy fighting: progress. 21st, N. of Ourcq, progress N. of Villemon-toire. Further S. advance E. of Tigny—Billy-sur-Ourcq. S. of Ourcq, "important advance" beyond Neuilly St. Front, captured heights E. of St. Croix—Grisolles.

"Under double pressure" of operations Ourcq—Marne, and of crossing effected Fossey—Chartèves, enemy driven back beyond Bézu St. Germain—Mont St. Père. Château-Thierry "practically cleared to N." Marne—Reims, violent fighting all day. With British and Italians captured Sainte Euphrase, Bouilly, gained ground up Ardre Valley. In Courton, Roi Woods, British took 400 prisoners (11 officers, 2 battalion commanders), 4 guns. 4 fresh enemy divisions thrown in. 54 now identified, 21 Aisne—Marne. 60-64 engaged.

22ND, *British*.—Night 21st—22nd. S.E. of Hébuterne, with French S.W. of Villers Bretonneux, progress. * Locre. 22nd, S. of Arras, E. of Nieppe Forest.

French.—Night 21st—22nd. * N. of Ourcq, Marne—Reims (Courton, Roi Woods). Ourcq—Marne. Grisolles, Bézu St. Germain, strong counter-attacks "broken up": positions everywhere maintained. 22nd, Ourcq—Marne. Powerful counter-attacks repulsed, "increased progress." Passed heights E. of La Croix—Grisolles, captured Epieds, gained ground N.E. of Mont St. Père. Americans captured Jaulgonne and woods to W. Marne—Reims. Positions Courton, Roi Woods maintained. Further N. British advanced: 200 prisoners. * N. of Ourcq, Champagne: no infantry action. E. of Reims. E. of the Suippes, advanced 1,000 yards on 13½-mile front N. of St. Hilaire-le-Grand—Souain—Mesnil-les-Hurlus. Recaptured whole of Main-de-Massiges, reoccupied old positions. Over 1,000 prisoners, 7 guns, 200 machine-guns.

23RD, *British*.—Night 22nd—23rd. S. of Hébuterne, Merris, and Meteren, Hamel, positions improved. * Villers Bretonneux (gas), Dickebusch. 23rd, Villers Bretonneux, Hinges, "other points."

French.—Night 22nd—23rd. Aisne—Champagne. "Only artillery actions." N. of Montdidier. "Local operation" on 4-mile front gained Mailly Raineval, Sauvillers, Aubvillers: 1,850 prisoners (52 officers, 4 battalion C.O.s), etc. 23rd, Ourcq. Enemy "brought up fresh reserves: tenacious resistance." N. of Ourcq. Captured and passed Le Plessier Huleu: reached W. outskirts Oulchy-la-Ville: captured Montgru. S. of Ourcq. With Americans, advanced ¾-mile beyond Château-Thierry road: captured Rocourt, most of Châtelet Wood. Right bank Marne. Advanced N. of Mont St. Père, Chartèves: extended bridgehead Jaulgonne. Marne—Reims, violent fighting. Ardre—Vrigny. With British, attacked strong positions: recaptured Vrigny and Woods E.: advanced ½-mile W. of Ste. Euphrase—Bouilly: British took 300 prisoners, 5 guns. From Vrigny Wood, Italians advanced to Méry Prémency—Gueux: 3 guns, etc.

24TH, *British*.—Night 23rd—24th. * Locre. 24th, Ypres.

French.—Night 23rd—24th. W. of Reims. 9 p.m. Vrigny, counter-attacks broken, new positions held. * Aisne—Marne, Courton, Roi Woods. 24th, Ourcq—Marne, successful attacks, progress. S. of Ourcq, "several hundred prisoners." Left. Advanced Armentières—Châtelet Wood—Brecy. Centre. With Americans, advanced 2 miles at certain points. Epieds—Trugny, desperate fighting. During evening, Epieds lost, recaptured: line carried N. beyond Courpoil. Right. Progress Fère Wood—N. of Chartèves—Jaulgonne. Further E. widened Tréloup bridgehead: captured S. corner Ritz Wood. 64 enemy divisions identified.

25TH, *British*.—Night 24th—25th. S. of Rossignol Wood, slight advance. * N. and S. of Scarpe, N. of Lens, "number of points" N. front. 25th, early, * S. of Meteren, attack on 4 posts repulsed.

French.—Night 24th—25th. N. bank Marne—Dormans. Strong enemy attack gained small wood 1,500 yards N. of Tréloup, Chassins: driven out. * S. of Ourcq. W. of Reims. 25th, N. of Ourcq. Occupied Oulchy-la-Ville. S. of Ourcq. With Americans, advanced 2 miles at certain points: "lively resistance," notably near Dormans. S.E. of Armentières: carried Hill 141, crossed Nanteuil brook. Further S.: captured Coincy, most of Tournelle Wood, advanced in Fère

Forest to Beauvarde—Le Charmel. S.W. of Reims. Vigny—Ste. Euphrase, enemy gained footing on Hill 240: driven off, 100 prisoners.

26TH, *British*.—Night 25th—26th. Hébuterne, Meteren, attacks heavily repulsed. * Somme, Bayolles (S.S.E. of Arras). 26th, Aveluy Wood, attack repulsed.

French.—Night 25th—26th. Aisne—Ourcq. Carried Villemontoire "after desperate struggle." Captured Oulchy-le-Château: advanced E. 700 prisoners, 4 guns, etc. N. of Marne. Captured Reuil, Ferme-des-Savards, drove enemy back to Binson Orquigny—Villers-sous-Chatillon. 26th, * S. of Ourcq: no infantry action.

27TH, *British*.—Night 26th—27th. * Somme—Ancre, La Bassée Canal. 27th, N. front.

French.—Night 26th—27th. Right bank Marne, line extended N. of Pont-à-Binson. Champagne. S. of Mont-sans-Nom, advanced 1,000 yards on nearly 2-mile front: over 300 prisoners (9 officers). 27th, N. of Marne, enemy withdrew on whole front. "On heels of rearguards" line advanced "Bruyères—Villeneuve-sur-Fère—Courmont—Passy—Grigny—Cuisles—La Neuville-aux-Larisses—Chau-muzy (British). Right bank Marne cleared on wide front. Advanced more than 9 miles N.E. of Château-Thierry.

28TH, *French*.—Night 27th—28th. N. of Marne, advance continued. Reached right bank, approached roads S. of Ourcq, Dormans—Reims. Champagne. S. of Mont-sans-Nom—N.E. St. Hilaire, several attacks repulsed: lines intact. 28th, cavalry and tanks forced crossing to N. bank Ourcq. Entered Fère-en-Tardenois. Reached Champvoisy. Carried Anthenay (British), Olizy, Violaine. Approached "appreciably nearer" Dormans—Reims road. About 400 prisoners. Later, Americans advanced on Seringes, Nésles, Sergy, Ronchères. Sergy changed hands 4 times. Cavalry crossed Dormans—Reims road at Chambrécy, Ville-en-Tardenois, Villers Agron. Champagne. * S. of the Monts, 2 attempts repulsed. 18th—28th, tanks took "glorious part."

29TH, *British*.—Night 28th—29th. Morlancourt. Australians captured 2 lines of trenches on over 2-mile front astride Bray—Corbie road: 143 prisoners. 29th, repulsed 3 attacks.

French.—Night 28th—29th. N. of Marne. Fighting Chambrécy, Ville-en-Tardenois, Ste. Gemme, Upper Ourcq: no change. 29th, increased resistance, violent fighting, further advance. Buzancy, 200 prisoners: Scots captured and held park and château. E. of Le Plessier Huleu—Oulchy-le-Château, passed Château-Thierry road: British captured Grand Rozoy, Cugny: carried Butte-de-Chalmont, 450 prisoners. Right bank Ourcq, progress N. of Fère-en-Tardenois, entered Sergy, Ronchères. S. of Sergy, Americans repulsed 4th division Prussian Guard. Further E. passed Dormans—Reims road S. of Villers Agron, advanced W. of Bligny—Ste. Euphrase. Champagne. Hill 181 (S. of Mont-sans-Nom), attack repulsed.

30TH, *British*.—Night 29th—30th. Australians captured Merris: 169 prisoners, etc. 30th, * Merris.

French.—Night 29th—30th. "No important event." 30th, right bank Ourcq. Advanced N.E. of Fère-en-Tardenois: captured Saponay. Sergy, gains held. E. of Oulchy-le-Château, attack on new positions repulsed. Americans finally captured Seringes. S.W. of Reims, Ste. Euphrase, attacks repulsed: slight advance on W.

31ST, *British*.—Night 30th—31st. * Somme, Merris, Kemmel. 31st, S.W. of Albert, E. of Robecq.

French.—Montdidier—Oise, Antheuil, attack broken. Americans cleared Seringes, Nésles: captured Grimpettes Wood: reached Cirige.

During July, British took 4,503 prisoners (89 officers): 15th—31st, French 33,400 prisoners (674 officers): enemy claimed 24,000. 31st, on W. front 201 enemy divisions. Of these 71 identified Aisne—Champagne (10 from Prince Rupprecht's army opposite British front), 20 in reserve under Prince Rupprecht.

ITALIAN FRONT.

- 1ST.—Asiago Plateau. Attacks broken, advance at some points. 127 prisoners, etc. W. of Monte Asolone, progress.
- 2ND.—Lower Piave. "Thrusts" (Chiasanuovo, Capo Sile—Dona) gained ground : 1,900 prisoners (45 officers), etc. W. of Monte Asolone. Head of Val San Lorenzo, attack repulsed, position consolidated. Now 25 officers, 596 other prisoners.
- 3RD.—Piave. N. of Cavazuccherina, progress : 223 prisoners (7 officers), etc. Brenta, Val San Lorenzo, Monte Cornone (Sasso Rosso), positions improved.
- 4TH.—Piave. S.E. of Chiasanuovo, N. of Cavazuccherina, attacks repulsed, positions extended. 419 prisoners, 4-in. howitzer battery, etc. N.E. of Monte Grappa, Porte-di-Salton (Val Calcino), "advantages gained." 30 prisoners (5 officers), etc. Asiago Plateau. Monte Cornone, 2 attacks repulsed.
- 5TH.—Piave. Grisolera—sea, reached right bank : over 400 prisoners (6 officers). Chiasanuovo, attack "arrested." Brenta. Porte-de-Salton, attacks repulsed. Monte Cornone, 3 attempts broken.
- 6TH.—Piave. Right bank cleared, positions consolidated. Asiago Plateau. Zocchi, French raid : 2 officers, 64 other prisoners. N. of Monte Grappa, progress : 51 prisoners, etc. Since June 15th, 523 officers, 23,911 other prisoners, 63 guns, 65 trench mortars, 1,234 machine-guns, 2 aeroplanes, etc. All lost guns, etc., recovered.
- 7TH.—Col Caprile, positions extended. N. of Monte-di-Val Bella. * Val Lagarina, Val Arsa.
- 8TH.—Monte Cornone, attack repulsed.
- 11TH.—Monte Cornone, attack broken. Laghi (Posina), Val Arsa (N. Asiago Plateau), posts captured.
- 12TH.—Monte Corona, attack repulsed : 2 officers, 64 other prisoners. * Pasubio.
- 15TH.—N. of Monte Grappa, 94 prisoners (3 officers), etc.
- 16TH.—S.E. slopes Sasso Rosso—Brenta, attacks broken : S. of Col Tasson (N. of Monte Grappa), repulsed.
- 19TH.—Adamello. Captured Monte Stabel, completely reoccupied Corno-di-Cavento. * Val Camonica, Pasubio, Asiago Plateau, E. of Montello.
- 23RD.—* Val Lagarina, Val Arsa (Monte Corno, attack repulsed).
- 26TH.—Night 25th—26th. * Monte Corno, attack gained footing, driven off.
- 30TH.—Night 29th—30th. * Monte Cornone, repulsed attack : prisoners, etc.

RUSSIA.

During July, allied detachments landed on Murman coast, Vladivostock. Occupied Kem (on Murman Railway, 250 miles S. of Kola), Madjuga Island (30 miles N. of Archangel). Czecho-Slovaks held trans-Siberian Railway Penza—Samara—Nijni Udinsk, Chita-Vladivostock : Bolsheviks between Nijni Udinsk—Chita (Lake Baikal section). Enemy reinforced in Finland. 24th, Japanese action arranged.

BALKAN FRONT.

- 3RD.—* Skra-di-Legen.
- 6TH.—Albania. Italians advanced coast—Tamorica Valley, French Tamorica—Devoli Valleys. French captured Mali Gharper summit (Bofnia massif, 25 miles S.W. of Lake Ochrida).
- 7TH.—French repulsed attack Mali Gharper.
- 8TH.—Italians carried heights Pojani Monastery—Levani : cavalry advanced between sea—Malakastra Mountains, cut bridges across the Semeni at Metali.

Fieri occupied. On left bank Tamorica, progress. Allies captured Casa Devris : French, all Bofnia crest (Cafa Becit—Mali Gharper). * Tchernia bend, French repulsed 5 attacks.

9TH.—Italians advanced lower and middle Semeni—Osum—head Tamorica Valley. French captured Cafa Guri Prer, Bofnia crest (N.W. of Mount Bofnia) : pursued enemy along Tamorica Valley. ["Front withdrawn" Fieri—Berat.] Tchernia bend. * N. of Monastir, French repulsed attacks.

10TH.—Italians captured Cafa Glumaka (S.E. of Berat). French, villages in Tamorica Valley above Dobreny, all Kosnitza crest. ["Organized new defensive line," Skumbi—Bulgarian right near Lake Ochrida.]

11TH.—Italians occupied Berat. French continued advance astride Devoli : right bank, captured Komjami height : left bank, cleared Devoli—Tamorica except Hill 500 dominating confluence. Staravina (15 miles E. of Monastir), Serbs repulsed attack.

12TH.—Night 11th—12th. E. of lower Devoli, Italians dispersed retreating columns. 12th, N. of Semeni, contact with new enemy line. Semeni—Vojusa cleared. Opposite French, enemy on organized line Rustani—Selconi—Hill 500. * Doiran. E. of Vardar, "the Lakes."

13TH.—Italians captured Cafa Darza heights. French, Hill 500, Nasta (close to), Gramsi (right bank Devoli).

14TH.—French advanced on enemy positions Cekini—Cruja.

15TH.—Right bank Devoli. French occupied Rastani, Prostani, reached the Holta.

16TH.—French carried Mecan.

16TH.—French occupied Gors crest.

19TH.—Night 18th—19th. Hill 1050 (12 miles N.N.E. of Monastir), Italians repulsed attack.

20TH.—In Devoli bend (N.E. of Berat), Allies captured Point 1071 Mali Silovis crest.

21ST.—N. of the Devoli, French captured part of Austrian positions on the Holta.

22ND.—Italians advanced along Mali Silovis crest, carried Height 900. On the Semeni, repulsed attack on Kuchi bridge (12 miles N.W. of Berat). French carried all enemy positions S. of the Holta.

23RD.—Above confluence of Devoli and Holta, French captured and held Izgyuba, Kokshova. Mountains dominating N. (right) bank Devoli cleared.

24TH.—Enemy counter-offensive. Italians repulsed 2 violent attacks on Ardenitsa (N. of Lower Semeni, 7 miles N. of Fieri). E. of Kuchi another attack gained ground.

25TH.—E. of Kuchi, Italians drove enemy back to river.

26TH.—Enemy reinforced. Italians repulsed repeated attacks Kuchi bridge (100 prisoners) : attempted crossing of Semeni at Yagodina : assault on Hill 760 (W. slopes Mali Silovis). French broke attacks N. of Devoli, S. of Lower Holta, Izgyuba.

27TH.—Italians repulsed 7 attacks on Ardenitsa.

28TH.—Italians repulsed attacks Kuchi Bridge.

29TH—31ST.—Italian line pressed back 5 miles, now 3 miles N. of Berat.

6TH—31ST.—Italians took over 2,300 prisoners (100 officers), 26 guns, etc. : French over 1,300 prisoners, etc. "Several hundred" Italian and Russian prisoners released.

PALESTINE FRONT.

10TH.—Arabs destroyed detachment marching from Medina to Hail.

14TH.—Night 13th—14th. Enemy attacks E. of Jordan dispersed by Indian Imperial Service Cavalry : on Abu Tellal ridges (7 miles N. of Jericho) gained

footing, position restored by Australians and New Zealanders. 510 prisoners (350 Germans from 3 units), etc.

EAST AFRICA.

1ST—3RD.—Nhamacurra (26 miles N. of Quilimane), "severe fighting." Enemy retired E. then S. "Met and closely pressed" at Ociva (on the Melete): Tibe (on the Molucue): Namirrue (confluence of Namirrue and Ligonba).

21ST—23RD.—Namirrue, "severe fighting at close quarters." Enemy abandoned hospital, retreated N. and N.E. 40-60 miles inland S. of Mozambique. Headed off, again driven S.

AVIATION.

During June, 1,235 aircraft destroyed, etc., on all fronts (991 by Allies, 244 by enemy): during July 1,179 (944 by Allies, 235 by enemy). Totals include aircraft destroyed by R.N. and Independent Air Force. Returns approximate.

In July, on W. front, British destroyed, etc., 459 (and 36 balloons), lost 117: French 300 (and 49 balloons): Americans 3: Belgians 4 (and 8 balloons). On Italian front 106 (British 69, lost 4): 26 on Balkan: 5 in Palestine.

During June, Independent Air Force carried out 74 raids, dropped 61 tons of bombs: during July, 100 raids (96 into Germany), 81 tons of bombs.

AUGUST 1st—31st, 1918.

BRITISH-FRENCH FRONT.

1ST, *British*.—Night July 31st—August 1st. * Villers Bretonneux, Bucquoy, Merris, Meteren.

French.—Night July 31st—August 1st. S.W. Reims. Bligny Hill, attack repulsed. 1st, N. of Ourcq. With British, advanced Le Plessier Huleu—river. Carried height (Hill 205) N. of Grand Rozoy, passed Beugneux, reached Cramoisselle, Cramelle. Nearly 2 miles advance. 600 prisoners. Further S. Americans captured Hill 230 (S. of Coulonges) and woods E., Cierges, Meunière Wood. N. of Dormans—Reims road, captured Romigny.

2ND, *British*.—Night 1st—2nd. * S. of Somme, S. of Ypres, N. of Béthune, E. of Hazebrouck. 2nd, N. of Béthune.

French.—Night 1st—2nd. N. of Marne, progress. Enemy abandoned line Fère-en-Tardenois—Ville-en-Tardenois: "hastened retreat." 2nd, Left, entered Soissons: crossed the Crise along whole length. Centre, N. of Ourcq, passed Arcy St. Restitué, entered Dole Wood. Further E., occupied Coulonges (2½ miles N. of Meunière Wood). Right, occupied Gossaucourt, Villers Agron, Ville-en-Tardenois. N. of Dormans—Reims road, 3-mile advance Vezilley—Lhery. Between Ardre—Vesle, occupied Gueux, Thillois.

3RD, *British*.—Night 2nd—3rd. Albert. [Hamel—Dernancourt, withdrew posts from W. to E. bank Ancre.] Occupied part of enemy front line. S.E. of Hébuterne, repulsed strong raid. * Béthune—Bailleul. 3rd, occupied most of ground W. of Ancre. * Kemmel.

French.—Night 2nd—3rd. Pursued advance towards Vesle. Left reached Aisne between Soissons—Venizel. 3rd, advanced on 30-mile front. Left occupied edge of S. bank Aisne and Vesles, Soissons—Fismes. Americans carried Fismes. E. of Fismes, reached Courville—Branscourt—Champigny: cavalry Soissons—Reims Railway. At certain points advanced over 6 miles. Over 50 villages "set free." Now 8,400 prisoners, 133 guns, taken by Americans.

4TH, *British*.—Night 3rd—4th. Cleared W. bank Ancre, Hamel, Dernancourt. * N. of Béthune, S. of Ypres.

French.—Reached Vesle at several points E. of Fismes. Notable resistance Maizon—Champigny. Footing gained on N. bank, Jonchery, Le Venteux and La Grange Farms. N.W. of Reims, advanced to "energetically defended" La Neuville. Left bank Avre, enemy abandoned positions Castel—Mesnil St. Georges, untenable since July 23rd. Occupied Branches, entered Hargicourt, W. outskirts Courtemanche.

[“Rearguards withdrew to N. bank Vesle, before strong attack on Fismes.”]

5TH, *British.*—Night 4th—5th. * La Bassée, N. of Béthune. Hazebrouck—Ypres. 5th, S.E. of Robecq, progress in Pacaut Wood. * Ypres.

French.—Night 4th—5th. N. of Vesle, advanced troops met “everywhere resistance.” 5th, Vesle, no change. N., local actions. River in flood.

6TH, *British.*—Night 5th—6th. * Villers Bretonneux (gas), Bucquoy, N. of Béthune. 6th, S. of Morlancourt. Attack at dawn by 1 enemy division from reserve gained footing in new positions astride Bray—Corbie road. S.E. of Robecq, advanced 2,000 yards.

French.—Night 5th—6th. N. of Montdidier. Occupied Avre bank Baroches—Morisel. E. of Montdidier, attempt broken. N. bank Vesle, attacks repulsed. 6th, * E. of Soissons, Vesle. Americans crossed Vesle E. of Bazoches, gained Soissons—Reims road, broke attacks.

7TH, *British.*—Night 6th—7th. S.W. of Morlancourt, recaptured most of lost ground. Astride Clarence brook, advanced line. * E. of Robecq, Merville, Dickebusch. 7th, S.W. of Morlancourt, repulsed 2 attacks. Clarence—Lawe, advanced line 1,000 yards on 5-mile front.

French.—Night 6th—7th. Montdidier. Progress S. of Framicourt, S.E. of Mesnil St. Georges. Vesle, La Grange Farm, repulsed attempt. Occupied Ciry Salsogne station. E. of Braine, 100 prisoners. Champagne. S. of Auberive, repulsed attack. 7th, * Oise—Aisne. Bailly, Tracey-le-Val, repulsed attempts. Vesle. With Americans occupied N. bank E. of Braine, repulsed 2 attacks. N. of Reims. Advanced line 400 yards between railways to Réthel, Laon. 74 enemy divisions now identified.

8TH, *British.*—4.30 a.m. After 3 (French 45) minutes’ artillery preparation, 4th British and 1st French armies “stormed the Germans” on over 20-mile front Braches—Morlancourt. “Rapid progress.” N. of Somme. Chipilly—S. of Morlancourt, “prolonged resistance, heavy fighting.” S. of Somme. “Final objectives” gained during afternoon. Cavalry pursued. French met strong resistance Moreuil, Morisel. Later, French captured Fresnay-en-Chaussée: British Le Quesnel, Caix. Line reached Plessiers—Rozainvillers—Beaucourt—Caix—Framerville—Chipilly—W. of Morlancourt: furthest advance 7 miles. Over 14,000 prisoners (from 7 divisions). 100 guns.

“During past few days,” enemy evacuated Lys Valley—Lawe—Bourre rivers (N.W. of Merville), line advanced over 2,000 yards. Occupied Locon, Le Cornet, Malo, Quentin, Le Petit Pacaut, Le Sart.

9TH, *British.*—Night 8th—9th. N. of Kemmel, progress on 1,000 yards front. 9th, S. of Somme, progress at all points, increased resistance. Canadians, Australians, captured outer line of Amiens defences: advanced 2 miles beyond at several points. Severe fighting. Later, captured Bouchoir, Meharecourt, Lihons: entered Rainecourt, Proyard. N. of Somme. Local fighting. 5.30 p.m., attacked with Americans. By nightfall, captured Morlancourt, high ground S.E. Counterattacks repulsed. Line reached Pierrepont—Rosières—Rainecourt—Morcourt. Now 17,000 prisoners, 200-300 guns, stores, material, etc.

French.—Night 8th—9th. Champagne. Prosnes, Mont-sans-Nom, Souain, attempts repulsed. 9th, on British right, captured Pierrepont, Contoire, Hangest-en-Santerre. Occupied Arvillers. Advance now 8½ miles. 4,000 prisoners.

Vesle. Americans captured Fismettes. 100 prisoners.

10TH, *British*. S. of Lihons, "substantial progress." Line reached Lihons—Fresnoy-les-Roye—Lignièrès—Conchy-les-Pots. Now 24,000 prisoners taken by Allies. 31 enemy divisions identified (10 from reserve, 21 on British front).

French.—Night 9th—10th. Progress E. of Arvillers, captured Davenescourt. S. of Montdidier. Attacked Ayencourt—Le Fretoy: captured Rubescourt, Assainvillers: reached Faverolles. 10th, Avre. Occupied Montdidier: advanced 6 miles E. Andechy—La Boissière—Fescamps S.E. 4.30 a.m., 3rd Army attacked on over 12-mile front astride St. Just-en-Chaussée—Roye road. Captured Rollot, Orvillers Sorel, Ressons-sur-Matz, Conchy-les-Pots, La Neuville-sur-Ressons, Elin-court. At some points advanced 6 miles. Since 8th, 12-mile advance on Amiens—Roye road: over 8,000 prisoners, 200 guns, etc.

11TH, *British*.—Night 10th—11th. N. of Somme, advanced line on high ground Etinehem—Dernancourt. S. of Somme, local fighting. N. of Kemmel, attack repulsed. 11th, Lihons. "Strong attacks with fresh divisions" penetrated at 1 point W. of village: after "fierce fighting," position "completely restored."

French.—Night 10th—11th. Avre—Oise. Carried Boulogne-le-Grasse massif, advanced E. of Bus. Further S., penetrated wooded region Matz—Oise: reached La Beslière, Gury: captured Mareuil Lamotte: advanced 3,000 yards N. of Chevincourt. 11th, Avre—Oise, continued advance. S. of Avre. Occupied Marquevillers, Grivillers: reached Armancourt—Thilleloy. N. of Roye-sur-Matz, reached outskirts Canny-sur-Matz. Further S., captured and passed La Beslière. Matz—Oise. Advance "accentuated" N. of Chevincourt: occupied Marchemont, Cambronne.

12TH, *British*.—Night 11th—12th. S. of Lihons, repulsed attack. Astride Somme, "linked up" positions E. of Mericourt—E. of Etinehem: 200 prisoners. E. of Robecq, Vieux Berquin—Merris, improved line. 12th, Roye road, E. of Fouquescourt, S. of Somme advance: "some hundreds of prisoners." S. of Somme. Captured Proyard, "sharp fighting."

French.—Night 11th—12th. Avre—Oise, no change. * Marquevillers, Grivillers. 12th, Avre—Oise. Captured Les Loges, Gury: progress N. of Roye-sur-Matz, Chevincourt. Vesle. Repulsed 2 attacks on N. bank near Fismes.

13TH, *British*.—Night 12th—13th. N. of Roye road, N. bank Somme, positions improved. Fouquescourt, Merris, attacks repulsed. 13th, Dickebusch, attacks repulsed. Since 8th, 1st French, 4th British armies took 28,000 prisoners (800 officers), "about" 600 guns, "several thousand" machine-guns, etc. 33 enemy divisions now identified.

French.—Matz—Oise. Progress N.E. of Gury, "strong resistance." Gained footing Plessis-de-Roye Park. Reached Belval. Further E. carried line $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles N. of Cambronne.

14TH, *British*.—Night 13th—14th. Advanced line E. of Vieux Berquin, Meteren. * Dickebusch, N.W. of Kemmel. 14th, Pavillers, progress. Enemy evacuated Beaumont Hamel, Serre, Puisieux-au-Mont, Bucquoy: closely followed.

French.—Night 13th—14th. Avre—Oise. * Roye-sur-Matz, Conchy-les-Pots. Vesle. Enemy attempts failed. 14th, Matz—Oise. Captured Ribécourt. E. of Belval, anticipated counter-attack. * Roye, Lassigny.

15TH, *British*.—Night 14th—15th. E. of Rainecourt, Albert—Ayettes, progress at several points. * Robecq, Sherpenberg. Since 8th, now 21,844 prisoners taken by 4th British Army. 8,500 by 1st French: 600-700 guns (450 by British). 15th, Canadians captured Damery, Parvillers. S.E. of Proyard, progress N. of Albert, fighting at several points. S.E. of Berquin, progress. * Kemmel—Ypres.

French.—Night 14th—15th. * Avre—Oise. Champagne. Marquises, attempt repulsed. 15th, Matz—Oise, progress. N.W. of Ribécourt, captured Alliche, Monolithe Farms. Whole of Lassigny massif gained.

16TH, *British*.—Night 15th—16th. Damery, attack on new positions heavily repulsed: over 250 prisoners, etc. N.E. of Morlancourt, progress. Left bank Ancre. Fighting E. of Thiepval Wood: progress Beaumont-sur-Ancre—Puisieux-au-Mont. * S. of Somme, La Bassée Canal—Ypres. 16th, Damery. With French, "progress" towards Fresnoy-les-Roye—Fransart.

French.—Night 15th—16th. Avre. Villers-les-Roye—St. Aurin, progress E. of Armancourt, occupied old lines. Champagne. Perthes-les-Hierlus, E. of Maison-de-Champagne, progress. 16th, W. of Roye, enemy pressed back. N. of Avre. With Canadians, advanced line Goyencourt—St. Mard-les-Triet—Laucourt. S. of Avre. Penetrated deeply in les Loges Wood. Vosges. Americans captured Frapelle.

17TH, *British*.—Night 16th—17th. N. of Roye road, Proyard: N. of Ancre, Vieux Berquin, Merris, progress. Scherpenberg, attack on posts repulsed. * Mont Rouge, Scherpenberg, Zillebeke Lake. 17th, N. of Lihons, S. of Bucquoy, progress.

French.—Night 16th—17th. * W. of Roye. S. of Avre, reached E. outskirts Loges Wood. Matz—Oise, repulsed counter-attacks Monolithe, Carnoy Farms. N.W. of Reims. Neuville, attempt failed. 17th, N. and S. of Avre, progress. W. of Roye, captured "strongly held trenches" of Cæsar's Camp. S. of river, approached Beauvraignes. Since 16th, 1,000 prisoners, etc. Further S. captured Canny-sur-Matz. Carnoy Farm, repulsed attack. N. of Aisne. Autrechies, captured position on 3-mile front to 1,650 yards depth: 240 prisoners.

Since July 18th, 70,000 prisoners, 1,700 guns, taken by Allies.

18TH, *British*.—Vieux Berquin—Bailleul, advanced line 1,000-2,000 yards on over 4-mile front: captured Oulstersteene, several farms, etc. 676 prisoners (18 officers). Merville, Chilly—Fransart, progress. Beaucourt, Serre, Puisieux, attacks on posts repulsed.

French.—Night 17th—18th. * Avre, Oise—Aisne. 18th, Canny-sur-Matz, Beauvraignes. S. of Avre, 400 prisoners. Oise—Aisne. S. of Carlepont—Fontenoy, 6 p.m., 10th Army "rectified front" on $9\frac{1}{2}$ -mile length to average depth of $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles. Occupied plateau W. of Nampeel, reached S. edge Audignacourt ravine, captured Novvroun Vingre, 1,700 prisoners.

19TH, *British*.—Night 18th—19th. Merville, progress. Oulstersteene—Meteren, counter-attack broken. * S. of Somme, S.W. and N. of Bailleul. 19th, Lihons—Herleville, attack on 1-mile front gained footing at 2 points: "at once driven out." Merville, progress on 1,000 yards front. Entered Merville, reached Paradis—Merville—Les Puresbecques road. Sharp fighting.

French.—Night 18th—19th. * N. and S. of Avre. 19th, Matz—Oise. Captured Fresnières, reached W. outskirts of Lassigny. Further S. debouched from Thiescourt Woods. On right, captured Pimproz, reached S. outskirts Dreslincourt. 500 prisoners. N. of Aisne. Carlepont—Fontenoy, success completed. Captured Morsain. Now 2,200 prisoners.

20TH, *British*.—Night 19th—20th. Vieux Berquin—Oulstersteene, on right of late advance, progress to road: 182 prisoners. N.E. of Chilly (S.W. of Chaulnes), 4 attacks on posts repulsed. Lawe—Lys, progress to E. of Paradis—Merville road. 20th, both banks Scarpe, local fighting. N.E. of Fampoux, line advanced. Astride Lys, "gained" l'Epinette, advanced to E. of Merville. N. of Merville, captured Vierhouck, La Couronne. Later, * N. and S. of Scarpe, counter-attacks repulsed. E. of Fampoux, further progress.

French.—Night 19th—20th. * Lassigny, Dreslincourt. Oise—Aisne, occupied Vassens (N.W. of Morsain). W. of Maisons-de-Champagne, broke attempt. 20th, S. of Avre, captured Beauvraignes "after bitter struggle" E. of Oise. 7 a.m., 10th Army attacked on 16-mile front Bailly—Aisne. Left, reached S. border Ourscamp Woods, outskirts of Carlepont and Caisnes. Centre, captured Lembay. Blairancourdelle, gained footing on plateau W. of Vassens. Right, captured

Vezaponin, Tartiers, Cuisy-en-Almont, Osly, Courtil. Average advance $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles : over 8,000 prisoners. Since 18th, over 10,000 prisoners.

21ST, *British*.—Night 20th—21st. Festubert—Lawe, occupied Le Touret. Locre, progress on 1-mile front : 138 prisoners. 21st, 5 a.m., without artillery preparation, 3rd Army attacked on 10-mile front Ancre—Mayonneville. English, N.Z., tanks, stormed foremost line : captured Beaucourt-sur-Ancre, Bucquoy, Ablainzeville, Mayonneville. English advanced on Albert—Arras railway : captured Achiet-le-Petit, Logeast Wood, Courcelles-le-Comte. Along railway, severe fighting. W. of Achiet-le-Grand, counter-attack repulsed. E. bank Ancre, opposite Thiepval, battle patrols fighting. N. of attack, line pushed forward Boisleux St. Marc—Mercatel. Lys, line advanced Le Touret, E. of Paradis, Merville—Oulstersteene. Locrehof Farm (N.W. of Dranoutre), attack repulsed. 2,000—3,000 prisoners, "a few guns."

French.—Night 20th—21st. Oise—Aisne, no enemy reaction. Occupied Carlepont, Cuts : gained ground W. of Lassigny. 21st, occupied Lassigny. Further S. entered Le Plémont, captured Orval Wood, carried line to outskirts Chiry Ourscamp. E. of Oise. Captured Carlepont Woods : advanced Sempigny—Pontoise. Further E., passed Noyon—Coucy-le-Château road : captured Camelin, Le Fresne Blérancourt : carried line to outskirts of St. Aubin. Since 20th, "freed" 20 villages, advanced 5 miles at certain points.

22ND, *British*.—Night 21st—22nd. Left bank Ancre, progress. S. and S.E. of Beaucourt. N. of Ancre—Miraumont, Achiet-le-Grand, attacks repulsed. E. and N.E. of Merville, progress : occupied outskirts of Neuf Berquin. N. of Bailleul, captured strong point. Locrehof Farm, fighting. 22nd, 4.45 a.m., Somme—Ancre. E. County, London, Australian troops attacked. Objectives early gained, advanced 2 miles on 6-mile front. N. of Bray, "considerable resistance" : counter-attack regained 500 yards. Albert "finally cleared." 1,400 prisoners, "a few guns." Left bank Ancre, S. of Beaucourt progress. N. of Ancre, several counter-attacks repulsed. Later, Miraumont, "entered our lines : driven out." N.E. of Achiet-le-Grand, posts pressed back, position restored. 200 prisoners. E. of Courcelles, Moyenneville, attacks repulsed. Since 21st, Somme—Moyenneville, over 5,000 prisoners.

French.—Night 21st—22nd. Matz—Oise. Occupied Le Plémont, Thiescourt, Cannectancourt, Ville : reached the Divette. E. of Noyon, "in touch" with Oise, Sempigny—Bretigny. Further E. captured Bourguignon, St. Paul-aux-Bois : pushed N. Reached Ailette at Quincy Basse. Ailette—Aisne, gained W. approaches to Pommier. 22nd, Matz—Oise. Occupied "edge" Divette, mouth—Evrécourt. E. of Oise, advanced to outskirts of Quierzy. Ailette—Aisne, captured St. Aubin, Selens, Bagneux, Epagny, Bieuxy, Vaurezis, Pommiers. Oise—Aisne, much enemy abandoned material. Since 20th, over 200 guns.

23RD, *British*.—Night 22nd—23rd. Baillescourt Farm (E. of Beaucourt), 2 attacks repulsed. E. of Le Touret, N.W. of Neuf Berquin, E. of Oulstersteene, progress. N.W. of Bailleul, attack broken. 23rd, attacked on over 30-mile front Lihons—Mercatel. Right. S. of Somme, 4.45 a.m., English, Scots, Australians carried Herleville, Chuignes, Chuignolles, woods between and to river. Average advance into enemy positions 2 miles. Left, 4.55 a.m., English, Scots, Guards stormed and passed Gomiécourt, Ervillers, Hamelincourt, Boyelles, Boiry, Becquerelles. Right centre. E. bank Ancre, S.E. Albert—Grandcourt. English, Welsh, gained ground after heavy fighting. S. of Grandcourt, repulsed counter-attack. Left centre, 11 a.m., along railway N. of Grandcourt, English captured Achiet-le-Grand, Bihucourt, ridge overlooking Irles. Afternoon, advance continued. "Several thousand prisoners." Since 21st, 14,000 prisoners, "number of guns."

French.—Night 22nd—23rd. * Beauvraignes—Oise, notably Plémont, Passel, Chiry Ourscamp. Held S. banks Oise, Ailette, Sempigny—Coucy-le-Château railway.

E. of Selens. Advanced line to outskirts Guny, Pont St. Marc. 23rd, * Matz—Oise. Crossed Divette near Evricourt. Ailette—Aisne, progress E. of Bagneux, W. of Cr cy-au-Mont.

24TH, *British*.—Night 23rd—24th. Albert, N.W. of Neuf Berquin, progress. Neuf Berquin occupied. N. of Bailleul, S. of Locre, N. of Kemmel, attacks repulsed. Midnight, advance resumed. N. of Somme. 24th, right. Australians captured Bray and positions near: 1,329 prisoners (47 officers). London, E. County troops made progress on high ground S.E. of Albert. Right centre, Welsh, N. County troops captured La Boiselle, Ovillers, Mouquet Farm, Thiepval, Grandcourt: gained and passed Thiepval ridge. Over 2,000 prisoners. Left centre, E. Lancashires heavily engaged all day about Miraumont, until village outflanked N. and S. N. of Miraumont. N.Z. division carried Loupart Wood (400 prisoners), Gr villers, Birgvillers, reached Avesne-lez-Bapaume. On flanks of N.Z., English captured Irles, Bihucourt, after "strong resistance": advanced on Sapignies. Left, English, Scots, Guards advanced Mory—Croisilles—Neuville Vitasse, captured St. Leger, Henin-sur-Cojeul, Hill E. "Numbers of prisoners, quantities of material." Enemy "considerably" reinforced. Elsewhere, local actions. N.E. of Fampoux, captured section front line. N. of La Bass e Canal, captured old British line E. and N.E. of Givenchy, progress in enemy positions. N. of Bailleul, advanced line: afternoon, counter-attack broken.

French.—Night 23rd—24th. * Lassigny. Oise—Aisne. 24th, Ailette—Aisne, progress. S. of Cr cy-au-Mont, 100 prisoners. Vesles. W. of Fismes, Americans carried line on 800 yards front to Soissons—Reims road.

25TH, *British*.—Night 24th—25th. N. of Somme. Held Albert—Bapaume road to outskirts of Le Sars. Captured Contalmaison, Warlencourt, Eaucourt. N. of Bapaume, captured Sapignies, Behangies. N. of Bailleul, broke attack. Since 21st, now over 17,000 prisoners by 3rd and 4th Armies. 25th, enemy reinforced, increased opposition, many counter-attacks broken. Right, N. bank Somme, Australians carried high ground E. of Bray. London, E. County troops captured Mametz, advanced on Carnoy. Welsh captured Mametz Wood. Centre, crossed Albert—Bapaume road on whole length S. of Bapaume. Captured Martinpuich, Le Sars, Le Barque. Left, N. of Bapaume, severe fighting Favreuil, Mory, Croisilles. Progress E. of Behagnies, in Neuville Vitasse. Givenchy, attack repulsed.

French.—Night 24th—25th. N. of Roye, attempt broken. * Beauvraignes. Ailette—Aisne, progress E. of Bagneux. 25th, * Lassigny. Ailette—Aisne, progress E. of Bagneux: attacks repulsed S. of Cr cy-au-Mont. 400 prisoners.

26TH, *British*.—Night 25th—26th. N. and S. of Bapaume, Eaucourt l'Abbaye, Favreuil, attacks repulsed. Favreuil captured and passed. S.E. of Mory, W. of Croisilles, positions improved. 26th 3.30 a.m., astride Scarpe, 1st Army troops attacked Gavrelle—Croisilles. N. bank. Scots carried first line S. of Gavrelles: reached outskirts Roeux, captured chemical works. S. bank. Canadians captured Orange Hill first rush: captured and passed Wancourt, Menchy-le-Preux. On right, Scots, Londoners completed capture of high ground H nin l—Croisilles: "vigorous resistance." Many prisoners. Astride Somme, Welsh captured Bazentin-le-Grand. English advanced on Montauban. Australians entered Suzanne, captured and passed Cappy. Fighting at numerous other points.

French.—Night 25th—26th. * Roye, Beauvraignes, Ailette—Aisne. 26th, Avre, captured Fresnoy-les-Roye, St. Mard: "lively resistance": 1,500 prisoners (36 officers).

27TH, *British*.—Later 26th, night 26th—27th. Maricourt—Bapaume, severe fighting, repeated counter-attacks repulsed, progress. English, Welsh, passed Montauban and ridge: captured High Wood: reached Longueval. 6.30 p.m., pressed back on Bazentin-le-Grand—High Wood: held E. of High Wood. Later,

broke 2nd attack. Ligny Thillois (N. of High Wood), pressed back 400-500 yards by 2 attacks. Bapaume. N.Z. carried N. outskirts, fierce fighting. Further N., English in hard fighting Croisilles: advanced on Beugnatre. Canadians captured ridge E. of Wancourt, advanced E. of Guemappe. N. of Scarpe, Scots "made substantial progress towards Louvain." On S., astride Somme, Australians advanced on Dompierre, E. of Suzanne. Since morning 21st now over 21,000 prisoners. 27th, Scarpe—Sensée. Canadians penetrated positions "deeply": captured Cherisy, Vis-en-Artois, Sart Wood. Scots crossed Sensée, seized Fontaineles-Croisilles, spur S. N. of Scarpe. Scots carried Roeux, Greenland Hill, Gavrelle: English Arleux-en-Gohelle, old enemy lines S. Croisilles—S. of Bapaume. English, N.Z. heavily repulsed "a number" of attacks by fresh divisions: stormed Beugnatre, advanced at several points. English, Welsh reached outskirts of Flers, captured Longueval, Delville, and Bernafay Woods. "Strong opposition": counter-attacks by Prussian Guard repulsed. Astride Somme. Australians, English, Scots advanced E. of Maricourt, captured Fontain-les-Cappy and woods to river, Vermandovillers. Numerous prisoners.

French.—Night 26th—27th. Oise—Aisne. W. of Chavigny, attack broken. N. of Soissons. E. of Bagneux, line advanced 1,200 yards. Avre. St. Mard, several attacks repulsed. * Ailette—Aisne. 27th, Avre, 3 a.m., St. Mard, progress. Later, on 12½-mile front advanced over 2½ miles at certain points. Line now Chaulnes—Punchy—Liancourt—Verpillières. Occupied Hallu, Fransart, Cremery, Gruny, Carrépuits, Roye, Laucourt, Crapeaumesnil: prisoners. * Lassigny, Oise—Aisne.

Belgian.—Night 26th—27th. N. and S. Langemarck railway, attacked on 2-mile front: objectives gained. 90 prisoners, etc.

28TH, *British.*—Later 27th, night 27th—28th. S. of Somme, captured Foucaucourt. N. of Somme, captured most of Trones Wood: number of Prussian Guard prisoners. S. of Scarpe. 1st Army troops improved positions astride Arras—Cambrai road: reached outskirts of Haucourt, Rémy, Boiry Notré Dame. N. of Scarpe. Along Arras—Douai road, pressed back "a few hundred yards" to Greenland Hill. Astride Neuf Berquin—Estaires road, advanced line on 4-mile front. 28th, S. of Somme. Australians reached Fresnes—Herbecourt: stubborn resistance in front of river passages at Brie, Peronne. N. bank Somme. Captured Curlu, Hardecourt, after heavy fighting: advanced on Maurepas. Bapaume—Scarpe, progress at all points. Croisilles, outflanked by Londoners, occupied. English advanced on Vaucourt, S.E. of Fontaine-les-Croisilles. Canadians captured several strongly-defended localities and trench systems: Boiry Notré Dame, Pelves. Numerous prisoners. N. of Locon, progress.

French.—Night 27th—28th. N. and S. of Avre, occupied Chaulnes, Omiécourt; Balatre, Roiglise, Verpillières. Further S., penetrated into Crapeaumesnil Wood, captured Dives. Progress continued towards Somme. N. of Avre, reached Licourt—Potte—Mesnil-le-Petit—Nesle. Since 26th, 30 villages retaken, advanced about 7 miles at certain points. 28th, "under vigorous pressure, enemy hastened retreat" on 19-mile front. Occupied heights left bank Somme, Cizancourt—E. of Nesle: greater part W. bank Canal-du-Nord, Nesle—Noyon. N. of Oise, carried Suzoy, Pont l'Evêque, Vauchelles, Pourquericourt. Advanced over 6½ miles at certain points. Some 40 villages regained. 500 prisoners. Oise—Aisne. Juvigny, Americans repulsed attacks. Vesle. Bazoches—Fismettes, Americans stopped attempted crossing.

29TH, *British.*—Night 28th—29th. S. of Somme, as far as Fontaine-les-Croisilles, quiet. Astride Scarpe. E. and S.E. of Vis-en-Artois, E. of Boiry, Gavrelle, attacks repulsed: heavy fighting. W. of Oppy, posts slightly pressed back. Since morning 21st now over 26,000 prisoners, over 100 guns. 29th, reached W. bank Somme opposite Brie. Peronne: captured Hem. N. of Hem, advanced

Combles—Morval—Beaulencourt—Fremicourt: sharp fighting. N.Z. occupied Bapaume, drove out rearguards. S. of town, Vraucourt—Ecourt St. Mein—Hendecourt-lez-Cagnicourt, hard fighting: progress, prisoners. N. of town, Londoners, W. Lancs. advanced E. of Sensée: captured Bullecourt—Hendecourt-lez-Cagnicourt, protecting trench systems. N. of Scarpe, recaptured ground lost 27th on Greenland Hill. Astride Lawe, N. of Béthune. E. of Nieppe Forest, progress.

French.—Night 28th—29th. * Somme. 29th, occupied whole length Canal-du-Nord, except towards Catigny, Sermaize. N.E. of Ecuilly Beaurains, occupied Quesnoy Wood. Noyon "carried by sheer fighting," advanced to S. edge of Happlincourt, captured S. slopes Mont St. Simon, Landrimont, Morlincourt: several hundred prisoners. Oise—Aisne. N. and S. of Champs, forced crossing of Ailette: captured Guny, Pont St. Mard.

30th, *British.*—Night 29th—30th. Crossed Somme S. and W. of Peronne. Captured Cléry-sur-Somme, Combles: over 200 prisoners. Astride Scarpe. English, Scots gained ground towards Eterpigny—Hamblain-lez-Prés—Louvain: captured Rémy. Lawe—Lys, progress. 30th, E. and N. of Bapaume, increased resistance, progress. Entered Rencourt-lez-Bapaume. Bancourt: fighting all day. Captured Frémicourt, Vaulx Vraucourt. Reached W. outskirts of Beugny. Numerous prisoners. Ecourt St. Mein still held out. Bullecourt—Hendecourt. Pressed back to W. outskirts, connecting trenches: where attack held. N. of Bullecourt—Hendecourt, Canadians captured defences Hendecourt—Haucourt. Haucourt: several hundred prisoners. S. of Bapaume, "vigorous pressure on enemy." E. and N.E. of Cléry, progress. 300 prisoners. Lys, close pursuit. Captured Bailleul. Later. N. of Arras—Cambrai road, English captured St. Servins Farm, Eterpigny (E. bank Sensée).

French.—Night 29th—30th. Somme, Canal-du-Nord, no change. Ailette—Aisne. E. of Paisly, attacks repulsed, gains held. 30th, cleared E. bank Canal-du-Nord: captured Catigny, Sermaize. Crossed Canal opposite Catigny, Beaurains: captured Chevilly, Hill 60: entered Genvry. N. and E. of Noyon, violent fighting. Captured Happlincourt, Mont St. Simon: several hundred prisoners. Oise—Aisne, "keen struggle." N. bank Ailette, captured Champs. N. of Soissons. Captured Chavigny, Cuffies: reached outskirts Crouy.

31st, *British.*—Night 30th—31st. Somme. Australians captured position E. of Cléry, Feuillaucourt, Mont St. Quentin: 1,500 prisoners, etc. Lys. Occupied Lacouture, Vielle Chapelle—Lestrem (on Lawe). Advanced on Doulieu: "gained" Bailleul Station, Mont-de-Lille to E. Entered Dranoutre. N. of Kemmel Hill, progress. 31st, on Australian left, English captured Marrière Wood, high ground E. and N.: numerous prisoners. Astride Bapaume—Cambrai road, attacks repulsed. English completed capture of Rencourt-lez-Bapaume: prisoners, "a few guns." Vaulx Vraucourt—Bullecourt, positions improved: attacks repulsed, hard fighting, no "material" change. S. of Arras—Cambrai road, successful Canadian operation. Sensée—Scarpe. English advanced line 1,500 yards towards the Trinquis. Lys, enemy withdrawal. Occupied Kemmel Hill: reached Voormezele (captured by Americans)—Lindenhoeek—La Crèche—Doulieu: approached Estaire. Close pursuit, numerous prisoners.

French.—Night 30th—31st. * Canal-du-Nord, N. of Noyon. Ailette—Aisne. 31st, Canal-du-Nord, N. of Soissons, violent fighting: "advanced foot by foot." E. bank Canal. Captured Campagne: Chevilly, twice lost, recaptured: 200 prisoners. Happlincourt, Morlincourt, progress. N. of Soissons. Captured Juvigny, Chouy, "by sheer fighting": reached W. outskirts of Leury.

During August, British took 57,318 prisoners (1,283 officers): 657 (over 150 heavy) guns, over 5,750 machine-guns, over 1,000 trench mortars: "immense" material.

Since August 8th, 103 (2 dismounted cavalry) enemy divisions used. Now 203 (4 Austrian) on W. front: 35-40 in reserve (85 in March). 12 divisions broken up: strength of remainder reduced 20 per cent. since March.

ITALIAN FRONT.

3RD.—S. of Nago (N. end Lake Garda), captured and held Point 703 on Doss' Alto, lost June 15th: 176 prisoners (4 officers), etc.

4TH.—Monte Corno, Val Freddo, attempts broken.

7TH.—Night 6th—7th. * Monte Cornone, attack repulsed.

8TH.—Col-del-Rosso salient, 2 attempts repulsed.

9TH.—Night 8th—9th. Asiago—Canove (5 miles), 8 British raids. 355 prisoners (8 officers), etc.

10TH.—Night 9th—10th. Monte Sesinol. French raid. 243 prisoners (5 officers), etc.

12TH.—* Val Lagarina, Val Arsa, Ponte-della-Priula (S.E. of Montello).

13TH.—Night 12th—13th. Telina. Upper Zebur Valley, attacks on posts repulsed Payer Joch (Point 3434), Königspitze (3859). Tonale. Noce "torrent"—Val Genova, carried Monte Montello (3537), Punta-di-San Matteo (3684), spur S.E. of Cima Zigolon (2468). Over 100 prisoners.

14TH.—Captured Piave islet S.W. of Grave-di-Papadopoli: repulsed 3 attacks.

15TH.—Tonale, repulsed attacks on new positions.

17TH.—* Middle Piave, attack on islet repulsed.

19TH.—* Monte Cornone, attacks from W. and N. heavily repulsed. N. of Ledro Lake, attempt broken. * Val Lagarina, Val Astico, Monte Asolone.

22ND.—Brenta. Captured Rivalta, Sasso Stefani.

25TH.—Night 24th—25th. W. of Asiago, 3 British raids: 270 prisoners (6 officers), etc.

26TH.—Val Concei (Giudicaria), attempt repulsed. * Monte Grappa, Montello.

28TH.—Val Concei, attack repulsed.

RUSSIA.

2ND.—Allies occupied Archangel: captured Isarkagorka (5 miles S. along Vologda railway). Enemy retired towards Obozerskaia (70 miles S. on railway). Fighting at Kandalaksha (100 miles S. of Kola).

3RD.—British landed at Vladivostok: French, Japanese, Americans soon after.

12TH.—British joined Czecho-Slovaks on the Ussuri (N. of Vladivostok).

15TH.—British landed at mouth of the Dvina.

16TH.—Japanese advanced from Nikolaevsk (mouth of Amur, 600 miles N. of Ussuri).

19TH.—Ussuri. Grodekova, attack on Vladivostok—Harbin railway repulsed.

24TH.—Ussuri, Allies advanced.

28TH.—Japanese occupied Krasnoyarsk (midway Vladivostok—Khabarovsk).

31ST.—S. of Archangel. Allies captured and held position N. of Obozerskaia.

BALKAN FRONT.

1ST.—Italians repulsed reconnoitring parties: French, 4 "violent attacks" on new position S. of the Holta. ["Reached in pursuit close up to line Fieri—Berat."]

4TH.—French repulsed attacks confluence Devoli—Tamorica, between Devoli—Holta.

5TH.—* Struma, Vardar, Tcherma bend, N. of Monastir. Albania, "enemy did not renew attacks."

6TH.—Semeni Valley, Italian cavalry dispersed column: 72 prisoners, etc. Gramsi (E. of Devoli), French repulsed Bulgar detachments.

7TH.—French repulsed "violent attacks": 130 Austrian prisoners ("several" officers), etc.

10TH.—Italians regained Yagodina bridgehead, left bank Semeni.

11TH.—Italians "repulsed and followed up" enemy N.W. of Berat.

13TH.—French repulsed attacks Gere—Porocani.

15TH.—French repulsed attacks Gramsi—Porocani.

22ND.—Enemy attacked Italian positions Lower Semeni—Mali Tamorices. Lower Semeni, "completely repulsed": S. of Yagodina, slight advance "promptly arrested": W. of Point 1150, 1 post lost. Later attacks "everywhere repulsed. Some score prisoners." French repulsed various reconnaissances.

23RD.—Attacks renewed. Petovia, Italians repulsed, counter-attacked. Head of Buvalica (Point 1150), ground lost.

24TH.—N. of Fieri, attacks repulsed. N. of Buvalica, enemy "well pressed." [Captured bridgehead N. of Fieri, crossed Semeni: Berat, Siloves Mountains, progress.]

25TH.—[Captured Fieri, Berat.] Italian line, Malakastra Mountains—Cafa Glava (5 miles S. of Berat—Cafa Glumaka. French left fell back to preserve alignment.

28TH.—[Yanitsa—Vojusa (Malakastra Mountains), enemy again captured positions.]

PALESTINE FRONT.

8TH.—Camelry with Arabs captured Mudawara Station (65 miles S. of Maan): 120 prisoners, 2 guns, etc.

13TH.—Night 12th—13th. Successful raids on 10-mile front astride Jerusalem—Nablus road: 230 prisoners (7 officers), etc.

During July, August, Arabs accounted for 300 Turks, 80 camels, stores, etc.

CAUCASUS FRONT.

1ST.—Turks occupied Urmia (18 miles W. of Lake Urmia, 140 N.E. of Mosul).

19TH.—W.O. reported British and Indian troops had occupied Enzeli (S.W. shore Caspian Sea), Baku, Krasnovodsk (E. shore Caspian Sea, W. terminus of trans-Caspian Railway): Meshed. (The former force from Mesopotamia, via Khanikin, Paituk Pass, Kermanshah, Hamadan, Kazvin).

5TH.—Baku. Turk assault repulsed.

17TH.—N. of Baku, attack on Turks failed from lack of support.

26TH.—Baku. Turk attack repulsed by N. Staffs, Worcesters. Evacuation decided on.

EAST AFRICA.

13TH.—Enemy main body near Chalauca (60 miles W. of Angoche on coast). Columns converging from N.

14TH.—Enemy crossed the Ligonya, reached Igoga.

25TH.—Encountered near Numarro (Upper Licungo): retreated N.

27TH.—Met near Regone: fled N. for Lurio Valley.

29TH.—Rearguard attacked: "escaped."

30TH.—Enemy and British from N. and N.E. reached Lioma.

31ST.—Enemy attack repulsed: driven S. and taken in flank by British from E. 5 miles S.E. of Lioma, attacked: baggage captured. Pursuit continued.

AVIATION.

During August, 1,309 aircraft destroyed on all fronts (1,061 by Allies. 248 by enemy). On W. front, British destroyed 681 (and 47 balloons), lost 187: French 280 (and 66 balloons): Americans 6: Belgians 1. On Italian front 66 (35 by British, and 8 balloons, 2 by British): on Balkan 14.

SEPTEMBER 1st—30th, 1918.

BRITISH-FRENCH FRONT.

1ST, *British*.—Night August 31st—September 1st. Mont St. Quentin. Repeated attacks repulsed, prisoners. Progress towards Le Transloy. Longette, Ecoast St. Mien cleared. Lys. Crossed Lawe, approached La Bassée—Estaire road. 1st, 5.30 a.m., Australians captured Peronne, Flamicourt. St. Denis: progress on spurs E. and N.E. of Mont St. Quentin. Londoners attacked S.E. of Combles: captured Bouchavesnes, Roncourt, and high ground overlooking: reached W. outskirts St. Pierre Vaast Wood. "Stiff opposition": 2,000 prisoners. S. of Arras—Cambrai road. Cleared Morval high ground: captured Beaulencourt, ridge E. of Bancourt—Frémicourt: "pressed enemy hard" in Transloy: completed capture of Bullecourt, Hendecourt-lez-Cugnicourt. Several hundred prisoners. N. of Hendecourt, Canadians repulsed attack. Lens, progress. Lys. Reached Doulieu, le Verrier. Steenwerck: "closely engaged enemy" in Neuve Eglise, Wulverghem.

French.—Night August 31st—September 1st. Crossed Somme Canal E. of Epenaycourt: captured Rouy-le-Petit: 250 prisoners. N. of Soissons. Captured Leury, "several strongly held centres of resistance": 1,000 prisoners. 1st, * Somme, Canal-du-Nord. N. of Ailette, entered woods W. of Coucy-le-Château. S. of river, captured Crécy-au-Mont.

2ND, *British*.—Night 1st—2nd. Welsh, E. County troops captured Saillisel, Saillisel: heavy fighting. English "drew nearer" Transloy, Noreuil: prisoners. English, Scots captured Rencourt-lez-Cagnicourt, positions S.: "some hundreds of prisoners." Lys. Reached river E. of Estaire: captured Neuve Eglise. 2nd, 5.30 a.m., astride Arras—Cambrai road, attacked Drocourt—Quéant line "on wide front: determined resistance: enemy heavily defeated in his prepared defences." Left. English advanced through defences N.E. of Eterpigny. Centre. Canadians captured and passed Dury, Villers-lez-Cagnicourt, Cagnicourt. Right English, Scots, Naval Division, advanced beyond Rencourt-lez-Catigny on Quéant: captured Noreuil "and many strongly fortified positions." 10,000 prisoners. Opposite Canadians, 11 divisions identified on 8,000 yards front. Further S., progress. Afternoon, heavy attacks repulsed E. of Vaulx Vraucourt. English captured Villers-au-Flos, reached outskirts Brugny. Le Transloy, "sharp fighting." English captured village: attacks repulsed. Saillisel—Peronne. English, Australians captured St. Pierre Vaast, Allaines, Haute Allaines. E. and S.E. of Peronne. Australians repulsed "repeated" attacks. Several thousand prisoners. W. outskirts of Lens, Lys, progress.

French.—Night 1st—2nd. * Canal-du-Nord. Crossed canal opposite Nesle. Campagne, 2 attacks repulsed. Ailette. Progress in woods W. of Coucy-le-Château. E. of Pont St. Mard: 100 prisoners. 2nd, Canal-du-Nord, advanced E., gained footing on W. slopes Hill 72. Ailette—Aisne. Continued progress on plateau E. of Crécy-au-Mont, Juvigny: "desperate resistance." Captured Leury. Terny Sorny: advanced N. of Crouy. 1,200 prisoners.

3RD, *British*.—Night 2nd—3rd. "Enemy retired along whole front." Entered Pronville, Doignies, Bertincourt. Further N. entered Wulverghem: advanced N.E. of Steenwerck. 3rd, Peronne—Sensée, progress. Reached Ytres—Beaumont-lez-Cambrai—Baralle—Rumancourt—Léluse. "Rearguards captured or driven back

with loss." S. of Lys. English captured Richebourg St. Vaast, Estaires: prisoners, "a few guns." W. of Lens. N. of Givenchy-lez-La Bassée, progress.

French.—Night 2nd—3rd. * Somme, Oise—Aisne. 3rd, crossed Somme opposite Epenancourt. E. of Canal-du-Nord, entered Genvry: 200 prisoners. * E. of Noyon, reached Salency.

4TH, *British.*—Night 3rd—4th. N. of Moislains, reached E. side Vaux Wood: progress at other points. Line now Canal-du-Nord. N. of Arras—Cambrai road, occupied Ecourt St. Quentin. Lys. Occupied Sailly-sur-Lys, Nieppe, Le Romarin: approached Neuve Chapelle, Laventie. 4th, N. of Moislains. English, Welsh forced passage of Tortille, Canal-du-Nord, on wide front: carried Manancourt, Etrecourt: advanced on rising ground E. Further N., English, N.Z. captured Ruyaulcourt: reached N. outskirts Havrincourt Wood, E. of Canal. English crossed Canal opposite Démicourt—Boursies: repulsed attack. English entered Moeuvres from N. Moeuvres—old Hindenburg line, fighting till late: prisoners, etc. Lys, sharp fighting. Captured Hill 63 (N.W. of Messines), Ploegsteert: 200 prisoners. Wytschaete, repulsed repeated attacks.

French.—Night 3rd—4th. N.E. of Chévilley. Captured Chapitre Wood, Bussy: approached Crisolles. N. of Ailette, reached W. outskirts Coucy-le-Château—Jumencourt. S. of river. Advanced E. of Leuilly: reached outskirts of Clamecy, Braye: entered Bucy-le-Long: 1,500 prisoners. Crossed Vesle "at several points." 4th, N. of Oise and Vesle, enemy "forced to retreat." Canal-du-Nord—Oise, passed Libermont: reached outskirts Esméry Hallu: occupied l'Hôpital Wood. Further S., line now Freniches—Guiscard—Beaugies—Grandru—Mondescourt—Appilly. Further E., crossed Ailette: reached Marizelle (N.E. of Manicamp). Numerous prisoners, guns, etc. Ailette—Aisne, battle continued on plateau N. of Soissons. N. of Aisne, captured Bucy-le-Long, Le Moncel. Crossed Vesle on 19 miles front. Passed Chassémy—Brénelle—Vaubertin—Vauxcéré—Blanz. gained footing on crest N. of Paslicux. (Americans captured Bazoches, Perles, Fismette. Baslieux: reached Vauxcéré—Blanz—Le Grand Hameau.)

5TH, *British.*—Night 4th—5th. Lys. Line now Voormezele—Wulverghem—Ploegsteert—Nieppe—Laventie—Givenchy. S. of Neuve Chapelle—Givenchy, old line regained: E. of Givenchy, old enemy positions occupied. S. battle front. Inchy-en-Artois, attack repulsed. S. of Moeuvres, E. of Hermies, positions improved. Captured Neuville Bourjonville. E. of Manancourt, attack repulsed. Peronne, fighting, progress. Since morning 1st over 16,000 prisoners, over 100 guns. 5th, S. of Peronne, forced river crossings: captured St. Christ, Brie, Le Mesnil Bruntel: advanced astride Amiens—St. Quentin road: reached Athies, Mons-au-Chaussée: numerous prisoners. E. of Peronne. Captured Doingt: "important progress on high ground," Peronne—Nurlu. Nurlu—Sensée, fighting. Progress on spur N. of Equancourt: Neuville, Bourjonval, Moeuvres, fighting. Lys. N. of Hill 63, repulsed attack: S. and S.E. of Nieppe, N. of Wulverghem, progress.

French.—Night 4th—5th. E. of Vesle. Crossed Somme Canal, Voyennes—Offoy. Further S., passed Hombleux, Esméry Hallu, Flavy-le-Moldeux: reached N. of Guiscard—outskirts of Berlancourt. Ailette—Aisne. Carried Clamecy, Braye, Missy-sur-Aisne. Mont-des-Tombes (E. of Leuilly), 2 attacks repulsed. Vesle. With Americans, reached crest dominating Aisne. Crossed Vesle, Les Vanteaux—Jonchery. 5th, N. bank Somme Canal: occupied Falvy, Offoy. S., approached Ham road, Plessis, Patte d'Oie—Berlancourt. S.E. of Berlancourt, reached Guivry—Callouel—Crépigny—N. of Marest Dampcourt—S. outskirts Abbecourt. Advance 6,000 yards at certain points. Ailette, 3 p.m., enemy began retreat. Rapid progress N. Captured Pierremaude, Autreville, great part lower Coucy Woods: further E. Folembrav, Coucy-le-Château, Coucy-la-Ville, reached 1,000 yards S. of Fresnes. On right, captured E. part of Landricourt. S. of Ailette,

line now Neuville-sur-Margival—Vregny—slopes W. of Fort Condé. 30 villages regained. N. of Vesle, reached Aisne, Condé—Vieil Arcy : to E., Dhuizel—Barbonval—summit of Beauregard Farm plateau.

6TH, *British*.—Night 5th—6th. Peronne—Nurlu, sharp fighting. Lys. W. of La Bassée, progress. Occupied part of old enemy line E. of Neuve Chapelle, our old front line Fanquissart. N.W. of Armentières, progress. 6th, S. battle front, progress with French. S. of Peronne. Reached nearly 7 miles E. of Somme : captured Monchy Lagache, Vraignes, Tincourt : later, Longavesnes, Lieramont : approached Metz-en-Couture, S. part Havrincourt Wood. Numerous prisoners. N. of La Bassée Canal, W. of La Bassée, E. of Bac St. Maur, fighting. Opposite Erquinghem, S.E. of Ypres, progress.

French.—Night 5th—6th. Somme. Epénancourt, crossing continued : further S. reached Ham—Peronne road at several points. S. of Ham. Captured Le Plessis, Patte d'Oie, Berlancourt : passed Guivry, Callouel, Crépigny, Abbecourt. N. of Ailette. Reached Sinceny, plateau N. of Landricourt : S. of river, Vauxaillon ravine. N. of Vesle. Americans captured Longueval, Merval, Glennes : reached outskirts of Viel Arcy, Villers-en-Prayères, Revillon. 6th, Somme—Aisne, captured Ham, Chaunay. E. of Canal-du-Nord, line now Lanchy—Forreste—Villiers St. Christophe—Estouilly—Brouchy—Villeselve—Ugny-le-Gay—Viry—Noreuil. Since 5th advance reached 6½ miles in places. N. of Ailette. Reached Petit Barisis in lower Coucy Wood : more to right, outskirts of Fresnes—Quincy Basse—W. outskirts of Vauxaillon—Moisy Farm—Laffaux. N. of Aisne, occupied old trenches on whole front. S. of Aisne, American progress Villers-en-Prayères—Revillon. Patrols reached S. bank Aisne Canal.

Belgian.—Night 5th—6th. Langemarck. Attack repulsed on new positions captured August 26th—27th : "bitter fighting."

7TH, *British*.—Night 6th—7th. E. and N.E. of Peronne, progress. Captured Hancourt, Sorel-le-Grand, Metz-en-Couture : penetrated W. part Havrincourt Wood : many prisoners. N. of La Bassée Canal, progress Canteleux, Violaines. Hill 63—Wulverghem, progress towards Messines. 7th, reached Beauvais—Ruisel—Havrincourt. N. captured "Spoil Heap" on W. bank Canal opposite Hermies. By nightfall, captured Villéveque, Ste. Emilie, most of Havrincourt Wood.

French.—Night 6th—7th. Astride Somme. Occupied Pithon, Sommettes, Haucourt, Dury, Oliézy. Further S., captured Cugny, reached W. outskirts of Genlis Wood. N. of Oise. Entered Tergnier : line E. now along railway and canal. N. of Ailette. Captured Barisis, whole of lower Coucy Wood. N. of Quincy Basse, passed Aulers, Bassoles Aulers. S. of Ailette. Captured Nanteuil, La Fosse, Condé Fort, Condé-sur-Aisne. Vesle, no change. 7th, Somme, advanced line about 5 miles : "resistance much stronger." Captured Pont-de-Tugny, St. Simon : crossed St. Quentin (Crozat) Canal : heavy fighting. N.—S. line now Vaux—Fluquières—Happencourt—E. of Pont-de-Tugny, St. Simon—Avesnes—W. outskirts Jussy—railway Ham—Tergnier—Amigny Rouy—Barisis. * Ailette—Aisne. Advanced N. of Vauxaillon : carried Celles-sur-Aisne. S. of Laffaux Mill, repulsed 2 attacks. S. of Aisne. Americans passed Muscourt.

8TH, *British*.—Night 7th—8th. Hermeis, W. of Armentières, fighting. W. of La Bassée, progress. 8th, S. battle front, entered our lines of March. "Increased resistance : sharp fighting." Advanced on Vermand, Hesbescourt, Epéhy. S.W. of Ploegsteert, E. of Wulverghem, repulsed attacks.

During 1st week September over 10,000 prisoners.

French.—Night 7th—8th. N. of Oise. Captured Mennessis, reached St. Quentin Canal. S. of Oise. Reached outskirts of Servais. Laffaux, N. of Celles-sur-Aisne, repulsed attacks. 8th, N. of Somme, carried Vaux, Fluquières, Happencourt, Le Hamel (further E.). S. of Somme, "particularly stubborn resistance." N. and E. of St. Simon, violent fighting. Avesnes lost, recaptured : 100 prisoners.

Captured Artemps (N.E. of St. Simon). Astride Oise. Gained ground E. of Fargniers, W. of Servais.

9TH, *British*.—Night 8th—9th. * Arras—Cambrai road, La Bassée Canal. Ypres. 9th, English, N.Z. captured positions on high ground Peizières—Havrincourt Wood: repulsed attack: after sharp fighting, gained our old lines on ridge above Gouzeaucourt: captured Gouzeaucourt Wood. In E. part Havrincourt Wood, progress. Numerous prisoners. Fighting in other sectors. W. of La Bassée, attacks on new posts repulsed.

French.—Night 8th—9th. Somme. E. of Avesnes, progress towards Clastres: occupied La Motte Farm. Crossed Crozat Canal opposite Liez. * Oise—Aisne. Laffaux, 2 attacks repulsed: 80 prisoners (of 5 regiments). 9th, N. of Somme, captured Etreillers, Roupv: beyond Crozat Canal, Grand Seraucourt, Clastres, Montécourt Lizerolles, Remigny. Occupied Hill 103 (S. of Contescourt). Essigny-le-Grand Station, Hill 117. N. of Oise. Captured Liez Fort, woods N.W. of Canlers Farm, Red Farm. S. of Oise. Carried Servais brickworks and station. Aisne—Vesle, Glennés, positions enlarged.

Belgian.—Night 8th—9th. Astride Steenstraat—Dixmude road, captured front line on 2,000 yards front, as far as 800 yards N. of Kippe. Further S., W. of St. Julien, captured first line on 2,500 yards front to 500—600 yards depth. "Stubborn struggles."

10TH, *British*.—Night 9th—10th. W. of Gouzeaucourt, attack repulsed. S. of Havrincourt, line advanced. Lys. N.E. of Neuve Chapelle, W. and N. of Armentières, progress. 10th, Epéhy, Gouzeaucourt, fighting: prisoners. Advance towards Attilly, Vermand. Lys, progress continued. 75,000 prisoners, 750 guns in four weeks.

French.—Night 9th—10th. E. of Crozat Canal. Captured Gibercourt: advanced on Hinancourt, Essigny-le-Grand. S. of Ailette. Nantheuil-la-Fosse, 2 attacks repulsed. 10th, Somme—Oise, passed Hinancourt: repulsed attack from Essigny-le-Grand. La Fère—St. Quentin road, fighting. Occupied Travecy. S. of Oise. Laffaux, several attacks repulsed.

11TH, *British*.—Night 10th—11th. Ridge W. of Gouzeaucourt, Moeuvres, Ecourt St. Quentin, stiff fighting: attacks repulsed. W. of Erquinghem, progress. 11th, N. of Epéhy, Vermand, progress. W. of Gouzeaucourt, attempt broken. N.W. of Hulluch, S. of La Bassée Canal, fighting: posts established in enemy forward line. * Havrincourt Wood.

French.—Night 10th—11th. Laffaux, Celles-sur-Aisne, 6 attempts repulsed: 150 prisoners. * Aisne, Vesle, Champagne. 11th, S.E. of Roupv, attack repulsed.

Belgian.—Night 10th—11th. W. of St. Julien, captured and held position on 1½-mile front to over 400 yards depth.

12TH, *British*.—Night 11th—12th. Captured Attilly, Vermand, Vandelles. W. outskirts Holnon Wood, progress. N.W. of Havrincourt. Crossed Canal-du-Nord: occupied W. bank E. and N. of Moeuvres: "considerable opposition." S.W. of La Bassée. Captured "Railway Triangle" position: many prisoners, etc. 12th, English captured Trescault and our old lines E. and N. On their left, N.Z. advanced E. of Gouzeaucourt Wood. 62nd Division (Yorks.) captured Havrincourt (2nd time, 1st on November 20th, 1917). N. of Havrincourt. English crossed Canal-du-Nord: captured section Hindenburg line village—Canal. N. of Bapaume—Cambrai road, Lancashires completed capture of Moeuvres: "sharp fighting." 1,500 prisoners. S. of La Bassée Canal, N.W. of Armentières, progress. Later. English captured Holnon Wood, further N. Jeancourt. Moeuvres. Concentration shelled: attack broken.

French.—Night 11th—12th. * Reims, Prosnes. 12th, W. of St. Quentin, with British, reached Holnon—Savy road. St. Mihiel, 5 a.m., after 4 hours' artillery preparation, 1st American Army attacked on N. from Les Eparges, on E. on 12-mile

front Xivray—Fey-en-Haye. N., captured Combres. Centre, French advanced to edge of Roman Camp Fort : gained Mont Sec, most of Apremont Wood. E., Americans advanced 5 miles, captured Viéville-en-Haye, Pannes, Nonsard, Heudicourt. 6 p.m., captured Thiaucourt. 8,000 prisoners. 8 p.m., enemy evacuated St. Mihiel.

13TH, *British*.—Night 12th—13th. Havrincourt, attack repulsed. W. of Auchy-lez-La Bassée, progress. 13th, Vermand, Jeancourt, progress. S.W. of La Bassée. Captured Fosse 8 de Béthune, "The Dump" slag heap. S. of Gouzeaucourt, liquid fire attack repulsed. Havrincourt, enemy gained footing : driven out : hard fighting. N. of Havrincourt—Canal, progress. Moeuvre, fighting. Later. E. of Trescault, attack repulsed.

French.—Night 12th—13th. W. of St. Quentin, occupied Savy. St. Mihiel, 3 a.m., Americans occupied Vigneulles. 13th, S. of Ailette. Positions extended N. of Nanteuil-la-Fosse. Laffaux, Moisy Farm, attacks repulsed. St. Mihiel. Americans captured whole salient to 12 miles N.E. Line now Herbouville—Thillot—Hattonville—St. Benoit—Xammes—Jaulny—Thiaucourt—Viéville. Over 13,300 prisoners.

Belgian.—Night 12th—13th. * E. of Nieuport. S.E. of Draaibank, attacks gained footing : thrown back. 50 prisoners, etc.

14TH, *British*.—Night 13th—14th. N.W. of St. Quentin, line established E. of Behecourt—Jeancourt. N.W. of Gouzeaucourt, liquid fire attack repulsed. S. of Moeuvres, attack repulsed. W. bank Canal-du-Nord : posts established Sauchy Cauchy, opposite Oisy-le-Verger. La Bassée, occupied Auchy-lez-La Bassée. 14th, Havrincourt, line advanced E. and N. La Bassée Canal. * Neuve Chapelle (gas).

French.—S. of St. Quentin, reached outskirts of Fontaine-les-Clercs. Oise—Aisne. Captured Allemant, Laffaux Mill : "lively resistance." E. of Sancy, N.E. of Celles-sur-Aisne, progress. Now 2,500 prisoners. S. of Aisne, captured Glennes : 200 prisoners. St. Mihiel. Jaulny, Americans repulsed attack. Now 150 square miles liberated, 15,000 prisoners (including 35th Austrian division), over 100 guns, material, stores, etc.

15TH, *British*.—Night 14th—15th. N.W. of St. Quentin, progress N. and S. of Holnon Wood. Trescault, La Bassée, attacks repulsed. * Roisel, Moeuvres, Marquion, Givenchy, N.W. of Armentières (gas). 15th, N.W. of St. Quentin. Captured Maissemy, trench system E. and S.E. : 100 prisoners, etc. * S. of Arras—Cambrai road.

French.—Night 14th—15th. Vauxaillon, 2 attacks : Champagne, several raids : repulsed. 15th, S. of Oise, attacks repulsed. Carried plateau E. of Vauxaillon, ridge N.E. of Celles-sur-Aisne. Since 14th, 3,500 prisoners. St. Mihiel. St. Hilaire, Americans "easily repulsed" attack. Left bank Meuse. Line advanced 2 miles on 33-mile front Bezonvaux—Norroy. Now over 200 guns. 6 enemy divisions identified.

16TH, *British*.—Night 15th—16th. Astride Ypres—Comines road, line advanced on over 2-mile front : prisoners, etc. Moeuvres, Gavrelle, fighting. Sanchy Cauchy, Oppy, posts established. 16th, Ploegsteert, E. of Ypres, N.W. of St. Quentin towards Le Verguier, progress.

French.—Night 15th—16th. Oise—Aisne. E. of Vauxaillon, progress. Carried Mont-des-Singes : 300 prisoners. Further S. captured Vailly. 16th, N.E. and E. of Sancy, advanced nearly 1 mile on 2½-mile front : 600 prisoners, 2 4-in. guns.

17TH, *British*.—Night 16th—17th. N.W. of Hulluch, N.E. of Neuve Chapelle, positions improved. 17th, N.W. of St. Quentin, fighting : Holnon, ground gained. N.E. of Neuve Chapelle, Ploegsteert, progress.

French.—Night 16th—17th. * N. of Aisne. St. Hilaire-le-Grand—Mont-sans-Nom, N. of Reims, attempts repulsed. 17th, W. of St. Quentin. Holnon, Savy, progress : 100 prisoners. Ailette—Aisne. Progress on plateau N. and E. of Allemant : captured strongly-held *point d'appui* E. of Sancy. Vesle. Glennes, 3 attacks repulsed.

18TH, *British*.—Night 17th—18th. Captured Holnon Wood: prisoners. * Moeuvres: pressed back to W. outskirts. S. of La Bassée Canal, advanced line. 18th, 5.20 a.m. After few minutes' bombardment, troops of 3rd and 4th Armies attacked on 16-mile front Holnon—Gouzeaucourt: "sweeping over" our old line of March, 1918, captured "wide sectors" outer defences Hindenburg line. Right. English, Scots captured Fresnoy-le-Petit, Berthaucourt, Pontruet: "strong resistance." Right centre. 2 Australian divisions captured Le Verguier, Villeret, Hargicourt: penetrated 2 miles: occupied old enemy positions W. and S.W. of Bellicourt. Left centre. 74th Yeomanry, E. County, London divisions captured Templeux-le-Guerard, Ronssoy, Epéhy, Peizière: penetrated "to a great depth." N. of Peizière. 21st Division attacked over ground it defended March 21st—22nd: captured old trenches, Vaucellette Farm: repulsed attack: pushed forward over 1 mile: took several hundred prisoners, 1 advancing battery with teams. Over 6,000 prisoners, many guns. * Gouzeaucourt—Arras—Cambrai road, 5 p.m., Trescault—N. Guards, 3rd, 37th Divisions repulsed attack. Soon after, N. of Moeuvres, attack repulsed: enemy entering trenches "overwhelmed." Positions intact: many prisoners. 17th Division recaptured Gauche Wood: later, repulsed attack from Villers Guislain. S. and E. of Ploegsteert, positions improved.

French.—Night 17th—18th. * S. of Oise. N.E. of Sancy, attacks repulsed. 18th, W. of St. Quentin, progress with British. Holnon—Essigny-le-Grand, advanced over 1 mile on 6½-mile front: "desperate resistance": reached W. outskirts of Francilly Selency: captured Savy Wood, Fontaine-les-Clercs. Further S., reached S. outskirts of Contescourt, approached Essigny-le-Grand. Several hundred prisoners. N. of Aisne. W. of Jôuy, progress. E. of Allemant, attacks repulsed, ground gained. 130 prisoners.

Belgian.—Kippe, 5 a.m., enemy gained footing: position restored.

19TH, *British*.—Night 18th—19th. N. of Pontruet, English on their left, 1st and 4th Australian Divisions occupied enemy outpost line. Many prisoners, etc. Further N., severe fighting E. of Ronssoy and Epéhy. Lempire captured: attacks repulsed. Gauche Wood, repeated attacks repulsed. 19th, Lempire—Epéhy, advanced over 1 mile: captured Malassise Farm, many woods, etc., of our old line. N. of Gauche Wood, progress. Now over 10,000 prisoners, over 60 guns.

French.—Night 18th—19th. St. Quentin, penetrated Contescourt. * N. of Aisne. Moisy Farm, attack repulsed. Vesle. N.E. of Corlandon, attack broken. 19th, S.W. of St. Quentin, passed Contescourt, carried Castres. Further S., reached outskirts of Benay. Plateau W. of Jôuy, attack heavily repulsed: progress 100 prisoners.

20TH, *British*.—Night 19th—20th. Recaptured Moeuvres, obstinate fighting. N.W. of Hulluch, prisoners, etc. 20th, Scots cleared Moeuvres. N.W. of Hulluch, attack repulsed. N.W. of La Bassée. Advanced line on over 2½-mile front to Rue-du-Maraîs—Turelles: attack repulsed. Over 100 prisoners. Later. Moeuvres, attacks repulsed. Gauche Wood, 1 post pressed back.

French.—Night 19th—20th. St. Quentin, captured Essigny-le-Grand. S. of Ailette. N. of Allemant, E. of Moisy Farm, attacks "smashed." W. of Aizy, N.E. of Vailly, progress. Vesle. Jonchery, attempted crossing broken. 20th, E. of Essigny-le-Grand, Moisy Farm, progress. * St. Quentin, N. of Aisne.

Belgian.—Night 19th—20th. N. of Kippe, trench systems cleared.

21ST, *British*.—Night 20th—21st. Gauche Wood, repeated attacks repulsed. N.W. of Bellenglise, S.E. of Ypres, progress. N.W. of Messines, captured strong point: prisoners. 21st, E. of Epéhy. English advanced line, heavy fighting, attacks repulsed. Hargicourt, Australian progress.

French.—Night 20th—21st. St. Quentin. Captured Benay: progress N. Castres, attacks repulsed. * N. of Aisne.

22ND, *British*.—Night 21st—22nd. E. of Epéhy, captured Little Priel Farm and other points. S. of Villiers Guislain, attack repulsed, line advanced. N. of Scarpe. Gavrelle, progress on 2-mile front. 22nd, N.W. of La Bassée, attack repulsed. St. Villers Guislain, Zillebeke, positions improved. Afternoon. Ronssoy—Bony road, English captured strong point: 80 prisoners. Repulsed counter-attack from Guillemont Farm.

French.—Night 21st—22nd. * St. Quentin, N. of Aisne. 22nd, St. Quentin. E. of Hincourt—Lys Fontaine, reached W. outskirts Vendeul. N. of Aisne. N. of Allemant, 2 attacks broken. E. of Sancy, progress.

23RD, *British*.—Night 22nd—23rd. Ronssoy—Bony road: hard fighting, progress towards Tombois Farm. N.W. of Vendhuile: captured trenches, etc., on the Sauer. S. of Villers Guislain, 100 prisoners. S.E. of Gavrelle: progress on 1½-mile front, 60 prisoners. N.W. of St. Quentin. Berthaucourt: attack gained footing, driven out. 23rd, N.E. of Epéhy, captured strong point: E., repulsed attack on Little Priel Farm.

French.—Night 22nd—23rd. S. of St. Quentin. Penetrated woods N. of Lys Fontaine: carried Vendeul Fort and village: pushed on to Oise. 23rd, reached Oise between Vandeul—Travecy.

24TH, *British*.—Night 23rd—24th. * S.E. of Gavrelle, attack repulsed. N. and N.W. of Moeuvres, position improved. S.E. of Voormezele, regained part of old front. 24th, E. of Vermand, with French, attacked at dawn on 4-mile front the Omignon—S.: "vigorous resistance," especially at Selency: 800 prisoners. N.E. of Epéhy, positions improved. N. of Gricourt, 3 attacks repulsed (1 heavily by 2nd Sussex): prisoners.

French.—Night 23rd—24th. * St. Quentin, Ailette—Aisne. 24th, W. of St. Quentin, advanced with British. Captured Francilly Selency, L'Epine-de-Dallon, Dallon: "vigorous resistance." Further S., reached W. outskirts Giffecourt. 500 prisoners, etc.

25TH, *British*.—Night 24th—25th. Selency, Gricourt, progress. 25th, captured Selency. N.W. of Fayet, N. of Gricourt, attacks repulsed. E. of Epéhy, surprise foiled.

French.—Night 24th—25th. * St. Quentin, Ailette—Aisne, Vesle. Moisy Farm, attack repulsed. 25th, St. Quentin. Epine-de-Dallon, attack repulsed. Ailette—Aisne. Moisy Farm Plateau, N. of Allemant, "desperate fighting," gains maintained: prisoners.

26TH, *British*.—Night 25th—26th. Selency, Gricourt, progress: captured several strongly defended localities: prisoners. N.W. of La Bassée, attack repulsed.

French.—Night 25th—26th. Ailette—Aisne. Allemant, Laffaux Mill, attacks repulsed. E. of Sancy, progress. * Suippe—Meuse. 26th, 5 a.m. With Americans, attacked on 42-mile front, Suippe—Meuse heights N.W. of Verdun. Suippe—Argonne. On 22-mile front, French captured first-line positions: pressed beyond at certain points. Carried Navarin Farm. Buttes of Souvain, Mont Muret, Tahure and Mesnil. Tahure, Ripont, Rouvroy, Cernais-en-Dormois, Servon, Melzicourt: severe fighting. Over 7,000 prisoners (200 officers), etc. Argonne—Meuse. On 20-mile front, Americans stormed Vauquois, Varennes, Montblainville: captured Cheppy—Forges Wood, Malancourt, Béthincourt, Montfaucon, Cuisy, Nantillois, Septsurges, Dannevoux, Gercourt, Drillancourt. Over 5,000 prisoners.

27TH, *British*.—Night 26th—27th. Arleux, N.W. of La Bassée, S.W. of Fleurbaix, progress. 27th, S. of Sensée—S.W. of Catelet, portions of 1st, 3rd Armies attacked on 44-mile front. Right. S.W. of Catelet, Americans captured outer defences main Hindenburg system. Further N., 5th Division captured Beaucamp: with Lanes, 42nd Division cleared Beaucamp Ridge. Right centre. Guards, 3rd Division, 6th Corps, carried Flesquières, spur E. Scots, Naval units, 17th Corps stormed Canal-du-Nord E. and S.E. of Moeuvres: captured Anneux, Graincourt:

reached Cantaing, Fontaine Notre Dame. Left centre, 1st, 3rd, 4th Canadian Divisions forced Canal-du-Nord, captured Sains-lez-Marquion, Bourlon, Bourlon Hill: approached Raillencourt, Haynecourt. 56th (London) Division 22nd Corps crossed Canal-du-Nord, captured Sauchy Lestrée, Sauchy Cauchy. Left. English, Scots cleared Arleux-en-Gohelle, trench system near. Before nightfall, 6th, 17th Corps passed Flesquières Ridge—Bourlon heights. 1st Canadian Division passed Haynecourt, reached Douai—Cambrai road. 11th Division passed through Canadians, captured Epinoy. Oisy-le-Verger. 56th Division took 500 prisoners N.E. of Sauchy Cauchy. Raillencourt, attack repulsed. Over 10,000 prisoners, over 200 guns, etc.

French.—Night 26th—27th. Suippe—Meuse, no enemy reaction. 27th, Suippe—Argonne. Auberive—Ste. Marie-à-Py, progress: attacks repulsed. E. of Somme Py, crossed Challerange railway on 2½-mile front: advanced 1 mile N. N.E. of Tahure, carried Gratreuil and "powerful" works. Fontaine-en-Dormois. S. of Bouconville, progress: captured Echelle, Cernay Woods. 5-mile advance. Over 10,000 prisoners, much material. Argonne—Meuse. Americans captured Véry, Charpentry, Epinonville, Ivoiry: repeated attacks repulsed. Now over 6,000 prisoners (125 officers), over 100 (12 heavy) guns, etc.

28th, *British.*—Night 27th—28th. Cambrai—Beaucamp Ridge, 5th, 42nd Divisions repulsed attack. 28th, advanced 2 miles: captured Highland, Welsh Ridges. Later, Gouzeaucourt. 62nd Division captured Marcoing, advanced S.E. 5th, W. Ridings forced (Escaut) Scheldt Canal at Marcoing, captured defences on E. bank. Further N., 2nd, 5th Divisions cleared W. bank canal to La Folie Wood: captured Noyelles-sur-Escaut, Cantaing, Fontaine Notre Dame. Lancashires advanced E. of Fontaine, with Canadians N. of Bapaume—Cambrai road: "strong resistance." N. of Arras—Cambrai road. Canadians advanced N., English E. Canadians captured Raillencourt, Sailly, and connecting trench system. Further N., 56th Division captured Palleul. Later. S.W. of Gouzeaucourt, progress on high ground: Welsh Ridge, pressed back slightly. Marcoing, bridgehead enlarged E. of Canal: attack repulsed, numerous prisoners. Opposite Cantaing, Naval units established themselves E. of the Scheldt. Astride Bapaume Cambrai road, Canadians captured "Marcoing—Masnières line" N. to Sailly. English cleared Aubencheul-au-Bac, Pailleul: entered Arleux. Crossed the Trinquis near Sailly-en-Ostrevant. Since 26th, over 16,000 prisoners. Flanders. 2nd Army attacked with Belgians.

French.—Night 27th—28th. Suippe—Argonne. 5.30 a.m., resumed attack. Captured Somme Py, Les Causeurs, heights N. of Fontaine-en-Dormois. Ailette—Aisne. N.E. of Sancy, progress: 250 prisoners (4 officers). N. of Allemant, attack repulsed. Further S., captured Jouv, Aizy. 28th, enemy retired on Ailette. E. of Allemant—Jouv, occupied Pinon, S. outskirts Pinon Woods. Captured Vaudesson, Chavignon, Malmaison Fort. N. of Vailly, progress. Suippe—Argonne, progress, notably N. of Challerange Railway. Captured Manres: reached E. outskirts Ste. Marie-à-Py: attacks repulsed. Argonne—Meuse. Americans reached Brieuilles, Enermont. Over 20 villages taken, material, etc.

Belgian.—Dawn. On over 20-mile front, Dixmude—Ploegsteert Wood, attacked with 2nd British Army. Carried 1st lines, advanced on 2nd. Staden, attack repulsed. Captured nearly all Houthulst Forest: reached Woumen—Pierkenshoek—Sharp Baillie—Broodseinde. 4 miles advance. 4,000 prisoners, several guns. 9th British Division captured Beelacre: 29th passed Gheluvelt, captured Kruiseke. 35th captured Zandvoorde.

29th, *British.*—Dawn. Battle developed S. to near St. Quentin (over 30 miles). Right. 5.50 a.m., Bellenglise—N. 20th Corps attacked: crossed Scheldt Canal. 46th Division stormed main Hindenburg defences on E. bank: captured Bellenglise, Zchaucourt, Magny-la-Fosse: 4,000 prisoners, 40 guns. English advanced S. of

Bellenglise, covering S. flank. Further N., Americans attacked Hindenburg line on 6,000 yards front over Scheldt Canal tunnel. Right, reached Bellicourt—Nauroy: left, Bony. Centre, English captured Villers Guislain. N.Z. cleared Welsh Ridge, captured La Vacquerie. Bonavis—Masnières spur, 62nd Division captured Masnière, Les Rues Vertes, defensive system covering Rumilly, reached W. outskirts Rumilly. 2nd Division crossed Canal above Noyelles, advanced over $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles E. 63rd Division crossed E. of Cantaing, reached S. outskirts Cambrai. Left. Canadians passed defensive system N.W. of Cambrai, fought their way into outskirts of town. Further N. captured and held Sancourt. English cleared slopes S. of Sensée Canal. Bellicourt—Gonnelieu, heavy fighting till late: progress. Later. Bony, Villers Guislain, pressed back to W. outskirts. Aubencheul-au-Bec, Arleux, withdrawal. W. and N.W. of Cambrai, reached junction Arras—Bapaume roads: entered N. suburbs. Since 26th, St. Quentin—Cambrai, over 22,000 prisoners, over 300 guns.

French.—Night 28th—29th. N. of Aisne, pursuit continued. Occupied Pinon Woods, reached Ailette. E. of Chavignon. Ostel—Chavonne, "lively resistance." Champagne. Progress N.E. of Grateuil: captured Bellevue heights. 29th, St. Quentin. Captured Urvillers—Cerizy: crossed St. Quentin—La Fère road. 500 prisoners. Ailette—Aisne. Advanced $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles astride Chemin-des-Dames: Occupied Pargny Filain, Filain, Ostel. S. bank Aisne. Italians forced passage canal and river, reached Aisne—Soupir—Ostel. Champagne, "important results." Carried Bouconville, "bitterly defended" Mont Cuvelet: further N. Séchault. Advanced over 1 mile towards Challenger. Further W. captured Ardeuil, Montauxelles, Vieux: reached S. outskirts Aure: entered Ste. Marie-à-Py. Argonne—Meuse. Enemy reinforced. Cierges—Aire Valley, Americans repulsed attacks.

Belgian.—Flanders Ridge, gained footing in 2nd line. Carried Dixmude, Zarren, Stadenberg, Passchendaele, Moorslede, part Westroosebeke. N. of Houthulst, attack repulsed: captured Teret height. By night, 2-mile advance: reached Roulers—Menin road 2 miles from Menin. Now over 5,500 prisoners, over 100 (several heavy) guns, etc.

30th, *British.*—Night 29th—30th. 32nd Division captured Le Tronquay, defences E. of canal tunnel. 30th, St. Quentin—Cambrai, "important progress." S. of Bellenglise, 1st Division captured Thorigny, E. end canal tunnel at Le Tronquay. With 32nd Division advanced N.E. of Le Tronquay, E. of Nauroy. English, Australians, attacked N. along Nauroy—Gouy spurs: captured most of high ground S. of Gouy: many prisoners. English recaptured Villers Guislain, spur E. Gonnelieu, reached Canal Vendhuile—N. N.Z. cleared W. bank canal to Crèvecœur. After hard fighting Rumilly, English gained Rumilly—Cambrai road. N. of Cambrai, Canadian progress: severe fighting: prisoners. W. bank Lawes, Neuve Chapelle—Picantin, S.W. of Fleurbaix, progress: 50 prisoners. Later. N. of St. Quentin, captured Levergies, Vendhuile, approached Joncourt. Cambrai. English, Canadians captured Proville (S.), Tilloy (N.). Strong resistance.

27th—30th. St. Quentin—Cambrai, 30 enemy divisions engaged and heavily defeated.

French.—Night 29th—30th. S. of St. Quentin—Urvillers, attacks on Hill 88 "smashed." * Ailette—Aisne. 30th, Ailette—Aisne. Advanced E. of Ostel. N. of Aisne, Italians captured Soupir. Aisne—Vesle. Attacked on $7\frac{1}{2}$ -mile front. Captured Revillon, Romain, Montigny-sur-Vesle: reached outskirts Maurival, Venteloy, 1,600 prisoners. Champagne. Cleared and passed Ste. Marie-à-Py. N. of Somme Py, reached national road. Captured Aure, plateau, woods N.: Marvaux: approached Monthois. Séchault—Bouconville, enlarged gains. 26th—30th, Suippe—Argonne. Over 30,000 prisoners, over 300 guns. Argonne—Meuse. During last week, Americans took 120 guns, 750 trench mortars, 300 machine-guns, 100 heavy tank guns, etc.

Belgian.—Carried Amersvelde, Staden, Oostnieuwkirke (2½ miles W. of Roulers). Crossed Zarren—Roulers, Roulers—Menin roads at several points. British repulsed attacks Gheluwe, approached Menin, crossed the Lys, reached Warneton—Comines—Wervicq.

During September, Allies took 2,844 officers, 120,192 other prisoners, 3,669 guns, 23,000 machine guns. Of these British took 66,300 prisoners (1,500 officers), 700 guns, several thousand machine-guns, etc.

During August, September, British took 133,618 prisoners (2,782 officers), about 1,400 guns.

ITALIAN FRONT.

3RD.—Val Nonce (Tonale). S. of Monte Mantello, attack repulsed. Monte Mantello—San Matteo, 2 posts lost.

6TH.—Monte Solarola, 3 attempts broken.

13TH.—Val Brenta. Captured position S. of Corte: 343 prisoners (12 officers), etc. * Arsa—Astico, Asiago Plateau, Piave.

15TH.—Val Cesilla, Col d'Orso, raided line: 321 prisoners (5 officers), etc.

17TH.—Val Seren, 5 attacks on new positions repulsed.

18TH.—E. of Monte Pertica, 3 attacks broken.

19TH.—Val Seren, attempt repulsed.

21ST.—Point 703 Dosso Alto, attack gained footing, position restored.

22ND.—E. of Sisemol, French raid: over 100 prisoners (3 officers), etc.

27TH.—* Val Arsa (attack repulsed), Montello.

29TH.—Val Daone. Manon, attack broken.

RUSSIA.

5TH.—Archangel. Captured Obozerskaia (on Vologda Railway, 75 miles S.). Siberia. Japanese captured Khabarovsk, Amur bridge (about 400 miles N. of Vladivostok). 150 prisoners (some German officers), 120 guns, etc.

10TH.—Archangel. Americans landed. Siberia. Junction with Czecho-Slovaks at Olovyama. Railway cleared Lake Baikal—Manchuria Station.

18TH.—Finland. Ukhtinskaia (100 miles S. of Kem), Karelians defeated German-led forces. Siberia. Japanese occupied Blagoveshtensk: 15,000 Austro-German prisoners.

30TH.—S. Karelia cleared.

BALKAN FRONT.

1ST.—W. of Vardar. British captured and held works Altchak Mahle.

2ND—5TH.—* Altchak Mahle, attack repulsed.

11TH.—S.E. of Berat—Osum—Tamorica, fighting. [Captured position Tamorica Ridge.]

12TH.—Altchak Mahle, attack heavily repulsed.

15TH.—Vetrenik—Dobropolie—Sokol. After artillery preparation, French, Serbs captured first position on 7-mile front. Struma Valley. Greeks advanced line 2—3 miles on 19-mile front.

16TH.—Dobropolie—Vetrenik, breach widened E. and W. to 16 miles, 4½ miles in depth. E. of Vetrenik. French, Serbs carried Chlem, Golo Bilo massifs. Zborsko defences: Yugo Slav division stormed Kosyak massif. W. of Sokol Serbs captured position Sokol—Gradeshnitsa River: crossed Gradeshnitsa: threw enemy back on Razin Bey bridge. Captured Trnavska, Rovovska, Brazdasta ridges. 5 miles advance. Now over 4,000 prisoners, 30 guns, etc.

17TH.—Enemy reinforced. Attack developed on 22-mile front. Left. French, Serbs captured Razim Bey, Zovik (on the Tchernia), Stavavina, Polshista and

Belshishta heights, Gradeshnitsa. Centre. Advanced along crest N.W. of the Kozvak, gained footing on Kutchkov Kamen heights. German troops engaged. Now 10 miles advance at certain points. "Incessantly increasing prisoners": 50 (20 heavy) guns.

18TH.—Captured Gyurov Kamen, Chazerna heights: crossed Tcherina at Belashnitsa: passed Rozhden, Blatets massif. Over 5,000 prisoners, 10 guns. W. and E. of Lake Doiran. 5 a.m., British, Greeks, attacked. Captured trench system S. of Doiran: advanced 2,000 yards: held up. E. of Lake, carried outpost lines. 700 prisoners.

19TH.—Serbs passed Krnyovo—Strigovo—Dragojil—Poleshko. Captured Godiyak (Tcherina bend).

20TH.—Serbs reached Middle Vataša. On left, Allies crossed Tcherina near Chebren: on right, carried Porta, Djena heights. * Vardar, N. of Monastir.

21ST.—Drachevisko massif. French, Serbs, broke enemy resistance. To N. passed Vozarci, Kavadar: N.E. reached Vardar towards Negotin—Demir Kapu. Serbs crossed river, cut Uskub—Salonica, and Gradsko—Prilep railways. Tcherina bend. Italians captured Cheniste, Orle. N. and N.E. of Djerna heights. French, Greek progress.

22ND.—Monastir—Lake Doiran (95 miles) "precipitate" enemy retreat. N.E. of Monastir, French, Serbs reached Mogila—Kanashtli—Kalyani. Further N. Serbs captured Drenska—Planina heights, reached Gradsho—Prilep road at several points. Right bank Vardar, Allies passed Koynsko, Gurinet: left bank, captured Ghevgele, first line as far as Doiran. 12 guns, numerous prisoners. Tcherina. Italians reached Cairli—Dobrusovo—Musaoba: captured Bobiste height. E. of Vardar, British reached Kara Ozlular—Hamzai: W. advanced on Mrzenci, in touch with Greeks at Gurincet.

23RD.—Monastir—Prilep. Italians captured Topolchani heights: French advanced on Albanian roads. Monastir—Veles, pursuit continued. Enemy retreated "in greatest disorder" on Veles—Ishtip—Strumnitsa. French cavalry entered Prilep. French, Serbs, passed Prilep—Veles road. Serbs "established big bridgehead" on Vardar: N., occupied Enish Oba, Kara Hodjali, Voyshan, Ibirli. Astride Vardar, Allies reached Petrovo—Pardovisla—Chinarli—Kara Oglular (Lake Doiran). British, Greeks reached Pazarli—Furka—Smokvitsa (in touch with French, Greeks). British cavalry "headed for" Strumnitsa. 30 guns, etc.

24TH.—Left. Italians captured heights N. of Topolchani (Monastir—Prilep road). French, Serbs, passed Prilep: advanced on Krushevo—Kichevo—Veles road. Centre. Captured Popadija massif (E. of Babuna Pass). Serbs enlarged Enish Oba bridgehead, advanced on the Kriva Lakavista. Right. British, Greeks, approached Gradetz, Hudovo: captured Kara Bair massif.

25TH.—Serbs reached the Kriva Lakavista: approached Ishtip. Captured Gradsko Station: prisoners (2 German officers), 19 heavy guns. Prilep—Veles road, captured Izvor (N. of Babuna Pass): enemy "completely routed," prisoners, guns, etc. British cavalry entered Kosturino (Bulgaria): with Greeks advanced on Belashitsa range, reached Djuma Obasi. Now over 10,000 prisoners, over 200 guns counted.

26TH.—British entered Strumnitsa: with Greeks, stormed Belashitsa positions, 30 guns. Vardar Railway, Monastir—Prilep—Gradsko road cleared. Serbs captured Kochana: reached Karbinci (5 miles N. of Ishtip), cavalry 20 miles N.E.: attacked Veles. Left wing 11th German-Bulgar Army thrown back W. of Krushevo. Italians occupied Krushevo. Bulgars sought armistice.

27TH.—Italians reached Demirhisar (25 miles N. of Lake Prespa). French, Serbs passed Krushevo, advanced on Kichevo. Centre. Serbs carried Karabunishta, Rudnik: captured Veles and garrison, reached 22 miles S. of Uskub. To E. reached Rudovishta: cavalry, Leho (6 miles from frontier).

28TH.—Left. Captured Broad, heights N.W. of Mesna, Ochrida. Italians occupied Pribiltri, Kochesta. Serbs captured St. Nicholas, heights on left bank Pchinja (15—17 miles S. of Uskub). N. of Platchkavista, captured Karevo Selo (5 miles from frontier): 700 prisoners, 20 guns. Greeks advanced N. of Strumnitza on Pelicevo, down valley on Petrich. Now over 350 guns.

29TH.—Italians advanced on Petovo road to Uskub. Austrians "evacuated" position W. of Lake Ochrida. Karevo Selo, heavy fighting: part enemy troops cut off, retired N. Serbs captured Crni Vrh (20 miles N. of Ishtip), Gradishte (6 miles further W.): prisoners, 4 guns. French cavalry entered Uskub.

30TH.—Serbs occupied Plavitsa heights (Uskub—frontier). Allies entered Kichevo: captured Struga (Lakes region). Noon, armistice declared. Over 25,000 prisoners, over 360 guns.

CAUCASUS FRONT.

1ST.—Baku. Turks attacked. Allies' retreat covered by Warwicks.

14TH.—Baku. Heavy attack: after 16 hours' fighting, British returned to Enzeli. Turks occupied Jemalabad (100 miles N.E. of Tabriz).

17TH.—Turks captured Baku.

PALESTINE FRONT.

19TH.—Night 18th—19th. Attacked Jordan—the sea. E. of Jerusalem—Nablus road, captured El Mugheir, enemy communications S.E. cut. 19th, 4.30 a.m., after short bombardment, attacked Rafat—coast. French troops engaged. 8 a.m., lines penetrated to maximum depth of 5 miles. Noon, British, Indian, Australian cavalry seized Hudeira (Liktera): advanced on El Afuleh junction. Afternoon, infantry occupied Tul Keram junction: a brigade Australian Light Horse reached Anebta (on Tul Keram—Messudieh road and rail). 8 p.m., 3,000 prisoners, etc. Arabs cut Hedjaz railway at Deraa junction (E. of Lake Galilee): defeated enemy in Tafile district (S. of Dead Sea).

20TH, 8 p.m.—Left wing reached Bidieh—Baka—Messudieh junction: right wing, Khan Jibiet (1 mile N. of El Mugheir)—Es Sawieh, astride Jerusalem—Nablus road: cavalry occupied Nazareth, Afuleh, Beisan, captured retreating troops, etc. Jordan fords closed except Beisan—Jisr-ed-Damieh (27 miles). Arabs destroyed bridges in Yarmuk Valley, etc. 8,000 prisoners, 100 guns.

21ST, 9 a.m.—Left wing reached Beit Dejas (5 miles E. of Nablus)—Samaria—Bir Asur (5 miles E. by N. of Tul Keram): cavalry operating S. from Jenin—Beisan. Enemy "vainly" fled towards Jisr-es-Damieh. Cavalry held Nazareth, Jisr-el-Mujamia (road and rail crossing over Jordan, 6 miles S. of Lake Galilee). 18,000 prisoners, 120 guns.

22ND, early.—Seized Jisr-ed-Damieh ford. 8 p.m., 25,000 prisoners, 260 guns. 7th and 8th Turk armies (operating W. of Jordan) "virtually ceased to exist." Entire transport captured.

23RD.—W. of Jordan. Cavalry occupied Haifa, Acre. E. of Jordan. Enemy retreated on Amman (on Hedjaz railway). Australian, N.Z., W. Indian, Jewish troops in pursuit reached Es Salt: prisoners, guns. Arabs occupied Maan (on rail, 70 miles S. of Dead Sea): harassed enemy retiring N. on Amman.

25TH.—Sea of Galilee. Cavalry captured Tiberias, Semakh, Es Samrah. E. of Jordan. Cavalry occupied Amman: pursued N. Now over 40,000 prisoners, over 265 guns.

27TH.—Upper Jordan. Australian Light Horse captured Jisr Benat Yakub ford. E. of Jordan. El Kastel station (14 miles S. of Amman), contact with enemy retiring N. from Maan.

28TH.—Australian L.H. captured positions astride Mezerib—Deraa road: joined Arabs at Deraa. Now 50,000 prisoners, 325 guns.

29TH.—Ziga station (17½ miles S. of Amman), 10,000 4th Turkish Army surrendered.

30TH.—Cavalry surrounded Damascus. 1,000 prisoners, 3 guns. Since 19th, 61,000 prisoners, 330 guns.

EAST AFRICA.

2ND.—Enemy crossed Malema—Muletere road: rearguard attacked.

6TH.—Anguros (Upper Lurio), enemy "overhauled" from S. and E.: driven W.

AVIATION.

During September, 1,142 aircraft, 171 balloons destroyed on all fronts (902 by Allies, 240 by enemy). On W. front, British destroyed 582 (and 62 balloons), lost 297: French 181 (and 57 balloons): Americans "over" 100: Belgians 2. Italians 33. Balkan front (British) 5.

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